

**VITAL  
ISSUES  
IN  
MODERN  
ARMENIAN  
HISTORY**

**A Documented Exposé  
of  
Turkish Distortions**

EHRATA

1915 - April 24 - 1965

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Pages 66 and 73, Par. 3. that from these  
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Abraham Lincoln on November 19, 1863,  
Page 80, line 6, read:  
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once oppressed and decimated people.

EBC

## 1915 - April 24 - 1965

*It is rather for us to be dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain. . . .*

Abraham Lincoln on November 19, 1863,  
at Gettysburg National Cemetery.

The issuance in English of this work by me coincides with this year's worldwide commemoration by Armenians of the fiftieth anniversary of that all-encompassing Tragedy that befell their kin in Turkey during World War I. I, therefore, offer it in reverent remembrance of the myriad innocent victims of that Turkish Genocide of my forebears and of the selfless, martyred, champions of the concept of the intrinsic worth and dignity of man, as man, and of the welfare and freedom of this once oppressed and decimated people.

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## INTRODUCTION

by E. B. CHRAKIAN

THIS STUDY, by two senior members of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, is at once a review and an exposé, based on published documentary evidence, hitherto untapped archives, and other relevant source-materials, both indigenous and otherwise, of the perfidious distortions of the nature and import of a number of crucial matters involving, in particular, recent Armenian history, that are advanced and promoted in our times by Turkish memorialists, political and military writers, and historians.

For instance, it exposes the mendacious, albeit quite silly and naive, claims by Kemalist leaders and writers, to territories acknowledgedly steeped in Armenian history and tradition—still part of Turkey today—as *aboriginally* Turkish, on ostensibly archaeological-ethnographic grounds; their unconscionable efforts to make light of, or to explain away, or even to vindicate, the genocidal policies and their unrelenting implementation by Sultan Hamid in the nineteenth century and by the Young Turks in our own, as “absolute necessities” for the safety of the state . . . ; their distorted accounts of the total Armenian population and its comparative strength and distribution in the country, prior to and during the period of the 1915–1918 wholesale liquidation, pillage, and deportations perpetrated by the Ittihad-Young Turks.

It explores the history of Young Turk-Kemalist schemes to destroy as well the newly established Armenian Republic of 1918–1920 in Transcaucasia, on territory referred to at times as “Russian” or “Eastern” Armenia; their well-planned invasion of it to that end; and the ensuing characteristically wanton butchery and destruction in occupied areas—in Kars, Ardahan, Alexandropol, and so on.

It appraises the misinterpretations and the subterfuges employed by the Turks in the course of a variety of negotiations, specially those connected with the political fate of Armenia, both pre-Soviet and Soviet, as well as the devious tactics employed to circumvent agreements and treaties, such as, Brest-Litovsk, Alexandropol, Kars, Moscow.

And, in addition to other inquiries into similar abject practices in cognate areas found in modern Turkish historiography, the authors, in conclusion, also call attention to the widespread per-

nicious influences of an aggressive Pan-Turkism, nurtured directly or indirectly by Kemalists, and its dangers not only to minority elements and neighboring peoples, but to the peace of the world as well.

For the informed and the humane, no unconscionable distortion of the facts of history can cover up or justify in any sense the sheer bestiality of the extermination and of the uprooting of an entire people—on the whole, to all intents and purposes, an orderly and industrious people—as in the Genocide of the Armenians in 1915–1920 by Young Turks and Kemalists, in a sense, the dénouement of a series of acts of collective despoliation and carnage, begun in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Thus, the boundless, fathomless grief, in 1917, of the poet\* of this people's joys and sorrows:

Bitter, vexed,  
Day and night  
Cureless hurt  
In my heart.

Paternal hearth  
Ravaged, ruined,  
Bathed in blood,  
Sorrows untold.

Blessed tots,  
Mothers, sisters,  
Hurled unto fire,  
Rapier, rivers.

Grief, grief . . .  
So much grief:  
How can I bear  
So much grief?

No scouring, in private or in public, of the fiendish souls and hands of unrepentant criminals and their equally unrepentant apologists, in certain instances indistinguishable, can wash away layers upon layers of the blood of their countless innocent victims, — their hands and souls . . . “would rather the multitudinous seas incarnadine, making the green one red”.

\*Avedik Issahakian (1875–1957). Trans. my own.



TURKEY

BLACK SEA

CASPIAN SEA

GEORGIAN SSR

AZERBAIJAN SSR

ANCIENT ARMENIA

ARMENIAN SSR

ARMENIA

IRAN

SYRIA

IRAQ

LEGEND

Republic of Armenia (1918 - 1920)  
 Turkish boundary

Boundary enclosing Armenian territory awarded to Armenia by Sevres Treaty, as drawn by President Wilson (1920)

Present Armenian SSR & Turkish boundary

0 50 100 200 300 400 miles

No forced exodus of a people, as was the case with the Armenian people in Turkey, from their centuries-old hearths — their fatherland, can affect their unquestionable historic and moral right and claim to it, and to their hallowed ancestral treasures, monuments commemorative of the divine in man, that are now allowed by the usurpers to disintegrate, or to be desecrated. . . .

No human condition, no human order, can long endure, can remain unchallenged for long, that is founded on sheer brute force, chicanry, abnegation of right and fair-play, that "solves" human problems — individual or collective — by total organized liquidation, wherever and whenever men's heart and reason are quick to respond to the ennobling cause of moral justice and its optimum fulfilment in human life.

And as an auspicious first-step, as a guidepost and promise of total ultimate victory of that Right in the furtherance and actualization of the historic just claims of Armenia and Armenians against Turkey, one may surely commence with the implementation of *Wilsonian* Armenia, born of a solemn recognition of those claims, carved out from segments of territories of historic Armenia in Turkey and united with the Armenian Republic of 1918, and duly sanctioned by international agreement—the Peace Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, even if superseded subsequently by the ignominious Lausanne pact. . . .

It is the earnest hope of this writer also that the availability in English of the factual materials herein, culled from sundry sources that are quite inaccessible, for one reason or another, to many — historians and readers in general alike — and the issues discussed, will help correct certain misinterpretations, as well as omissions, *deliberate in certain quarters*, or oversights, bearing on some of the same issues, that have noticeably filtered through and colored some works in English — besides the characteristically notorious apologetics by Turks themselves — on present-day Turkey.

Watertown, Massachusetts  
January 1965

# 1

## THE PERVERSE METHODS AND SPIRIT OF TURKISH HISTORIOGRAPHY:

*Armenia is "a mere geographic reminiscence".*

Young Turk - Kemalists\*

DURING THE POST-WORLD WAR I YEARS there has appeared in Turkey a vast literature that deals with problems related to the history of modern Turkey, in particular, that of more recent times. The essential spirit and direction of these historical writings is Turkism, that is, the glorification and idealization of Turkish history — with no regard whatsoever to well-established facts, and with deliberate intent to distort the historically real.

This Turkism eulogizes the Turkish people's "singularly characteristic role" in the evolution and enrichment of world culture, in the light of which claims, it attempts to justify the tyrannical rule of the Sultans of subject peoples and the inhuman chauvinistic treatment by modern Turkey of racial minorities.

The reactionary and fanatical ideology of Turkophilism was formulated and propounded in the early 1930's, when, under the sponsorship and immediate guidance of Moustapha Kemal Ataturk, was founded *The Historical Society of Turkey* in 1931. From that time on this Society, with the continued support of Turkey's ruling circles, has consistently and unflaggingly championed its aims and purposes, the outstanding interpretation of which is this Society's four-volume *History (Tarih)*.

In its pages Turkism essentially reaches the conclusion that the Turks are the world's oldest people, that they alone are responsible for the spread of civilization over the earth, and that they themselves have been the founders of numerous large and small states. For example, we read on the first page of *Tarih's* fourth volume, which treats the history of the Turkish Republic:

In the history of mankind no other race has founded as many and as great states as the Turks have done. The Turks themselves founded

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\*My own captions throughout; quotations are from direct statements by Turks reproduced in text. (E.B.C.)

the great majority of the governments, kingdoms, and empires of Asia and Europe.<sup>1</sup>

But who, really, that is acquainted with the history of peoples does not know that hordes of Osmanli Turks appeared for the first time in Asia Minor in the third decade of the thirteenth century, A.D., and, in the course of time, founded a characteristically "brigand state" in Karahisar, the ominous prototype of others yet to come?\*

\*On the other hand, Seljuk Turks appear in Armenia no earlier than the first quarter of the eleventh century, A.D. (E.B.C.)

It is not necessary to supply gory details as to how, from the 14th to the 17th centuries, that "brigand state" put many countries to the fire and sword, destroyed the centuries-old statehood of a number of peoples, and spread itself over Asia Minor, Transcaucasia, the Balkans, Northern Africa, the Arabian Peninsula. No matter how assiduously fanatical Turkish historians try to "prove" the "value" of the Turk for world civilization, they can never disprove the notorious fact that Turkish conquests resulted in a marked deterioration and retardation of the cultural-historic development of those peoples who fell under the harsh yoke of Ottoman hegemony. It is for the very purpose of concealing this truth that Turkish writers deliberately misrepresent the history of the peoples of those countries conquered by the Ottoman Turk.



In the "scientific" publications of Turkish historians, in textbooks, and in the memoirs of public officials brought to light in recent times, we find marked attention given to numerous issues involving various periods of Armenian history. In addition, there have appeared of late "research" studies solely devoted to the Armenian people, with the apparent two-fold purpose, on the one hand, of distorting and smearing the ancient past and culture of the Armenians, on the other, of justifying the predatory, genocidal policy of Kemalist Turkey. *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*<sup>2</sup> by Esat Uras and *How Karabekir Destroyed Armenia*<sup>3</sup> by Cemal Kutay are striking examples.

This interest in Armenian history is to be explained not by any concern for an objective account of the untold sufferings of

<sup>1</sup>*Tarih*, Vol. IV: "Turkiye Cumhuriyeti" (Istanbul, 1934), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* (Ankara, 1950).

<sup>3</sup>Cemal Kutay, *Karabekir Ermenistani nasil yok etti?* (Istanbul, 1956).

Western Armenians\* under the cruel domination of the Ottoman Turk for centuries, but by their avowed aim to "validate, establish scientifically and historiographically", in other words, to vindicate the barbarous policy of extermination of the Armenians by Turkish governments and officialdom in the past.

Thus in this very spirit and approach, Esat Uras, "studying" in detail Armenian history from the earliest to present times, tries to synthesize the anti-Armenian opinions and sentiments of Turkish civil, political, and military personages and historians, and tries as well to misrepresent, to give a distorted view, of the past and the culture of the Armenian people. With the avowed purpose of "validating" the erroneous idea — with no basis in fact whatsoever! — that the Turks are the oldest inhabitants, that is, the aborigenes of Anatolia, Esat Uras and other exponents of Turkism labor assiduously to prove that, "Anatolia, the cradle of history, has been the motherland (*Anayurt*) of the Turk from time immemorial". With similar mendacious assertions they deny the very existence of historic Armenia in Eastern Anatolia as the fatherland of the Armenian people. Turkish historians naively think that, by omitting all references to *Armenia*, *Armenian Highlands*, *Ararat*, and many similar geographical terms and conceptions, they will have thereby eliminated them from the historically real itself — from having actually existed or existing—and as Esat Uras cynically states, "Armenia becomes a mere geographical expression, a reminiscence."<sup>1</sup>

It is necessary to note that the attempts of contemporary Turkish writers to "establish" the "legal" rights of Turkey to Armenian territories, from the viewpoints of history, geography, and law, have precedents. Both historians and public and state officials have made many similar efforts. The "proofs" furnished by present-day historians very closely resemble the "interpretations" of Kiazim Karabekir. When the Kemalist army had invaded and occupied a sizeable portion of Armenia\*\* on November 30, 1920, Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, then Commander of the Eastern Army and head of the Turkish delegation in Alexandropol to negotiate a peace treaty, came forward with an extensive memorandum on the "historic" rights of Turkey to Armenian lands. In it the past of these same territories Karabekir described as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>Uras, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

\*Common Armenian usage denoting Armenia or Armenians in Turkey, as Eastern refers to the same in Russia. (E.B.C.)

\*\*For details of the invasion, etc., see Part V. (E.B.C.)

Regarding their historic status, it is proven that Turanian\* races lived in these lands some twenty centuries before the Armenians settled there. The Urartians had a flourishing, resplendent civilization, and *the cuneiform tablets of Van concern not the Armenians, but solely these Turanian races. . . .* Therefore, in the light of archaeology as well, the rights of the Turks to these lands are obvious and proven.<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

In the same unabashed, deceptive vein, Karabekir cited "factual evidence" from the history of the middle ages: "During the period of Turkish domination, when Sultan Arp-Arslan vanquished and captured King Dionysius of Byzantine at Manazkert in the eleventh century, and when he handed Eastern Antolia over to Turkish princes, *they did not meet with any Armenians in this area at the time.* However, they did see Byzantines and Georgians among the fateful defenders of these lands." (Italics ours.)

As a sequel to these allegations, he further asserted that the Armenians immigrated from the Caucasus and Persia in later times.<sup>2</sup> According to Karabekir, therefore, there were no Armenians in the fatherland of the Armenian people — in historic Armenia in the eleventh century. And this at a time when they, the Ottoman Turks themselves, had not yet emigrated from Central Asia and Altai into Asia Minor, where Armenian sovereign statehood had existed from earliest times; and, beginning with the tenth century, Ani and Kars had been capitals of Armenia.

It is just this kind of chauvinistic misrepresentation that is being utilized in the works of present-day Turkish historians.

These historians are also denying in their published works the heroic struggle of the Armenian people for liberation from the heinous rule of the Sultans and for national independence. They attribute the existence of the Armenian Question to Armenian

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\*Claim that Turks are of "Turanian" stock from Turania in Turkestan, Central Asia. (E.B.C.)

<sup>1</sup>Arm. SSR State Central Historical Archives, f. 200, op. 1, d. 866, l. 117-118. (In Armenian)\*\*

\*\*I have deemed it advisable to give the Armenian sources in English translation throughout the text. On the other hand, the Russian references are simply transliterated, but others, Turkish and French, are kept the same as in the original Armenian text. Also, since specific references to classified archive — materials in both Soviet Armenian and Russian languages employ the same system, I have used the Russian transliteration for the Armenian sources as well. (E.B.C.)

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, l. 118-119.

ecclesiastical leaders in Constantinople and to the *Huntchakian* and *Dashnagtzakan* "committees",\* who, they allege, simply concocted this question with a view to bringing about intervention by foreign powers, thereby threatening the security and independence of Turkey.

It is quite apparent that the aim of such deliberate falsification is to explain away the criminal depredation of Armenians by the Turk as the direct consequence solely of the operations of these "committees". Even in this connection Turkish writers, however crudely, slyly, distort the very nature of the just and single-minded struggle of large segments of the Armenian people in Western Armenia against inhuman Ottoman rule and for national political independence.

Turkish historians not only discuss matters of vital import that encompass the ancient and medieval past of the Armenian people, but the modern era as well, and, in particular, more recent times.

The primary aim of this study is to bring into the open the mendacities perpetrated by contemporary Turkish writers in their treatment of some important and complex issues of modern Armenian history.

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\*The references are to two Armenian groups: *Huntchakian*, after the journal *Huntchak* ("Bell"), published by a number of patriotic Armenian students in Switzerland, and the organ of the Armenian Social Democratic Huntchakian Party, which they founded in 1887, in Geneva.

*Dashnagtsakan* ("Federationist") or *Dashnag* refers to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnagtsoutiun* — *Dashnag*, for short) organized in 1890 in Tiflis, Georgia, by young intellectuals, concerned with the plight of their compatriots in Turkey.

The first formally organized but short-lived, politically-oriented group was the *Armenakans* ("Armenists"), founded in the early 1880's in Van, Turkish Armenia. It is named after M. Portoukalian's newspaper "Armenia", published by him in Marseilles. The present Armenian Liberal Democratic Party (*Ramgavar-Azadakan*), organized in 1921 by the union of the former Constitutional Democrats (f. in 1908) and the Reformed *Huntchakists*, who had split still earlier from the mother organization, traces its origin to the *Armenakans*.

No doubt, the times were more than ripe for such organized expressions, however splintered, of the mounting spirit of protest and resistance on the part of the people to continued Turkish misrule and oppression. (E.B.C.)

## 2

### ARMENOCIDE: NOT QUITE TOTAL (1870–1909):

*"Crush the jaws that utter the name Armenian."*

Sultan and Young Turks

ISSUES INVOLVING THE MOVEMENT for liberation of the Armenian people in Western Armenia, which spread at an accelerated pace in the second half of the nineteenth century, have received wide attention in the works and memoirs of Turkish historians, state and public officials. Turkish writers spare no effort to refute the heroic popular character of the struggle of the Armenian people against the tyrannical rule of the Sultans, and to identify it with "the activities of Dashnag and Huntchakist committees". In this vein, Esat Uras in the work cited above and Ahmet Bedevi Kuran in his voluminous *Revolt Movements and National Strifes in the Ottoman Empire* devote numerous pages to the activities of these "committees", assiduously promoting the idea that, until their appearance in the Ottoman Empire, there had been no anti-Turk popular movement whatever.<sup>1</sup> These writers have gone so far in their falsifying of public records and facts as to attribute to the same "committees" such heroic and glorious pages in the Armenian people's struggle for emancipation as the revolt in 1862 of Zeitoun, the revolt in 1863 of Moush, the revolt in 1865 of Charsanjak, the revolts again, in 1875 and 1884, of Zeitoun. In fact, it is well known that these "committees" had not yet come into existence in the period in question. Long before their appearance the people's struggle against the cruel misrule of the Sultan in the third quarter of the nineteenth century had attained massive proportions and transformed itself into a national — liberation movement.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>See Eras Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 443–446; Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Inkilap hareketleri ve milli mücadele* (Istanbul, 1956), pp. 186–187.

<sup>2</sup>For details, see M. K. Nersesian, *The Struggle for Liberation of the Armenian People Against Turkish Tyranny, 1850–1870*: Erevan, Publication of the Academy of Sciences of the Arm. SSR., 1955; V. K. Meliksetian, *The Revolt of Zeitoun in 1862; Collected Scientific Studies in the Histori-*

These movements for independence in Western Armenia continued in the ensuing years. There is incontrovertible evidence that the Sultan's Government, and independently of the struggle of the Armenian masses for freedom, came forward with a specific genocidal program in the early 1870's to implement fully its policy of total extermination of the Armenian people. The barbarous aims of the Ottoman Empire are clearly and cynically stated by the well-known Anglophile, Kiamil Pasha, who in the days of Abdul Hamid was grand vizier for many years. Speaking about the liberation movements of Christian peoples of European Turkey and the intervention of Western powers, he stated:

. . . If we nurtured snakes in our midst in Europe, we should not repeat the same folly in Asiatic Turkey. The sensible thing to do is to destroy and eliminate any and all elements which may some day give rise to the same danger, afford the opportunity for foreign intervention, and serve as its tool.

Now, today, at least, the interests of England demand that our territories in Asia Minor (we and England not only do not recognize the word Armenia, but must needs crush the very jaws that utter that name) remain free from any foreign intervention and from all possible occasions for such intervention. Therefore, for the sake of that sacred cause—and our right as a sovereign state demands it, too—it is imperative that we exterminate any and all suspicious elements in order to insure our future security. Thus, we must eliminate, leave behind no traces of, that Armenian nation. And to accomplish this task, we are lacking in nothing; we have all the means we need—governors, judges, tax-collectors, police, in short, everything. We can declare a religious war, an easy war—waged against a 'nation' that has no arms, no army, no leadership. . . . And if that Armenian 'nation' is destroyed and if Christian Europe should look for a co-religionist and does not find it in Asiatic Turkey, it will leave us alone. Then we can begin to concern ourselves with internal affairs and reforms.<sup>1</sup>

This monstrous genocidal program of Kaimil Pasha's government was obviously put into operation in the years 1894–1896 when the Ottoman rulers systematically organized a series of extensive massacres. Prof. Dillon, speaking of the wholesale butcheries of the Armenian people during those years, asserts with emphasis:

<sup>1</sup>*Trial (Portz), a National and Literary Monthly* (Tiflis, 1879), No. 7–8, pp. 204–205 (Armenian).

*cal Museum of the Academy of Sciences*, No. 2, 1950; *et. cct.* (All in Armenian).

It is already proven that the pillage and massacres of Sassoun is the *deliberately* organized act of the Sublime Porte, an act planned in advance meticulously and executed mercilessly, albeit the terrors perpetrated . . . evinced a feeling of pity even in the hearts of Turkish soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

Source-materials about the Armenian massacres in the 1890's are voluminous. There are numerous memoranda by consuls and ambassadors in Turkey and Russia, as well as by those representing European states, memoirs of contemporaries, appeals of Armenians of Turkish Armenia, and of the Patriarchate of the Armenian Church in Constantinople. The newspapers and periodicals of the times are full of despatches and articles descriptive of the barbarities of the blood-thirsty Abdul Hamid. And, finally, there is a vast literature in Armenian, Russian, and European languages about the massacres. There is no need, therefore, for detailed discussions of this subject. Let it be noted, however, that the massacres perpetrated in the Armenian provinces in 1894-1896 took the lives of 300,000 human beings; that more than 3000 Armenian villages were burned and reduced to ashes; that tens of thousands were forced to flee their native land into all corners of the earth to safeguard life and limb.

Following these butcheries on a massive scale, Turkish authorities then settled the depopulated regions of Western Armenia with Mohammedans from elsewhere. Nor did Constantinople escape the massacres. The Russian military attaché, Colonel Peshkov, reports in a memorandum dated Sept. 22, 1895, a conversation he had on this occasion with representatives of the "Young Turkey" society, in which he writes that special detachments, organized by order of Abdul Hamid and made up of the scum of the populace and of gendarmes, "spearheaded the shameful drive against the life of innocent and unprotected people who had become the victims of Abdul Hamid's cowardice and blood-thirstiness. . . ."

"To everyone participating in these punitive detachments", continues Peshkov, "were promised 20 piastres a day and a free hand to loot and plunder with full guarantee against punishment. . . . There is more! When on August 14, the minister of armed forces, unaware of the arrangements of the palace clique, ordered two companies of soldiers to put a stop to the massacres, he received orders 'not to interfere in the matter' from the Yuldiz (Sultan's

<sup>1</sup>Prof. Em. Dillon, *Polozhenie del v Tureckoj Armenii*. Cf. "Polozhenie armjan v Turcii do vmesatel' stva derzav v. 1895 g" (Collection of articles) (Moscow, 1896), p. 332.

palace—the authors)."<sup>1</sup> It was later reported that some 800 families were destroyed in these massacres.<sup>2</sup> Turkish writers, either consciously suppressing historical evidence or crudely falsifying them, attempt to cover up the monstrous plans of government circles to annihilate once and for all the Armenian people in Western Armenia and, in general, in Turkey as a whole.

Similar efforts to justify the policy of exterminating the Armenians, both by the Sultan and by the Young Turks, were made earlier, in particular in publications during World War I. Of this vintage is *The World War and the Turkish-Armenian Question* by the one-time Turkish ambassador to the United States, Ahmed Rustem Bey, published in 1918 in Switzerland.<sup>3</sup> From beginning to end, the writer justifies the policy of his government toward the Armenians. With no mention whatever of anti-Armenian measures by the Sultan's Government, Rustem Bey tries hoisting the blame for the 1894–96 massacres, and those that followed, on "fanatical mobs", the Kurds, based on "facts" drawn from reports by officials of Czarist Russia.<sup>4</sup> He says: "The perpetrators of all acts of disorderly conduct in the name of Islam in Turkey are the mob and those persons who acted on their own individual initiative, under the impact of fanaticism and lawlessness."<sup>5</sup>

Esat Uras, a contemporary historian, repeats and develops further the deceit of his predecessors.

Speaking of the 1894–1896 depredations, the 1909 butcheries at Adana, and, finally, of the 1915–16 wholesale massacres and deportations well known to the entire world, he shamelessly asserts that nothing of the sort ever happened, that "the accounts of numberless writers about the killings by Turks of 600 thousand, 800 thousand, or even one million Armenians, are not in the least in accord with reality. Each and every one is a fable. On the contrary, the number of Mussulmans killed by the Armenians exceeds those cited above."<sup>6</sup>

Such deceitful pronouncements of Turkish perverters of historical fact cannot in any way refute what is abundantly reported

<sup>1</sup>Central' nyj Goudarstvennyj voenno-istoriches-kij arxiv (CGVIA), f. 450, op. 1, d. 113, l. 55–56.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Ahmed Rustem Bey, *La guerre mondiale et la question turco-arménienne* (Berne, 1918).

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 7–13.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup>Esat Uras, *op. cit.*, p. 617.

in archives, in documentary materials, in the writings of Europeans. All of these sources expose the genocidal policy and acts of Abdul Hamid, the "bloody Sultan", and of his successors, the leaders of the "Young Turks" who pursued the same policy, but on a still larger scale. The platform of the Young Turks aimed, on the one hand, to assimilate the various Mohammedan peoples, on the other, to exterminate, once and for all, Christians within the Ottoman Empire. One of the first implementations of this dastardly policy was the wholesale extermination of law-abiding and peaceful people in the spring of 1909 in Adana and other Cilician cities. The first wave of these bloody events occurred on April 14-16, 1909, during the days of the reactionary revolt in Istanbul. And April 25, that is, the day following the triumphant entry into Istanbul of soldiers led by Young Turks, ushered in still another series of slaughters.

"This second carnage," wrote Mandelstam, translator in the embassy of Czarist Russia in Istanbul, "was more terrifying than the first. The government of the Young Turks tried to absolve itself of all responsibility by concocting the fiction of an Armenian revolt but had to abandon this version of events in the face of the real facts."<sup>1</sup> And Zinovev, the Russian ambassador, reported from Istanbul on May 1, 1909: "The insanities of the Mohammedans in the vilayet of Adana have reached diabolical proportions. Their Christian victims, particularly the Armenians, number some 15,000.<sup>2</sup> Soldiers despatched by the government, jointly with a fanatical mob of Mohammedans, massacred Christians, "with no regard to sex or age, and pillaged and burned their homes. . . ." "The city of Adana," the report states elsewhere, "no longer exists."<sup>3</sup>

Gibbons, one of the eye-witnesses of the massacres, gives a detailed description of the carnage, and notes specially that Armenians were savagely knifed and shot on the streets, that they were burned alive in houses in which they sought refuge. The marauders spared neither the aged, nor women — not even children. "This massacre was more terrible", concludes the author, "than those in the days of Abdul Hamid."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Andre Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Lausanne, Paris, 1917), p. 205.

<sup>2</sup>*Arxiv vensnij politiki Rossii (AVPR), f. Politarxiv, d. 1034, l. 130.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Helen Davenport Gibbons, *The Red Rugs of Tarsus* (Paris, 1919), p. 101.

"Those Armenians who had succeeded in escaping the first carnage are now destroyed. Adana has become a veritable inferno." Gibbons writes further on.<sup>1</sup>

Following the example of Adana, the authorities of the city of Tarsus also organized the massacre of Armenians on May 3, accompanied by pillaging and burning. "The massacre of Armenians", reported the Russian ambassador, "has spread to Aleppo, Zeitoun, Marash, Antioch, and Biletjik".<sup>2</sup>

Still another eye-witness testifies that on April 16, 1909, the local authorities of Tarsus distributed arms to specially imported Mohammedan fanatics who invaded the Armenian sectors of the city and embarked on a bloody massacre. "Armenian domiciles were burned . . . people abandoning their burning homes faced firing squads. Very few Armenians were able to survive."<sup>3</sup>

Contemporary Turkish authors, in their efforts to justify the chauvinistic, genocidal policy of the Young Turks, are obviously falsifying the facts of the history of recent times, among them the bloody events of 1909 in Adana. For instance, the Pan-Turkist historian, Esat Uras, brazenly declares that the responsibility of the massacres of Adana rests on the Armenians, who, as he puts it, "tortured the Mohammedans", adding, "the government of the Young Turks is not to blame here".<sup>4</sup> At the same time, this same writer deliberately and severely reduces the number of victims in the Adana massacres, insisting that the total loss involved was one thousand lives.<sup>5</sup>

Like other Turkish historians, Esat Uras intentionally disregards in this matter not only the unquestionably reliable and verified foreign source-materials cited above, but also the unequivocal confessions and crystal-clear revelations of Turkish writers themselves. Thus, while he repeats the deceit that "the Mohammedans were tortured by the Armenians", he passes over in silence the memoirs of Mevlanzade Rifat, one of the leading figures of the

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, (quotes from Gibbons are direct translations from the Armenian text. E.B.C.)

<sup>2</sup>AVPR, f. *Politarxiv*, d. 1034, l. 130.

<sup>3</sup>*La voix de l'Arménie* (Jan. 15, 1918), No. 2, p. 67

<sup>4</sup>Esat Uras, *op. cit.*, p. 575.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.* It must be further pointed out that Uras here is actually repeating Ahmed Rustem Bey, mentioned earlier, who, with a view to justifying the genocidal policy of the Young Turks, wrote as early as 1918 that the government is not to blame for the 1909 massacre in Adana, which was simply "a fracas, a fight between two elements in Cilicia, the Mohammedans and the Armenians". Ahmed Rustem Bey, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-33.

*Ittihad ve Terakke*\* party, in which Rifat asserts that *the guilt for the Adana massacres of 1909 rests in truth on the government of the Young Turks*. "Even during the most troubled days of the revolt of March 31, 1909," writes Mevlanzade, "the *Ittihad ve Terakke* party had not forgotten the Armenians. The Adana branch (the local organization of that party), *in compliance with orders from the Central Committee*, had begun preparations for a general massacre in Cilicia, specially in Adana.

"Spreading the word that the Armenians are planning a revolt and are seeking the establishment of an Armenian national home in Cilicia, *they began the campaign to incite the common people against the Armenians.*"<sup>1</sup> (italics ours.)

In his discussion of the causes of the April 25, 1909 massacres in Adana, Mevlanzade straightforwardly says:

"On Sunday, the 25th of April, 1909, *without any apparent reason*, gun shots were heard in the afternoon from the Armenian sector. Armenians engaged in routine business in the market place became panicky. Propagandists of the *Ittihad ve Terakke* who were on hand assured the frightened Armenians with the words, 'There's nothing to fear', so as to forestall their escape.

The situation became clear to them with the increasing intensity of gunfire. The battalion of Dedeh Aghajie, with no reason whatever, had been ordered to fire on the Armenians."<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

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\**Union and Progress* (E.B.C.)

<sup>1</sup>Mevlanzade Rifat, *The Dark Folds of the Turkish Revolution* (Beirut, 1938), p. 171. This Armenian text is a translation from the Turkish edition in Arabic symbols of: *Turkiye inkilabinin ic yuzu* (Aleppo, 1929).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 174.

### 3

#### ARMENOCIDE: TOTAL (1915-1918):

*"Annihilation to the last man", . . . men, women, children,  
and infants.*

Young Turks and Sultan

TURKISH DEBAUCHERS OF HISTORY have made still greater effort to justify the beastly genocidal policy of the Young Turks toward the Armenians, in particular, for the period of World War I.

In their endeavor to "disprove" the fact of large-scale liquidations of Armenians through massacre, they have represented the total Armenian population of Western Armenia and Cilicia at a much lower figure, accompanied by emphatic assertions that the Armenians have never been in the majority in these territories. In this very same manner, Esat Uras knowingly omits consideration of statistical data found in foreign sources, and bases his findings solely on Turkish population figures, which the Sultan's government, prompted by political considerations, had always, and deliberately, reported in reduced numbers.

Utilizing these figures, specially governmental statistics for the years 1911-1912, Esat Uras concludes that the entire Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire numbered 1,161,000, and that "the Armenians never presented a majority in any locality, not even in the vilayets of Bitlis, Van, and Erzerum. In Sivas, where the total Armenian population was the largest, the Mohammedans again outnumbered the Armenians: there were 840,000 Mohammedans as compared to 170,000 Armenians, a mere fifteen percent of the total population. *There was no vilayet, no sanjak, not even a nahieh (province) where Armenians constituted a majority*".<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

Professor Tayyib Gokbilgen, historian, in his *The Beginnings of the National Conflict*, published by the Historical Society of Turkey, likewise finds that "in the entire history of the eastern vilayets constituting the Turkish fatherland (?) the Armenians

<sup>1</sup>Eras, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-147.

have from the earliest days presented an insignificant minority".<sup>1</sup>

In another part of the text, where he returns to the problem of numbers of Mohammedans and Armenians in eastern vilayets, he falls into the absurdity of citing data purportedly from "official European statistics", without one single reference to sources.

"Before the War", he writes, "against a population of 4,000,000 Mohammedans, there were only 600,000 Christians here."<sup>2</sup> He considers it to be an unquestionable fact that the Turks constituted a majority in the vilayets of Erzerum and Bitlis, and that in the vilayet of Diarbekir the Armenian population did not even reach five percent, but was actually closer to 3.5.<sup>3</sup>

These numbers are blatantly manufactured falsehoods. In general, they have no relationship whatever to the facts. Let us turn to the evidence at hand to see how and why:

According to data supplied by Jacques de Morgan, there were 2,380,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire on the eve of World War I.<sup>4</sup> The Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople reliably reports a total of 2,666,000, of which 1,630,000 lived in Western Armenia.<sup>5</sup> The American writer, Joseph Guttman, states, on the basis of figures he employs, which it must be pointed out are reduced, that 1,058,000 Armenians lived in Western Armenia.<sup>6</sup> And George Lenzowski, in his discussion of the Armenian massacres, notes that some 2,000,000 were deported.<sup>7</sup> The French renowned journalist, Maurice Pernot, in his *The Turkish Question*, says that the total Armenian population in Turkey reached upwards of 2,500,000.<sup>8</sup> According to the evidence gathered by the French jurist, Rolin Jacquemyns, there were 2,400,000.<sup>9\*</sup> And the recently published *Soviet Historical Encyclopedia* cites the figure, 2,500,000, for the period preceding the 1915-1916 massacres.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Prof. Tayyib Gokbilgin, *Milli mücadele barslarken*. Mondros müta-rekesinden Sivas Kongresine. Birinci Kitap (Türk Tarih Karumu Basi-mevi, Ankara, 1959), p. 73.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Jacques de Morgan, *Histoire des peuple armenien* (Paris 1919), p. 297. (Available also in English translation by Ernest F. Barry. E.B.C.)

<sup>5</sup>*Population arménienne de la Turquie, avant le guerre. Statistiques établies par le Patriarchat arménien à Constantinople* (Paris, 1920), p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Joseph Guttman, *The Beginning of Genocide* (New York, 1948), p. 9.

<sup>9\*</sup>Jacquemyns' articles originally appeared in 1887 and 1889 in *Revue le Droit International*, etc.—an authoritative appraisal of official documents, etc. for the years after 1876. (E.B.C.)

Apropos of the relative percentages of ethnic-national groups in the six Armenian vilayets, Turkish writers avoid any distinction between the Turk and other Mohammedan inhabitants in reporting population statistics because of their pan-Islamic program of assimilation and chauvinistic mentality. In other words, Mohammedans are not reported according to ethnic groups. In this manner, they represent the entire Mohammedan population as made up of Turks only, so that they can insist that the Turks are not only in the majority in all the Armenian vilayets, but even in the provinces.

The citation of just a few facts should suffice to expose this deception: In the vilayet of Van, the Armenians numbered 185,000; in the vilayet of Bitlis, 180,000; whereas the Turks were 47,000 and 40,000, respectively. Likewise, in the vilayets of Kharpout and Diarbekir, the Armenians outnumbered the Turks: In the former, there were 168,000 Armenians and 102,000 Turks; in the latter, 105,000 Armenians and 45,000 Turks.<sup>1</sup>

"Notwithstanding the fact that the Sublime Porte had taken measures to re-distribute, to separate, the Armenian population by artificially creating different administrative districts", writes Diev, "in the provinces of Moush, Poulanik, Khulat, the Armenians were 50-60 percent [of the population]; in the vast province of Van, spread along the western shores of Lake Van, 80 percent", and so on.<sup>2</sup>

It is quite apparent the assertions of Turkish historians about the Armenians constituting an insignificant percentage of the population in Western Armenia and their severe reduction in general of the total count of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, by which they intend concealing the massacre of more than one million Armenians, cannot stand critical scrutiny. In their "objective",

<sup>1</sup>Population arménienne de la Turquie avant la guerre. Statistiques établies par le Patriarcat arménien de Constantinople (Paris, 1920), pp. 9-10.

<sup>2</sup>Gr. A. Diev, *Armjanskij vopros v Turcii*. In "Polozhenie armjan v Turcii", etc. (*op. cit.*), p. 399.

<sup>3</sup>George Lenzowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (New York, 1953), pp. 48-49.

<sup>4</sup>Maurice Pernot, *La question turque* (Paris, 1923), p. 207.

<sup>5</sup>M. G. Rolin-Jacquemyns, *Armenija, armjane, i traktaty*. Trans. from the French. Cf., "Polozhenie armjan b Turcii do vmeshatel' stva derzhav v 1895 godu." (Moscow, 1896), p. 8.

<sup>6</sup>*Sovetskaja istoričeskaja enciklopedija* (Moscow, 1961), Vol. I, p. 748.

"scientific" works, these people utilize extensively the memoirs, published during the last two decades and introduced<sup>1</sup> with lavish praise, by the notorious cutthroats, the executioners of the Armenian people, Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, Talaat, Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy), and others. And this not simply by chance, indeed. For it is impossible for Turkish writers to get any help whatever, in order to vindicate and to corroborate their views, by citing the numerous published "foreign source-materials" supplied by disinterested observers and witnesses, the collections of documentary evidence, or even from the memoirs and factual reports of Turkish officials who held very important positions during the war, and who, to exonerate themselves, expose, however unwillingly, the genocidal policy and operations of the Young Turks against the Armenian people.

The fanatically nationalist and reactionary Hussein Djahit Yaltchen, in his *Introduction to The Memoirs of Talaat Pasha*, published in 1946 in Istanbul, notes that the former grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire decided to refute the accusations made against the Young Turks of World War I. "This book", he writes in the *Introduction*, "is the document (*mudafaanamesi*) that vindicates the *Ittihad ve Terakke party*."<sup>2</sup> Yaltchen correctly appraises Talaat's "creative achievement"(!), whose author, having fled to Berlin after the ignominious defeat of the Ottoman Empire, was bent on vindicating, by means foul and heinous, the criminal political actions of the Young Turks and their administration, which he headed with his associates, Enver and Djemal. With deliberate care and consistency, Talaat distorts the policy of the Young Turk government *vis-a-vis* the Armenian question, to which he devotes an entire section. Now, this is understandable. For, having been Minister of Internal Affairs during the World War years (and from

<sup>1</sup>Such eulogies and glorifications of sinister political figures of the past are found not only in these *Introductions*, but also in works of a different character: In *The New Turkey*, a collection of lengthy studies by well-known Turkish authors on the history, diplomacy, culture, rights, so on, of Turkey (published lately in Turkey and subsidized by the Rockefeller Fund), we find pages of similar praise devoted to the Young Turk party and its leaders, the notorious "triumvirate", composed of Enver, Talaat, and Djemal. "These three were patriotic, talented and *compassionate* persons"; "*Ittihad ve Terakke* was a political party in the democratic sense" . . . Enver Pasha was a hero dedicated to liberty . . .", writes one of the authors, Professor Enver Ziya Karal. See *Yeni Türkiye* (Istanbul, 1959), p. 44.

<sup>2</sup>*Talat pasanın hatiralari* (Istanbul, 1946), p. 1.

1917 on, also, as *Grand Vizier*), he, with the collaboration of Enver, Djemal, Dr. Nazim, Behayettin Shakir, and some other leaders of the Young Turks, had formulated and directed with dispatch the execution of the monstrous plan for the total annihilation of the Armenian people. In his *Memoirs* Talaat also repeats the fabricated version about rebellions by Armenians:

"No sooner had the War started", he writes, "Armenians revolted in the vilayets of Moush, Bitlis, Van."<sup>1</sup> "Forgetting" his own personal secret orders and numberless secret telegrams about destroying the Armenians to the very last man, and in this manner solving the Armenian Question once and for all (these charges are based on documents published by Naim Bey and Mevlanzade), Talaat shamelessly asserts that, "when the chief staff prepared the original outline of the law to deport the Armenians", he "*once again showed his opposition to it*". (Italics ours.) Talaat Pasha's primary aim in publishing his memoirs is to absolve the Young Turk trio of all responsibility for its crimes. He spares no effort to vindicate the policy of the Ittihadists. He characterizes as "unjust" the death verdict rendered by the military court of Istanbul on July 6, 1919, against Ittihad ring leaders.<sup>2\*</sup> But with apparent primary concern for himself, Enver, and Djemal, he writes unabashedly: "A number of people have not been rightly condemned, for there is striking evidence demonstrating their innocence."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup>This same court, on the same day, had condemned to death, *in absentia*, the former leaders of the defeated Ottoman Empire, Enver, Talaat, Djemal and Dr. Nazim, for the deportations from the Armenian vilayets and for the massacres of Armenians.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 76.

\*Neither post-war Turkish governments nor the victorious Entente undertook either to bring before courts of justice or implement this military court's verdict against some of these Young Turk perpetrators of the Armenian genocide during World War I. Needless to say, the appropriation by Turks of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of all kinds of properties, etc., which the Armenians, massacred or deported to perish along the way, left behind, also went unchallenged! (Of some two million Armenians living in Turkey before 1914, the latest available Turkish figures show that about 50,000 reside in Istanbul, and around 30-40,000 scattered throughout the interior provinces.)

Of the Ittihad-Young Turk high executioners who found refuge in Europe and elsewhere, for the most part in disguise, grief- and revenge-stricken Soghomon Tehlerian, a student in his early '20's, ferreted out and killed Talaat on a boulevard in Berlin on March 15, 1921, and in daylight, submitted himself to trial (Dr. Lepsius was a defense witness), and was

It is this very fraud of Talaat Pasha's that supplies the basis for the views of contemporary Turkish historians. For example, Esat Uras vindicates the executioners of the Young Turk clique by quoting from fraudulent documents forged by the Sultan's Government and the Ittihad Party, the aim of which was to confuse public opinion by concealing from the world their criminal actions. Thus this author cites the proclamation by the Sultan's Government on the occasion of the Armenian massacres, which, along with an attempt to "refute" reports spread about them, stated that:

in order to establish general peace, the Ottoman Government, in keeping with its unlimited sovereign rights, took measures to curb the Armenian revolt movement, *but at no time resorted to massacre*. . . . If certain Armenians have been expelled from areas involved in military operations, this action stems from the legitimate concern of the Sultan's Government to insure its national safety.<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

At the same time, Esat Uras does not conceal his displeasure with the confession, made in a speech on October 19, 1918, by Prime Minister Damad Ferit Pasha, who had replaced the Young Turk triumvirate, wherein Ferit blamed the former government for organizing the Armenian massacres and exposed the leaders of the Young Turks, who had concocted and published a book to conceal their inhuman oppressions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Esat Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 620-621.

<sup>2</sup>The reference is to a publication by the Young Turk government, in 1916, in Istanbul, entitled, *The Revolt Movement of the Armenian Committees before and after the Proclamation of the Constitution*. It contained fabricated "documents", photographs, population figures, and other fraudulent data.

duly exonerated. Tehlerian died in California in 1960. Behayettin Shakir and Djemal Azmie Bey met a similar fate, again in Berlin, in 1922, in the hands of Aram Yerganian and others. Ahmed Djemal was assassinated in Tiflis, Georgia, July 21, 1922. Enver died on August 22, 1922, under somewhat mysterious circumstances during his Pan-Turanian military campaigns in Transcaucasia—in all likelihood, it is suggested, by a Russian Armenian's avenging bullet. Again, Salid Halim was shot on December 6, 1921, in Rome. All others, now living or dead, went scot free. . . .

Had the enlightened conscience of the day effectively met the crying moral issues involved, even these sporadic *vendettas*, born of fathomless grief, frustration, and revenge, might not have been attempted.

While planning the Nazi genocide of Jews, Hitler is quoted as having said with characteristic aplomb and contempt, "Who today recalls the Armenian Massacres?" Who, indeed!

Fortunately for the future of mankind Nazi war criminals are still being called to account, of late by the German people themselves. (E.B.C.)

In the same speech Damad Ferit, referring to the propaganda theme of this work, namely, that the mass expulsion of one million Armenians into the Arabian deserts was necessitated by military, strategic, considerations noted that this account of the matter cannot stand any kind of critical scrutiny. The Prime Minister of the Sultan was constrained to acknowledge that nothing could justify the bestialities that were perpetrated, and that "the responsibility for the deportation of the Armenians rests on the Government of the day".<sup>1</sup>

Another well-known Turkish historian, Professor Hikmet Bayuk, in a lengthy, detailed discussion of the Armenian massacres in his multi-volume *History of the Turkish Revolution*, repeats the same deceitful assertion by Talaat concerning Armenian revolts. Bayur reiterates the view that the punitive measures taken by the Young Turks were the result of Armenian revolts in the Armenian vilayets, that the Government itself had not, prior to the revolts, conceived and formulated a policy of massacre, and that, in point of fact, it was compelled to resort to "defensive measures".<sup>2</sup>

The assertions by our enemies of that period regarding the deportation as well as the massacre of Armenians are false. In fact, there was a general Armenian uprising at a time when the Turkish leadership and army were in a very critical plight, writes Bayur.<sup>3</sup>

"Who made the first move in all this?" he asks, and replies: "It is sheer enemy propaganda, the aim of which is to discredit the Turks severely, that we were predisposed to deport and to destroy the Armenians without any cause whatever."<sup>4</sup>

This deceitful account of a "general Armenian rebellion", which was assiduously promoted and circulated by the ruling coteries of the Young Turks, and is by contemporary Turkish historians, — this wholly false accusation is refuted not only by the testimonies of eye-witnesses of the massacres, but even by one of the very Young Turk leaders, by Mevlanzade, himself. In the work cited above he confesses unequivocally that the massacres organized everywhere had forced the Armenians in various localities to resort to rebellion for self-defense.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>See Esat Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 703–704.

<sup>2</sup>Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı tarihi*, Cilt III, 1914–1918 genel savası, Kısım 3 (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu basımevi, 1957), pp. 3, 5–6, 9.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

<sup>5</sup>Mevlanzade Rifat, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

We find Mandelstam at the time making similar affirmations:

Notwithstanding the deceitful communications of the Turkish Government, there has been no Armenian revolution or revolt — not in the least. The Armenians took up arms only when they were threatened with massacre.<sup>1</sup>

Now it is quite natural, of course, that during the massacres, Armenians in a number of places, such as, at Van, Shabin Kharahisar, on Musa Dagh, and elsewhere, took up arms in self-defense, and thus made it possible for some to escape the massacres.

In a crass attempt to misrepresent historical evidence, Hikmet Bayur characterizes the great Armenian Tragedy as "a way of suppressing the Armenian revolt".<sup>2</sup> Comparing it with the extermination of Jews by Nazi Germany, he unabashedly concludes that the action taken against the Armenians, namely, the massacres, were not really conducted on any large scale.<sup>3</sup> We generally find Bayur representing the mass deportations and wholesale butcheries of the Armenians as a re-location, dictated solely by strategic reasons:

"The people were re-located in large groups in the vicinities of Aleppo and Diarbekir", he writes. "They were sent by caravan, accompanied by gendarmes; that they had to supply their own food. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

The same writer reiterates obstinately that local and military Turkish authorities in truth "had treated them [the Armenians — authors] in a more or less correct manner", and that only "in the interior provinces, massacres perpetrated by Kurds and auxiliary gendarmes, contagious diseases, want, and fatigue had resulted in the loss of nearly a half million people".<sup>5</sup> (Italics ours.)

It is quite apparent that Bayur makes two misrepresentations: He deliberately minimizes the total number of victims, and then insists that the Young Turk government and local authorities are not to blame for the Armenian massacres. There is no doubt, indeed, that the Turkish historian is fully acquainted with the contents of published official documents in European languages about the massacres, the extant statistical data, and numerous other works,

<sup>1</sup>A Mandelstam, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>2</sup>Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>A similar comparison is made by Ahmed Rustem Bey, mentioned earlier, who finds that "the excesses" permitted by the Ottoman Empire against Christians "never reached the terrors of the Inquisition and St. Bartholomew's Day"! *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>4</sup>Y. H. Bayur, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

all of which show conclusively that the great Tragedy of 1915 entailed the loss of more than one million people.

The German scientist, Lepsius,\* for example, who was in Turkey during World War I at the time of the massacres, and who, with the help of German consulates gathered and later published a vast array of data and documentary evidence on the massacres, finds that the 1915 victims numbered one million.<sup>1</sup>

A. Mandelstam, in his reputable work, *The Fate of the Ottoman Empire*, based likewise on information from German consulates (it would not be in the least to the interest of the Germans to exaggerate!), concludes that more than one million were victimized, of which about five hundred thousand were women and children.<sup>2</sup> A number of other writers cite the same figure.<sup>3</sup> The cumulative evidence from these disinterested sources is incontrovertible, and tellingly so!

<sup>1</sup>See J. Lepsius, *Deutschland und Armenien* (Potsdam, 1919), p. LXV.

\*Dr. Johannes Lepsius 1858–1926), philosopher, theologian, humanitarian, who, in the face of the butchery of Sultan Hamid of over 300,000 of his Armenian subjects in the middle 1890's, dedicated his life from then on to the amelioration of the tragic plight of these people. Of his chief works, we may note: *Le rapport secret sur les massacres d'Arménie*, 1918; *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914–1918*, Potsdam, 1919; *Jesus at the Peace Conference*, 1919. (E.B.C.)

<sup>2</sup>A. Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1917), p. 408.

<sup>3</sup>See *La cause nationale arménienne. Documents concernant le problème de la libération de l'Arménie Turque* (Paris, 1945), p. 20; *Sovremennaja Turcija* (Moscow, Izd. Vost. lit.-y., 1956), p. 131; BSE., 2nd ed., Vol. III, p. 65; *Sovetskaja istoričeskaja enciklopedija* (Moscow, 1961), Vol. I, p. 748.

# 4

## ARMENOCIDE: TOTAL'S ALLEGED JUSTIFICATION (1915-1918):

*Compassion is "a deadly ailment".*

Young Turks and Sultan

LET US NOW CONSIDER BAYUR'S other mendacious assertion: that the Young Turk government was not involved, was not "an accomplice", in the perpetration of the massacres. There is not one single word in his voluminous study about the secret resolutions of the Government and its numerous orders and instructions to local authorities, all of which made it absolutely clear that the Armenian deportations must be systematically and consistently exploited with a view to their ultimate extermination. Furthermore, this Turkish historian, who cites from numerous sources to validate his erroneous conclusions, must surely have been fully acquainted with the secret documents that were published as early as 1920 by Naim Bey and with the memoirs of Mevlanzade Rifat, one of the directors of the Ittihad Central Board.

The memoirs of Naim Bey, who was chief secretary of the Aleppo Committee in charge of affairs involving deported Armenians, appeared in 1920 in London.<sup>1</sup> By virtue of his office, he had access to a series of original copies of very important documents issued by the Young Turk Government and the Ittihad Party on the subject of the deportation and extermination of Armenians.

The other Turkish source is the memoirs of Mevlanzade. These are valuable because the author, as a member of the Central Board of the *Ittihad ve Terakke*, participated in its secret sessions, in one of which, early in 1915, the savage plan to destroy the Armenian people was first formulated.

Describing in detail that meeting, which was presided over by Talaat and attended by Enver, Dr. Nazim, Dr. Behaettin Shakir, Ghara Kemal, Hassan Fehmin, Djavit, and Agha Oghlou Ahmed, Mevlanzade states that the main report was given by Dr. Nazim,

<sup>1</sup>*The Memoirs of Naim Bey*, London, 1920. (Reprinted, 1964, in U.S.A. E.B.C.)

the executive secretary of the Young Turk Central Board, in which he said:

"If we are going to be satisfied with the kind of local massacres that occurred in Adana and other places in 1909 . . . if this purge is not going to be universal and final, instead of good, it will inevitably result in harm. It is imperative that the Armenian people be completely exterminated; that not even one single Armenian be left on our soil; that the name, Armenian, be obliterated. We are now at war; there is no more auspicious occasion than this; the intervention of the great powers and the protests of newspapers will not even be considered; and even if they are, the matter will have become an accomplished fact, and thus closed forever. The procedure this time will be one of total annihilation — it is necessary that not even one single Armenian survive this annihilation. Perhaps some of you might say, to go that far will be bestial—what harm could possibly come from children, the aged, and the infirm that their extermination should also be considered necessary? Only those who are culpable should be punished. . . . I beg of you, gentlemen, don't be so weak and compassionate", continues this cannibal, "that's a deadly ailment."<sup>1</sup>

Following this, in his discourse on the aims and problems of the Young Turk revolution, Dr. Nazim, addressing his fellow-conspirators, asks:

Why did we have this Revolution? What was our objective? Was it to depose Abdul Hamid's men so that we could fill their positions? . . . I became your brother and comrade in order to vitalize Turkism. I want to see the Turk, and only the Turk, living on this land; I want to see him become his own lord and master on this land. *Let the non-Turkish elements be completely destroyed — no matter what their nationality and religion are. This country must be purged of all non-Turk elements. . . . Pitiful will be our lot, if a total liquidation, a total extermination, is not consummated.*<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

At this same meeting Dr. Behaettin Shakir also confines his comments to the avowed aims of the Young Turk revolution:

By founding the Ottoman state upon nationalist ideals and for the good of the Turkish nation, we revolutionaries created the present political order. Within our national boundaries we can permit only Turkish progress and prosperity: *We must of necessity clean up our land; we must destroy all harmful and unnatural weeds — all those nationalities that are remnants of olden times.* The aim and policy of our Revolution is just that. . . .<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

Hassan Fehmin, another participant in this secret session, "explains" in turn how the Armenians should be exterminated:

<sup>1</sup>Mevlânâzade Rifat, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–160.

<sup>2</sup>Mevlânâzade Rifat, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

. . . Total annihilation without leaving behind even one single soul, is legal [right?]. . . . As it has been said, every one shall be destroyed; there shall be no exempting of the aged, the sick, women, and children. I am thinking of an easy method of extermination: we are at war. We can send those young Armenians who can bear arms to the front lines. There, coupled between fire by Russians facing them *and by special forces in their rear dispatched by us for that purpose, we can trap and annihilate them. In the meantime, we can order our faithful adherents to plunder and to liquidate the old and the infirm, women and children, who remain behind in their homes. . . . This seems a suitable method.*<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

Having expressed his approval of this monstrous program to annihilate a whole race, Enver Pasha adds that "the decision as to ways and means of extermination is the responsibility of the executive committee".<sup>2</sup>

Djavid, another bloodthirsty scoundrel, "affirms" the view in turn that the necessity to exterminate the total Armenian population stems from the nationalist policy of the Government: "The annihilation to the very last man of the Armenians is just as urgent a need from the viewpoint of our national policy, as it is important for the purpose of attaining economic domination by the Turk."<sup>3</sup>

Mevlânzade then recalls that at the end of that same secret conference, "upon Talaat's instruction, votes were taken and counted. The result indicated unanimity of opinion about exterminating the Armenians to the very last man".<sup>4</sup>

The Ittihad ve Terakke Party recommended that a special organization be set up for carrying out this decision, made up of criminals and murderers under the direction of the 'three-man executive committee', composed of Dr. Nazim, Dr. Behaettin Shakir, and the Minister of Education, Shoukrie.<sup>5</sup>

This "three-man executive committee" in its first session discusses in detail the question of the total liquidation of Western Armenians and the methods by which to implement it. Behaettin Shakir is quoted as having said with unusual gravity that the committee "has assumed a very important and serious responsibility, and if we do not fulfill that responsibility as it should be, *if we should leave it only partly fulfilled, like the previous ones, we shall not be able to escape the vengeance of the Armenians. . . .*" Hav-

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 148.

ing pointed out the very favorable state of affairs brought about by the war, he "warns" his comrades that "the suitability of this exceptional turn of events must be exploited to the fullest. *Such an opportunity does not present itself every day. . .*".<sup>1</sup>

This trio, having agreed that "the task of exterminating the Armenians—the unarmed, the hands-tied, the infirm, and the aged Armenians, to the very last one of them is a beastly crime", decide that its execution can be entrusted neither to the army, the militia, the police, nor to the people in general, because this "will spoil the people, who may later turn against us, and even rebel". They then resolve that the executors of that mass slaughter must be hardened inmates of prisons who are incarcerated for homicide and other heinous crimes. When these are freed, the trio can muster from their ranks a select force of some 10 to 12 thousand in less than a month, which they can organize "into detachments of ten, as a minimum, and of fifty at the most, over which they can appoint trustworthy captains, to whose command the men will be subject".<sup>2</sup>

In order to give a complete description of that execrable "plan of execution", proposed by Behaettin Shakir and approved by the "three-man executive committee", let us quote Mevlanzade in full:

All the cities and towns that have Armenians, and which of these places must be exterminated first, we must decide with the Minister of Internal Affairs, and to each one of these areas we shall dispatch the necessary contingent from these forces. These will await the arrival of Armenian convoys at various suitable points on the road designated by us. Talaat, the Minister of Internal Affairs, in turn will instruct the executive officers in those cities to evacuate, along a designated route to a specified location, all resident Armenians, in groups, twice a day, and under the supervision of the military police—*which action he will explain as necessitated by their being away from the theatre of war.* Upon receiving such an instruction, police officers will gather all the Armenians together and begin sending them off, under guard, in groups at a time, along the specified routes. When they have reached the place where our specially organized corps of *chetehs*\* are stationed, the guards will hand them over to these *chetehs*, then return. *The chetehs will at once put to death all these Armenians to the very last one, and, to prevent any ill-effects upon the public health, they will throw them into pits dug in advance, and bury them. And in this way they will eventually succeed in fully accomplishing the task of total*

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 186–187.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 191–193.

\*Reference is to the "irregulars"—brigands, in this case, made up of the freed assassins, hoodlums, etc. (E.B.C.)

*extermination*. The money, jewelry, and other personal belongings found on these Armenians will be distributed among the *chetehs*.<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

In his summary of the deliberations of this session, Dr. Nazim says: "We are then agreed in principle; there is nothing more to discuss. We must see Talaat and start operations."<sup>2</sup>

There was no delay in obtaining Talaat's approval for these methods of execution formulated by the three-man committee: "The minister of internal affairs, Talaat, had given the necessary final instructions<sup>3</sup> to the vilayets for the deportation of Armenians and the central board of *Ittihad ve Terekke* had advised all its branches and the inspectors."<sup>4</sup>

Mevlânzade's memoirs also make plain how meticulously and loyally local authorities carried out this monstrous scheme and the secret orders of the Young Turk government:

Armenians everywhere, without sparing the young and old, the infirm and the aged, and exempting temporarily only those who adopted Islam, were herded together in one place, and deported in groups under military police guard along designated routes.

The *chetehs* of the special corps subject to the 'three-man executive committee' would await the arrival of these convoys of Armenians at designated places, like ravens awaiting corpses.

Exhausted from the hardships of travel on foot, spiritually demoralized, depressed from having been separated from their homes, in which they were born and bred, these pitiful groups, once they reached their destination where *chetehs* were stationed, would be left in their care by the military police escorts, who would then return. . . . In the hands of these monsters, organized as a special corps, these human flocks were subjected to tortures and barbarities beyond imagination and description.<sup>5</sup>

The first-hand material presented by Naim Bey, an important public office-holder, further shows that, simultaneously with submitting Armenians to the depredations of the henchmen of the "special organization" set up for that purpose, the Young Turk government also approved their mass expulsion into the desert of Deir-es-Zor as one of its prized tools of total liquidation. This latter means the government employed with equally, if not more, heartless steadfastness, demanding, as Naim Bey records, that week-

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>3</sup>For the full text of this order, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 197-199.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.



Arrows show direction Armenian deportees from Turkey were forced to follow (April 1915 —). From *The Cry of Armenia*, published by The American Armenian Relief Fund, in cooperation with the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, New York.

ly reports be made to him on what was accomplished. Whenever word reached Talaat about the mild manner in which some individual Armenians were treated, he immediately sent orders to local authorities not to give way to pity — "to be relentless to the very end, and not to spare even infants in cradles". For instance, in one of the secret orders to the Governor of Aleppo, Talaat writes:

All the rights of Armenians to live and work on Turkish land are abrogated in full. The responsibility for this is assumed by the Government, which has ordered *that not even infants in cradles be spared*. The results of the execution of this order are apparent in various provinces. Notwithstanding this fact, special treatments are accorded, for reasons unknown to us, to 'certain individuals' who, instead of being exiled directly to the deportation areas, are retained in Aleppo, thereby causing the Government new difficulties. Do not listen to their explanations, or reasoning; send them away, whether they be women or children, *even when they are not able to move*. . . . In place of the indirect means (harshness, haste, hardships of travel, misery, and poverty) used in other areas, *it is feasible to use direct methods with safety*. . . .

Inform those officials who have been designated to do this job, *that they can accomplish our real purpose without fear of being held responsible*. . . .<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

In another secret order, dated September 16, 1915, and likewise sent to the Governor of Aleppo, Talaat says:

It was previously reported to you that under orders from the *Djemiet* (Central Committee of the Ittihad Party — authors), the Government has decided *to exterminate, to the last man, all the Armenians in Turkey*. Those who are opposed to this order and decision cannot remain in office in the Empire. *Their* (the Armenians' — authors) existence must be ended, *no matter how harsh the means employed may be*, without any consideration whatever for age, sex, and conscience.<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

Following Talaat's instructions, the job of "effecting the death" of Armenians by deportations into the desert was seen through with increasing speed. "The death toll was telegraphed to Istanbul in code every two weeks,"<sup>3</sup> writes Naim Bey. According to his figures, "More than 200,000 Armenians, all those who were convoyed into the desert, lost their lives during the Des-es-Zor massacres."<sup>4</sup>

The Government of the Young Turk party pursued its geno-

<sup>1</sup>*The Memoirs of Naim Bey*, p. 16. (Trans. from the Armenian. E.B.C.)

<sup>2</sup>Naim Bey, *ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

cidal policy with such merciless consistency as to dispatch special orders to pick up and to send into the desert immediately all those children who by sheer accident had survived the massacres. Naim Bey's disclosures of the content of a number of telegrams in code signed by Talaat bring into full view the barbarous, the beastly, character of the Young Turks. Two examples should suffice: In his telegram on November 5, 1915, to the Provincial Governor of Aleppo, Talaat wrote:

We have been informed that in Sivas, Mamouret-al-Aziz, Dairbekir, and Erzerum, a few Mohammedan families have either adopted or taken as servants little children of Armenians. . . . We hereby order you to gather together all such children in your province and send them to the deportation camps.<sup>1</sup>

In another telegram, sent on January 15, 1916, Talaat stated: We have heard that certain newly-opened orphanages are also admitting Armenian children. This is done because our intentions are not known by them. . . . The Government considers the feeding of such children or attempts to prolong their life as acts that are contrary to its aims, because the Government views the life of these children detrimental. I shall arrange so that such children are not admitted to orphanages nor attempts made to found new ones for them.<sup>2</sup>

Of course, there is no doubt that contemporary Turkish "researchers" in history are acquainted with these and similar indigenous documentary and other trustworthy sources. But for Turkish debauchers of historiography it would not help their cause at all to acknowledge their existence. It serves their perverted aims best to call as witness Talaat alone — the arch organizer of the massacres, whose *ad hoc* "explanations" serve as the very basis for their approach and interpretations.

It is in this very manner and spirit, for example, that Hikmet Bayur "has seen fit" to recapitulate the history of the mass slaughter of Armenians in 1915 with Talaat's address, delivered before the infamous last session on November 1, 1918, of the Ittihad conclave.

In that speech, Talaat, pausing over the policy pursued by the Young Turk party with reference to the Armenians, tries in every way to justify atrocities by linking them with an "absolute necessity imposed" upon them solely by the reigning state of war.

Acknowledging that "in all likelihood such a major incident involving deportations has taken place", Talaat, who "has forgotten" his own numerous orders and the secret resolutions of the

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

Ittihad Government, shamelessly asserts, with regard to the massacres and deportations, that "the Sublime Porte did not act upon any previously voted decision", and that "the responsibility (for the massacres, etc.) *first and foremost falls upon the races who promoted intolerable movements*".<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.) At the same time Talaat\* attempted to hoist the "excesses" permitted during the Armenian deportations onto individual officials, who "did show unusual cruelty and violence".<sup>2</sup>

It is this sort of contemptible deceitfulness that supplies the very premise upon which rests the entire fabric of the pseudo-scientific, the mendacious, approach and interpretations of modern Turkish historiography in its treatment of the Armenian massacres.

## 5

ARMENOCIDE: TOTAL AND BEYOND (1919-1920):  
*"Must needs destroy" this new "cantankerous growth",*  
 THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA.  
 Young Turk - Kemalists

IN THE PUBLISHED WORKS of military and political leaders and historians, in the memoirs of statesmen, in textbooks on recent times, special attention is given to events of the years 1920-21: to the foreign policy of Kemalists toward Transcaucasia, the negotiations of July-August, 1920, in Moscow, the Armenian-Turkish war of 1920, the Alexandropol Treaty, the Kars and Moscow agreements of 1921, and other related matters - all of which are treated in an extremely prejudiced, distorted manner. And in anti-Soviet publications Turkish writers spare no effort to justify the Kemalist invasion of Transcaucasia, which they even represent as a "contribution" to the establishment of the soviet regime there, as being an integral part of the national-liberationist movement in Turkey, etc.

<sup>1</sup>Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44.

\*Remember also Talaat's boast: "What Hamid could not accomplish in thirty years, we [Young Turks] achieved in thirty days." (E.B.C.)

The distortions of the aim and nature of historiography by Turkish historians have reached absurd proportions! Chauvinistically inspired "scientific studies" about the most reactionary and fanatical political and military leaders of the not-too-distant past portray these as having played magnificent roles in history. If the memoirs of such notorious executioners of the Armenian people as Talaat Pasha, Kiazim Karabekir, and others appeared in book form within the past two decades, Turkish historians are now devoting individual studies to these same figures in a series under the title of: *The Hidden Pages of the History of the Recent Past*. It is equally characteristic of these publications to dwell also on the issues outlined above in their discussions of Turkish leaders. In this spirit and manner, for example, the well-known Turkish historian, Djemal Kutay, has already published individual studies on Talaat's<sup>1</sup>, Enver Pasha's<sup>2</sup> and Kiazim Karabekir's<sup>3</sup> political and military activities. And his venomous *How Karabekir Destroyed Armenia*<sup>4</sup> is representative, in spirit, aims, and method of treatment of issues, of the writings of other historians. This "research study" is of special interest to us because it discloses hitherto unknown data that reveal new facets in the criminal actions of Talaat, Karabekir, and others against the Armenian people.

It is well known that the aggressive intentions and plans of the Young Turks for Transcaucasia during World War I were thwarted by the telling blows of the Russian Army. But the ruling circles of the "New Turkey", resting on the debris of the Ottoman Sultanate, had not resigned from these intentions during the years of the national-liberationist struggles of the Turkish people.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Djemal Kutay, *Talaat Pasayı nasıl vurdular?* (Istanbul, 1956).

<sup>2</sup>Djemal Kutay, *Atatürk — Enver paşa hadiseleri* (Istanbul, 1956).

<sup>3</sup>Djemal Kutay, *Karabekir Ermenistani nasıl yok etti?* (Istanbul, 1956).

<sup>4</sup>*Karabekir Ermenistani nasıl yok etti?*

<sup>5</sup>There are even works today that are specially concerned with tracing and describing the "hereditary" ties between the aggressive foreign policy of Kemalists and that of the Young Turks, portraying the former as the immediate successors to and pursuers of the unfulfilled program of the Young Turks. Kutay's *Events Connected with Atatürk and Enver Pasha* (*Atatürk—Enver paşa hadiseleri*, 1956), cited above, is an excellent example of this interpretation. The very title reveals the author's aim. Kutay, who is poisonously anti-Soviet, lavishes boundless praise on Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism, and points to the genuineness of and the similarity between the ideas and objectives of Enver and Kemal, as revealed also in their personal correspondence which he brings to light in this work (see

The following decision, reached as early as the beginning of 1920, is found recorded in one of the minutes of the meetings of a representative committee headed by Mustafa Kemal: "To dispatch armed forces, officially or otherwise, to the Eastern front, and to undertake the concentration of soldiers in the rear in order to destroy the Caucasian barriers."<sup>1</sup> Kemal himself informed Kiazim Karabekir of this decision in a personal letter, dated February 6, 1920, quoted in *Ataturk in Anatolia* by Terfik Bikilioglu, who is recognized in Turkey as an expert on Soviet-Turkish relations.<sup>2</sup>

It was not, therefore, by mere chance that, although the Greek army was rapidly approaching Ankara, the Kemalists, impelled by their policy of aggrandizement, were concentrating their forces on the Eastern front along the Transcaucasian border. According to Karabekir's own statement, they were to invade Armenia on the "most favorable occasion" that presented itself.<sup>3</sup> It should suffice simply to note that, at the time of the first battle<sup>4</sup> at Inonou, the government of Ankara had only 15,000 men against a Greek force of 60,000, and this when against the Armenian army of 30,000 on the Eastern front the Kemalists had mobilized 50,000.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Mustafa Kemal, *Put novoj Turcii*, Vol. III (Moscow, 1934) p. 313.

<sup>2</sup>See his *Atatürk Anadoluda, 1919-1921* (Ankara, 1959), p. 19.

<sup>3</sup>Djemeal Kutay, *Karabekir Ermenistani nasil yok etti*, p. 36.

<sup>4</sup>During the battle waged in the environs of Inonou (a village to the west of Ankara) on January 10, 1921, the Turks had 15,000 men against the Greeks' 60,000, notwithstanding the fact that they had already accomplished their aggressive mission against Armenia, and that they could have easily transferred a sizeable segment of their forces to the Eskishehir-Ankara battleline, which had decisive value for the future of Turkey. Yet the Kemalists kept the Eastern Army intact along the Transcaucasian border because of the Kemalist government's aggressive plans for Transcaucasia, her anti-Soviet intentions, and her determination to enforce the plundering Alexandropol agreement.

<sup>5</sup>A. B. Kadishchev, *Intervencija i grazdanskaja vojna v Zakarkaze* (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961), p. 324.

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*Op. cit.*, pp. 27-28, 30-31, 34-36, *et. seq.*). Having identified Enver Pasha as "the creator of the army that carried on the fight for Turkish national liberation in Anatolia" in 1920, he doggedly promotes the view that Enver's anti-Soviet adventure in the Middle East (which Kutay regards as "the struggle for the independence of nations") continued in a different manner the struggle for national liberation in Anatolia (*Ibid.*, pp. 51-52). For Enver's letter, see also: Terfik Biyiklioglu, *Ataturk Anadoluda, 1919-1921* (Ankara, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1959), p. 20.

Even the infamous Enver and Talaat, who had brought the Ottoman Empire to ignominious defeat, and who, disguised, found refuge in Berlin, were well aware of these plans. They even offered advice to the rulers of the "New Turkey", whom they regarded as the successors of their once thwarted policy of aggression. Talaat writes in a letter from Berlin:

"My dearest Karabekir Pasha, if your military preparations are completed, go ahead and attack. *There's no doubt that the victory attained in the East will have a profound influence on the Eastern front as well as on the entire world.*"<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

Relevant also is the fact that, prior to writing to Karabekir, Talaat discusses "the invasion being readied against Armenia" with Enver in Berlin, and receives the latter's complete approval of the project.<sup>2</sup>

It is equally clear from the boastful utterances of the same author that "as early as the months of Spring Karabekir had completed the mobilization and the equipping of his soldiers for the purpose of launching an attack against the Armenians."<sup>3</sup> The following telegram by Karabekir, sent to governing circles in Ankara about the middle of April, likewise attests to the real reasons for concentrating Kemalists forces at the time near Kars and Bayazid: "Very soon now, I shall report that Armenia has been completely erased from the map of the world."

The foreign-language press in Turkey also reported the aggressive intentions and plans of the Kemalists. For instance, the French newspaper, *Le Bosphore*, published in Istanbul, featured a communication on May 5, 1920, from its correspondent in Erzerum "on the existence of a very obvious anti-Armenian disposition in Kemalists circles".

It must be added, however, that these aggressive tendencies and aims of the nationalists were voiced for the first time at their conventions in Erzerum during July 23 to August 6, 1919.<sup>4</sup> To conceal their plans to attack Armenia, they took advantage of the just demands of the Armenian people for Armenian territories by representing them as "combative maneuverings". Thus in a coded telegram on August 3, 1919 (during the Erzerum meeting), Kemal reveals that "the spirit and aims of the Erzerum congress are deter-

<sup>1</sup>Djemeal Kutay, *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>4</sup>Re decisions of this congress, see General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Milli Mucadale Hatiralari*, pp. 121-122.

mined by the events in Ismir *and the threats of Armenian offensive action*;<sup>1</sup> which are alleged to be the real causes of the growth and expansion of their national-liberation movement. (Italics ours.)

During the time of the Erzerum congress the focus of attention was not the real dangers threatening Turkey from the imperialist powers, but "the evil intentions of the Armenians".

Furthermore, a specific resolution was passed by the Sivas congress (in session, September 4-11, 1919) committing the nationalists to an implacable campaign against all movements concerned with the founding of an independent Armenia.<sup>2</sup>

In a telegram on November 17, 1919, to Ali Fouat, Moustafa Kemal asserted: "As it is obvious from the decisions of the congresses of Erzerum and Sivas, the nation will not yield even an inch of sod to Armenia".<sup>3</sup>

Under the cloak of similar resolutions the Kemalists were assiduously making plans for aggressive action against Transcaucasia, and especially against Armenia. The question was repeatedly brought up for critical review in the sessions of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. There is ample documentary evidence in archives of this preoccupation, in one part of which we find stated that the sessions of the Grand National Assembly, with the participation of representatives of the Government in Istanbul,\* frequently discussed the question of occupying all of Transcaucasia, took specific, concrete steps to implement it, and sent spies to Transcaucasia and Northern Caucasus.<sup>4</sup>

To carry out its offensive program in the Caucasus, the Ankara government decided to occupy Eastern Armenia on the first suitable occasion. To this end it appointed as commander of the Eastern front Kiazim Karabekir, who had already in World War I dis-

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 139-140. See also Prof. M. Tayyib Gokbilgin, *Milli Mucahade baslarken. Mondros Mutarekesinden Sivas Kongresine*. Birinci Kitap (Ankara, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1959), p. 168.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

<sup>3</sup>Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, Vol. II (Moscow, 1932), p. 120.

<sup>4</sup>CGAKA, f. 109, op. 3, d. 298, l. 28.

\*Following the dissolution of the Parliament in Istanbul by the Sultan, Kemal set up on the 23rd of April, 1920, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara as the new Government. Thus, there was the Sublime Porte in Istanbul and the Kemalist Assembly in Ankara. It was not until November 1, 1922, that the Grand National Assembly declared the Sultanate abolished, the Grand National Assembly itself sovereign, and all acts of the Sublime Porte, from March 16, 1920 on, null and void. (E.B.C.)

tinguished himself for his Armenocidal activities. Hikmet Bayur confesses in his *Foreign Policy of the Turkish Government* that the government in Ankara was engaged in preparations for an invasion of Armenia for a long time, but that the delay in evacuating British occupation forces had compelled it to postpone action for a time. "Notwithstanding this," writes Bayur, "we completed mobilization of forces in the eastern sector of the country and took the necessary preliminary steps for the creation of the Eastern front."<sup>1</sup>

Mustafa Kemal himself frequently mentions the preliminary preparations for an attack on Armenia. For instance, in an address delivered on August 14, 1920, he states:

"With regard to the annexation of the three vilayets (the reference is to Kars, Batum, and Ardahan — the authors), the Grand National Assembly has authorized the Council of Ministers to occupy them whenever the opportunity presents itself. To that end, we gave orders on June 6 to the Eastern army to prepare for attack."<sup>2</sup>

Kemal discusses this question in detail in a speech before the Grand National Assembly in 1927. Commenting on the state of events during June of 1920 on the Eastern front, he said:

"We resolved to invade Armenia. In June of 1920, we ordered that steps be taken to mobilize and concentrate forces in Eastern districts. Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, commander of the 15th Corps, was appointed Commander of the Eastern front."<sup>3</sup>

We find the Ankara Government, therefore, concerned in June of 1920, not with the offensive of the Greek army in Thrace and Anatolia, and its occupation of Adrianople, Ereclin, Brousa, Balikesir and some other cities, not with concentrating its main armed forces on the Western front against the Greeks, but with concentrating them along the Armenian border in preparation for an invasion.

For Kemalist ruling circles the actual existence of an independent Armenia was intolerable, hence their main objective from the very beginning was the extermination of Armenia, after which it would be quite feasible, in their opinion, to continue the fight on the Western front against the Greeks. That they gave paramount significance and priority to their preparations for an offensive against Armenia is amply in evidence in the very interesting data which the Turkish military historian, Chevtath Kerim, presents in

<sup>1</sup>Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye devletinin dis siyasi* (Istanbul, 1938), p. 65.

<sup>2</sup>*Atatürk'ün soylev ve demeceleri*, Vol. III (Istanbul, 1945), p. 90.

<sup>3</sup>Mustafa Kemal, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III (Moscow, 1932), p. 117.

his *Lectures on the Turkish Struggle for Independence*. This is what he says:

"The leaders in Ankara, prompted by political and military considerations, appraised the state of affairs in the East as being more serious. Since the problems involving the wars with the Greeks and the French from the beginning were construed as defensive in character, we, therefore, sought with meager forces to hinder the enemy's future advances with all available means. . . . Our attention was focused on the Eastern front because with the attainment of success here *we must needs destroy the Armenian Army, as well as the Armenian state*, which still fester the body of our country like a cankerous growth. . . ." <sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

These matters are now openly discussed by former military officers and historians, among them the well-known historian, Professor Enver Ziya Karal<sup>2</sup>, the fanatically reactionary, General Ali Fuat Cebesoy<sup>3</sup>, Tahsin Unal<sup>4</sup>, who lectures on political history in a military academy, and others.

The cumulative evidence in archival source-materials, the personal revelations by Turkish leaders, among them Mustafa Kemal's, the numerous facts cited by contemporary Turkish writers, unquestionably demonstrate the truth that the Kemalist Government had been making preparations and drawing up a detailed program for a long time for the ultimate destruction of Armenia, and that it undertook the implementation of that program *on its own initiative*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>M. Kemal, *Ibid.*, p. 314.

<sup>2</sup>*Turkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi, 1918-1953* (Istanbul, 1958), p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>*Moskova hatilari* (Istanbul, 1955), p. 61.

<sup>4</sup>*1700 den 1958-e Kadar turk siyasi tarih* (Ankara, 1958), p. 270.

In the light of all this, we think the time has come when we should re-consider the mistaken view, fairly common in our historiography and based on a one-sided evaluation by Stalin as early as 1920 of the Turkish-Armenian War, that "the Dashnags started the war against Turkey" under orders from the Entente (See E. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 458). Many writers among us repeat this erroneous interpretation by Stalin and overlook the Kemalists' own specific aggressive policy and concrete plans for destroying Armenia once and for all.

There is no question, of course, that the adventurous character of Dashnag policy was partly instrumental in causing the Turco-Armenian war, that is, its policy of tying the fate of Armenia with the imperialist Entente and of rejecting the offer of aid by Soviet Russia. There are still other writers who link the *aggressive intentions* of the Ankara government exclusively with the political opponents of Kemal. For example, Professor

It must be asserted again that Turks who represent the aggression in the Fall of 1920 against Armenia as the most important prerequisite of the *liberation* movement speak, with no reservation whatever, of the preparations made by Kemalists for war against Armenia, the appointed hour for attack, the concentration of armed forces, and other related matters. In view of this, the confessions of General Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebeşoy), a former Kemalist military leader, are quite interesting.

In his memoirs, *On the National Liberation Struggle*, Cebeşoy, while discussing in detail the preliminary preparations for an attack on Armenia on the Eastern front, notes with pain that the attack did not take place in the Spring and that it was postponed to some later date:

"Had not Kaizim Kiarabekir's proposal in May for immediate action against Armenia met with opposition, then in November 1920, when important changes had taken place in the West, the Western front would have been doubly stronger . . ."<sup>1</sup>

In the writer's judgment, the month of May presented "the most favorable" turn of events and conditions for launching the attack:

For "the Armenian army was occupied with crushing the internal Bolshevik uprisings (the reference is to the revolt in May — authors) in May of 1920 and with holding back the Azerbaijanians in the north. Menshevik Georgia was in no position to come to Armenia's aid. And against the Armenians in *that very difficult situation* stood the 15th detachment, made up of three regular divisions and volunteer groups. This force was in a position to defeat the Armenians with dispatch."<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

But why was that attack delayed? Why did it not take place in the Spring? Cebeşoy's explanation is that the President (Mus-

<sup>1</sup>Ali Fuat Cebeşoy, *Milli mucadele hatiralari*, p. 511.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 485.

A. F. Miller's inaccurate version in *Vsemirnaja istoria (History of the World)*:

"There were political and military figures in Anatolia who were secret, and even open, enemies of Kemal and who favored compromise with the imperialists. They wanted to divert the Turkish national movement from the fight against imperialist intervention and direct it along chauvinistic lines against the peoples of the Caucasus." (See *Vsemirnaja istoria*, Vol. III (Moscow, Sotekgiz, 1961), p. 452.)

In this manner, the Turkish invasion of Armenia in 1920 was accepted, not as the act of Kemalists but of their political opponents. Such an interpretation contradicts the indisputable truth that the Kemalists themselves in the end followed a chauvinistic course.

tafa Kemal — authors) of the Grand National Assembly and the Council of Ministers postponed the invasion of Armenia after the following telegram, signed by President Mustafa Kemal, was sent to Kiazim Karabekir Pasha:

"Until the decisions of the peace conference regarding us are made clear, for the present, in view of the course of both internal and external events, *it is not to our advantage to be deprived of the possibility of coming to an understanding with the Allied Powers. . . .* The attack on Armenia would furnish an opportunity for the Allied Powers and America to declare war against us . . ." <sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

It is therefore, quite evident from the telegram bearing Kemal's signature that the Ankara government still hoped to join the imperialist Allied Powers in concerted actions against the Soviets and for that very reason it was compelled to postpone the prearranged invasion.

These revelations from present-day Turkish writers, and, generally, the policy pursued by the Kemalists from the very inception of the Turkish national-liberation struggle tend to confirm the belief that the Kemalist movement possessed a unique characteristic that was representative of the Turkish bourgeoisie: *On the one hand, it was anti-imperialist and national-liberationist, aimed against European imperialism; on the other, that movement itself assumed an aggressive, imperialistic character in the East with respect to Turkey's neighbors — Transcaucasia and its peoples.* And this aggressiveness Turkish writers present as an integral part of their national-liberation movement. There is more: The victory in the Turco-Armenian War of 1920, which resulted from their aggressive action, is heralded by these same writers as an important pre-condition of the subsequent extension of the struggle for emancipation. Witness Professor Enver Ziya Karal in his *History of the Turkish Republic*:

"The military victory over the Armenians in the East was the first victory in our fight for independence."<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.) And Cemal Kutay ties in the same victory with the future destiny of the national-liberation struggle: "If Karabekir had not been victorious in the East, what would have been the fate of the national struggle?"<sup>3</sup>

Cebesoy gives a similar appraisal. In his memoirs he brings to light for the first time the contents of a telegram sent to Kiazim

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 482.

<sup>2</sup>Karal, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>Kutay, *Karabekir Ermenistani nasil yok etti?* p. 62.

Karabekir on November 28, 1920, by Ismet Bey,\* Kemal's most intimate comrade-in-arms and at the time commander-in-chief of the Western front:

"My dear, my dearest, brother Kiazim . . . *The Eastern invasion brought life to us and to our cause.* We were so distressed, so hard-pressed, that to begin to breathe again a definitive turning-point was necessary. With the help of the Almighty, you discovered that turning-point both perfectly correctly and successfully . . ." Ismet continues, "*Mustafa Kemal Pasha specially does not quite know how to express his gratitude. Everyone is repeating the same.*"<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

With similar concealment of the real reasons and aims of the Turkish invasion of the Fall of 1920, Turkish historians interpret and prize the usurpations of other people's territory, the wholesale extermination of the peaceful populace, the beastly cruelties perpetrated by Kemalist soldiers (about these later) as the fight for "liberation" and "independence"!

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<sup>1</sup>Cebesoy, *Op. cit.*, pp. 485-486.

\*No other than Ismet Inonu (1884-), prime minister, once more, of Turkey since November, 1961. Was chief of staff of Ottoman armies in Yemen and Eastern Thrace in World War I, and Undersecretary of War in 1918. From the outset, closest to Mustafa Kemal, who made him Chief of Staff in May, 1920. Won decisive victory over Greeks in 1921 at battle of Inonu, hence his surname. Made foreign minister by Kemal. Astutely negotiated with the Allied Powers the infamous Lausanne Treaty, signed July 24, 1923 (U. S. Senate did not ratify it), which made a mockery of justice of the ratified Sèvres Peace Treaty of August 10, 1920. (Among other commitments, this had recognized and provided for Armenian territorial rights in their historic homeland in Turkey. See below.) Inonu then became Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of Nationalist Turkey; "inherited" the presidency upon Atatürk's death in 1938; was elected to that office in 1943, and held it until 1950.

Ismet Inonu may be said to symbolize Young Turk-Ittihad and Kemalist traditions. . . . (E.B.C.)

## 6

## RAPE OF THE ARMENIAN REPUBLIC (1920-1921):

“. . . to fulfill our 'national pledge'."

Young Turk - Kemalists

IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY the Kemalist aggression against Armenia, Turkish writers resort to still another device to falsify historical evidence, namely, their attempt to represent Soviet Russia as having approved Turkish aggressive action.

In his Berlin letter to Karabekir quoted above, Talaat Pasha, with a view to encouraging the militarist and anti-Armenian predilections of the former, "assures" him that Soviet leaders will not intervene in, will not in any way place obstacles before, the advances of Turkish armed forces into Armenia. He writes: "Do not attach any significance to the Bolsheviks being really able to protect Armenia."<sup>1</sup>

But it is well known that the contemplated Turkish attack of June was postponed solely because of Soviet Russian intervention. The communication, on June 3, 1920, of K. V. Tchicherin, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, to Mustafa Kemal, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, made the position of Soviet Russia toward Armenia and the Armenians very clear. Recalling the promise made in Kemal's letter of April 26 regarding the right of the peoples of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, the region of Batum, and Eastern Thrace to determine their own fate, the Soviet Government stated clearly that on the basis of this statement it "naturally assumes that there will be unhampered plebiscites in these territories, participated by emigrants and the exiled who, for reasons beyond their control, were forced to leave their homeland, to which they must be returned."<sup>2</sup> Thus the Soviet government made it clearly known that the future of these areas shall be decided by the people themselves in a peaceful manner, and without any outside interference. At the same time this document serves witness to the fact also that the Soviet

<sup>1</sup>Kutay, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>*Documenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*, Vol. II (Moscow, 1958), p. 555.

Government considered feasible, under the conditions made possible by the new regime, the carrying out of the decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars of December 29, 1917, regarding Turkish Armenia.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of Soviet Russia expressed the hope that the new government in Ankara would be loyal to the principles proposed in Kemal's letter of April 26, 1920, one of which was the promise to have Turkish Armenia determine its own fate. In a telegram sent by Tchicherin on July 19, 1920, that dealt with the question of negotiations, it was declared to the minister of foreign affairs of the Dashnag government of Armenia:\*

"The friendly relations, which the Soviet Government is trying to bring about with the Turkish national government in Asia Minor, it is, among other things, taking advantage of to obtain adequate land in Asia Minor in order to insure the Armenian people the opportunity for its own development. It was exclusively because of the influence of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Government that the Turkish Nationalists stopped the mobilization of forces which they had started, the object of which was to strike a new blow against the Armenian people. . . . The Soviet Government will continue to follow this same course of impartial, friendly treatment toward the working masses in every nation. And the Armenian people can rest their hope and faith in its lasting friendly treatment, and within the limits of its power on its aid to prevent any catastrophe that threatens the life of the Armenian people."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This resolution, then, reserved the right of Armenians, scattered around the world as a result of the massacres, to return to their country, Turkish Armenia, and to decide the fate of these territories by free and secret ballot. The resolution was not carried out because of predatory aggressive actions taken by sultanist Turkey. This fact is recorded in the collected documents of the USSR, thus: "In February, 1918, by exploiting the incident between Armenian detachments and the Mohammedan population, which they themselves had instigated, the Turks moved their soldiers into the territories of 'Turkish Armenia', and (thereby) deprived the Armenian population of the possibility of applying the right of self-determination provided by the decree of the S.P.C." See *Documenty*, etc., *supra*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1957), p. 712.

<sup>2</sup>*The Great Socialist October Revolution and the Victory of the Soviet Order in Armenia: Collected Documents and Source-Materials* (Erevan, Publication of the Academy of Sciences, Arm. SSR., 1960), p. 353. (*In Armenian.*)

\*In the Caucasus, or part of Russian Armenia, declared a Republic on May 30 (28), 1918. Since November 1920, a member of the USSR. (E.B.C.)

The fact that this decisive stand of the Soviet Government compelled Ankara to postpone its planned attack on Armenia is apparent also from a speech made by Kemal before the Grand National Assembly, in which he revealed the contents of the above-mentioned note and called special attention to the irrevocable opposition of the Soviet to Turkey's invasion of Armenia. It was for this reason, he told the *Medjlis* (the Parliament), that they decided on June 20 to stop the preparations for attack on Armenia by the Eastern Army. For the question of the possibility, the feasibility, of an invasion of Armenia cannot be considered in isolation: "Relations with Armenia constitute a small part, only one side, of the total state of things in the East and of the whole network of mutual relationships between Turkey and the Bolshevik Government."<sup>1</sup>

Having accepted Soviet Russia's offer of mediation, Ankara agreed to send to Moscow a special delegation with a view to showing that it was in favor of settling the question of the territories in dispute by peaceful means. In point of fact, however, Kemalists never abandoned their aggressive intentions; they were simply waiting for an opportune time when they could carry on their detailed plans of long standing.

The Turkish delegation, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bekir Samie Bey, arrived in Moscow on July 19, 1920. It met a number of times with K. V. Tchicherin and his deputy, L. M. Kharakan,\* and was received by V. I. Lenin as well. These meetings and negotiations soon demonstrated that the Turkish government did not intend to abide by the principles it had previously accepted as a basis for the solution of territorial questions. Yet Kemal in his letter of April 26, 1920, had enunciated the main principles of Ankara's foreign policy, which included:

The retention within the boundaries of Turkey of those territories only that were beyond dispute.

The right of national self-determination of Turkish Armenia and of other areas with mixed populations, etc.<sup>2</sup>

On the basis of these principles the Russian Government championed during the Moscow negotiations the determining of

<sup>1</sup>*Ataturkin soylev ve demecleri*, Vol. I, pp. 89-90. See also on the same: Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Siyasi Ratiralari*, "Vatan", Vol. III, no. 14 (1954).

<sup>2</sup>For details see *Dokümenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*, Vol. II (Moscow, 1957), pp. 454-455, p. 725.

\*A distinguished Russian Armenian who held various important government posts. (E.B.C.)

national boundaries in the light of the distribution of ethnic populations prior to the world war. Thus it demanded:

"There shall be a rectification of the boundaries of Turkey, such that areas which are predominantly Mohammedan in population shall be included in Turkey, while those territories which had a majority of Armenians up to 1914 shall be annexed to Armenia."<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding their former commitments in principle, and because of their aggressive intentions against Armenia, they dismissed forthright the just proposals of the Soviet Government and thereby caused the Moscow negotiations to end in failure.

Ali Fuat Cebesoy, a member of the Moscow delegation and the first ambassador of Kemalist Turkey to Soviet Russia, writing about the negotiations in the summer of 1920 in his *Memoirs in Moscow*, published in 1955, attempts to conceal or deny the aggressive plans of the Ankara Government. His account of the actual state of things is such as to characterize the territorial claims of Ankara as perfectly legitimate and as involving decidedly Turkish lands only. He says:

"The Government of Ankara did not entertain any hostile intentions against neighboring countries, and did not pursue any other aim than the achievement of its independence and freedom *within the areas of its national boundaries*."<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

With characteristic misrepresentations Turkish writers hold the Russian Government responsible for the failure of the Moscow negotiations. This is what Professor Enver Behnan Shapolyo insists on in his *History of the Turkish Republic*, that is, that no agreement was reached in Moscow because of the position taken by the Russians, thereby causing the failure of the negotiations.<sup>3</sup> Similar assertions are made by Mukerrem Kamil Su,<sup>4</sup> Professor Esmer,<sup>5</sup> and Tevfik Biyiklioglu, who says:

"The main reason for not ratifying the preliminary agreement for friendly relations signed in Moscow on August 24, 1920, was that the Soviets intended to give territories *encompassing our Eastern vilayets* to the Dashnag Armenians."<sup>6</sup> (Italics ours.)

<sup>1</sup>*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 726-727.

<sup>2</sup>*Moscova hatiralari*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>3</sup>*Turkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi* (Istanbul, 1954), p. 67.

<sup>4</sup>Mukerrem Kamil Su ve Kamil Su, *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi* (Istanbul, 1957), pp. 77-78.

<sup>5</sup>Prof. Ahmet Sukru Esmer, *Turk diplomasisi, 1920-1955*, "Yeni Turkiye" (Istanbul, 1959), p. 69.

<sup>6</sup>*Bellekten* (Temmuz, 1961), p. 479. Cf. also the same author's *Ataturk Anadolu'da* (Ankara, 1959), p. 20.

Then, Biyiklioglu, in the same fraudulent vein, "justifies" the Kemalist invasion of Armenia in the Fall of 1920 by representing it as a peace-promoting action:

"The purpose and end of our military actions against Dashnag Armenia during the brief period of September–October, 1920, was to establish peace and order in that area and to fulfill our 'national pledge'."<sup>1</sup>

What is more, this attack on Armenia, which Kemalist historians represent as a "legitimate" undertaking, did not merely have as its aim the subjugation of Armenia. The attack was at the same time aimed at Soviet Russia, and had all the earmarks of a base anti-Soviet maneuvering which it attempted to conceal. V. I. Lenin saw and wrote about this at the time. In his report on October 9, 1920, *On the Internal and External State of the Republic*, he considered conditions in the Caucasus as involved and complex, and concluded as well that it is likely the Kemalists will not be content with defeating Armenia only: "The Turks commenced their attack on Armenia lately with the intention to occupy Batum, and after that, in all probability, Baku as well."<sup>2</sup>

As to the kind of "peace and order" Kemalist soldiers assured for the areas occupied by them, as a result of the invasion of Armenia in September of 1920, is evident in numerous archival materials and in documents published recently by the ministry of foreign affairs of the USSR. Let us mention some of them:

In one document, which portrays in detail the occupation of Kars by the Turkish army, it was recorded that for two full weeks the peaceful civil population of that city and the surrounding towns was subjected to massacres; that the number of those killed was countless. . . . The same report states that:

"Having captured Kars, the Turks immediately undertook to transport to Sarikhamish and Erzerum everything that was of value — small and heavy firearms, munitions, machinery from factories and laboratories, household furniture," etc.<sup>3</sup>

We find the following in still another communication:

"Those people who were saved from massacre are condemned to starvation and untold privation, since the districts of Kars and Alexan-

<sup>1</sup>Bellefen, 1961, p. 489. See also Cebesoy, *Siyasi Ratilari*, "Vatan", Vol. III, No. 21 (1954).

<sup>2</sup>V. I. Lenin, *Doklad o vnutrennem i vnesnem polozenii Respubliki na Sovescanii aktiva Moskovskoj organizacii RKP(b) 9 oktjabrja 1920 goda*. "Leninskij sbornik", XXXVI (Moscow, Gospolizdat, 1959), p. 131.

<sup>3</sup>CGAKA, f. 109, op. 3, d. 241, l. 12.

dropol are in total economic ruin. The Turks have taken out all the bread, rice, and other foodstuffs from these places. They have left behind not even one single animal, whether that be cow, horse, or sheep—all are headed in droves toward Erzerum. Parallel with this deathly economic breakdown are the relentless massacres which the Turks perpetrated in these same regions from the very first moment they invaded them. . . . The Armenian population of Alexandropol and of some tens of towns in various regions of Armenia have been put to the sword. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

In another document, a memorandum presented by Gosdanashevili to the ministry of foreign affairs of Soviet Georgia, we find described the Turkish occupation of Alexandropol:

"The Turks dismantled all telegraphic equipment, cut the city off from the world outside, and embarked on their monstrous plan—to exterminate a whole people. All roads leading from city to town, from town to city, were closed; they left nothing open. There was no food in the city. There was but one inference to be drawn from this: to starve the people to death. For the Turks the results were glittering: The impoverished inhabitants and the deported were dying in hundreds. Transportation facilities were inadequate to cope with the task of gathering the strewn corpses. . . . According to the figures of a committee formed by local authorities, the losses in life during the period of occupation of the city and the Alexandropol district are approximately as follows: Of the men, 30,000 were murdered, 20,000 were wounded, 16,000 were captives, and 10,000 died from hunger. Of the women, 15,000 were murdered, 5,000 were wounded, 3,000 were taken away as slaves, and 1,000 died from hunger. Of the children, 5,000 were murdered, 3,000 were wounded, and 10,000 died from starvation."<sup>2</sup>

In his telegram of June, 1921, to K. V. Tchicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of RSFSR, Alexander Miasnikian, President of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Armenia, informed him that, following the Turkish evacuation of Alexandropol, thousands of corpses of women and children were discovered in that city's environs.

"The investigating committee has just completed its work, the results of which we report to you for your information. . . ." Then the telegram went on to say: "The committee has counted 12,050 dead bodies in the districts of Aghpoulagh and Tchatchour, of which 80 percent are children of ages 5 to 12. There are numberless corpses of young women and girls." In a summary statement at the end, it said that, on the basis of the findings of the Alexandropol commit-

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, d. 241, f. 12.

<sup>2</sup>*Politarxiv MID SSSR.*, inv. No. 53351, l. 14.

tee, the total number killed by the Turks reached 60,000, of which 30,000 were men, 15,000 women, 5,000 children, and 10,000 young girls. Of the 38,000 wounded, 20,000 were men, 10,000 women, 5,000 young girls, and 3,000 children. Some 18,000 men were carried away as prisoners. Only 2,000 have survived; the rest have died either from starvation, exposure to the elements, or by the sword.<sup>1</sup>

We find the following in a report made by the committee of the district of Alexandropol on December 24, 1920, to the Commissar of Internal Affairs concerning the slaughter and pillage of towns and villages in the area by Turkish soldiers:

"Hitherto unseen and unheard-of crimes are being perpetrated in the rural district. . . . All the towns are plundered, there is nothing left behind — no livestock, no bread, no clothes, nor yet fuel. The streets of these towns are filled with dead bodies. This is nothing yet: All this becomes still more intolerable when the soldiers harass their prisoners and punish the people in more horrible ways. Not content with this, they seek more pleasure by subjecting them to a variety of tortures. They force parents to hand over to these executioners their eight-year-old daughters and 20 to 25 year-old sons. They rape the girls and murder the young men — all this in the presence of parents. This is the way they conducted themselves in all the towns. Young girls and women up to the age of 40 are snatched away — no one knows whereto, while men up to 45 years of age are murdered. These towns are depopulated. The situation has no precedent; it is beyond description."<sup>2</sup>

The hypocrisy, the mendacity, of Turkish writers about the alleged "peaceful" mission of Kemalist forces in Transcaucasia, and specially in Armenia, has deeper roots. Even in the Fall of 1920, when Turkish hordes were penetrating deep into the heart of Armenian territory, putting cities and towns to fire and sword, exterminating the innocent, law-abiding populace, the leaders of the "New Turkey" were proclaiming shamelessly that their bayonets did not signify oppression but liberation from the Dashnag yoke. On the eve of the Turkish attack Kiazim Karabekir made a special announcement to the people of Armenia in which he proclaimed: "The purpose of the Kemalist attack is to liberate at once both the Christians and the Mohammedan population from the Dashnags."<sup>3</sup> And from Tiflis, the representative of the Ankara government, Kiazim Bey, had the gall to announce, after the Turk-

<sup>1</sup>*Arxiv vnesnej politiki SSSR*, f. 132, op. 4, p. 6, d. 14, l. 52.

<sup>2</sup>*The Great Socialist October Revolution and the Victory of the Soviet Order in Armenia*, etc., *supra*, pp. 447-448. (In Armenian)

<sup>3</sup>*Central 'nyj partarxiv IML pri CK KPSS* f. 85, op. 14, d. 21, l. 1.

ish forces had destroyed and pillaged occupied areas and exterminated the inhabitants:

"We are far removed from any intention to destroy Armenia, but wish for an Armenia that is democratically self-governed. Armenia herself can testify to the fact that not even a single oppressive act has been committed by us in the occupied areas."<sup>1</sup>

The appeal to world sentiment by the "Anatolia Agency" on October 23, 1920, was a good example of the fanatical and demagogic public pronouncements of the Kemalists. In this "document", written in French and sent out on behalf of the Ankara Government, Kemalists proffered "explanations" concerning "the clashes between Turkish nationalist forces and *Armenian gangsters* in the Caucasus".<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.) Deliberately distorting the actual picture of things, the Kemalist government produced "official" statistical data in this "appeal", regarding the "cruelties" perpetrated by Armenians against the Mohammedan population in Kars and other areas, "the burning of 199 towns", etc. At the end of this entirely fraudulent declaration the Ankara Government attempted to convince world opinion that "the responsibility for the shedding of blood rests solely upon the Armenians".<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, Kemalists tried to hide their aggressive policy in Transcaucasia by symbolizing it as the struggle for Turkish independence against the Entente, which was a widely entertained sentiment during that period among the masses. A. B. Kadishchev's appraisal in his *Intervention and Civil War in Transcaucasia* is correct, when he says:

"They represented the war against Armenia as a fight against the Entente, which supplied them the opportunity to conceal their aggressive intentions in Transcaucasia."<sup>4</sup>

The aims of that attack were far from what Turkish propaganda presented them as being!

Dashnag detachments undertook on September 24, 1920, to clear the district of Olthie of Turkish forces. It must be noted that the Brest-Litovsk agreement\* had, along with other territories,

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, d. 21, l. 5.

<sup>2</sup>See *Arm. SSR Historical Archives*, f. 200, op. 1, d. 867, l. 40. (In Armenian)

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, f. 200, op. 1, d. 867, l. 41.

<sup>4</sup>A. B. Kadishchev, *Intervencija i grazdanskaja vojna v Zakavkaz's*, p. 321.

\*Peace Treaty signed on March 3, 1918, by Russia and Germany and her allies. (E.B.C.)

handed that district over to the Turks also. But the government of RSFSR had declared this predatory agreement void in a note dated September 20, 1918, in which it accused the Turkish Government of flagrant violation of Article Four of that Treaty, the provision that the future of the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, once parts of the Russian Republic, was to be decided by a free vote of their inhabitants. "Instead," the note charged, "following the signing of the treaty these areas were seized by Turkish armed forces and a military occupational regime established therein, accompanied by intolerable plundering and oppression of the civil-peaceful population. . . ." It then exposed the methods employed by Turkish authorities in conducting the so-called "plebiscite": That the people of these districts were so terrorized in advance and put in such a predicament as to make the right to self-determination reserved for them a shameful joke. That on the eve of election day, all citizens who enjoyed any reputation in these areas were either exiled or arrested, many of whom were even shot to death. That since the election was conducted under the direct control of Turkish authorities, it was not difficult to determine in advance what the outcome would be under the given circumstances.

Having construed the oppressive measures against the population of those districts snatched from Russia as a violation of Article Four of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Soviet Government declared that:

It cannot "accept the so-called expression of the will of the people in the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum; that it holds that the right of the people in these districts to found a new order has not been effected; that, therefore, the question of a new status is still unresolved."<sup>1</sup>

Although the Government of Soviet Russia had declared the Brest-Litovsk Treaty nugatory, making it obligatory for the Ankara Government, therefore, to evacuate its forces from the district of Olthie, the latter was in no way disposed to recognize the rights of Armenia to the territory involved. In point of fact, it had been looking for an excuse for aggressive action. For, from the very beginning Kemalist rulers made their position very clear toward the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Thus, on April 23, 1920, the first day of the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal declared unequivocally in his address that "the boundaries of Turkey must include *Batum, Kars, Ardahan* in the Caucasus, and *Mosul and Diarbekir* in Mesopotamia".<sup>2</sup> (Italics ours.)

<sup>1</sup>*Dokümenty vnesnej politicki SSSR*, Vol. I, pp. 490-491.

<sup>2</sup>*Gazata Gruzija*, 1920, no. 89.

To retain possession of Olthie, the Kemalists undertook "to establish *de jure*" their "rightful" claim to the area on the basis of the predatory treaties of Brest-Litovsk and of Batum. This is what we read in a note sent by Ankara on July 8, 1920, to the Dashnag Government of Armenia:

"As you also well know, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, by which the Armenian Republic was formally recognized, and the Batum Treaty,\* which supplements it, serve as the basis for the existing relations between the two Governments. These treaties are signed by fully empowered representatives, and approved and confirmed by both Governments. Since the Olthie district is included within the three vilayets (Kars, Ardahan, and Batum — the authors), under the terms of the aforementioned treaties, *in compliance with the free vote of the people*, it becomes the absolute possession of the Ottoman State."<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

As to how popular and free was the "free" "plebiscite" administered by the Sultan's Government in 1918 was demonstrated above. Even the French newspaper *Le Bosphore*, of Istanbul, made note of the fact that if Enver annexed the provinces of Kars and Ardahan under the pretext of a "plebiscite" conducted by him, Kemal did not even do that. It wrote:

"Mustafa Kemal demands that the Armenians acknowledge the pact of Brest-Litovsk, that is to say, they agree to cede the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Kemalists, which had earlier been occupied by Enver. And they ask this even though the same pact speaks of a prior plebiscite. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

The Dashnag Government in its reply of July 28 pointed out, however, that the arguments presented by the Ankara Government in its memorandum of July 8 were groundless, since the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum were signed by the Sultan's Government, which Kemalists do not recognize. It stated further on:

"The fact that You accept as premise the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum, which basically do not acknowledge the actual existence of Armenia, deprives us, very much to our pain, of any hope of reaching an understanding with You, since You continue still to be

<sup>1</sup> *Arm. SSR Historical Archives*, f. 200, d. 402, l. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Bjulleten Narodnogo Komissariata inostrannyx del RSFSR*, 1921, No. 57, p. 16.

\*Signed by the Armenian Republic under duress on June 14, 1918, only seven days after its forced declaration of independence following the collapse of the Transcaucasian Sejm (Federation). Georgia and Azerbaijan had declared their independence on May 26 and 27, respectively. (E.B.C.)

dominated by the aims and tendencies of the German Kaiser's and the Sultan's imperialist governments, which have found expression in those Treaties . . ." At the end, the note adds: "Armenia has no intention of making any moves beyond the former Turko-Russian borders. What is of special import is that it has the right to hope that Turkey shall not interfere in any issue that involves Armenian internal affairs. Consequently, Your demand to evacuate the district of Olthie, which forms an integral and undisputable part of the Republic of Armenia, and the aggressive movements of your soldiers in the same district are entirely inconceivable and unpermissible."<sup>1</sup>

The Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR states that "this terminated negotiations, and Kemalists began intensive preparations for an attack."<sup>2</sup>

There are documentary materials of special interest in the Armenian SSR Central Historical Archives relative to Kemalist military maneuvers and preparations, in one of which we read:

"1. Regiments (17, 28, 29, and 36) of the 15th Army stationed along the border were concentrated in the district of Bartous and Olthie. A general call to arms of men up to 40 was made. Harsh measures were taken against desertion. They succeeded fully in supplying each of these regiments with 1000 to 1100 bayonets—a total of 4000 to 4500.

"2. They organized two local companies, 2000 fighters, from among the Mohammedans of the district of Tortoum and Nariman.

"3. They sent agitators and spies into the district of Olthie among Kurds and Turks, who succeeded in organizing in northern sections of the district a number of *chetehs*, a total of close to 1000 'irregulars'.

"Finally, to reinforce this body of armed might they dispatched from Erzerum to Bartous as many as 400 gendarmes.

"Thus in this way the Turks were able to bring together, in the Bartous and Olthie district alone, up to 4500 regular soldiers and 3000 to 3500 irregulars."<sup>3</sup>

Mustafa Kemal himself acknowledges that they resolved for the second time to attack Armenia in September:

*"We decided at that time to launch an attack on Armenia. We were busy with preliminary preparations. The necessary orders and instructions had been given to the commander of the Eastern front."*<sup>4</sup> (Italics ours.)

<sup>1</sup>Arm. SSR Historical Archives, f. 200, op. 1, d. 402, l. 19. See also *Bjulleten Narodnogo*, etc. As above, pp. 16–17.

<sup>2</sup>*Bjulleten* . . ., as above, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>Arm. SSR Historical Archives, f. 200, op. 1, d. 867, l. 19.

<sup>4</sup>Mustafa Kemal, *Put novoj Turcii*, Vol. III, p. 108.

The French newspaper, *Le Journal d'Orient*, in an article entitled, *How Kemalists Decided to Attack Armenia*, published on October 19, 1920, exposed the plans for attack by Kemalists, from which we quote in part:

"In search of some sensationalistically adventurous action, which they could exploit to boost the demoralized spirit of the population of Anatolia, Kemalists in Ankara conceived the project of a general attack on Armenia under the personal sponsorship of Mustafa Kemal himself, about which governmental bodies in Constantinople were undoubtedly informed in advance. Except that those in Constantinople did not know what kind of preliminary preparations predated this sudden decision. On September 7, the commander of the 15th Regiment, Kiazim Karabekir, arrived in Ankara from Erzerum, where on the very next day a meeting of the Supreme Military Council was called under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. Attending the meetings were Generals Ahmed Fevzin, Mouhaetten, Ali Fuat and Nouretin, and Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of the General Staff.

"General Kiazim Karabekir declared that a *general attack on Armenia was a must . . .*

"The Council then asked him if his forces were adequate, and if he was confident of total victory for Kemalists arms.

"Kiazim Karabekir answered that he has under him four divisions, two of which are under the command of Remzie.

"Each of these divisions numbered 8- to 9,000 men and would receive the aid of Turkish and Kurdish irregular forces. Although Turkish artillery at the Moslem front was still disorganized, according to Kiazim, it was nevertheless adequate.

"Now there was only one question that still remained unanswered for Mustafa Kemal, that is, the position of Georgia, in the event of an attack on Armenia, which was known to have an army that, however small in number, was very well organized."<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

The same article then states that a secret delegation, headed by Yusouf Kemal Bey, was sent to Tiflis, where it met with Geordania, the president of the Supreme Council of Georgia, and Keketchgorie, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and received their assurances that "in the event of a Kemalist-Armenian conflict, Georgia will declare its strict neutrality. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

Whereupon the Kemalist army took advantage of events in the district of Olthie to launch its attack.

It should be noted that contemporary Turkish writers not only

<sup>1</sup>*Le journal d'Orient*, no. 704, October 19, 1920. (See Arm. SSR Historical Archives, f. 200, op. 1, d. 443, l. 36-37.)

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

openly write about the previously planned invasion of Armenia but also acknowledge the fact that Kemalist forces started the military operations. This is what Professor Enver Ziya Karal, for instance, says in *The New Turkey*, published recently: "Our invasion movement of September 24, 1920, against Armenia ended in our decisive victory."<sup>1</sup> Professor Ahmed Shoukrou Esmer writes the same thing in his lengthy article, *Turkish Diplomacy during 1920-55*, which appears in the same work.<sup>2</sup>

When it embarked on its already well-planned invasion, the Ankara Government took stock also of the fact that Soviet Russia was occupied with a war against Polish interventionists and that it had transferred a number of divisions of its forces in the Caucasus to the Polish front. Thus the Turkish rulers found conditions that prevailed at the time favorable for embarking upon their aggressive program — to put an end to Armenia as a sovereign state and to place Soviet Russia before an accomplished fact.

Furthermore, they had still other motives behind this invasion. By subjugating Eastern Armenia, they wished to demonstrate the absolute inapplicability of the Sèvres Treaty\* and thereby influence as well the policy of the Allied Powers toward Turkey. Concerning this intention of the Turkish Government *The London Times* of December 22, 1920, says:

"... Mustafa Kemal invaded Armenia in order to occupy Kars and Ardahan. It occurs to him that by conquering Armenia, he shall be able to exert pressure upon the Entente and America."<sup>3</sup>

Turkish forces were able to occupy a major portion of Arme-

<sup>1</sup>H. R. Ertug, *et al.*, *Yeni Turkiye* (Istanbul, 1959), p. 58.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>3</sup>*Bjulleten Narodnogo*, etc., 1920, No. 25, p. 36. (Trans. from the Armenian. E.B.C.)

\*The peace treaty with Turkey, signed August 10, 1920, by representatives of the Sultan, the Allied Powers, and the Armenian Republic, which was recognized by all signatory powers. Turkey also agreed to the extension of the boundaries of the Armenian Republic to include territories in Turkish Armenia. The task of drawing up the map of a united and free Armenia was entrusted to President Wilson who, on November 22, 1920, awarded to the Armenian Republic some 40,000 square miles, comprising the stipulated Armenian provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. This boundary decision was binding on all signatory powers. These and other historically Armenian territories, such as, Kars and Ardahan, are still part of Turkey. The Sèvres instrument was formally buried by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Kemalist Turkey and the Allied Powers on July 24, 1923. . . . The U. S. Senate rejected it in 1927. (E.B.C.)

nia in a very short time after the invasion. Soviet Russia once again attempted to intervene to put an end to that ludicrous war, and to save Armenia from total destruction. The Soviet Government of Russia was even ready to give military aid to Armenia. This is borne out by a statement made by LeGrand, representative of the RSFSR, to the Dashnag Government, on November 19, 1920, that if the Armenian Government were to seek military aid from Soviet Russia, that it would be given; that Soviet Russia could not remain indifferent to the Kemalists invasion, since

"that aggression has begun to take on a *purely imperialistic character*. The fulfillment of such Turkish aims would thereby bring about the strengthening of the imperialist predilections of Kemalists, which in turn would change the original nature of that movement as a liberationist movement. For Armenia to have Kars would not transform Armenia into an imperialistic country; whereas, if it were in Turkey's possession, in the event of changes in the disposition of Kemalists, it could play that very role. It is entirely obvious that the creation of such a change in character would present a decided threat to Russia, and that is contrary to the interests of Soviet Russia."<sup>1</sup>

During that same discussion, LeGrand turns to the question of military aid to Armenia and states definitely that, as a result of the victory over Wrangel and the liquidation of the Polish front, Soviet Russia possesses sufficient available forces which it is ready to employ immediately to prevent the Kemalists advance and thus free Armenia's territory of Turkish occupation.<sup>2</sup>

V. I. Lenin discusses this question in detail in his well-known address, *On Our Internal and External State and the Problems of the Party*, delivered on November 21, 1920, before the Moscow regional convention of the RC(b)P, in which he says:

"Developments in the Caucasus at the present time are very complicated and extremely difficult to appraise. We may, therefore, be engulfed in war any day. But such a war should not be terrifying now, in view of the almost completed settlement with Poland and the total liquidation of Wrangel. If such a war is hoisted on us, then that would mean for us *still more strengthening of our forces and of our position*. . . . We can look upon such a turn of events calmly, for it will be a war confined to a remote corner of the land. *This, in turn, will give our side perfect superiority of power, which probably will be even more profitable for us than what we got from the Polish war.*"<sup>3</sup>

All this shows conclusively that Soviet Russia was favorably

<sup>1</sup>See *Arm. SSR Historical Archives*, f. 300, op. 1, d. 867, l. 332-333, 335-336.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>V. I. Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 31, p. 520.

disposed toward, and was capable of rendering military assistance to, Armenia, even at the risk of war with Turkey.<sup>1</sup> Had the Dashnag government agreed to accept that assistance, the Armenian people would have avoided additional sacrifices of tens of thousands of lives and new territorial losses. However, the Dashnags preferred to come to an agreement with the Turkish plunderers, hoping thereby to prolong their rule a little longer with the help of the latter.

The Turkish invasion of 1920 ended with the defeat of the Dashnags and the signing of the crushing treaty of Alexandropol. Following the footsteps of Kemal<sup>2</sup>, Turkish writers speak of it with special pride and bluster as "the first international agreement of the new Turkish state"<sup>3</sup>, concealing from their readers the fact that, since that treaty was signed by a government that had been already overthrown, it had no *de jure* status. Nor do they tell them that the Turks failed to enforce the predatory terms of that treaty because of the establishment of a Soviet regime in Armenia and of the firm stand taken by Soviet Russia. As a result, the Treaty of Alexandropol<sup>4</sup> was not recognized either by Soviet Armenia or by Soviet Russia, and, along with the agreements of Moscow and Kars, was declared void by them.

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<sup>1</sup>We deem it necessary to call attention to the fact that many of our historians unduly overemphasize the danger of the possibility of the Entente taking advantage of the Kemalists to promote their anti-Soviet policy. They represent the situation as if Soviet Russia was fearful of such an eventuality; that, in order to forestall it, it was, therefore, constrained to make major concessions. Such a viewpoint has no basis in fact whatever. In truth, the newly-created Soviet Republic had been able to turn back the invasion by fourteen nations, organized by the Entente, and to come out the victor in that unequal struggle. Furthermore, at the time when Kemalists invaded Transcaucasia, Soviet Russia had already completed the crushing of the interventionists and the internal anti-revolutionary elements. On the other hand, England, the power that inspired the Entente, having taken stock of the real situation, was engaged in negotiating with RSFSR for a trade agreement, and signed that pact on the very same day that the Turco-Soviet agreement was signed, namely, on March 16, 1921.

<sup>2</sup>Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 119.

<sup>3</sup>Prof. Dr. Ahmet Sukru Esmer, *Türk Diplomasisi, 1920-1955*, in "Yeni Türkiye" (Istanbul, 1959), p. 69.

<sup>4</sup>Negotiations for the armistice treaty of December 2, 1920, to end the disastrous Turco-Armenian war, began in September; Kiazim Karabekir's forces were now pounding at the very gates of Erevan.

In point of fact, this treaty was invalid since the Dashnag Government was not in existence, *de facto* or *de jure*, at the time of signing. It

Yet, Turkish writers falsely claim that Soviet Russia did recognize the Alexandropol Treaty. "According to the instrument signed on March 16, 1921", writes Professor Karal, "the Moscow government did recognize the agreement the Armenians signed with us."<sup>1</sup> (Reference is to the Alexandropol Treaty—authors.) Tefvik Biyiklioglu asserts that the present boundaries between Turkey and the Soviet Union were drawn by the treaties of *Alexandropol*, Moscow and Kars.<sup>2</sup> Unal's statement repeats the same refrain: "The Treaty of Kiumrie\* was followed by those of Moscow and Kars."<sup>3</sup> But there is more to come! With shameless disregard for truth, and with intent to cover up the predatory character of the Alexandropol Treaty, this same author attempts this lame justification:

"The Armenians were compelled by the Kiumrie Treaty to resign for our benefit *from those territories of ours* lost by the Ottoman Empire in 1878."<sup>4</sup> (Italics ours.) According to him, by the terms of the Alexandropol Treaty Turkey was to receive back those territories, namely, Kars and Ardahan, which were annexed to Russia by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. This is an absolute falsehood. First, because those lands are *historically* integral parts of Armenia, lands which Turks falsely identify as theirs originally.<sup>5</sup> Second, because Turkey grabbed not only those Armenian territories by the Treaty of Alexandropol but also others that are parts of Eastern Armenia.

We now see that Turkish historians, along with their justifying Turkish aggression against Armenia, "legalize" as well "a portion" of the results of that aggression — the predatory Treaty of Alexan-

<sup>1</sup>Prof. Enver Ziya Karal, *Birinci Cihan harbinden Lozan muahedesine Kadar Turkiyenin siyasi olaylari*, "Yeni Turkiye" (Istanbul, 1959), p. 58.

<sup>2</sup>See his *Ataturk Anadoluda*, p. 76.

<sup>3</sup>Tahsin Unal, *1700 den 1958 e Kadar Turk Siyasi Tarih* (Ankara, 1958), p. 270.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>See also *Bellesten*, Temmuz 1961, p. 487.

\*i.e., Alexandropol, now Leninakan, second largest metropolis in Soviet Armenia. (E.B.C.)

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had, in an extraordinary assembly during November 30 to December 1, 1920, attended as well by other Dashnag leaders, voted preference for Russian over Turkish orientation, declared Armenia a Socialist Republic on December 1, relinquished the reins of government to the Bolsheviks, and signed an agreement with the Soviets some time prior to the signing of the treaty with the Turks, whereby among other concessions, Armenian signatories relinquished rights in Turkish Armenia provided by the Treaty of Sèvres. For other details, see text. (E.B.C.)

dropol, by which the territory of Armenia was limited to the districts of Erevan and Lake Sevan, which in point of fact should have been subjected as well to Turkish domination! According to Article Two of the Treaty of Alexandropol the districts of Nakhitchevan, Sharour and Shahtakhtie were specifically put under Turkish rule. Turkey was given the right "to supervise the railroads and other means of transportation" (Article Eleven), "to undertake military measures in the territory of Armenia", and so on.<sup>1</sup> As it is justly remarked, in the *Soviet Historical Encyclopedia*, "By the Treaty of Alexandropol Armenia in essence became a vilayet [province] of Turkey."<sup>2</sup>

Turkish falsifications of historical fact and of documentary evidence have reached such heights as to claim that their aggressive operations and the subjugation of others' lands have been "contributions" to the victory of the Soviet order in Transcaucasia. We thus find Tevfik Biyiklioglu writing in the July, 1961, issue of the *Bulletin*, published by The Historical Society of Turkey:

"During the time when Soviet Russia was extremely preoccupied with internal clashes and the war with Poland, its forces in Transcaucasia — in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, were weak and disorganized. And the sovietization of those states and peoples was made possible by virtue of Turkish assistance only."<sup>3</sup> (Italics ours.)

But, what was that "assistance" rendered by Kemalist Turkey? Was it that the Turkish invasion of Transcaucasia had caused the Armenian people still more untold catastrophes and sacrifices? Was that "assistance" in the form of destruction of Armenian lives and property? For it is reported in *The Soviet Historical Encyclopedia* that:

"on the basis of incomplete data the number of victims in just the areas occupied by the Turks, as a result of the Turco-Armenian war, was close to 198,000 lives, [and] the value of the properties destroyed and appropriated by the Turks is estimated at eighteen million gold rubles."<sup>4</sup>

Actually, Kemalists continued their predatory policy in Transcaucasia after the establishment of the Soviet system in Armenia, at the same time revealing clearly their anti-Soviet attitude. If

<sup>1</sup>Prof. Ju. V. Kljuchnikov and Prof. A. V. Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaja politika novejshego vremeni v dogovorax, notay i diklaracijay*, Part III, no. 2 (Moscow, 1929), pp. 71-73.

<sup>2</sup>*Sovetskaja istoricheskaja enciklopedija*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1961), p. 748.

<sup>3</sup>*Bulletin*, Temmuz 1961, p. 488. See also the same author's *Ataturk Anadolu'da*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>4</sup>*Supra*. Vol. I, p. 748.

Kemalist leaders were declaring demagogically on the eve of their invasion of Armenia that their attack of "short duration" had as its aim the liberation of the working masses of Armenia from the Dashnag yoke, they still continued to pursue the same policy against Armenia after its sovietization, as they had against Armenia ruled by the Dashnag party.

The overthrow of Dashnag rule and the sovietization of Armenia brought about radical changes in Transcaucasia, thereby creating a real opportunity to effect a just and durable peace between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Armenia. The spirit of the new Armenia was expressed by the Military — Revolutionary Committee's declaration, of November 29, 1920, proclaiming the founding of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic. That statement said in part:

"We believe the Turkey that is freed of its imperialistic yoke will extend a fraternal hand to us, now that we have vanquished our enemy and are together engaged in battle against the ravenous Entente. We are also convinced that it will not be the victor's sword that will suggest the conditions for the conciliation to come between Soviet Armenia and the workingman's Turkey, but the fraternal geniality and cooperativeness of the free peoples of Soviet Armenia and the workingman's Turkey."<sup>1</sup>

Let us now see how Kemalist Turkey treated Armenia after its sovietization.

With no consideration whatever of the new established order, the Ankara Government undertook to put into effect the enslaving provisions of the Treaty of Alexandropol. The Soviet Government of Armenia, in a memorandum on December 10, 1920, to Ahmed Moukhdar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, said that it expected of the Ankara Government to declare void the peace treaty signed with the Dashnags, and agree to calling a conference soon,

"to come to an understanding in the light of the new conditions consequent upon the revolutionary changes. The Soviet Government, therefore, considers that very necessary, since it has in its possession abundant information which, notwithstanding the new turn of events, definitely points to kinds of activities in the areas occupied by the Turkish military command, that cannot be explained in any other way than that the hostile, implacable policy toward Armenia is still being pursued. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*The Great Socialist Revolution of October and the Victory of the Soviet Order in Armenia*, p. 405. (In Arm.)

<sup>2</sup>*Documenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959, p. 379.

The Ankara Government's note of December 15, 1920, not only indicated that Turkey was unwilling to give up the Treaty of Alexandropol, but it endeavored to "establish" its rights to the seized Armenian territories.

"The Turco-Armenian Treaty," it declared disdainfully, "is an agreement that is not based on force, but on the right of self-determination of nations, and we desire to annex only territories with Turkish populations."<sup>1</sup> (Italics ours.)

And in its memorandum of February 5, 1921, the Ankara Government further asserted that "the Treaty of Alexandropol does not represent force, but justice, the carrying out of which is a prerequisite to establishing peace in the Caucasus". With crude misrepresentation of actual conditions, the Kemalist Government insisted in the same note that "the areas ceded to Turkey were populated mainly by Turks."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, with utter disregard of the fact that a new, a Soviet, regime now existed in Armenia, and of the new Government's declaration of principles concerning foreign policy, which were proposed as the basis for a discussion of the problems of determining mutual friendly relations and of establishing a just peace, the Kemalist Government continued its aggressive operations against the Armenian people. And, if it had not been for the Government of Soviet Russia, the Armenian people would have been subjected to further sufferings and privations by Kemalist occupation forces.

The government of the RSFSR declared unequivocally that it did not recognize the predacious Treaty of Alexandropol. In his telegram of December 11, 1920, to K. G. Ortchoniktze, member of the Military-Revolutionary Council of the Caucasian theatre of war, Tchicherin proposed that the Turks be made to understand that the Soviet Government demands "the clearing of the Alexandropol district and the withdrawal from the province of Kars of Turkish soldiers."<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, Tchicherin sent a note directly to Turkey's Grand National Assembly on December 19, in which he said that, in order to demonstrate its feelings of cordiality towards the Soviet Government, as well as toward the workers and farmers of Armenia and all Soviet Republics, the Ankara Government

"should take the necessary steps so that the Turkish army may clear without delay the province of Alexandropol and all areas to the

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 397.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 487-488.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 380.

north and east of the province of Kars, the occupation of which . . . must not determine in advance the Turco-Armenian boundary line."<sup>1</sup>

In still another telegram sent to Ortchonikze on January 18, 1921, Tchicherin reiterated this stand of the Soviet Government: "Every task of each and every Soviet Republic is also our task, and we cannot be faithful to ourselves if we looked upon the destruction of a brother Soviet Republic with indifference."<sup>2</sup> At the time of the second conference, begun on February 26, 1921, in Moscow, the delegation of the Ankara Government, taking advantage of the overthrow for a brief period of the Soviet regime in Erevan by an adventurous act of the Dashnags\*, once again came forward with the demand that the question of boundaries be settled in accordance with the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Alexandropol. Furthermore, by exploiting the same temporary turn of events, the Turks refused to negotiate with the representatives of Soviet Armenia, which had been invited to join the conference.

The determined position taken by the Government of Soviet Russia forced the Turkish delegation to resign from the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Alexandropol. And on March 16, 1921, an agreement was signed by RSFSR and Turkey, whereby Turkey received a large portion of the areas its armies had occupied in Transcaucasia. The ceded area was 24,997 sq. kilometers, with a population of 572,000, which until 1914 was part of the Russian Empire. (It involved the province of Kars, Gaghuzvan, Ardahan, Arthvin, the southern sector of the province of Batum, and the district of Sourmalu.)

As a result of the invasion of Transcaucasia in the years 1920 and 1921, the Kemalists succeeded in partly fulfilling their plans for territorial aggrandizement which they had inherited from the Turkey of the Sultans.

This is what the French language newspaper, *Le Bosphore*, had to say again about the territorial usurpations of Kemalists:

"Mustafa Kemal can no longer pretend that he is protecting exclusively Turkish territories. . . . Kemal is pursuing Enver's policy."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 393.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 479.

<sup>3</sup>See *Bjulleten Narodnogo Komissariata inostrannyx del RSFSR*, 1921, No. 57, p. 16.

\*Known as the February revolt, commenced on the 18th. The interim Dashnag rule and the accompanying fratricidal carnage lasted well-nigh forty-five days. (E.B.C.)

Even after these territorial concessions, the Kemalists government continued to retain its soldiers in the district of Alexandropol within the territory of Soviet Armenia, although it was obligated by the Moscow Treaty to withdraw them without delay.

Not until April 22, 1921, did the Turks leave Alexandropol and its environs, and this only after A. I. Gheker, Commander of the 11th Army, presented the following ultimatum to Karabekir on April 13, upon instructions from the Soviet Government:

"In order to prevent any unpleasant misunderstandings, which may come about presently . . . we request of you to take immediate steps to evacuate the province of Alexandropol and to withdraw the Turkish forces beyond the boundaries drawn by the Moscow Treaty. In case I am not advised by you as to the withdrawal of such armed forces, I shall be compelled to order the Red army into the area in question. Should this happen, I absolve myself of any and all responsibility for such consequences as may follow from such an action."<sup>1</sup>

In addition, Kemalists exploited the weaknesses of the Menshevik regime in Georgia\*, and in conspiracy with native Mensheviks attempted to extend their territorial possession at the expense of that country also, by involving it in the anti-Soviet bloc, made up of all the anti-revolutionary, displaced governments of Transcaucasia.

On March 17, 1921, that is, on the very next day following the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, the Ankara forces, in clear violation of the territorial provisions of that Treaty, occupied Batum. Apropos of this action we find Kiazim Bey, the representative of the Ankara Government in Tiflis, Georgia, saying in his order:

"By decision of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, based upon our national rights that are confirmed by duly signed treaties at various times, the region of Batum, the provinces of Aghalkalak and Aghaltzeka are being returned on this day to the folds of the Motherland, and, politically and administratively, will be subject to the Turkish National Government."<sup>2</sup>

It was only because of the speedy action taken by the 11th Army in Transcaucasia that these areas in Soviet Georgia were liberated from the Turkish usurpers. Red battalions entered Batum

<sup>1</sup>See *Bulletin (social sciences)*, Academy of Science of the Arm. SSSR, 1957, No. 2, pp. 97-98. (In Arm.)

<sup>2</sup>See *CGAOR Gruz.* SSSR, f. 13s, op. 1, ed. xr. 66, l. 33.

\*Became a Soviet Republic on February 25, 1921. Azerbaijan's sovietization occurred on April 28, 1920. (E.B.C.)

on March 18, and on March 21 the last of the Turkish detachments laid down their arms, and surrendered.

It is these aggressive operations of the Kemalist regime in Transcaucasia which Turkish historians represent as "assistance" in the successful establishment of the Soviet order therein. . . .

## 7

### EMERGENCE OF A MUTILATED ARMENIAN SSR (1920-1921):

*Just short of total annihilation! Rancor and  
machinations continue.*

Young Turk - Kemalists

WE FIND THE HISTORY of events leading to the signing of the Treaties of Kars and Moscow also misrepresented in the works of contemporary Turkish historians. They accuse Soviet Russia for the delay in signing the 1921 Moscow pact. This is what Professor Ziya Karal is, in effect, saying:

"The Soviets were in no hurry to sign the 1921 treaty. They awaited developments to get a clear picture of the authority of the Grand National Assembly." In his opinion, the Moscow Treaty was signed "as a result of the victories over the Armenians in the East and over the Greeks in the West in the first battle at Inonou, as well as the invitation Turkey received from the Entente powers to the London Conference."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, according to Karal, it was under the compelling influences of these events that led Soviet Russia to sign the treaty of March 16, 1921. This twisting of the facts is actually intended to serve him so that he might represent the new state of things in the brightest colors: to picture the Turkey of the day as a very strong nation, with which the Great Powers of the West had to reckon, and, thus, to justify his rejecting the value of, and the need for, the Moscow Treaty for his country.

<sup>1</sup>Karal, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

Let us consider one by one the "facts" adduced by this historian: Was it Turkey's victory over Armenia, that was in virtual ruin under the Dashnag rule, which was the proof of the striking power of the Ankara government? Under the circumstances such a victory was not difficult of attainment, particularly when Kemalists had concentrated their main armed might, early in the Summer of 1920, against Armenia, as we have already pointed out. What about his other argument? Was it really the first battle (in January, 1921) at Inonou which decided the successful outcome of Turkey's national-liberationist movement? Turkish arms barely succeeded in staying the advance of the Greek army, and this with great difficulty. Nor did the Turks attempt to push forward. Even after that defeat, the Greeks represented a formidable force, had notable successes, and in August, 1921, were within range of Ankara. Now it is a fact that the Treaty of Moscow was signed six months before the Turkish army, commanded by Kemal, defeated the Greeks in September, 1921, in the battle of Sakaria. And it took another year to achieve a decisive victory over the Greeks near Domloupinar.

Although Karal mentions the London Conference, he does not say a word about its wretched failure. This meeting of the Allied powers during February and March, 1921, concerned itself also with the Near Eastern question with a view to re-considering the Treaty of Sèvres. Kemalists had entertained great hopes in connection with this conference; they thought that England was ready to make definite concessions. But the negotiations failed to give any aid or comfort whatsoever to Kemalists. The specific proposals of the Ankara delegation involving the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres — the re-establishment of the 1913 boundaries of Turkey in Europe, the evacuation of Greek forces from the Smyrna district, the fixing of boundaries with Armenia in compliance with the Treaty of Alexandropol — all these proposals the conservative *London Times* declared "ludicrous demands" on February 25, 1921. Subsequently, Kemal himself acknowledged that the Turkish delegation at the London Conference was convinced that, "The Entente nations wished to guarantee the unobstructed carrying out of the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres."<sup>1</sup>

During the Conference the leader of the Turkish delegation, Bekir Sami Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, carried on secret negotiations with Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of England. Sami Bey proposed Turkish membership in the anti-Soviet bloc of powers with a view to creating a buffer state between the West and

<sup>1</sup>M. Kemal, *Put 'novoj Turcii*, Vol. III, p. 200.

Soviet Russia by uniting with Turkey the mountaineers of northern Transcaucasia.<sup>1</sup> Because of the failure of the London Conference to promote the fulfillment of the national aims of Turkey and the disclosure of the fact of secret negotiations, the Ankara Government was forced to dismiss Sami Bey, as well as blamed him for the guilt in negotiating secretly with Lloyd George.

Thus, their ignominious failure at the London Conference, as well as the threats of a new attack by the Greeks, compelled Kemalists to approach the Turco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow at the time with more seriousness. It was after this change of attitude that an agreement was reached, and the signing of the Treaty on March 16 made possible.

Turkish historians deliberately pass over certain salient factors when they, wholly unjustifiably, blame the government of RSFSR for undue procrastination in reaching an agreement at Moscow. There is documentary evidence to prove that Soviet Russia had accepted in principle, as early as November, 1920, to call a conference in Moscow for a Turco-Soviet treaty. For instance, the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RC(b)P on November 27, under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, having appraised prevailing conditions in Transcaucasia, decided that an immediate settlement of peace and order therein was an absolute necessity.<sup>2</sup> On December 1, 1920, Tchicherin telegraphed P. V. LeGrand, the representative of RSFSR in Armenia, instructing the latter to explain the position of his government on certain issues involving Transcaucasia.

"We wish to know", wrote Tchicherin, "if the Turkish Government has received the first draft<sup>3</sup> of the treaty, which we and Bekir Sami Bey prepared, and which was sent to Ankara with Yousuf Kemal. Does the Turkish Government consider it acceptable, and how does it feel about those matters which caused disagreement between us and Bekir Sami, and about which the latter could not come to any decision."<sup>4</sup>

And on December 9, 1920, the Government of the RSFSR in a memorandum, which welcomed the calling of a Turco-Soviet conference, stated that it was necessary to have representatives of

<sup>1</sup>See Halide Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York, London, 1928), p. 255.

<sup>2</sup>*Leninskij sbornik*, XXXVI, p. 144.

<sup>3</sup>This refers to the August 24 preliminary version of the Soviet-Turkish treaty signed by the conferees.

<sup>4</sup>*Dokumenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, pp. 364-365.

Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan present at this conference, since it must "decide on territorial and other issues involving those Governments and Turkey and Russia."<sup>1</sup>

Karal's 'exposition' of the reasons for the signing of the 1921 treaty is not unique. Altemur Kilic, equally guilty of distorting the course of events involved in Soviet-Turkish relations in his book published in the United States, in essence repeats the same falsehood, when he says:

"The 1921 treaty was signed only after the victories, first against the Armenians, then against the Greeks on the Western front, convinced the Soviet leaders that the star of Turkey was once more on the move."<sup>2</sup>

Similar misrepresentations are made in the treatments of the Treaty of Kars, signed on October 13, 1921, by Turkey and the Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia.

If Professor Karal attributes the delay in effecting an agreement at Moscow to the policy of Soviet Russia, on the other hand, Mukerrem Kamil Su and Kamil Su do the very same thing for the Treaty of Kars in their textbook, *The History of the Turkish Republic*, thus:

"Before the Russians came forward to act as mediator, they wished to determine the strength and power of the Turkish government. They, therefore, waited for a while. It was only after the great victory of the Turkish army near Sakaria that they acknowledged to themselves the strength of the new Turkish government, whereupon they mediated between us and the Caucasian Republics in the signing of the treaty."<sup>3</sup>

This deliberate falsification by Turkish writers, let us note, is "founded" on *Tarih (History)*, prepared by the Turkish Historical Commission, in which we read:

"The Moscow government delayed for a time the signing of the Treaty of Kars. It was only after the victory of the Turks on the Sakaria River that it signed that treaty."<sup>4</sup>

In point of historical fact it was Turkey which was responsible for the procrastination of negotiations, the delaying tactics employed, to reach an agreement with the Transcaucasian Republics.

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 371.

<sup>2</sup>Altemur Kilic, *Turkey and the World* (Washington, 1959), p. 39. (Trans. from the Arm. text. E.B.C.)

<sup>3</sup>*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1957), p. 85.

<sup>4</sup>*Tarih*, Vol. IV, "Turkiye Cumhuriyeti" (Istanbul, 1934), pp. 103-104.

This is amply borne out both by source-materials found in archives, as well as by additional facts and documents brought to light in recent times.

The Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921, made provision for the signing of an agreement between Turkey and the Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia for the purpose of establishing orderly and normal relations between these states. But the Ankara government itself, under one pretext or another, repeatedly postponed those negotiations. And the basic reason for these postponements and delays was Turkey's unwillingness to resign from its determination to implement the predacious Treaty of Alexandropol, which the Moscow Treaty had declared null and void. This fact is made crystal-clear in Tchicherin's memorandum of April 8, 1921, to Ali Fuat, the Ambassador of Turkey in Moscow:

"I cannot conceal from you," wrote Tchicherin, "the great astonishment which I felt upon learning of the statement made by Kemal Fevzi Pasha, Minister of War in the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

"The Minister of War declares in particular that the Turkish Army must remain on the Eastern front to serve the role of a balancing force. It is difficult for me to see what other military force it is intended to counteract, in order to sustain the balance of power in the Caucasus. Since the only other military power in that area is the Red army of the united Soviet Republics, the inference is drawn that, in the judgment of the Minister of War, the Turkish army must play a role inimical to Soviet forces and as a counterbalancing power against Soviet military might."

Whereupon the memorandum observes that the Minister's statement wholly contravenes the provisions of the Moscow Treaty, and constitutes a hostile act against Soviet arms. Referring to that portion of the declaration by Fevzi Pasha in which he had asserted that the evacuation of the territories of Armenia occupied by the Turkish army will be carried out only after the execution of the terms of the Alexandropol Treaty, the Government of Soviet Russia declared in no uncertain terms that it considers "the desire to put into effect the Treaty of Alexandropol as tantamount to abrogating the Treaty of Moscow."<sup>1</sup>

Tchicherin in a telegram to K. G. Ortcheniktze instructed him to convey to the Ankara Government that it was necessary to effect without delay the new boundaries drawn by the Moscow Confer-

<sup>1</sup>*Documenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, pp. 53-54.

ence and to evacuate Alexandropol immediately of all Turkish soldiers:

"Convey strong objections in our name to Karabekir Pasha's declaration that he does not want to evacuate Alexandropol, and inform as well the Government of the Grand National Assembly of our irrevocable insistence that the Turkish forces must withdraw with dispatch beyond the boundary lines determined in Moscow. Point out the fatal consequences that may ensue from a clash between the forces of the Red Army and Turkish soldiers . . ." Once again the Government of RSFSR reminds the ruling circles in Ankara that "all Soviet Republics are closely tied to Soviet Russia with an inviolable pact."<sup>1</sup>

Even after these admonitions and reminders, the Turkish Government persisted in a devious and covert manner to hang on to the Treaty of Alexandropol.

Representatives at the Moscow Conference had agreed that the Turkish delegation would stop over at Tiflis, Georgia, to negotiate a treaty with the three Republics in Transcaucasia. Yet upon their arrival Yousuf Kemal, head of the delegation and Minister of Foreign Affairs, unexpectedly announced that he can only sign a treaty with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and that he is not empowered to carry on negotiations with Armenia. This is the reason, therefore, the planned conference between the three Republics and Turkey did not take place. Yet, the Ankara Government attempted to hoist the responsibility for the failure on Soviet Russia and the three Soviet Republics by accusing them of not honoring Article 15<sup>2</sup> of the Moscow Treaty. In his communication of June 6, 1921, Tchicherin himself answered the charge that article 15 had not been carried out only because the Turkish delegation had made it impossible to negotiate a treaty between the Transcaucasian Republics and Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

It was as late as June 14 when the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs received word from Ali Fuad, the Turkish Ambassador, that his country agrees to negotiating a pact with all three Republics of Transcaucasia. The delay of three more months subsequently was also caused by the stand taken by Ankara.

Contrary to its original proposal to have the conference at

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup>Article 15 obligated Soviet Russia to take the necessary steps to assure the approval by the three Transcaucasian Republics of those Articles of this Treaty that concerned them. See *Documenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, p. 602.

<sup>3</sup>*Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 169.

Kars,<sup>1</sup> the Government of Turkey now suggested Ankara, which was altogether unsuitable for the Republics of Transcaucasia (because of the lack of facilities for the delegations to communicate with their respective governments). Tchicherin's reply of August 8, 1921, rejected that proposal, and gave the additional reason that Ankara was too close to the theater of war. Turkey insisted on its proposal once again, but to no avail.

These facts, therefore, clearly disprove the contentions of Turkish historians that the Soviets were responsible for the delays in negotiating the Treaty of Kars. What is more, because of the persistent attempts of the Kemalists to impose the Treaty of Alexandropol on Soviet Armenia, the RSFSR itself was specially interested in expediting an agreement between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Republics.

Turks resorted to similar delaying, dishonest tactics during the conference in Kars. A. Muravian, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia, reported on October 5, 1921, that "the Turks are deliberately stalling negotiations in the hope that the Polish-Russian crisis will become acute".<sup>2</sup> Y. Ganetzkin, the RSFSR representative, telegraphed Tchicherin on October 6:

"All of us are left with the impression that the Turks are deliberately procrastinating at the Conference. News is circulating in the city that war will be declared against Poland any day now. It is definitely clear to all of us that the Turkish delegation is exploiting such an eventuality."<sup>3</sup>

Turkish historians have misrepresented, in their typical, fraudulent manner, the course negotiations at Kars took. Its impartial treatment will inevitably demonstrate that the Ankara Government is guilty of a dishonest and equivocal policy not only toward the Republics of Transcaucasia, but also toward Soviet Russia. Turkish historians say that nothing out of the ordinary happened at the Conference, that "the negotiations ran smoothly. . . ."<sup>4</sup> Yet, the materials found in archives, and, above all, the minutes of the sessions of the Conference clearly show that the negotiations had an extremely strained and intense quality, and this, because of the openly inimical attitude of the Turkish delegation toward Soviet Armenia.

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 227, 249, 255, 287.

<sup>2</sup>*Arm. SSR Central Historical Archives of the October Revolution and Socialist Reconstruction*, f. 40/113, op. 3, d. 75, l. 56. (In Arm.)

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, f. 40/113, op. 3, d. 75, l. 50.

<sup>4</sup>Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova hatiralari* (Istanbul, 1955), p. 259.

The Turks raised the issue of independent treaties with individual Republics at this conference, too. They really wanted the chance to meet separately with the representatives of Soviet Armenia so that they could propose their terms, unhindered; that is to say, to impose on Armenia the plundering Treaty of Alexandropol. They brought up the question unexpectedly in the very first session; unexpectedly, because the proposal had been rejected before. But the united and determined stand of the three Republics caused the Turks to yield in the end. This is how G. C. Ordzonikidze describes the events revolving around this issue:

"Our delegation informed the Turks in no uncertain terms that it demands negotiations be conducted collectively with all Transcaucasian Republics and one treaty only be signed. . . . In response to the Turkish request for a legal justification of our proposal, we explained that the Transcaucasian delegation represented the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics."<sup>1</sup>

But the Turks still persisted in their harassment, and in the September 30th session they asked the provocative question: "What is the nature of the interrelationships that exist between the Soviet Republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan?" Tchicherin gave a formal answer in his note of October 3 to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs: That the Governments of the three Transcaucasian Republics had kept the Government of Soviet Russia informed of the existence of a political-economic agreement and of close ties between them, and that all their political and economic problems are resolved by them in unison.<sup>2</sup> Not until this action by Soviet Russia did the Turkish delegation (headed by that inveterate fanatic and executioner, Kiazim Karabekir Pasha) consent to negotiate a treaty collectively with the three Soviet Republics, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

There was heated argument also about the disposition of large quantities of materials and equipments which the Turks had plundered and removed from occupied Alexandropol. The Transcaucasian delegation insisted on their replacement, while the Turks shamelessly attempted to "prove" their right to them.<sup>3</sup>

As to the question of a final rectification of Turco-Soviet boundaries, the Turkish delegation once more revealed its inflexibly hostile attitude towards Soviet Armenia. It is quite true

<sup>1</sup>G. K. Ordzonikidze, *Izbrannye stati i reci* (Moscow, 1939), p. 177.

<sup>2</sup>*Documenty vneshnej . . . (supra)*, Vol. IV, p. 392.

<sup>3</sup>See *Arm. SSR Central Historical Archives of the October Revolution and Socialist Reconstruction*, f. 40/113, op. 3, d. 75, l. 59.

that the Kars Conference did not concern itself with territorial questions as such, since these were taken up in the Treaty of Moscow. But the Transcaucasian delegation did come up with a proposal to revise the Soviet-Turkish boundary line slightly, namely, to transfer to Soviet Armenia the city of Ani with its historic ruins because of their unique value as monuments of the culture of the Armenian people. The Turks refused to comply, notwithstanding the fact that the Government at Ankara had earlier given its consent.<sup>1</sup>

## 8

### PAN-TURKISM TODAY: Aims and Dangers

THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES of the pseudo-scientific treatment by modern Turkish historians of certain problems involving the not-too-distant past demonstrate the mendacious manner with which, among others, it serves the following objectives: On the one hand, their works attempt to justify the ultra-nationalistic, the fanatical and genocidal policy and activities of both the Sultan's Government and the leaders of the Young Turk party, and, on the other, their Pan-Turkist programme of aggressive maneuvering and of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of other peoples. Thus, they misrepresent the invasion of Transcaucasia in 1920-1921 as an integral part of the national-liberation struggle, and the areas annexed, as a result of that aggression, as traditionally, really Turkish lands.

Furthermore, there is a studied promotion of an anti-Soviet policy that is decidedly permeated with the spirit of Pan-Turkism. This reactionary ideology serves even today as an effective weapon of Turkish foreign policy in current schemes of political-nationalist expansion.

This contention is strikingly borne out by the so-called first Pan-Turkist Congress, which was held in Istanbul in March, 1955

<sup>1</sup>CGAOR *Azerb. SSR*, f. 4s/28r, op. 1, ed. xr., 81.

— with the full knowledge of the Turkish Government — and attended by invited repatriates and other “compatriots” in the diaspora. Those who spoke called for the extension of the frontiers of the Turkish world through “liberating Turkish brethren who live outside of Turkey”. The congress took into this “Great Turkey” the Caucasus, the Middle East, Bovoldjie, and all those lands that are inhabited by Turkish-speaking peoples. Characteristically enough, participants in the congress elected Menderes, who was Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, as honorary president of their federation.<sup>1</sup>

Pan-Turkism is still a useful aggressive weapon in the armamentarium of Turkish reactionaries.

The extremely biased spirit and direction of Turkish historiography has, likewise, brought about an infiltration of militant Pan-Turkist ideas and feelings among large segments of the Turkish people, and, of consequence, hatred of racial minorities within the country, as well as of the peoples of neighboring states.

And its wide-spread pernicious influence has been a major stumbling block in the struggle of liberal and progressive elements against both foreign imperialists and native reactionaries, and for genuinely democratic and peace-promoting institutions in that country.

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<sup>1</sup>*Protiv šal' sificacii istorii Vostoko* (Moscow, Izd. Vostochnoj Literatury, 1961), p. 98.

## Some Salient Facts on Armenia

(EDITOR'S ADDENDUM)

The Armenian SSR, one of the fifteen Republics of the USSR, is confined to an area of 11,306 square miles, about 90% the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined. The pre-Soviet Republic of Armenia (1918–1920) in the Caucasus, prior to the invasion by Kemalist Turkey in 1920 and its subsequent dismemberment, is estimated at 26,491 square miles.

Historically, the Armenian homelands, in Turkey and the Soviet Union combined — extending from Transcaucasia to the Mediterranean Sea — and including such districts as Nakhitchevan, Zangezur, Karabagh, Akhalkalak, and, in Turkey, the vilayets, Van, Bitlis, Diarbakir, Harpout, Sivas, Erzerum, Trebizond, and Cilicia, represent some 130,000 square miles.

To the pre-Soviet Armenian Republic the Sèvres Treaty (August, 1920) added roughly 40,000 square miles by accepting the detailed demarcation of the south-western boundaries between Armenia and Turkey drawn by President Wilson (November 22, 1920) to whom this task was entrusted by the signatory powers. This "Wilsonian" Armenia in Turkey involved the Armenian vilayets of Bitlis, Van, Erzerum, and Trebizond. Combined with the then Armenian State, which still included Kars and Ardahan, it totalled about 67,000 square miles. . . .

In 1920, on the eve of its sovietization, Armenia's population was 780,000, swelled by refugees from Turkey. It was war-torn, poverty-stricken, and subject to epidemics. However, on January 1, 1964, it reached 2,070,000, over 90% of whom are Armenians. Intermittently since 1924, Soviet Armenia has also absorbed 200,000 repatriates, preponderantly from the Middle East, Greece, and Cyprus — one-time refugees or deportees from Turkey of the Young Turks and Kemalists. Since 1963, repatriation from the Middle East and Cyprus has been given impetus again.

In addition, around 900,000 Armenians live in the Soviet Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, almost equally divided between them. In Georgia, they are concentrated in Tiflis, its capital, which was one of the great centers earlier of Armenian intellectual life in the dispersion, and the Akhalkalak district adjacent to Armenia. In Azerbaijan, they are settled, for the most part, in Zanzezur and the Karabagh Oblast (created in 1923) in the east, and in the

autonomous Nakhitchevan district, which lies within Soviet Armenia and has, along the southeast, common boundaries with Turkey and Iran, but none with Azerbaijan itself. Nakhitchevan, predominantly Armenian in culture and population (as are the other areas), was placed "under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, *provided Azerbaijan shall cede this protectorate to no other country*", by the Treaties of Moscow (Article 3), and Kars (Article 5) in 1921. . . . (My italics. See Map, p. 9).

With Armenians elsewhere in the Soviet Union, their total number well-nigh exceeds the three million mark.

Yerevan, the one-time typical Asian town, now the capital of Armenia, is a metropolis "with wide thoroughfares, squares, parks, fountains and architectural ensembles". An ultra-modern cultural center, with a population of 600,000, it symbolizes a phenomenal, diversified, cultural growth — an unprecedented creative upsurge of the intellectual and spiritual forces at work in the entire country. It symbolizes the Armenian people's tremendous achievements in education on all levels; in the physical and human sciences; in literature, music and drama; in industry and technological know-how; and in architecture, sculpture and painting — however much still remains to be achieved. The singular accomplishments of individual scientists, *in Armenia itself*, as, for instance, in astrophysics, archaeology and biology, and of creative artists, as in music, painting and architecture, are well known, indeed, to the informed beyond the country's narrow confines.

One cannot help but contrast this picture — however invidious this sort of thing always is — with that presented by "modernized" Kemalist Turkey, as appraised by foreign writers, as well as by some enlightened Turks themselves who seem very much concerned over the still tragic state of cultural affairs of their country. Would that, of course, this were not so! For much more good could probably come from peoples when they are enlightened, culturally creative, and manifest a spirit of fair-play.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

E. K. SARKISIAN has specialized in the history of Turkey and the Armenian people, in particular that of Western (Turkish) Armenians, first at Leningrad University, then at the Institute of Eastern Studies in Moscow. Since 1942, Dr. Sarkisian has been affiliated with the Armenian Academy of Sciences in Erevan, Soviet Armenia, and is at present the director of its Division of the History, Economy and Culture of Turkey. "The main object of his studies", states a memo submitted on the occasion of this translation, "is Western Armenia, in view of which he has investigated, and continues to investigate, the policies of the Ottoman Sultans, the Young Turks, as well as the Kemalists *vis-à-vis* Western Armenia, the Armenians in present-day Turkey, and Eastern Armenia." Sarkisian has published eight lengthy studies as well as some fifty articles in this area, in Armenian, Russian, and some in German.

He is at present engaged in two special projects which involve the Young Turk movement and the history of Western Armenians in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

R. G. SAHAKIAN graduated from the Avedik Issahakian intermediate school (named after Armenia's one-time poet laureate), in Tiflis, Georgia, and in 1953 from Erevan State University's College of International Relations. His doctoral dissertation, "Soviet-Turkish Relations during 1925-1935", won for him the title of "candidate of historical sciences" in 1961 at the Institute of History of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. Sahakian is a senior research worker in the Division of Eastern Studies of the same Academy. His published monographs and articles are concerned with Turkish-Soviet relations.

Dr. Sahakian's latest study, "The Entente and Turkey", treats at length the policies of France and Kemalist Turkey in Cilicia in 1919-1921.

E. B. CHRAKIAN, product of Watertown (Massachusetts) public schools, holds degrees from Boston, Brown, and Harvard Universities. At various times since 1925, he has taught philosophy and/or psychology at Brown and Wisconsin Universities, Illinois Woman's College, the Graduate Division of Bridgewater (Massachusetts) State College, and elsewhere. For the past twenty years, he has been lecturing on courses in philosophy, at times in Education as well, at Northeastern University.

Professor Chrakian, public speaker and author of numerous articles in English and Armenian, was prime mover in founding in 1932, in Boston, the first English weekly of its kind (now *The Armenian Mirror-Spectator*) and its first editor, as well as one-time chairman of the New England Educational Committee of the Armenian General Benevolent Union of America.

He is an active member, *inter alia*, of The American Philosophical Association, American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Association of University Professors, and is listed in *Who's Who in American Education*, *Who's Who in the East*, and *Who Knows What among Experts*, etc.