

AN ANTHOLOGY
OF

HISTORICAL WRITINGS
ON THE

ARMENIAN MASSACRES
OF 1915

- VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE • ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE
• HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS • AMBASSADOR
HENRY MORGENTHAU • FRIDJHOF NANSEN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD 5

A TESTIMONY BY VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE 5

AN ANTHOLOGY

A TESTIMONY BY ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE 15

The Armenian People And The Ottoman Government 17

OF

The Deportation OF 1915: Antecedents 22

The 44

HISTORICAL WRITINGS

A TESTIMONY BY DR. HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS 75

ON THE

A TESTIMONY BY Ambassador HENRY MORGENTHAU 82

The Turk People In The Armenian Type 85

ARMENIAN MASSACRES OF 1915

The Murder Of A Nation 100

Kalaidzian Tells Why He «Deports» The Armenians 120

Major Pasha Explains The Armenian 140

«I Shall Do Nothing For The Armenians» 160

Says The German Ambassador 180

VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE

A TESTIMONY BY FRIDJHOF NANSEN 195

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

The Armenians During The Great War 205

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

BIOGEOGRAPHY 215

Ambassador **HENRY MORGENTHAU**

APPENDICES 225

FRIDJHOF NANSEN

MAP 235

FOREWORD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	5
A TESTIMONY BY VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE	9
A TESTIMONY BY ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE	15
The Armenian People And The Ottoman Government	17
The Deportations Of 1915: Antecedents	32
The Deportations Of 1915: Procedure	48
A TESTIMONY BY Dr. HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS	75
A TESTIMONY BY Ambassador HENRY MORGENTHAU	83
The Turk Reverts To The Ancestral Type	85
The «Revolution» At Van	102
The Murder Of A Nation	108
Talaat Tells Why He «Deports» The Armenians	130
Enver Pasha Discusses The Armenians	145
«I Shall Do Nothing For The Armenians» Says The German Ambassador	164
A TESTIMONY BY FRIDJHOF NANSEN	183
The Armenians During The Great War	185
BIBLIOGRAPHY	217
APPENDICES	231
MAP	

FOREWORD

The present volume, consisting of the writings of some of the eminent historians and statesmen in the present century, is a tribute to those who died, most of them not knowing why, more than fifty years ago, as victims of a diabolical plan, executed in the most cruel and inhuman manner, to solve a political problem. The political problem at the time was known as the Armenian Question. As part of the larger problem, the Eastern Question, it had interested the major European Powers. The Ottomans had witnessed, in the course of the nineteenth century, the liberation of the Serbs, the Rumanians, the Greeks and the Bulgarians. At the turn of the century they felt that the turn of the Armenians had come. The gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was a fact and if it was being delayed, this was due to the rivalry among the European Powers more than to any inherent strength of the tottering Empire. Moreover, while the Turks could put up with the loss of such peripheral territories as Rumania and Greece, because the Turkish population in such territories was rather small, they could not envisage the loss of the Armenian territories which were lying right in the heart of the Empire and which contained a substantial Turkish and Kurdish popula-

tion. Furthermore, the loss of Armenia would have meant the end of their Pan-Turanian dream - a dream cherished by such thinkers as Zia Gokalp and finally adopted by the Young Turks as their political creed. It consisted of joining hands with the Turkish races of Caucasia and Central Asia. The Armenians were the only obstacle in between. The Ottoman Empire had failed as an Empire based on religion. Now the Turks were to build a new Empire based on race.

Such were the feelings, when the Armenian Question became a concern of international diplomacy at the Berlin Congress in 1878. The Armenians had dared, although inhabitants of their lands for at least three thousand years and the owners of a distinct and ancient civilisation, to protest against the misrule of the Ottomans who had established their bloody rule of oppression around the fourteenth century. The Armenians had asked for reforms and the Sultan was forced to promise such reforms under Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. But the Sultan was aware of the European rivalry and instead of the promised reforms, he organised the 1894-95 massacres killing around 300,000 Armenians.

The coming to power of the Young Turks and the Ottoman Constitution of 1908 had raised hopes again. Equality before the law was promised. In 1914, after a series of defeats in the Balkan Wars, Turkey had accepted another deal with the European Powers on reforms in the Armenian provinces. But the First World War broke out in 1914 and the Turks knew that this was the golden opportunity to get rid of the Armenian Question by simply eliminating the Armenians. They seized

the opportunity with both hands and the ruling party, Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakke), in a series of secret meetings, decided on the mass extermination and deportation of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire. The plan was meticulously carried out in 1915 and the subsequent years resulting in the violent death of more than a 1,500,000 Armenians. Some testimony of this genocidal act is found in the present volume, by a number of distinguished contemporaries.

The present volume has not been compiled to promote a spirit of vengeance. That would be taking a negative attitude. But our human dignity and sense of justice are deeply hurt when mankind has still on its conscience the first organised genocide of the present century. It is true that the Allied Powers after the First World War promised to do justice to the Armenian people. The first Peace Treaty with Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, even provided for an independent Armenia within the Turkish Armenian territories. But the European Powers and the United States, in spite of the fact that President Wilson himself had drawn the borderline between Armenia and Turkey, as the arbitrator under the Treaty of Sèvres, were not willing to force the treaty on Turkey. European diplomacy, expressing itself mainly in terms of conflicting economic rivalry, had taken the upper hand once more. The Armenians were deserted and the Turks were allowed to attack Russian Armenia, which had by then become an independent republic, and to occupy part of its territory and to force the remaining part to fall into the lap of Soviet Russia, in the face of a shocked world public opinion.

Mankind has today become more conscious of crimes against humanity and of the right of peoples to self-determination. The United Nations Charter, the Nuremberg Trials, the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the United Nations Resolution on the Imprescriptibility of Crimes against Humanity of 1968, are evidences of such consciousness.

But nothing has been done as yet to make reparations for the great injustice committed against the Armenians some fifty years ago. What is more, the Turks continue to insult human intelligence, the dignity and the moral sense of mankind, by denying the facts, by refusing to accept responsibility and by misrepresenting history, in their pitiful attempts to cover their past guilt.

The Armenian people await justice. The genocide started in 1915 by the Turks continues as long as the Armenians are not allowed to recover their lands and are subjected to a slow surrender of their identity in foreign lands. This is a great inequity. Indignation against injustice is one of the chief constituents of the moral sense of the community. Furthermore, it is being more and more realised that permanent peace and security in the world can only be established if injustice is remedied wherever committed and that our civilization will have to declare its bankruptcy if those who are not injured do not feel as much indignation as those who are. This is why mankind will have to do justice to the Armenians.

The Editors

The whole Armenian population of each town or village was cleared out, by a house-to-house search. Every inmate was driven into the street. Some of the men were thrown into prisons, where they were put to death, sometimes with torture; the rest of the men, with the women and children, were marched out of the town. When they had got some little distance they were separated, the men being taken to some place among the hills where the soldiers, or the Kurdish tribes who were called in to help in the work, massacred them by shooting. The children and old men were taken to some kind of soldier's camp, where they were kept in cages, and were starved and killed — in their hundreds.

A Testimony by Viscount JAMES BRYCE

Extracts from a speech delivered in the House of Lords of Great Britain, on October 6th, 1915.

Man kind has today become more conscious of crimes against humanity and of the right of peoples to self-determination. The United Nations Charter, the Nuremberg Trials, the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the United Nations Resolution on the Imprescriptibility of Crimes against Humanity of 1968, are evidences of such consciousness.

But nothing has been done as yet to make reparations for the great injustices committed against the Armenians some fifty years ago. What is more, the Turks continue to insult human intelligence, the dignity and the moral sense of mankind, by denying the facts, by refusing to accept responsibility and by misrepresenting history, in their pitiful attempts to cover their past guilt.

The Armenian people await justice. The genocide started in 1915 by the Turks continues as long as the Armenians are not allowed to recover their lands and are subjected to a slow surrender of their identity in foreign lands. This is a great inequity. Indignation against injustice is one of the chief constituents of the moral sense of the community. Pure

VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE
British Statesman and scholar,
Regina Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford, Undersecretary of state
for foreign affairs, Chancellor of
the Duchy of Lancaster, President
of the Board of Trade, Chief Secre-
tary for Ireland, Ambassador to
Washington, Author of many his-
torical works among which «The
Armenians Under The Ottoman
Empire».

by the Turkish Government, and they already had been told of everything they possessed. Not a few of the women were striped and made to travel in that condition beneath a burning sun. Some of the mothers went mad and threw away their children, being unable to carry them further. The massacre was marked by a line of corpses and mutilated bodies seen to have arrived at the destination which had been investigated for them in advance, no doubt because it was impossible and because there was little prospect that any would survive their hardships. I have had circumstantial accounts of these atrocities which bear internal evidence of being veridical, and I was told by an American friend who has lately returned from Constantinople that he had heard

«The whole Armenian population of each town or village was cleared out, by a house-to-house search. Every inmate was driven into the street. Some of the men were thrown into prison, where they were put to death, sometimes with torture; the rest of the men, with the women and children, were marched out of the town. When they had got some little distance they were separated, the men being taken to some place among the hills where the soldiers, or the Kurdish tribes who were called in to help in the work of slaughter, despatched them by shooting or bayonetting. The women and children and old men were sent off under convey of the lowest kind of soldiers — many of them just drawn from gaols — to their distant destination, which was sometimes one of the unhealthy districts in the center of Asia Minor, but more frequently the large desert in the province of Der el Zor, which lies east of Aleppo, in the direction of the Euphrates. They were driven along by the soldiers day after day, all on foot, beaten or left behind to perish if they could not keep up with the caravan; many fell by the way, and many died of hunger. No provisions were given them

by the Turkish Government, and they already been robbed of everything they possessed. Not a few of the women were stripped naked and made to travel in that condition beneath a burning sun. Some of the mothers went mad and threw away their children, being unable to carry them further. The caravan route was marked by a line of corpses, and comparatively few seem to have arrived at the destinations which had been prescribed for them — chosen, no doubt, because return was impossible and because there was little prospect that any would survive their hardships. I have had circumstantial accounts of these deportations which bear internal evidence of being veracious, and I was told by an American friend who has lately returned from Constantinople, that he had heard accounts at Constantinople, confirming fully these which had come to me, and what had struck him was the comparative calmness with which these atrocities were detailed by those who had first-hand knowledge of them. Things which we find scarcely credible excite little surprise in Turkey. Massacre was the order of the day in Eastern Rumelia in 1876, and, in 1895-6, in Asiatic Turkey.

When the Armenian population was driven from its homes, many of the women were not killed, but reserved for a more humiliating fate. They were mostly seized by Turkish officers or civilian officials, and consigned to their harems. Others were sold in the market, but only to a Moslem purchaser, for they were to be made Moslems by force. Never again would they see parents or husbands — these Christian women condemned at one stroke to slavery, shame and apostasy. The boys and the girls were also very largely sold into slavery, at prices sometimes of only ten to twelve shillings, while other boys of tender age were delivered to dervishes, to be carried off to a sort of dervish monastery, and there forced to become Musulmans.

«... But the most pitiable case is not that of those whose misery was ended by swift death, but of those unfortunate women who, after their husbands had been killed and their daughters violated, were driven out with their young children to perish in the desert — where they have no sustenance. It would seem that three-fourths or four-fifths of the whole nation has been wiped out, and there is no case in history, certainly not since the time of Tamerlane, in which any crime so hideous and upon so large a scale has been recorded.

«... Wherever the Armenians, almost wholly unarmed as they were, have fought, they have fought in self-defence to defend their families and themselves from the cruelty of the ruffians who constitute what is called the Government of the country. There is no excuse whatever, upon any such ground as some German authorities and newspapers allege, for the conduct of the Turkish Government. Their policy of slaughter and deportation has been wanton and unprovoked. It appears to be simply an application of the maxim once enunciated by Sultan Abdul Hamid: «The way to get rid of the Armenian Question is to get rid of the Armenians»; and the policy of extermination has been carried out with far more thoroughness and with far more blood-thirsty completeness by the present heads of the Turkish Administration — they describe themselves as the Committee of Union and progress — than it was in the time of Abdul Hamid».

A Testimony by ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*From the Historical Summary in
«The Treatment of Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916».*

THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE
AND
THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT

When the Ottoman Government entered the European War in 1914, it had ruled Armenia for just four hundred years, and still had for its subjects a majority of the Armenian people. Anyone who inquires into the relations between the Government and the governed during this period of Near Eastern history will find the most contradictory opinions expressed. On the one hand he will be told that the Armenians, like the rest of the Christians in Turkey, were classed as «kayaks» (cattle) by the dominant race, and that this one word sums up their irremediable position; that they were not treated as citizens because they were not even treated as men. On the other hand, he will hear that the Ottoman Empire has been more liberal to its subject nationalities than many states in Western Europe; that the Armenians have been perfectly free to live their own life under a paternal government, and that the Government and the Armenians have been in a friendly and harmonious relation.

A Testimony by ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*From the Historical Summary in
«The Treatment of Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916».*

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Historian, Formerly Director of
Studies in the Royal Institute of
International Affairs and Re-
search, Professor of International
History in the University of
London.*

**THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE
AND
THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT**

When the Ottoman Government entered the European War in 1914, it had ruled Armenia for just four hundred years, and still had for its subjects a majority of the Armenian people. Anyone who inquires into the relations between the Government and the governed during this period of Near Eastern history will find the most contradictory opinions expressed. On the one hand he will be told that the Armenians, like the rest of the Christians in Turkey, were classed as «Rayah» (cattle*) by the dominant race, and that this one word sums up their irremediable position; that they were not treated as citizens because they were not even treated as men. On the other hand, he will hear that the Ottoman Empire has been more liberal to its subject nationalities than many states in Western Europe; that the Armenians have been perfectly free to live their own life under a paternal government, and that the friction between the Government and its subjects has been due to the native perversity and instability of the Armenian character, or, worse still, to a

(*) *It appears to be uncertain whether this is really the literal meaning of the word, its current connotation being purely the political one.*

revolutionary poison instilled by some common enemy from without. Both these extreme views are out of perspective, but each of them represents a part of the truth.

It is undoubtedly true (to take the Turkish case first) that the Armenians have derived certain benefits from the Ottoman dispensation. The case division between Moslem and Rayah, for instance, may stamp the Ottoman «State Idea» as mediaeval and incapable of progress; but this has injured the state as a whole more appreciably than the penalised section of it, for extreme penalisation works both ways. The Government ruled out the Christians so completely from the dominant Moslem commonwealth that it suffered and even encouraged them to form communities of their own. The «Rayah» became «Millets» — not yoke-oxen, but unshackled herds.

These Christian Millets were instituted by Sultan Mohammed II, after he had conquered Constantinople in 1453 and set himself to reorganise the Ottoman State as the conscious heir of the Eastern Roman Empire. They are national corporations with written charters, often of an elaborate kind. Each of them is presided over by a Patriarch, who holds office at the discretion of the Government, but is elected by the community and is the recognised intermediary between the two, combining in his own person the headship of a voluntary «Rayah» association and the status of an Ottoman official. The special function thus assigned to the Patriarchates gives the Millets, as an institution, an ecclesiastical character (*); but in the Near East a church is merely the foremost aspect of a nationality, and the authority of the Patriarchates extends to the control of schools, and even to the

(*) *The word «Millet» means simply «religious sect» in the Arabic language, from which it was borrowed by the Turks.*

administration of certain branches of civil law. The Millets, in fact, are practically autonomous bodies in all that concerns religion, culture and social life; but it is a maimed autonomy, for it is jealously debarred from any political expression. The establishment of the Millets is a recognition, and a palliation, of the pathological anomaly of the Near East — the political disintegration of Near Eastern peoples and the tenacity with which they have clung, in spite of it, to their corporate spiritual life.

The organisation of the Millets was not a gain to all the Christian nations that had been subjected by the Ottoman power. Certain orthodox populations, like the Bulgars and the Serbs, actually lost an ecclesiastical autonomy which they had enjoyed before, and were merged in the Millet of the Greeks, under the Orthodox Patriarch at Constantinople. The Armenians, on the other hand, improved their position. As so-called schismatics, they had hitherto existed on sufferance under Orthodox and Catholic governments, but the Osmanlis viewed all varieties of Christian with an impartial eye. Mohammed II summoned the Gregorian Bishop of the Armenian colony at Broussa, and raised him to the rank of a Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople. The Ottoman conquest thus left the Gregorian Armenians their religious individuality and put them on a legal equality with their neighbours of the Orthodox Faith, and the same privileges were extended in time to the Armenians in communion with other churches. The Gregorian Millet was chartered in 1462, the Millet of Armenian Catholics in 1830, and the Millet of Armenian Protestants in the forties of the nineteenth century, as a result of the foundation of the American Missions.

The Armenians of the Dispersion therefore profited in that respect, by Ottoman rule, and even in the Armenian homeland the account stood, on the whole, in the Otto-

man Governments's favour. The Osmanlis are often blamed for having given the Kurds a footing in this region, as a political move in their struggle with Persia; but the Kurds were not, originally, such a scourge to the Armenians as the Seljuks, Mongols, or Kara Koyunli, who had harried the land before, or as the Persians themselves, whom the Osmanlis and the Kurds ejected from the country. The three centuries of Kurdish feudalism under Ottoman suzerainty that followed Sultan Selim's campaign of 1514 were a less unhappy period for the Armenians than the three centuries and more of anarchy that had preceded them. They were a time of torpor before recuperation, and it was the Ottoman Government again that, by a change in its Kurdish policy, enabled this recuperation to set in. In the early part of the nineteenth century a vigorous anti-feudal, centralising movement was initiated by Sultan Mahmoud, a reformer who has become notorious for his unsuccessful handling of the Greek and Serbian problems without receiving the proper credit for his successes further east. He turned his attention to the Kurdish chieftains in 1834, and by the middle of the century his efforts had practically broken their power. Petty feudalism was replaced by a bureaucracy centred in Constantinople. The new officialdom was not ideal; it had new vices of its own; but it was impartial, by comparison, towards the two races whom it had to govern, for the class prejudice of the Moslem against the well-behaved Rayah was balanced by the exasperation of the professional administrator with the unconscionable Kurd. In any case, this remodelling of the Ottoman State in the early decades of the nineteenth century introduced a new epoch in the history of the Armenian people. Coinciding, as it did, with the establishment of the American Missions and the chartering of the Catholic and Protestant Millets, it opened to the Ar-

menians opportunities of which they availed themselves to the full. An intellectual and economic renaissance of Armenian life began, parallel in many respects to the Greek renaissance a century before.

This comparison brings us back to the question: Was the Armenian revival of the nineteenth century an inevitable menace to the sovereignty and integrity of the Ottoman State? Is the disastrous breach between Armenian and Turk, which has actually occurred, simply the fruit of wrong-headed Armenian ambitions? That is the Turkish contention; but here the Turkish case breaks down, and we shall find the truth on the Armenian side.

The parallel with the Greek renaissance is misleading, if it implies a parallel with the Greek revolution. The Greek movement towards political separatism was, in a sense, the outcome of the general spiritual movement that preceded it; but it was hardly an essential consequence, and certainly not a fortunate one. The Greek War of Independence liberated one fraction of the Greek race at the price of exterminating most of the others and sacrificing the favoured position which the Greek element had previously enjoyed throughout the Ottoman Empire. It was not an encouraging precedent for the Armenians, and the objections to following it in their own case were more formidable still. As we have seen, no portion of Ottoman territory was exclusively inhabited by them, and they were nowhere even in an absolute majority, except in certain parts of the Province of Van, so that they had no natural rallying point for a national revolt, such as the Greeks had in the Islands and the Morea. They were scattered from one end to another of the Ottoman Empire; the whole Empire was their heritage, and it was a heritage that they must necessarily share with the Turks, who were in a numerical majority and held the reins of political power. The alternative to an Otto-

man State was not an Armenian State, but a partition among the Powers, which would have ended the ambitions of Turk and Armenian alike. The Powers concerned were quite ready for a partition, if only they could agree upon a division of the spoils. This common inheritance of the Armenians and the Turks was potentially one of the richest countries in the Old World, and one of the few that had not yet been economically developed. Its native inhabitants, still scanty, backward and divided against themselves, were not yet capable of defending their title against spoilers from without; they only maintained it at present by a fortuitous combination in the balance of power, which might change at any moment. The problem for the Armenians was not to overthrow the Ottoman Empire but how to preserve it, and their interest in its preservation was even greater than that of their Turkish neighbours and co-heirs. Our geographical survey has shown that talent and temperament had brought most of the industry, commerce, finance and skilled intellectual work of Turkey into the Armenians' hands. The Greeks may still have competed with them on the Aegean fringe, and the Sephardi Jews in the Balkans, but they had the whole interior of the Empire to themselves, with no competition to fear from the agricultural Turks or the pastoral Kurds. And if the Empire were preserved by timely reforms from within, the position of the Armenians would become still more favourable, for they were the only native element capable of raising the Empire economically, intellectually and morally to a European standard, by which alone its existence could permanently be secured. The main effort must be theirs, and they would reap the richest reward.

Thus, from the Armenian point of view, a national entente with the Turks was an object of vital importance, to be pursued for its ultimate results in spite of present difficulties and drawbacks. About the middle of the nine-

teenth century there seemed every likelihood of its being attained. The labours of Sultan Mahmoud and the influence of Great Britain and France had begun to inoculate the Turkish ruling class with liberal ideas. An admirable «Law of Nationalities» was promulgated, and there was a project for a parliamentary constitution. It looked, to an optimist, as if the old mediaeval caste-division of Moslem and Rayah might die away and allow Armenian, Turk and Kurd to find their true relation to one another — not as irreconcilable sects or races, but as different social elements in the same community, whose mutual interest was to co-operate for a common end.

This was the logical policy for the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire to pursue, and the logic of it was so clear that they have clung to it through difficulties and drawbacks sufficient to banish logic altogether — “difficulties” which amounted to a bankruptcy of political sense in the Imperial Government, and «drawbacks» which culminated in official massacres of the Armenian population. There were two causes of this sinister turn of events: the external crisis through which the Empire passed in the years 1875-8, and the impression this crisis made upon Sultan-ul-Hamid, who came to the throne in 1876, when it was entering upon its gravest phase.

In these years Empire had been brought to the verge of ruin by the revolt of a subject Christian population, the Bosniak Serbs, which spread to the other subject races in the Balkan provinces, and by a momentary breakdown in the diplomatic mechanism of the European balance of power, which enabled Russia to throw her military force into the scales on the Balkan rebels' behalf. The ruin was arrested and partilly repaired, when Turkey lay prostrate under Russia's heel, by a reassertion of the balance of power, which deprived Russia of most of her gains and half the Balkan Christians of their new-

won liberties. Abd-ul-Hamid was clever enough to learn from these experiences, but not, unfortunately, to learn aright, and he devoted all his astuteness to carrying out a policy far more injurious to the Empire than the troubles it was meant to avert. He seems to have inferred from the war with Russia that Turkey was and never would be strong enough to hold its own against a first-class power; it was not her internal strength that had saved her, but the external readjustment of forces. Therefore, any attempt to strengthen the Empire from within, by reconciling its racial elements and developing its natural resources, was Utopian and irrelevant to the problem. The only object of importance was to insure against an attack by any single Power by keeping all the Great Powers in a state of jealous equilibrium. Now the breakdown of this equilibrium, in 1877, which had been so disastrous for Turkey, had been directly caused by an antecedent disturbance of equilibrium within the Empire itself. A subject Christian nationality had tried to break away violently from the Ottoman body politic. Here was the root of the whole trouble, to Abd-ul-Hamid's mind, and the primary object of his policy must be to prevent such a thing from happening again. The subject nationalities of the Empire were not for him unrealised assets; they were potential destroyers of the State, more formidable even than the foreign Powers. Their potentialities must be neutralised, and the surest course, with them as with the Powers, was to play them off against one another. In fine, the policy of Abd-ul-Hamid was the exact antithesis of the instinctive Armenian policy which we have indicated above; it was not to strengthen the Empire by bringing the nationalities into harmony, but to weaken the nationalities, at whatever cost to the Empire, by setting them to cut each other's throats. Abd-ul-Hamid applied this policy for forty years. The Macedonians

and the Armenians were his special victims, but only the Armenians concern us here.

It was inevitable that the Armenians should be singled out by Abd-ul-Hamid for repression. When Turkey sued for peace in 1878, the Russian troops were in occupation of the greater part of the Armenian plateau, and the Russian plenipotentiaries inserted an Article (No. 16) in the Treaty of San Stefano making the evacuation of these provinces conditional upon the previous introduction of reforms in their administration by the Ottoman Government. A concrete scheme for the reorganisation of the six vilayets in question (*) had already been drawn up by a delegation of their Armenian inhabitants. It provided for the creation of an Armenian Governor-General, empowered to appoint and remove the officials subordinate to him; a mixed gendarmerie of Armenians and the sedentary elements in the Moslem population, to the exclusion of the nomadic Kurds; a general assembly, consisting of Moslem and Christian deputies in equal numbers; and equal rights for every creed. The Ottoman Government had approved and even encouraged this project of provincial autonomy when it feared that the alternative was the cession of the provinces to Russia. As soon as it had made certain of the Russian evacuation, its approval turned to indifference; and when the European Congress met at Berlin to revise the San Stefano Treaty, the Ottoman emissaries exerted themselves to quash the project altogether. In this they were practically successful, for the Treaty drawn up at Berlin by the Congress merely engaged the Ottoman Government, in general terms (**), to introduce «amelioration» in the

(*) *Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Mamouret-ul-Aziz, Sivas.*

(**) *Article 61.*

"provinces inhabited by Armenians" without demanding any guarantee at all (*). The Russian troops were withdrawn and the ameliorations were a dead letter. The Ottoman Government was reminded of them, in 1880, by a collective Note from the six Powers. But it left the Note unanswered, and after the diplomatic démarches had dragged on for two years the question was shelved, on Bismarck's suggestion, because no Power except Great Britain would press it.

The seed of the "Armenian Reforms" had thus fallen upon stony ground, except in the mind of Abd-ul-Hamid, where it lodged and rankled till it bore the fruit of the «Armenian Massacres.» The project had not really been a menace to Ottoman sovereignty and integrity. It was merely a proposal to apply in six vilayets that elementary measure of "amelioration" which was urgently needed by the Empire as a whole, and without which it could never begin to develop its internal strength. But to Abd-ul-Hamid it was unforgivable, for to him every concession to a subject Christian nationality was suspect. He had seen the Bulgars given ecclesiastical autonomy by the Ottoman Government in 1870 and then raised by Russia, within eight years, into semi-independent political principality. Armenian autonomy had been averted for the moment, but the parallel might still hold good, for Russia's influence over the Armenians had been increasing.

Russia had conquered the Armenian provinces of Per-

(*) *There was an equally vague clause to the same effect in the special «Cyprus Convention» between Turkey and Great Britain, but in neither treaty was there any guarantee of its observance. The Berlin Treaty merely provided that the Ottoman Government should communicate its measures of reform to the Powers, but, as they were never carried out they were never reported.*

sia in 1828 (*), and this had brought within her frontier the Monastery of Etchmiadzin, in the Khanate of Erivan, which was the seat of the Katholikos of All the Armenians. The power of this Katholikos was at that time very much in abeyance. He was an ecclesiastical relic of the ancient united Armenian Kingdom of Tigranes and Tirdates, which had been out of existence for fourteen hundred years. There was another Katholikos at Sis, a relic of the mediæval kingdom of Cilicia, who did not acknowledge his supremacy, and he was thrown into the shade altogether by the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople, who was the official head of the Armenian Millet in the Ottoman Empire — at that time an overwhelming majority of the Armenian people. But Russian diplomacy succeeded in reviving the Katholikos of Etchmiadzin's authority. In the forties of the nineteenth century, when Russian influence at Constantinople was at its height and Russian protection seemed the only recourse for Turkey against the ambition of Mehemet Ali, the ecclesiastical supremacy of Etchmiadzin over Constantinople and Sis was definitely established, and the Katholikos of Etchmiadzin, a resident in Russian territory, became once more actual as well as the titular head of the whole Gregorian Church. Russia had thus acquired an influence over the Armenians as a nation, and individual Armenians were acquiring a reciprocal influence in Russia. They had risen to eminence, not only in commerce, but in the public service and in the army. They had distinguished themselves particularly in the war of 1877. Loris Melikov,

(*) *Russia began to acquire territory south of the Caucasus at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the last King of Georgia ceded his Kingdom to the Tsar, to save it from the hands of the Turks and Persians.*

Lazarev and Tergoukasev, three of the most successful generals on the Russian side, were of Armenian nationality. Melikov had taken the fortress of Kars, and the Treaty of Berlin left his conquest in Russia's possession with a zone of territory that rounded off the districts ceded by Persia fifty years before. The Russian frontier was thus pushed forward on to the Armenian plateau, and now included an important Armenian population — important enough to make its mark on the general life of the Russian Empire (*) and to serve as a national rallying-point for the Armenians who still remained on the Ottoman side of the line.

Such considerations outweighed all others in Abd-ul-Hamid's mind. His Armenian subjects must be deprived of their formidable vitality, and he decided to crush them by resuscitating the Kurds. From 1878 onwards encouraged their lawlessness, and in 1891 he deliberately undid the work of his predecessor, Mahmoud. The Kurdish chieftains were taken again into favour and decorated with Ottoman military rank; their tribes were enrolled as squadrons of territorial cavalry; regimental badges and modern rifles were served out to them from the Government stores, and their retaining fee was a free hand to use their official status and their official weapons as they pleased against their Armenian neighbours. At the same time the latter were systematically disarmed; the only retaliation open to them was the formation of secret revolutionary societies, and this fitted in entirely with Abd-

(*) *Tiflis, the former capital of the Georgian Kingdom and now the administrative centre of the Russian Provinces of the Caucasus has become practically an Armenian city in the course of the nineteenth century, and Armenian settlements have spread far further into the interior of Russia.*

ul-Hamid's plans, for it made a racial conflict inevitable. The disturbances began in 1893 with the posting up of revolutionary placards in Yozgad and Marsovan. This was soon followed by an open breach between Moslem and Christian in the districts of Moush and Sassoun, and there was a rapid concentration of troops — some of them Turkish regulars, but most of them Hamidié Kurds. Sassoun was besieged for several months, and fell in 1894. The Sassaunlis — men, women and children — were savagely massacred by the Turks and Kurds, and the attention of Great Britain was aroused. In the winter of 1894-5 Great Britain persuaded France and Russia to join her in reminding the Ottoman Government of its pledge to introduce provincial reforms, and in the spring they presented a concrete programme for the administration of the Six Vilayets. In its final form it was a perfunctory project, and the counter-project which the Ottoman Government announced its intention of applying in its stead was more illusory still. It was promulgated in 1895, but the first of a new series of organised massacres had already taken place a few days earlier, at Trebizond, and in the following months the slaughter was extended to one after another of the principal towns of the Empire. These atrocities were nearly all committed against peaceful, unarmed urban populations. The only place that resisted was Zeitoun, which held out for six months against a Turkish army, and was finally amnestied by the mediation of the Powers. The anti-Armenian outbreaks were instigated and controlled by the Central Government, and were crowned, in August, 1896, by the great massacre at Constantinople, where for two days the Armenians, at the Government's bidding, were killed indiscriminately in the streets, until the deathroll amounted to many thousands. Then Abd-ul-Hamid held his hand. He had been feeling the pulse of public opinion, both abroad and at

home, and he saw that he had gone far enough (*). In all more than 100,000 men, women and children had perished, and for the moment had sufficiently crippled the Armenian in his Empire.

Yet this Macchiavellian policy was ultimately as futile as it was wicked. In the period after the massacres Armenian population in Turkey was certainly reduced, partly by the actual slaughter and partly by emigration abroad. But this only weakened the Empire without permanently paralysing the Armenian race. The emigrants struck new roots in the United States and in the Russian Caucasus, acquired new resources, enlisted new sympathies; and Russia was the greatest gainer of all. The Armenians had little reason, at the time, to look towards Russia with special sympathy or hope. In Russia, as in Turkey, the war of 1877-8 had been followed by a political reaction, which was aggravated by the assassination of the Tsar, Alexander II., in 1881; and the Armenians, as an energetic, intellectual, progressive element in the Russian Empire, were classed by the police with the revolutionaries, and came under their heavy hand. Yet once an Armenian was on the Russian side of the frontier his life and property at least were safe. He could be sure of reaping the fruits of his labour, and had not to fear sudden death in the streets. During the quarter of a century that followed the Treaty of Berlin, the Armenian population of the Russian provinces increased remarkably in prosperity and numbers, and now, after the massacres, they were reinforced by a

(*) *Though the British Government was the only Government that attempted to put pressure on the Turks to desist. In Germany it was the mot d'ordre that the massacres were a British invention with a political purpose, and the German Emperor shortly afterwards sent his portrait to Abd-ul-Hamid as a complimentary gift.*

constant stream of Ottoman refugees. The centre of gravity of the Armenian race was shifting more and more from Ottoman to Russian territory. Russia has profited by the crimes of her neighbours. The Hamidian régime lasted from 1878 to 1908, and did all that any policy could do to widen the breach between the Ottoman State and the Armenian people. Yet the natural community of interest was so strong that even thirty years of repression did not make the Armenians despair of Ottoman regeneration.

Nothing is more significant than the conduct of the Armenians in 1908, when Abd-ul-Hamid was overthrown by the Young Turkish Revolution, and there was a momentary possibility that the Empire might be reformed and preserved by the initiative of the Turks themselves. At this crisis the real attitude of the different nationalities in the Empire was revealed. The Kurds put up a fight for Abd-ul-Hamid, because they rejoiced in the old dispensation. The Macedonians — Greek, Bulgar and Serb — who had been the Armenians' principal fellow-victims in the days of oppression, paid the Constitution lip-homage and secretly prepared to strike. They were irreconcilable irredentists, and saw in the reform of the Empire simply an obstacle to their secession from it. They took counsel with their kinsmen in the independent national States of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, and, four years later, the Balkan League attacked Turkey and tore away her Macedonian provinces by force.

The Armenians, on the other hand, threw themselves wholeheartedly into the service of the new régime. As soon as the Ottoman Constitution was restored, the Armenian political parties abandoned their revolutionary programme in favour of parliamentary action, and co-operated in Parliament with the Young Turkish bloc so long as Young Turkish policy remained in any degree li-

beral or democratic. The terrible Adana massacres, which occurred less than a year after the Constitution had been proclaimed, might have damped the Armenians' enthusiasm (though at first the proof that the Young Turks were implicated in them was not so clear as it has since become). Yet they showed their loyalty in 1912, when the Turks were fighting for their existence. It was only under the new laws that the privilege and duty of military service had been extended to the Christian as well as the Moslem citizens of the Empire, and the disastrous Balkan Campaign was the first opportunity that Armenian soldiers were given of doing battle for their common heritage. But they bore themselves so well in this ordeal that they were publicly commended by their Turkish commanders. Thus, in war and peace, in the Army and in Parliament, the Armenians worked for the salvation of the Ottoman Commonwealth, from the accession of the Young Turks in 1908 till their intervention in the European War in 1914. It is impossible to reconcile with this fact the Turkish contention that in 1914 they suddenly reversed their policy and began treacherously to plot for the Ottoman Empire's destruction.

THE DEPORTATIONS OF 1915:

ANTECEDENTS

There is no dispute as to what happened in 1915. The Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire were everywhere uprooted from their homes, and deported to the most remote and unhealthy districts that the Govern-

ment could select for them. Some were murdered at the outset, some perished on the way, and some died after reaching their destination. The death-roll amounts to upwards of six hundred thousand; perhaps six hundred thousand more are still alive in their places of exile; and the remaining six hundred thousand or so have either been converted forcibly to Islam, gone into hiding in the mountains, or escaped beyond the Ottoman frontier. The Ottoman Government cannot deny these facts, and they cannot justify them. No provocation or misdemeanour on the part of individual Armenians could justify such a crime against the whole race. But it might be explained and palliated if the Armenians, or some of them, were originally in the wrong; and therefore the Ottoman Government and its German apologists have concentrated their efforts on proving that this was the case.* There are three main Turkish contentions, none of which will bear examination.

The first contention is that the Armenians took up arms and joined the Russians, as soon as the latter crossed the Ottoman frontier. The standard case its champions cite is the "Revolt of Van." The deportations, they maintain, were only ordered after this outbreak to forestall the danger of its repetition elsewhere. This contention is easily rebutted. In the first place, there was no Armenian revolt at Van. The Armenians merely defended the quarter of the city in which they lived, after it had been beleaguered and attacked by Turkish troops, and the outlying villages visited with massacre by Turkish patrols. The outbreak was on the Turkish side, and

(*) *In such publications as Vérité sur le mouvement révolutionnaire Arménien et les mesures gouvernementales (Constantinople, 1916); or Die Armenische Grage, von C. A. Bratter (Berlin, Concordia-Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915).*

the responsibility lies with the Turkish governor, Djvedet Bey. The ferocious, uncontrollable character of this official was the true cause of the catastrophe. Anyone who reads the impartial testimony on this point, will see that this was so. And, in the second place, the deportations had already begun in Cilicia before the fighting at Van broke out. The Turks fired the first shot at Van on the 20th April, 1915; the first Armenians were deported from Zeitoun on the 8th April, and there is a record of their arrival in Syria as early as the 19th. The case of Van, which the apologists have made so much of, simply falls to the ground (*), and they cannot rehabilitate themselves by adducing any previous revolt at Zeitoun. It is true that twenty-five fugitive conscripts defended themselves for a day in a monastery near Zeitoun against Turkish troops, and decamped into the mountains during the night. But this happened only one day before the deportation, and the deportation must have been de-

(*) *In the pamphlet Vérité sur le mouvement révolutionnaire Arménien et les mesures gouvernementales, the following passages occur: «The Imperial (Ottoman) Government abstained from exercising any pressure or adopting any repressive measures against the Armenians until the day the revolt broke out at Van towards the middle of April, 1915» (page 10); «No coercive measure was decreed by the Imperial Government against the Armenians until the date of their armed revolt, which took place at Van and in the other military zones in the course of the month of June, of the year 1915, and until they had made common cause with the enemy forces» (page 15). These statements are direct falsehoods, as is also the statement (page 12) that — «After the occupation of Van by the Russians and Armenians, the Moslem population of the town was pitilessly massacred.» We have authoritative neutral testimony on both these points, by which the Turkish statements are refuted. Yet these lying statements are the pivot of the whole apologia presented in this pamphlet.*

cided upon far in advance, for it was preceded by a protracted inquisition for arms, and there were Moslem refugees from the Balkans concentrated on the spot, ready to occupy the Zeitounlis' houses the moment the rightful owners were carried off. During all these preliminary proceedings — most of which were violations of the charter of liberties held by Zeitoun from the Ottoman Government — the population as a whole (15,000 individuals as against the 25 who rebelled) very scrupulously kept the peace. This was the policy of the leaders, and they were obeyed by the people. Nothing happened at Zeitoun that can account for the Government's scheme of deportation.

There were several other instances in which the Armenians took up arms, but none of them are relevant to the case. They were all subsequent in date to these cardinal instances, and were simply attempts at self-defence by people who had seen their neighbours massacred or deported, and were threatened with the same fate themselves. The Armenians of Moush resisted when they were attacked by Djevdet Bey, who had already tried to massacre the Armenians of Van and had succeeded in massacring those of Sairt and Bitlis. The Armenians of Sasoun resisted when the Kurds had destroyed their kinsmen in the plain of Diyarbekir and were closing in upon themselves. This was in June, and the Nestorian Christians of Hakkiari resisted under the same circumstances and at the same date. Further west, a few villages took up arms in the Vilayet of Sivas, after the rest of the Sivas Armenians had been deported; and at Shabin Karahissar the Armenians drove out their Turkish fellow-townsmen and stood for several weeks at bay, when they heard how the exiles from Trebizond and Kerasond had been murdered on the road. The defense of Djibal Mousa in August (the only story in this volume with a happy

ending) was similarly inspired by the previous fate of Zeitoun. The resistance at Ourfa in September was another act of despair, provoked by the terrible procession of exiles from Harpout and the north-east, which had been filing for three months through Ourfa before the Armenian colony there was also summoned to take the road. These are all the instances of resistance that are reported, and they were all a consequence of the deportations, and not their cause. It may be added that, wherever resistance was offered the Turks suppressed it with inconceivable brutality, not merely retaliating upon the fighting men, but, in most cases, massacring every Armenian man, woman and child in cold blood after the fighting was over. These cases were not palliations of the atrocities, but occasions of the worst excesses.

The second contention is that there was a general conspiracy of Armenians throughout the Empire to bring about an internal revolution at a moment when all the Ottoman military forces were engaged on the frontiers, and so deliver the country into the hands of the Allies. The prompt action of the Ottoman Government in disarming, imprisoning, executing and deporting the whole people — innocent and guilty alike — is alleged to have crushed this movement before it had time to declare itself. This is an insidious line of argument, because it refuses to be tested by the evidence of what actually occurred. If the actual outbreaks were isolated, inspired by panic, confined to self-defence, and posterior in date to the Government's own preventive measures, all that, on this hypothesis, is not a proof of the Armenians' innocence, but only of the Government's energy and foresight. Yet when this indictment is examined, it, too, is found to rest on the most frivolous grounds.

The revolution, it is alleged, was to break out when the Allies landed in Cilicia — but such a landing was

never made; or it was arranged in conjunction with the landing at the Dardanelles — but the landing was made and the outbreak never happened. Indeed, it is hard to see what the Armenians could have done, for nearly all their able-bodied men between twenty and forty-five years of age were mobilised at the beginning of the war, and the age limit was soon extended in either direction to eighteen and fifty. The Turks make sweeping allegations about secret stores of bombs and arms, which prove to be false in every case where they can be checked. The Armenians certainly possessed a moderate number of rifles and revolvers, because, for the past six years, under the Young Turkish régime, they had been permitted to carry arms for their personal security, a privilege that had always been enjoyed, as a matter of course, by every Moslem in the Ottoman Empire. But evidently there were not enough arms in their possession to go round, even among the comparatively few men left behind after mobilisation; for when, in the winter of 1914-5, the Ottoman authorities made a house-to-house search for arms, and conducted their inquisition by atrocious physical tortures, the Armenians bought arms from each other and from their Moslem neighbours, in order to be able to deliver them up and suffer no worse punishment than mere imprisonment. This practice is recorded independently by several trustworthy witnesses from various localities.

The stories of bombs are more extravagant still. In the town of X., for instance, a bomb was unearthed in the Armenian cemetery, which was made the pretext for the most atrocious procedure against the Armenian inhabitants. Yet the bomb was rusty with age, and was believed to date from the days of Abd-ul-Hamid, when the Young Turks, as well as the Armenian political parties, were a secret revolutionary organisation and not

averse to using bombs themselves. In the same town, a blacksmith in the employment of the American College was cruelly tortured for "constructing a bomb"; but the "bomb" turned out to be a solid iron shot which he had been commissioned to make for the competition of "putting the weight" in the College athletic sports.

It was also alleged that Armenians resident on the coast had been in treacherous communication with the Allied fleets. The Armenians boatmen of Silivri, for instance, on the Sea of Marmora, were deported on the ground that they had furnished supplies to British submarines; and before this, as early as April, 1915, half-a-dozen Armenians from Dört Yöl, a village on the Gulf of Alexandretta, were hanged at Adana on the charge of having signalled to the Franco-British cruiser squadron — a step which was followed up by the deportation of the whole population of Dört Yöl into the interior, to do navvy-work on the roads. This charge against Dört Yöl can be checked, for the witness of the hangings (a resident in Cilicia of neutral nationality and excellent standing) states, from his personal knowledge, that only one Armenian from Dört Yöl had had any communication with the Allied warships. This evidence is authoritative, and it has probability on its side; for, if Dört Yöl was in regular communication with the Allied squadron, it is inconceivable that the Armenians of Djibal Mousa, a few miles further down the coast, should have taken 44 days to attract the same squadron's attention, when it was a question for them of life and death.

Thus the second contention breaks down, and we are left with the third, which lays little stress on justice or public safety and bases the case on revenge. The Armenian civil population in the Ottoman Empire, it is argued, owes its misfortunes to the Armenian volunteers in the Russian Army. "Our Armenians in Turkey," say the Turks

in effect, "have certainly suffered terribly from the measures we have taken; they may even have suffered innocently; but can you blame us? Was it not human nature that we should revenge ourselves on the Armenians at home for the injury we had received from their compatriots fighting against us at the front in the Russian ranks — men who had actually volunteered to fight against us in the enemy's cause?"

This is almost the favourite argument of the apologists, and yet it is surely the most monstrous of any, for these Armenian volunteers owed no allegiance to the Turks at all, but were ordinary Russian subjects. Through territorial acquisitions and free immigration from across the Russian Government had, by 1914, acquired the sovereignty over little less than half the Armenian race (*). Russia was as much the lawful "fatherland" of this substantial minority as Turkey was of the remainder. It is a misfortune for any nation to be divided between two allegiances, especially when the states to which they owe them elect to go to war; but it is at least an alleviation of the difficulty, and one that does honour to both parties concerned, when either fraction of the divided nationality finds itself in sympathy, even under the test

(*) According to an official calendar, published at Alexandropol by authority of the Katholikos of Etchmiadzin, from which extracts have been communicated to the Editor by Mr. H. N. Mosditchian, the statistics of the Armenian population in Russia, up to date, are 1,636,486 for the Caucasus, and approximately two million for the Empire as a whole. For the Ottoman Empire, statistics compiled at the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1912 estimate the Armenian population at 2,100,000; Turkish official statistics, on the other hand, admit no more than 1,100,000, which on their own showing would give Russia a majority.

of war, with the particular state to which its allegiance is legally due. The loyalty of the Russian Armenians to Russia cast no imputation upon the Ottoman Armenians, and was no concern of the Turks. The latter will probably explain that they had no objection to the Russian Armenians doing their duty, but resented their doing more; "The conscripts naturally answered the summons, but why did those who were exempt equip themselves so eagerly as volunteers? The Ottoman Armenians adopted a painfully different attitude. At the beginning of the war, the Young Turkish Party sent representatives to the Congress of the Armenian 'Dashnaktzoutioun' Party at Erzeroum, offered them concessions to their nationality, and called upon them to organise volunteers and join in the invasion of Russian territory. Yet they decidedly refused — refused in this case when their kinsmen did not wait to be asked in the other. This reveals the real sympathies and aspirations of the Armenian people, not only the Armenians in Russia, but those in our country as well."

There is, of course, a crushing answer to these tirades. If the Armenians felt so differently towards the Turks and the Russians, then that was a serious reflection on their treatment by the Turks, and the logical way to change their feelings was to treat them better. Could the civilian Armenians who remembered the massacre of their innocent kinsfolk at Adana a few years before have been expected to volunteer in support of those who had commanded these massacres? Could their feelings have been other than they were? But so long as only their feelings were in question and their behaviour remained correct, the Turks had no right to proceed with them in any but a humane and constitutional manner. The argument can be driven home by a parallel. There are Polish volunteer legions in the Austro-Hungarian Army. What would the

Turks' German apologists have said if the Russian Government had appeased its resentment against these Austrian-Polish volunteers by wiping out all the Russian-Polish civilians on their own side of the frontier?

It is a significant fact that all these Turkish complaints are directed against Russian Armenians in Russian service. There is no hint of treachery or malingering on the part of those Ottoman Armenians who had been drafted, many of them illegally, into the Turkish Army — no insinuation that their record was not as satisfactory in 1914 as in 1912 (*). To the editor's knowledge, the German apologists have only been able to fasten upon two "traitors" in the legal (though not in the moral) sense of the word. There have been refugees, of course, like Mourad of Sivas, who escaped into the Caucasus when the atrocities were in full course — men who had just been compelled to fight for their lives, and had seen their neighbours and kinsfolk massacred once more on all sides of them. Not even the German apologists would dare to censure these men under circumstances for enrolling in the volunteers. But there are only two cases adduced of Ottoman subjects who went over to the Russians before the atrocities began — a certain Karakin Pasdermadjian, a deputy in the Ottoman Parliament, and another Armenian named Suren, stated to have been a delegate at the "Dashnaktzoutioun" Congress at Erzeroum. "In face of this," argues the German writer from whose pamphlet these instances are taken (**), "it was the Otto-

(*) *The 25 recalcitrants at Zeitoun do not come into question, for the Zeitounlis were excepted from military service by special charter, and the attempt to conscribe them was a violation by the Ottoman authorities of Ottoman law.*

(**) *Die Armenische Frange, von C. A. Bratter, Berlin, Condordia Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915. The reference is to p.p. 9-10.*

man Government's duty to uphold public law and order. In wartime, measures of this kind assume an especially weighty and pressing character" — and with this generality he implicitly condones the atrocities of 1915. If this represents the official apologia of the Ottoman Government, the only answer is a *reductio ad absurdum*. On the same principle, when Sir Roger Casement landed from a German submarine on the Irish coast, it would have been the British Government's duty to deport all the Roman Catholic inhabitants of Ireland and maroon them, say, on the coast of Labrador or in the central desert of Australia. The parallel is exact, and leaves nothing more to be said, unless, indeed, what was said by Talaat Bey, the Young Turkish Minister of the Interior, in a recent interview with a correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* (*). "The sad events that have occurred in Armenia," he vouchsafed, «have prevented my sleeping well at night. We have been reproached for making no distinction between the innocent Armenians and the guilty; but that was utterly impossible, in view of the fact that those who were innocent to-day might be guilty to-morrow.» There is no need of further witnesses.

The various Turkish contentions thus fail, first to last, to meet the point. They all attempt to trace the atrocities of 1915 to events arising out of the war; but they not only cannot justify them on this ground, they do not even suggest any adequate motive for their perpetration. It is evident that the war was merely an opportunity and not a cause — in fact, that the deportation scheme, and all that it involved, flowed inevitably from the general policy of the Young Turkish Government. This inference will be confirmed if we analyse the

(*) *Reproduced in the Paris journal Le Matin, 6th May, 1916, in a special despatch dated Zürich, 5th May.*

political tenets to which the Young Turks were committed.

The Young Turkish movement began as a reaction against the policy of Abd-ul-Hamid. Its founders repudiated his "neutralisation of forces"; they maintained that the Ottoman Empire must stand by its own strength, and that this strength must be developed by a radical internal reconstruction. From their asylum at Paris they preached the doctrines of the French Revolution — religious toleration, abolition of caste-privileges, equality of all citizens before the law, equality of obligation to perform military service, constitutional government through a representative parliament. And when they came into power, they made some attempt to put these doctrines into practice. In Turkey for a brief space of the year 1908, as in France twelve decades before, the vision of "Pure Reason" did bring peace and goodwill among men. Nearly all the foreign observers who were in the country when "Huriet" came, testify to this momentary, magic transfiguration of hatred into love; and the Armenians, who had desired more than any of their neighbours to see this day, might well believe that the Young Turks' ideal was identical with their own. Yet there were differences beneath the surface. The Young Turks realised that the Christian elements were an asset; they did not propose, at the outset, to destroy them, as Abd-ul-Hamid had done; but they wanted still less to co-operate with them as separate partners in the Ottoman State. The "Millet" were as abhorrent to them, as an institution, as the autocracy of Abd-ul-Hamid. They set up against the principle of the "Millet" the programme of «Ottomanisation». The Turkish leaven was to permeate the non-Turkish lump, until it had all become of one uniform Turkish substance. In Parliament this programme took such forms as a bill to make the Turkish

language the universal and compulsory medium of secondary education (*), and the Armenian deputies found themselves opposing it in concert with the Liberal Party, which included the Arab bloc and stood for the toleration of national individualities. The Young Turks, in fact, had imbibed both the good currents and the bad in the modern political atmosphere of Western Europe — its democratic doctrines but its chauvinism as well. Most political theorists debarred from responsible practice give this same confused allegiance to incompatible ideals, and all, when they come into power, are compelled by circumstances to choose which master they will serve. In 1908, the choice of the Young Turks was not predestined; the "Committee of Union and Progress" might have set its divided goals; but disillusionment soon decided its orientation. The magic dawn of "Huriet" faded; the old, crushing burden of Ottoman Government descended upon shoulders not expert, like Abd-ul-Hamid's, at balancing the weight; the Austro-Bulgarian violation of the Treaty of Berlin and the subsequent territorial losses of the Balkan War shook the Young Party's prestige, aggravated the difficulty of their problem, and embittered their attitude towards its solution. The current of chauvinism gained upon them more and more, and their intervention in the European War demonstrated that its mastery was complete, for their calculations in intervening were of a thoroughly Prussian character. A military triumph was to restore them their prestige; it was to recover ancient territories of the Empire in Egypt, the Caucasus and the coveted Persian province of Azerbaijan; it was to shake off the trammels of international control, and solve the

(*) *The vast majority of secondary schools in the Empire being, of course, American, Armenian or Greek, and practically none of them Turkish.*

internal problem by cutting the Gordian Knot. But the hopes of conquest and prestige were early shattered by the strategical failures of the winter of 1914-5, which were almost as humiliating as those of 1912, and then the Young Turks concentrated savagely upon "Ottomanisation" at home.

Ottomanisation has become the Young Turks' obsession. Their first act after declaring war was to repudiate the Capitulations; their latest stroke has been to declare the Turkish language the exclusive medium of official business in the Empire, with only a year's delay — a step which has caused consternation among their German allies. And in this mood they turned to the Armenian question, which happened at the moment to have reached an important phase.

In 1912-3 the diplomatists of Europe had once more met in consultation over the Ottoman Empire, and the Armenians had presented their case to the Conference at London, as they had presented it at Berlin thirty-five years before. (*) When the Conference proved unable to take cognizance of their petition, they applied to the individual governments of the Powers. The Russian Government took the initiative and drafted a new scheme for the Signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. The German Government opposed, but was won over by the Russian diplomacy and by the representations of the Armenian delegates, who repaired to Berlin in person. Then, when the German opposition had been withdrawn, the Russian draft was revised by the Ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople, accepted, with modifications, by the Young Turkish Government, and actually

(*) *The Delegation of 1912 was nominated by His Holiness the Katholikos of Etchmadzin. Its President was His Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha.*

promulgated by them on the 8th February, 1914.

In its final shape, the scheme still embodied the main points of reform which had been regarded as cardinal ever since 1878. There was to be a mixed Gendarmerie, under a European chief, recruited from the Turks and Armenians, but closed to the Kurds; Moslem and Christian were to be equal before the law; the Armenian language was to be a recognised medium in the courts and public offices (a bitter clause for the Young Turkish nationalists); there were to be no restrictions on the multiplication of Armenian schools. Finally, the vilayets affected by the scheme (*) were to be divided into two groups, and each group was to be placed under a European Inspector-General. The two Inspector-Generals were authorised to appoint and dismiss all officials in their respective spheres, except those "of superior rank." They were themselves to be appointed by the Ottoman Government, on the recommendation of the Powers, for a term of ten years, and not to be removable within this period. The Government duly proceeded to select two candidates for these Inspectorates, a Dutchman and a Norwegian, but its treatment of these gentlemen soon showed that in diplomacy, at any rate, the Young Turks had adopted the methods of Abd-ul-Hamid. A clause was inserted in the Inspectors' contract of engagement, empowering the Government to denounce it at any moment upon payment of an indemnity of one year's salary — a flat violation of the ten years' term provided for under the scheme; and the list of "superior officials" was inflated until the patronage of the Inspectors, which,

(*) *The Ottoman Government, for statistical reasons, added the Vilayet of Trebizond to the original Six, the Moslem element being here in a sufficient majority to balance, to some extent, the Armenian majority in the rest.*

next to their irremovability, would have been their most effective power, was reduced to an illusion. The unfortunate nominees were spared the farce of exercising their maimed authority. They had barely reached their provinces when the European War broke out, and the Government promptly denounced the contracts and suspended the Scheme of Reforms, as the first step towards its own intervention in the conflict.

Thus, at the close of 1914, the Armenians found themselves in the same position as in 1883. The measures designed for their security had fallen through, and left nothing behind but the resentment that still held them at its mercy. The deportations of 1915 followed as inexorably from the Balkan War and the Project of 1914 as the massacres of 1895-6 had followed from the Russian War and the Project of 1878. Only in the execution of their revenge the Young Turks revealed all the sinister features of their dissimilarity to Abd-ul-Hamid. The Sultan, so far as he differed from the familiar type of Oriental despot, had been an opportunist in the tradition of Metternich — a politician of mature experience and delicate touch, unencumbered by any constructive programme to disturb the artistry of his game of finesse. He repressed the Armenians to a nicety after preparing for it eighteen years. The Young Turks were adventurers who had caught the catchwords of another generation and another school — the apes of Danton and Robespierre, and doctrinaires to the core. For the old, anachronistic ascendancy of Moslem over Rayah, to the maintenance of which Abd-ul-Hamid had cynically devoted his abilities, they substituted the idea of Turkish nationalism, which clothed the same evil in a more clearly-cut and infinitely more dynamic form. They were fanatics with an unreasoned creed, builders with a plan that they meant to carry through, and no half-measures would content them, no inhibitions

of prudence or humanity deter them from the attempt to realise the whole. Hindrances only exasperated them to sweeping action, and a blind concentration on their programme shielded them from doubts. "Our acts," Talaat Bey is reported to have said, in the interview quoted above, "have been dictated to us by a national and historical necessity. The idea of guaranteeing the existence of Turkey must outweigh every other consideration." The first of these sentiments is the pure-milk of the eighteenth century idéologues; there is a Prussian adulteration in the second, which smacks of more recent times. It is the voice of the youngest, crudest, most ruthless national movement in Europe, and the acts which it excuses, were the barbarous initiation of the Near East into the European fraternity.

THE DEPORTATIONS OF 1915:

PROCEDURE

It will be well to give a bare summary of events, to bring out the essential unity of design which underlay the procedure against the Armenians at the various dates and in the various provinces of the Empire. This fundamental uniformity of procedure is more sinister than the incidental aggravations of the crime by Kurds, peasants, gendarmes or local authorities. It is damning evidence that the procedure itself, which set in motion all the other forces of evil, was conceived and organised by the Central Government at Constantinople.

The dismissal of the Inspectors-General and the ab-

rogation of the reforms were followed immediately by the mobilisation of the Ottoman Army for eventual participation in the war, and with this the sufferings of the Armenians began. It has been mentioned already that the Young Turks had extended the duty of military service to their Christian fellow-citizens, and that the Armenian recruits had distinguished themselves in the Balkan War; but naturally the measure was not retrospective, and Armenians who were already past the statutory age of training when it was introduced, were allowed to pay the "Rayah" poll-tax as before, under the formula of an exemption-tax in lieu of military service. In the autumn of 1914, however, there was a general levy of all males in the Empire from twenty years of age to forty-five, and soon from eighteen to fifty, in which the Armenians, whether they had paid their annual exemption-tax or not, were included with the rest. There were also drastic requisitions of private supplies, by which the Armenians, again, were the principal sufferers, since they were the chief merchants and store-keepers of the country. These were considerable hardships and injustices, but they were not necessarily in themselves the result of a malevolent design. Apart from what actually followed, they might have been simply the inevitable penalties of a country which had been embarked by its Government on a struggle for existence.

In October, when mobilisation was completed, the Government had, in fact, declared war on the Allies, and in December its grandiose military operations began. Enver Pasha, with the main Ottoman forces, started an encircling movement against the Russian troops in Caucasia, along a front extending from Erzeroum to the Black Sea Coast; Halil Bey led a flying column across the frontier of Azerbaijan, and raised the Kurds; Djemal Pasha felt his way across the Sinai Peninsula towards the Suez

Canal. For a week or two the invading armies met with success. They reached Ardahan, almost in the rear of Kars, they pushed the Russians back from their rail-head at Sari-Kamysh, and they occupied the capital of Azerbaijan, Tabriz. But then the campaign broke down in disaster. Two Turkish army corps were destroyed at Sari-Kamysh in the first week of January, 1915, and the rest were driven out of Russian territory by the end of the month; on the 30th January, the Russians even reoccupied Tabriz. Djemal's Egyptian expedition was a month in arrear, but its fortunes were the same. He reached the Canal at the beginning of February, after a creditable desert march, only to return by the way he came, after an abortive night attack. There was no more question of the offensive for the Turks, but only of defending their own straggling frontiers; and this breakdown was a bitter blow to Young Turkish official circles, for it shattered half the hopes that had lured them into the war. The unmeasured optimism of the winter gave place to equally violent depression, and under the influence of this new atmosphere the persecution of the Armenians entered a second and more positive phase.

A decree went forth that all Armenians should be disarmed. The Armenians in the Army were drafted out of the fighting ranks, re-formed into special labour battalions, and set to work at throwing up fortifications and constructing roads. The disarming of the civil population was left to the local authorities, and in every administrative centre a reign of terror began. The authorities demanded the production of a definite number of arms. Those who could not produce them were tortured, often in fiendish ways; those who procured them for surrender, by purchase from their Moslem neighbours or by other means, were imprisoned for conspiracy against the Government. Few of these were young men, for most of

the young had been called up to serve; they were elderly men, men of substance and the leaders of the Armenian community, and it became apparent that the inquisition for arms was being used as a cloak to deprive the community of its natural heads. Similar measures had preceded the massacres of 1895-6, and a sense of foreboding spread through the Armenian people. «One night in the winter,» writes a foreign witness of these events, «the Government sent officers round the city to all Armenian houses, knocking up the families and demanding that all weapons should be given up. This action was the death-knell to many hearts.»

The appalling inference was in fact correct, for the second phase of persecution passed over without a break into the third and final act, and it is evident that the whole train had been laid by the Ministry at Constantinople before the first arms were called in or the first Armenian thrown into prison. This carries the detailed organisation of the scheme at least as far back as February, 1915, and, indeed, the elaborate preparations that had already been made by the 8th April, the date of the first deportation at Zeitoun, presuppose at least as long a period. It is extremely important to emphasise these chronological facts, because they refute the attempt of the apologists to disconnect the last phase from the phases that preceded it, and to represent it as an emergency measure dictated by the military events of the spring.

In reality, the situation had been growing tenser before the spring began. In outlying villages, the inquisition for arms had been accompanied by open violence. Men had been massacred, women violated and houses burnt down by the gendarmerie patrols, and such outrages had been particularly frequent in the Vilayet of Van, where the soldiers seem to have been exasperated by their recent reverses and were certainly stimulated by the tru-

culence of the Governor Djevdet Bey, who had returned to his administrative duties after his unsuccessful campaigning beyond the frontier. The crowning outrage was the murder of four Armenian leaders from the City, when they were on their way to an outlying district to keep the peace, at Djevdet's own request, between the local Armenians and their Moslem neighbours. The Armenian inhabitants of the City of Van took warning from the fate of the villagers and from this last and most sinister crime, and prepared themselves, in case of need, for self-defence. Their action was justified by Djevdet Bey himself, for he had been drawing a cordon round the garden suburbs of Van, where the majority of the Armenian population lived, and on the 20th April he unleashed his troops upon them without provocation. The Armenians of Van found themselves fighting for their lives against a murderous attack by what was supposed to be the lawful Government of their country. There had been the same sequence of events at Zeitoun. The search for arms had been accompanied by a formidable concentration of troops in the town, and the final phase had been opened, not indeed by a butchery, but by the deportation of the first batch of the inhabitants. This had occurred on the 8th April, twelve days before Djevdet Bey's outbreak at Van, and both events were previous to the new turn in the military situation. In fact, it was the distress of the Armenian civil population at Van that decided the Russian initiative. A Russian column, with a strong contingent of Russian-Armenian volunteers, forced its way towards the city from the direction of Bayazid, and relieved the defenders on the 19th May, after they had been besieged for a month. The strategy of encirclement was now retorted upon the Turks themselves, for on the 24th May another Russian column occupied Urmia, and drove the last of the Turco-Kurdish invaders out of Azerbaijan.

A British expeditionary force was simultaneously pressing up the Tigris, and while events were taking this serious turn in the east, the heart of the Empire was threatened by the attack on the Dardanelles. By the end of May, 1915, the outlook was as desperate as in the bad days of 1912, but it must be emphasised again that the final phase in the procedure against the Armenians had already begun before these acute military dangers emerged above the horizon. The military straits in which the Young Turks found themselves in the spring of 1915 may have precipitated the execution of their Armenian scheme, but have no bearing whatever upon its origination.

On the 8th April, then, final phase began, and the process carried out at Zeitoun was applied to one Armenian centre after another throughout the Ottoman Empire. On a certain date, in whatever town or village it might be (and the dates show a significant sequence), the public crier went through the streets announcing that every male Armenian must present himself forthwith at the Government Building. In some cases the warning was given by the soldiery or gendarmerie slaughtering every male Armenian they encountered in the streets, a reminiscence of the procedure in 1895-6; but usually a summons to the Government Building was the preliminary stage. The men presented themselves in their working clothes, leaving their shops and work-rooms open, their ploughs in the field, their cattle on the mountain side. When they arrived, they were thrown without explanation into prison, kept there a day or two, and then marched out of the town in batches, roped man to man, along some southerly or south-easterly road. They were starting, they were told, on a long journey — to Mosul or perhaps to Baghdad. It was a dreadful prospect to men unequipped, for travel, who had neither scrip nor staff, food nor clothes nor bedding. They had bidden no fare-

well to their families, they had not wound up their affairs. But they had not long to ponder over their plight, for they were halted and massacred at the first lonely place on the road. The same process was applied to those other Armenian men (and they numbered hundreds or even thousands in the larger centres) who had been imprisoned during the winter months on the charge of conspiracy or concealment of arms, though in some instances these prisoners are said to have been overlooked — an involuntary form of reprieve of which there were also examples during the French Reign of Terror in 1793. This was the civil authorities' part, but there was complete co-ordination between Talaat Bey's Ministry of the Interior and Enver Pasha's Ministry of War, for simultaneously the Armenian Labour Battalions, working behind the front, were surrounded by detachments of their combatant Moslem fellowsoldiers and butchered in cold blood.

The military authorities also made themselves responsible for the civil population of Bitlis, Moush and Sasoun, who were marked out for complete and immediate extermination on account of their proximity to Van and the advancing Russian forces. This task was carried out by military methods with the help of the local Kurds — another reversion to the tactics of Abd-ul-Hamid — but its application appears to have been limited to the aforementioned districts. In the rest of the Empire, where the work was left in the hands of the civil administration, the women and children were not disposed of by straightforward massacre like the men. Their destiny under the Government scheme was not massacre but slavery or deportation.

After the Armenian men had been summoned away to their death, there was usually a few days interval in whatever town it might be, and then the crier was heard

again in the streets, bidding all Armenians who remained to prepare themselves for deportation, while placards to the same effect were posted on the walls. (*) This applied, in actual fact, to the women and children, and to a poor remnant of the men who, through sickness, infirmity or age, had escaped the fate marked out for their sex. A period of grace was in most cases accorded for the settlement of their affairs and the preparation of their journey; but here, again, there were cases in which the victims were taken without warning from the loom, the fountain or even from their beds, and the respite, where granted, was in great measure illusory. The ordinary term given was a bare week, and it was never more than a fortnight — a time utterly insufficient for all that had to be done. There were instances, moreover, in which the Government broke its promise, and carried away its victims before the stated day arrived.

For the women there was an alternative to deportation. They might escape it by conversion to Islam; but conversion for an Armenian woman in 1915 meant something more physical than a change of theology. It could only be ratified by immediate marriage with a Moslem man, and if the woman were already a wife (or, rather, a widow, for by this time few Armenian husbands remained alive), she must part with any children she had, and surrender them to be brought up as true Moslems in a «Government Orphanage» — a fate of uncertain meaning, for no such institutions were known to be in existence. If the convert could find no Turk to take her, or shrink from the embraces of the bridegroom who offered himself, then she and her children must be de-

(*) *Proclamation announcing and justifying the deportation of the Armenians has been published complete in the Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post of the 5th February, 1915.*

ported with the rest, however fervently she had professed the creed of Islam. Deportation was the alternative adopted by, or imposed upon, the great majority.

The sentence of deportation was a paralysing blow, yet those condemned to it had to spend their week of grace in feverish activity, procuring themselves clothing, provisions and ready money for the road. The local authorities placed every possible obstacle in their way. There was an official fiction that their banishment was only temporary, and they were therefore prohibited from selling their real property or their stock. The Government set its seal upon the vacated houses, lands and merchandise, «to keep them safe against their owners' return;» yet before these rightful owners started on their march they often saw these very possessions, which they had not been allowed to realise, made over by the authorities as a free gift to Moslem immigrants, who had been concentrated in the neighbourhood, in readiness to step into the Armenians' place (*). And even such household or personal chattels as they were permitted to dispose of were of little avail, for their Moslem neighbours took shameless advantage of their necessity, and beat them down to an almost nominal price, so that when the day of departure arrived they were often poorly equipped to meet it.

The Government charged itself with their transport, and indeed they were not in a position to arrange for it themselves, for their ultimate destination was seldom divulged. The exiles from each centre were broken up into several convoys, which varied in size from two or three hundred to three or four thousand members. A detach-

(*) *These Moslem immigrants were particularly in evidence in Cilicia, and in the Vilayets of Erzeroum and Trebizond.*

ment of gendarmerie was assigned to every convey, to guard them on the way, and the civil authorities hired or requisitioned a certain number of ox-carts (arabas), usually one to a family, which they placed at their disposal; and so the convoy started out. The mental misery of exile was sufficiently acute, but it was soon ousted by more material cares. A few days, or even a few hours, after the start, the carters would refuse to drive them further, and the gendarmes, as fellow-Moslems, would connive at their mutinousness. So the carts turned back, and the exiles had to go forward on foot. This was the beginning of their physical torments, for they were not travelling over soft country or graded roads, but by mule-tracks across some of the roughest country in the world. It was the hot season, the wells and springs were sometimes many hours' journey apart, and the gendarmes often amused themselves by forbidding their fainting victims to drink. It would have been an arduous march for soldiers on active service, but the members of these convoys were none of them fitted or trained for physical hardship. They were the women and children, the old and the sick. Some of the women had been delicately brought up and lived in comfort all their lives; some had to carry children in their arms too young to walk; others had been sent off with the convoy when they were far gone with child, and gave birth on the road. None of these latter survived, for they were forced to march on again after a few hours' respite; they died on the road, and the new-born babies perished with them. Many others died of hunger and thirst, sunstroke, apoplexy or sheer exhaustion. The hardships endured by the women who accompanied their husbands on Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna bear no comparison with the hardships these Armenian women endured. The Government which condemned them to exile knew what the journey would mean,

and the servants of the Government who conducted them did everything to aggravate their inevitable physical sufferings. Yet this was the least part of their torture; far worse were the atrocities of violence wantonly inflicted upon them by fellow human beings.

From the moment they left the outskirts of the towns they were never safe from outrage. The Moslem peasants mobbed and plundered them as they passed through the cultivated lands, and the gendarmes connived at the peasants' brutality, as they had connived at the desertion of the drivers with their carts. When they arrived at a village they were exhibited like slaves in a public place, often before the windows of the Government Building itself, and every Moslem inhabitant was allowed to view them for his harem; the gendarmes themselves began to make free with the rest, and compelled them to sleep with them at night. There were still more horrible outrages when they came to the mountains, for here they were met by bands of «chettis» and Kurds. The «chettis» were brigands, recruited from the public prisons; they had been deliberately released by the authorities on a consideration which may have been tacit but which both parties clearly understood. As for the Kurds, they had not changed since 1896, for had they always retained their arms, which Abd-ul-Hamid had served out and the Young Turks could not or would not take away; and they had now been restored to official favour upon the proclamation of the Holy War, so that their position was as secure again as it had been before 1908. They knew well what they were allowed and what they were intended to do. When these Kurds and chettis waylaid the convoys, the gendarmes always fraternised with them and followed their lead, and it would be hard to say which took the most active part in the ensuing massacre — for this was the work which the brigands came to do. The first to be

butchered were the old men and boys — all the males that were to be found in the convoy except the infants in arms — but the women were massacred also. It depended on the whim of the moment whether a Kurd cut a woman down or carried her away into the hills. When they were carried away their babies were left on the ground or dashed against the stones. But while the convoy dwindled, the remnant had always to march on. The cruelty of the gendarmes towards the victims grew greater as their physical grew more intense; the gendarmes seemed impatient to make a hasty end of their task. Women who lagged behind were bayoneted on the road or pushed over precipices, or over bridges. The passage of rivers, and especially of the Euphrates, was always an occasion of wholesale murder. Women and children were driven into the water, and were shot as they struggled, if they seemed likely to reach the further bank. The lust and covetousness of their tormentors had no limit. The last survivors often staggered into Aleppo naked; every shred of their clothing had been torn from them on the way. Witnesses who saw their arrival remark that there was not one young or pretty face to be seen among them, and there was assuredly none surviving that was truly old — except in so far as it had been aged by suffering. The only chance to survive was to be plain enough to escape their torturers' lust, and vigorous enough to bear the fatigues of the road.

Those were the exiles that arrived on foot, but there were others, from the metropolian districts and the north-west, who were transported to Aleppo by rail. These escaped the violence of the Kurds, but the sum of their suffering can hardly have been less. They were packed in cattle-turcks, often filthy and always overcrowded, and their journey was infinitely slow, for the line was congested by their multitude and by the passage of troops.

At every stopping-place they were simply turned out the open, without food or shelter, to wait for days, or even weeks, till the line was clear and rolling-stock available to carry them a further stage. The gendarmes in charge of them seem to have been as brutal as those with the convoys on foot, and when they came to the two breaks in the Baghdad Railway, where the route crosses the ranges of the Taurus and Amanus Mountains, they too had to traverse these, the most arduous stages of all, on foot. At Bozanti, the rail-head west of Taurus, and again at Osmania, Mamouret, Islahia and Kotmo, stations on either slope of the Amanus chain, vast and incredibly foul concentration camps grew up, where the exiles were delayed for months, and died literally by thousands of hunger, exposure, and epidemics. The portion of them that finally reached Aleppo were in as deplorable a condition as those that had made the journey on foot from beginning to end.

Aleppo was the focus upon which all the convoys converged. In April, it is true, half the Zeitounlis had been sent northwestward to Sultania, in the Konia district, one of the most unhealthy spots in the Anatolian Desert. But the authorities changed their mind, and despatched the exiles at Sultania southeast again, to join their fellow-townsmen in the Desert of Syria. Thenceforward, the south-eastern desert was the destination of them all, and Aleppo, and in a secondary degree Ourfa and Ras-ul-Ain, were the natural centres of distribution.

Some of the exiles were planted in the immediate neighbourhood of Aleppo itself — at places like Moum-bidj, Bab, Ma'ara, Idlib — but these seem to have been comparatively few, and it is not certain whether their quarters there were intended to be permanent. Many more were deported southward from Aleppo along the Syrian Railway, and allowed to find a resting-place in the

districts of Hama, Homs and Damascus. A still larger number were sent towards the east, and cantoned on the banks of the Euphrates, in the desert section of its course. There were some at Rakka; Der-el-Zor was the largest depôt of all, and is mentioned in this connection more frequently than any place after Aleppo itself; some were sent on to Mayadin, a day's journey further down the river, and Moslem travellers reported meeting others within forty-eight hours' journey of Baghdad. No first-hand evidence has come in of their presence at or near Mosul, though they were frequently informed on their journey that their destination was to be there.

The dispersal of the exiles was thus extremely wide, as the authors of the scheme had intended that it should be, but certain features are common to all the places to which they were sent. They were all inhabited by Moslem populations alien to the Armenians in language and habits of life; they were all unhealthy — either malarious or sultry or in some other respect markedly unsuitable for the residence of people used to a temperate climate; and they were all remote from the exiles' original homes — the remotest places, in fact, which the Government could find within the Ottoman frontiers, since Christians were debarred from setting foot on the sacred deserts of the Hidjaz, and a British expeditionary force was occupying the marches of Irak. The Ottoman Government had to content itself with the worst districts at its disposal, and it did its utmost to heighten the climate's natural effect by marooning the exiles there, after an exhausting journey, with neither food, nor shelter, nor clothing, and with no able-bodied men among them to supply these deficiencies by their labour and resource.

The transmission of the exiles to these distant destinations was naturally slow — indeed, the slowness of the journey was one of the most effective of its tor-

ments. The first convoy started from Zeitoun on the 8th April, 1915; fresh convoys followed it during the seven ensuing months from the different Armenian centres in the Empire, and there is no record of any stoppage until the 6th November. On that date an order from Constantinople reached the local authorities, at any rate in the Cilician plain, directing them to refrain from further deportations; but this only applied to the remnant of the local Armenian residents, and the masses of exiles from the north and north-west who were still painfully struggling across the barriers of Taurus and Amanus, were driven on remorselessly to their journey's end, which cannot have been reached by them (or by such of them as survived) before the very close of the year. The congestion of the routes was partly responsible for this delay; but the congestion would have been still more pronounced if the scheme had not been carried out methodically, region, by region, in an order which betrays more than anything else the directing hand of the Central Government. Cilicia was the first region to be cleared, just as it had been the principal region to suffer in the massacres of 1909. Strategically and economically, it was the most vital spot in Asiatic Turkey, and its large and increasing Armenian population must always have offended the sensibilities of the Young Turkish Nationalists. It was the natural starting-point for the execution of the Ottomanisation Scheme, and the deportation were in progress here fully six weeks before they were applied to the remainder of the Empire. Zeitoun was cleared on the 8th April; Geben, Furnus and Albustan within the next few days; Dört Yöl before the end of the month. At Hadjin, on the other hand, the clearance did not begin till the 3rd June, and dragged on into September; while at Adana, the city of the plain, there was only an abortive clearance in the third week of May, and the serious

deportations were postponed till the first week in September.

The next region to be cleared was the zone bordering on Van and immediately threatened by the Russian advance, from the Black Sea to the Persian frontier. In the south-eastern districts of this zone — Bitlis, Moush, Sassoun and Hakkiari — the clearance, as has been remarked already, was not effected by deportation, but by wholesale massacre on the spot. Outlying villages of the Boulanik, Moush and Sassoun areas were destroyed in the latter part of May, and before the end of the same month Djevdet Bey retreated down the Bohtan Valley from Van, and massacred the Armenians of Sairt. The Armenians of Bitlis were next massacred by Djevdet, on the 25th June; and, in the first week of July, 20,000 fresh troops arrived from Harpout and exterminated the Armenians of Moush — first the villagers and then the people of the town, which was bombarded by artillery on the 10th June. After making an end of Moush these troops joined the Kurdish irregulars operating against Sassoun, and on the 5th August, after bitter fighting, the surviving Sassounlis — man, woman and child — were annihilated in their last mountain stronghold. At the end of July the Ottoman forces temporarily re-entered Van, and slaughtered all the Armenian inhabitants who had not escaped in the wake of the Russian retreat. In June and July the Nestorian (Syrian) communities of the district of Hakkiari, in the upper basin of the Greater Zab, were also attacked by the Kurds and destroyed, except for a remnant which crossed the watershed into the Urmia basin and found safety within the Russian lines.

In the north-western districts of the frontier zone the semblance of deportation was preserved, but the exiles — women and children as well as men — were invariably massacred in cold blood after a few days on

the road. Before the end of May there was a massacre at Khunyss, and on the 6th June the deportations began (with the same consummation) in the villages of the Erzeroum plain. At Erzeroum itself the first deportation took place on the 6th June, and the last on the 28th July (or on the 3rd August, according to other reports). The Armenian Bishop of the city was deported with this last convoy, and never heard of again. At Baibourt, the surrounding villages were similiary cleared before the town, and the townspeople were despatched in three convoys, the last of which started on the 14th June. From the town of Erzindjian four convoys started on successive days, from the 7th June to the 10th. Practically none of the exiles from Erzindjan, Baibourt or Erzeroum seem to have outlived the first stages of the journey.

At Harpout, the clearance began on the 1st June, and continued throughout the month. On the 2nd, 3rd and 4th July the adjoining town of Mezré was emptied as well. The convoys from these two places and the neighbouring villages were terribly thinned by atrocities on the road.

At Trebizond the deportations were carried out from the 1st to the 6th July, and seem to have been simultaneous in the various coast towns of the Vilayet. Here, too, deportation was merely a cloak for immediate massacre. The exiles were either drowned at sea or cut down at the first resting-place on the road.

In the Vilayet of Sivas, again, the villages were dealt with first, but the city itself was not cleared till the 5th July. At X. the men were deported on the 26th June, the women on the 5th July, and the last remnant, who had found protection with the American Missionaries, were carried away on the 10th August. All the men, and many of the women, were massacred on the road.

The Armenian population in the provinces west of

Sivas, and in the metropolian districts surrounding Constantinople, was removed by train along the Anatolian Railway Konia, and thence towards Aleppo along the several sections of the Baghdad line. In all this region the scheme was put into execution distinctly later. At Angora the deportations began towards the end of July, at Adapazar about the 11th August; at Broussa there seems to have been no clearance till the first weeks of September, but this is stated to have been one of the last places touched. At Adrianople, however, the Armenians were not deported till the middle of October; and at K., in the Sandjak of Kaisaria, not till the 12th/15th November.

The south-eastern outposts of the Armenian Dispersion were left to the last, although their immediate neighbours in the Cilician highlands had been taken at the very beginning. The villagers of Djibal Mousa were not summoned till the 13th July; Aintab was not touched till the 1st August, and then only cleared gradually during the course of the month. The summons to Ourfa, which was answered, as at Djibal Mousa, by defiance, was not delivered till the last week in September.

Glancing back over this survey, we can discern the Central Government's general plan. The months of April and May were assigned to the clearance of Cilicia; June and July were reserved for the east; the western centres along the Railway were given their turn in August and September; and at the same time the process was extended, for completeness' sake, to the outlying Armenian communities in the extreme south-east. It was a deliberate, systematic attempt to eradicate the Armenian population throughout the Ottoman Empire, and it has certainly met with a very large measure of success; but it is not easy to present the results, even approximately, in a statistical form. The only people in a position to keep an accurate account of the numbers affected were

the Ottoman authorities themselves; but it is unlikely that they have done so, and still more unlikely that they would ever divulge such figures to the civilised world. We are compelled to base our estimates on the statements of private persons, who were excluded from detailed investigation by the jealous suspicion of the government officials and were seldom able to observe events in more than a limited section of the field. We must make our computations by piecing together these isolated data from private sources, and since Oriental arithmetic is notoriously inexact (and this is scarcely less true of the Nearer than of the Further East), we shall only make use of testimony from foreign witnesses of neutral nationality. Such witnesses may be assumed to be comparatively free from unconscious exaggeration and completely innocent of purposeful misrepresentation, and we can accept their statements with considerable assurance.

The first step is to establish the number of Armenians living within the Ottoman frontiers at the moment the deportations began. All the other figures ultimately depend upon this, but it is harder than any to obtain, for there are no independent foreign estimates of this on record, and the discrepancy between the native estimates is extreme (*). The Armenian Patriarchate, after an enquiry conducted in 1912, placed the number as high as 2,100,000; the Ottoman Government, in its latest official returns, puts it at 1,100,000 and no more. Both parties have an equal political interest in forcing their figures, but the Armenians are likely to have had a greater respect for exactitude, or at any rate a stronger sense

(*) *Though not more extreme than in other parts of the Near Eastern World, like Hungary, where statistics of nationality are a burning question of political controversy.*

of the futility of falsification. The most «neutral» course under the circumstances is to halve the difference, and to take the number provisionally as being 1,600,000, with the qualification that the true figure certainly lies between this and 2,000,000, and probably approaches more closely to the latter. The rest of the necessary figures can fortunately be drawn from foreign neutral testimony, in which such baffling discrepancies are rarer.

The second step is to estimate the number of those who have escaped deportation. There are the refugees who have escaped it by crossing the frontier — 182,000 into the Russian Caucasus and 4,200 into Egypt, according to detailed and trustworthy returns (*). There are also two important Armenian communities in Turkey where practically all but the leaders have been left unmolested — those of Smyrna and Constantinople. At Constantinople about 150,000 Armenians must still remain. Then there are the Catholic and Protestant Millets, which were nominally exempted from deportation, and the exempted converts to Islam. It is impossible to estimate the numbers in these categories with any plausibility, for the conduct of the authorities in respect of them was quite erratic. Many of the converts to Islam, as well as Armenians of the other denominations, were given the same treatment as the Gregorians, and the actual percentage of conversions is unascertainable, for they were encouraged in some places and discouraged in others. We must also allow for those who managed to elude the Government's net. As a general rule, this category is more numerous in reality than it appears to be, and this is especially so in the Near East. But in the present case the Young Turks seem to have put a Prussian thorough-

(*) *The former figure is taken from the American Relief Committee's Fourth Bulletin, dated 5th April, 1916.*

ness into the execution of their scheme, and the margin of ineffectiveness was evidently narrow. In the towns, such as Zeitoun, Hadjin, Sivas, X., and Erzeroum, where we have sufficient testimony to cross-check the estimates presented, the clearance, by deportation or massacre, seems to have been practically complete. At Erzeroum, for instance, there were 20,000 Armenians before the clearance began, and when it was over there were not more than 100 left. Concealment on any considerable scale can only have been practised in the villages, yet the number of those who have emerged from hiding since the Russian occupation is extraordinarily small. According to the investigations of the Patriarchate, there were 580,000 Armenians in 1912 in the Vilayets of Erzeroum, Bitlis and Van, which are now within the Russian lines. The American Relief Committee has recently been informed by its agents on the spot that there are now only 12,100 left alive there. Whatever arbitrary margin of reduction the absence of confirmatory statistics may make it necessary to subtract from the former figure, the proportion borne to it by the 12,100 survivors remains infinitesimal. Putting the communities at Constantinople and Smyrna and the refugees together at about 350,000, we shall certainly not be reckoning too low if we allow a quarter of a million for the Protestants, Catholics, converts and others who were spared, and estimate the total number of Armenians in Turkey who escaped deportation at not more than 600,000.

This leaves at least 1,000,000 to be accounted for by deportation and massacre, and probably 1,200,000 or more.

The third step is to estimate what proportion of these million Armenians has perished and what proportion survived, and here again our material is scanty and generalisation unsafe, the procedure of the authorities being erratic in this respect also. In certain vilayets, like Van

and Bitlis, there was no deportation at all, but massacre outright; in others, like Erzeroum and Trebizond, and again at Angora, deportation and massacre were equivalent, the convoys being butchered systematically at an early stage on the road. In Cilicia, on the other hand, the men as well as the women seem to have been genuinely deported, and the convoys seem only to have been reduced by sickness and exhaustion. Yet even where there was no wholesale massacre on the journey, a convoy might practically be exterminated by degrees. A large combined convoy, for instance, of exiles from Mamouret-ul-Aziz and Sivas, set out from Malatia 18,000 strong and numbered 301 at Viran Shehr, 150 at Aleppo. In this case, however, the wastage appears to have been exceptional. We have one similar instance of a convoy from Harpout which was reduced on the way to Aleppo from 5,000 to 213, a loss of 96 per cent; but in general the wastage seems to fluctuate, with a wide oscillation, on either side of 50 per cent; 600 out of 2,500 (24 per cent.) reached Aleppo from a village in the Harpout district; 60 per cent. arrived there out of the first convoy from the village of E. (near H.), and 46 per cent. out of the second; 25 per cent. arrived out of a convoy from the village of D. in the same neighbourhood. We shall certainly be well within the mark if we estimate that at least half those condemned to massacre or deportation have actually perished.

We can check this estimate to some extent by the record of arrivals at certain important centres of traffic on the exile routes, or at the final destinations of the convoys. On the 16th August, 1915, for instance, an exceedingly competent neutral resident at Constantinople stated that, to his knowledge, there were then 50,000 exiles scattered along the route from Bozanti (the first break in the Baghdad line) to Aleppo; on the 5th Novem-

ber, another witness, who had just traversed this route, wrote back from Aleppo that he had passed 150,000 exiles between there and Konia. Again, 13,155 exiles had reached or passed through Aleppo by the 30th July, 1915, and 20,000 more arrived there between that date and the 19th August. By the 3rd August 15,000 of these had been transmitted alive to Der-el-Zor, and this was only the beginning of the arrivals in the Zor district. No exiles reached Damascus before the 12th August, but between that date and the 3rd October, 1915, 22,000 of them had come through. These are isolated data, and prove little in themselves, but in its Bulletin of the 5th April, 1916, the American Relief Committee has published a cable recently received in the United States from a competent source, in which the total number of Armenian exiles alive at that time in the regions of Der-el-Zor, Damascus and Aleppo is estimated roughly at 500,000. This figure is possibly an exaggeration, but it is not incompatible with our two previous conclusions, that the total number of Armenians affected by the Young Turks' scheme was at least a million, and that at least 50 per cent of these have perished. To the alleged 500,000 survivors in the three regions mentioned we must add an uncertain but inconsiderable margin for the exiles who may have been planted at Mosul or who may still, in March, 1916, have been held up on the road; and this will raise the original number affected to something approaching 1,200,000, which we considered, on other grounds, to be nearer the real figure than the bare million which we accepted.

We can sum up this statistical enquiry by saying that, as far as our defective information carries us, about an equal number of Armenians in Turkey seem to have escaped, to have perished, and to have survived deportation in 1915; and we shall not be far wrong if, in round num-

bers, we estimate each of these categories at 600,000.

The exact quantitative scale of the crime thus remains uncertain, but there is no uncertainty as to the responsibility for its perpetration. This immense infliction of suffering and destruction of life was not the work of religious fanaticism. Fanaticism played no more part here than it has played in the fighting at Gallipoli or Kut, and the "Holy War" which the Young Turks caused to be proclaimed in October, 1914, was merely a political move to embarrass the Moslem subjects of the Entente Powers. There was no fanaticism, for instance, in the conduct of the Kurds and chettis, who committed some of the most horrible acts of all, nor can the responsibility be fixed upon them. They were simply marauders and criminals who did after their kind, and the Government, which not only condoned, but instigated, their actions, must bear the guilt. The peasantry, again (own brothers though they were to the Ottoman soldiery whose apparent humanity at Gallipoli and Kut has won their opponents' respect), behaved with astonishing brutality to the Armenians who were delivered into their hands; yet the responsibility does not lie with the Turkish peasantry. They are sluggish, docile people, unready to take violent action on their own initiative, but capable of perpetrating any enormity on the suggestion of those they are accustomed to obey. The peasantry would never have attacked the Armenians if their superiors had not given them the word. Nor are the Moslem townspeople primarily to blame; their record is not invariably black, and the evidence in the volume throws here and there a favourable light upon their character. Where Moslem and Christian lived together in the same town or village, led the same life, pursued the same vocation, there seems often to have been a strong human bond between them. The respectable Moslem townspeople seldom desired the extermination of their Armenian neigh-

bours, sometimes openly deplored it, and in several instances even set themselves to hinder it from taking effect. We have evidence of this from various places — Adana, for instance, and A.F. in Cilicia, the villages A.J. and AK in the A.F. district, and the city of Angora. The authorities had indeed to decree severe penalties against any Moslem as well as any alien or Greek who might be convicted of sheltering their Armenian victims. The rabble naturally looted Armenian property when the police connived, as the rabble in European towns might do; the respectable majority of the Moslem townspeople can be accused of apathy at worst; the responsibility cannot rest with these.

The guilt must, therefore, fall upon the officials of the Ottoman Government, but it will not weigh equally upon all members of the official hierarchy. The behaviour of the gendarmerie, for example, was utterly atrocious; the subordinates were demoralised by the power for evil that was placed in their hands; they were egged on by their chiefs, who gave vent to a malevolence against the Armenians which they must have been harbouring for years; a very large proportion of the total misery inflicted was the gendarmerie's work; and yet the gendarmerie were not, or ought not to have been, independent agents. The responsibility for their misconduct must be referred to the local civil administrators, or to the Central Government, or to both.

The local administrators of provinces and sub-districts — Valis, Mutessarifs and Kaimakams — are certainly very deeply to blame. The latitude allowed them by the Central Government was wide, as is shown by the variations they practised, in different places, upon the common scheme. In this place the Armenian men were massacred; in that they were deported unscathed; in that other they were taken out to sea and drowned. Here the

women were bullied into conversion; here conversion was disallowed; here they were massacred like the men. And in many other matters, such as the disposal of Armenian property or the use of torture, remarkable differences of practice can be observed, which are all ascribable to the good or bad will of the local officials. A serious part of the responsibility falls upon them — upon fire-eaters like Djevdet Bey or cruel natures like the Governor of Ourfa; and yet their freedom of action was comparatively restricted. Where they were evilly-intentioned towards the Armenians they were able to go beyond the Central Government's instructions (though even in matters like the exemption of Catholics and Protestants, where their action was apparently most free, they and the Central Government were often merely in collusion); but they might never mitigate their instructions by one degree. Humane and honourable governors (and there were a certain number of these) were powerless to protect the Armenians in their province. The Central Government had its agents on the spot — the chairman of the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, the local Chief of Gendarmerie, or even some subordinate official on the Governor's own administrative staff. If these merciful governors were merely remiss in executing the instructions, they were flouted and overruled; if they refused to obey them, they were dismissed and replaced by more pliant successors. In one way or another, the Central Government enforced and controlled the execution of the scheme, as it alone had originated the conception of it; and the Young Turkish Ministers and their associates at Constantinople are directly and personally responsible, from beginning to end, for the gigantic crime that devastated the Near East in 1915.

In April, 1915, the Ottoman Government began to put into execution throughout Turkey a systematic and carefully-prepared plan to exterminate the Armenian race. In six months nearly a million Armenians have been killed. The number of the victims and the manner of their destruction are without parallel in Modern History.

In the autumn of 1914, the Turks began to mobilize Christians as well as Muslims for the army. For six months, in every part of Turkey, they called upon the Armenians for military service. Exemption money was accepted from those who could pay. A few weeks later

A Testimony by Dr. HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

From «The Blackest Page of Modern History»

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Historian, author of «The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire»,
«The New Map of Europe», etc.

In April, 1915, the Ottoman Government began to put into execution throughout Turkey a systematic and carefully-prepared plan to exterminate the Armenian race. In six months nearly a million Armenians have been killed. The Number of the victims and the manner of their destruction are without parallel in Modern History.

In the autumn of 1914, the Turks began to mobilize Christians as well as Moslems for the army. For six months, in every part of Turkey, they called upon the Armenians for military service. Exemption money was accepted from those who could pay. A few weeks later the exemption certificates were disregarded, and their holders enrolled. The younger classes of Armenians, who did not live too far from Constantinople, were placed, as in the Balkan wars, in the active army. The older ones, and all the Armenians enrolled in the more distant re-

gions, were utilized for road, railway, and fortification building. Wherever they were called, and to whatever task they were put, the Armenians did their duty, and worked for the defence of Turkey. They proved themselves brave soldiers and intelligent and industrious labourers.

In April, 1915, orders were sent out from Constantinople to the local authorities in Asia Minor to take whatever measures were deemed best to paralyse in advance an attempt at rebellion on the part of the Armenians. The orders impressed upon the local authorities that the Armenians were an extreme danger to the safety of the empire, and suggested that national defence demanded imperatively **anticipatory** severity in order that the Armenians might be rendered harmless.

In some places, the local authorities replied that they had observed no suspicious activity on the part of the Armenians and reminded the Government that the Armenians were harmless because they possessed no arms and because most vigorous masculine element had already been taken for the army. There are some Turks who have a sense of pity and a sense of shame! But the majority of the Turkish officials responded with alacrity to be hint from Constantinople, and those who did not were very soon deplaced.

A new era of Armenian massacres began.

At first, in order that the task might be accomplished with the least possible risk, the virile masculine Armenian population still left in the cities and villages was summoned to assemble at a convenient place, generally outside the town, and gendarmes and police saw to it that the summons was obeyed. None was overlooked. When they had rounded up the Armenian men, they butchered them. This method of procedure was generally feasible in small places. In larger cities, it was not always

possible to fulfil the orders from Constantinople so simply and promptly. The Armenian notables were assassinated in the streets or in their homes. If it was an interior city, the men were sent off under guard to «another town.» In a few hours the guard would return without their prisoners. If it was a coast city, the Armenians were taken away in boats outside the harbour to «another port.» The boats returned astonishingly soon without the passengers.

Then, in order to prevent the possibility of trouble from Armenians mobilized for railway and road construction, they were divided in companies of from three hundred to five hundred and put to work at intervals of several miles. Regiments of the Turkish regular army were sent «to put down the Armenian revolution,» and came suddenly upon the little groups of workers plying pickaxe, crowbar, and shovel. The «rebels» were riddled with bullets before they knew what was happening. The few who managed to flee were followed by mounted men, and shot or sabred.

Telegrams began to pour in upon Talaat bey at Constantinople, announcing that here, there, and everywhere Armenian uprisings had been put down, and telegrams were returned, congratulating the local officials upon the success of their prompt measures. To neutral newspaper men at Constantinople, to neutral diplomats, who had heard vaguely of a recurrence of Armenian massacres, this telegraphic correspondence was shown as proof that an imminent danger had been averted. «We have not been cruel, but we admit having been severe,» declared Talaat bey. «This is war time.»

Having thus rid themselves of the active manhood of the Armenian race, the Turkish Government still felt uneasy. The old men boys, the women and children, were an element of danger to the Ottoman Empire. The Ar-

menians must be rooted out of Turkey. But how accomplish this in such a way that the Turkish Ambassador at Washington and the German newspapers might be able to say, as they have said and are still saying, «All those who have been killed were of that rebellious element caught red-handed or while otherwise committing traitorous acts against the Turkish Government, and **not women and children**, as some of these **fabricated** reports would have the Americans believe?» Talaat bey was ready with his plan. Deportation — a regrettable measure, a military necessity — but perfectly humane.

From May until October the Ottoman Government pursued methodically a plan of extermination far more hellish than the worst possible massacre. Orders for deportation of the entire Armenian population to Mesopotamia were despatched to every province of Asia Minor. These orders were explicit and detailed. No hamlet was too insignificant to be missed. The news was given by town criers that every Armenian was to be ready to leave at a certain hour for an unknown destination. There were no exceptions for the aged, the ill, the women in pregnancy. Only rich merchants and bankers and good-looking women and girls were allowed to escape by professing Islâm, and let it be said to their everlasting honour that few availed themselves of this means of escape. The time given varied from two days to six hours. No household goods, no animals, no extra clotting could be taken along. Food supply and bedding was limited to what a person could carry. And they had to go **on foot** under the burning sun through parched valleys and over snow-covered mountain passes, a journey of from three to eight weeks.

When they passed through Christian villages where the deportation order had not yet been received, the travellers were not allowed to receive food or ministrations of any sort. The sick and the aged and the wee

children fell by the roadside, and did not rise again. Women in childbirth were urged along by bayonets and whips until the moment of deliverance came, and were left to bleed to death. The likely girls were seized for harems, or raped day after day by the guards until death came as a merciful release. Those who could committed suicide. Mothers went crazy, and threw their children into the river to end their sufferings. Hundreds of thousands of women and children died of hunger, of thirst, of exposure, of shame.

The pitiful caravans thinned out, first daily, and later hourly. Death became the one thing to be longed for: for how can hope live, how can strength remain, even to the fittest, in a journey that has no end? And if they turned to right or left from that road to hell, they were shot or speared. Kurds and mounted peasants hunted down those who succeeded in escaping the roadside guards.

They are still putting down the Armenian revolution out there in Asia Minor. I had just written the above paragraph when an English woman whom I have known for many years came to my home. She left Adana, in Cilicia, only a month ago. Her story is the same as that of a hundred others. I have the identical facts, one eye-witness testimony corroborating the other, from American, English, German, and Swiss sources. This English woman said to me, «The deportation is still going on. From the interior along the Bagdad Railway they are still being sent through Adana on the journey of death. As far as the railway exists, it is being used to hurry the work of extermination faster than the caravans from the regions where there are no railways. Oh! if they would only massacre them, and be done with it, as in the Hamidian days! I stood there at the Adana railway station, and from the carriages the women would hold up their children, and cry for water. They had got beyond a desire for bread.

Only water! There was a pump. I went down on my knees to beg the Turkish guard to let me give them a drink. But the train moved on, and the last I heard was the cry of those lost souls. That was not once. It was almost every day the same thing. Did Lord Bryce say eight hundred thousand? Well, it must be a million now. Could you conceive of human beings allowing wild animals to die a death like that?»

But the Turkish Ambassador in Washington declares that these stories are «fabrications,» and that «no women and children have been killed.»

THE TURK REVERTS
TO THE ANCESTRAL TYPE

The withdrawal of the Allied fleet from the Dardanelles had consequences which the world does not yet completely understand. The practical effect of the event, as I have said, was to isolate the Turkish Empire from all the world excepting Germany and Austria, England, France, Russia, and Italy, which for a century had held a restraining hand over the Ottoman Empire, had finally lost all power to influence or control. The Turks now perceived that a series of dazzling events had changed them from cringing dependents of the European Powers into free agents. For the first in two centuries they could now live their national life according to their own inclinations, and govern their peoples according to their own will. The first expression of this rejuvenated national life was an episode which, so far as I know, is

A Testimony by
Ambassador HENRY MORGENTHAU

From «Ambassador Morgenthau's Story»

Only water! There was a pump. I went down on my knees to beg the Turkish guard to let me give them a drink. But the train moved on, and the last I heard was the cry of those lost souls. That was not once. It was almost every day the same thing. Did Lord Bryce say eight hundred thousand? Well, it must be a million now. Could you conceive of human beings allowing wild animals to die a death like that?

But the Turkish Ambassador in Washington declares that these stories are "fabrications" and that "no women and children have been killed."

A Testimony by

HENRY MORGENTHAU

HENRY MORGENTHAU

United States Ambassador at
Constantinople during the First
World War.

THE TURK REVERTS

TO THE ANCESTRAL TYPE

The withdrawal of the Allied fleet from the Dardanelles had consequences which the world does not yet completely understand. The practical effect of the event, as I have said, was to isolate the Turkish Empire from all the world excepting Germany and Australia. England, France, Russia, and Italy, which for a century had held a restraining hand over the Ottoman Empire, had finally lost all power to influence or control. The Turks now perceived that a series of dazzling events had changed them from cringing dependents of the European Powers into free agents. For the first in two centuries they could now live their national life according to their own inclinations, and govern their peoples according to their own will. The first expression of this rejuvenated national life was an episode which, so far as I know, is the most terrible in the history of the world. New Turkey, freed from European tutelage, celebrated its national rebirth by murdering not far from a million of its own subjects.

I can hardly exaggerate the effect which the repulse of the Allied fleet produced upon the Turks. They believed

that they had won the really great decisive battle of the war. For several centuries, they said, the British fleet had victoriously sailed the seas and had now met its first serious reverse at the hands of the Turks. In the first moments of their pride, the Young Turk leaders saw visions of the complete resurrection of their empire. What had for two centuries been a decaying nation had suddenly started on a new glorious life. In their pride and arrogance the Turks began to look with disdain upon the people that had taught them what they knew of modern warfare, and nothing angered them so much as any suggestion that they owed any part of their success to their German allies.

«Why should we feel any obligation to the Germans?» Enver would say to me. «What have they done for us which compares with what we have done for them? They have lent us some money and sent us a few officers, it is true, but see what we have done! We have defeated the British fleet — something which neither the Germans nor any other nation could do. We have stationed armies on the Caucasian front, and so have kept busy large bodies of Russian troops that would have been used on the western front. Similarly we have compelled England to keep large armies in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and in that way we have weakened the Allied armies in France. No, the Germans could never have achieved their military successes without us; the shoe of obligation is entirely on their foot.»

This conviction possessed the leaders of the Union and Progress Party and now began to have a determining effect upon Turkish national life and Turkish policy. Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him. And now that the fortunes of war were apparently

favouring the empire, I began to see an entirely new Turk unfolding before my eyes. The hesitating and fearful Ottoman, feeling his way cautiously amid the mazes of European diplomacy, and seeking opportunities to find an advantage for himself in the divided counsels of the European powers, gave place to an upstanding, almost dashing figure, proud and assertive, determined to live his own life and absolutely contemptuous of his Christian foes. I was really witnessing a remarkable development in race psychology — an almost classical instance of reversion to type. The ragged, unkempt Turk of the twentieth century was vanishing and in his place was appearing the Turks of the fourteenth and the fifteenth, the Turk who had swept out of his Asiatic fastnesses, conquered all the powerful peoples in his way, founded in Asia, Africa, and Europe one of the most extensive empires that history has known. If we are properly to appreciate this new Talaat and Enver, and the events which now took place, we must understand the Turk who, under Osman and his successors, exercised this mighty but devastating influence in the world. We must realize that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races. A fairly insane pride is the element that largely explains this strange human species. The common term applied by the Turk to the Christian is «dog,» and in his estimation this is no mere rhetorical figure; he actually looks upon his European neighbours as far less worthy of consideration than his own domestic animals. «My son,» an old Turk once said, «do you see that herd of swine? Some are white, some are black, some are large, some are small — they differ from each other in some respects, but they are all swine. So it is with Christians. Be not deceived, my son. These Christians may wear fine clothes, their women may be very beautiful to look upon; their skins are white and

splendid; many of them are very intelligent and they build wonderful cities and create what seem to be great states. But remember that underneath all this dazzling exterior they are all the same — they are all swine.»

Pratically all foreigners, while in the presence of a Turk, are conscious of this attitude. The Turks may be obsequiously polite, but there is invariably an almost unconscious feeling that he is mentally shrinking from his Christian friend as something unclean. And this fundamental conviction for centuries directed the Ottoman policy toward its subject peoples. This wild horde swept from the plains of Central Asia and, like a whirlwind, overwhelmed the nations of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor; it conquered Egypt, Arabia, and practically all of northern Africa and then poured into Europe, crushed the Balkan nations, occupied a large part of Hungary, and even established the outposts of the Ottoman Empire in the southern part of Russia. So far as I can discover, the Ottoman Turks had only one great quality, that of military genius. They had several military leaders of commanding ability, and the early conquering Turks were brave, fanatical, and tenacious fighters, just as their descendants are to-day. I think that these old Turks present the most complete illustration in history of the brigand idea in politics. They were lacking in what we may call the fundamentals of a civilized community. They had no alphabet and no art of writing; no poets, no art, and no architecture; they built no cities and they established no lasting state. They knew no law except the rule of might, and they had practically no agriculture and no industrial organization. They were simply wild and marauding horsemen, whose one conception of tribal success was to pounce upon people who were more civilized than themselves and plunder them. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries these tribes overran the cradles

of modern civilization, which have given Europe its religion and, to a large extent, its civilization. At that time these territories were the seats of many peaceful and prosperous nations. The Mesopotamian valley supported a large industrious agricultural population; Bagdad was one of the largest and most flourishing cities in existence; Constantinople had a greater population than Rome, and the Balkan region and Asia Minor contained several powerful states. Over all this part of the world the Turk now swept as a huge, destructive force. Mesopotamia in a few years became a desert; the great cities of the Near East were reduced to misery, and the subject peoples became slaves. Such graces of civilizations as the Turk has acquired in five centuries have practically all been taken from the subject peoples whom he so greatly despises. His religion comes from the Arabs; his language has acquired a certain literary value by borrowing certain Arabic and Persian elements; and his writing is Arabic. Constantinople's finest architectural monument, the Mosque of St. Sophia, was originally a Christian church, and all so-called Turkish architecture is derived from the Byzantine. The mechanism of business and industry has always rested in the hands of the subject peoples, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Arabs. The Turks have learned little of European art or science, they have established very few educational institutions, and illiteracy is the prevailing rule. The result is that poverty has attained a degree of sordidness and misery in the Ottoman Empire which is almost unparalleled elsewhere. The Turkish peasant lives in a mud hut; he sleeps on a dirt floor; he has no chairs, no tables, no eating utensils, no clothes except the few scant garments which cover his back and which he usually wears for many years.

In the course of time these Turks might learn certain things from their European and Arab neighbours,

but there was one idea which they could never even faintly grasp. They could not understand that a conquered people were anything except slaves. When they took possession, of a land, they found it occupied by a certain number of camels, horses, buffaloes, dogs, swine, and human beings. Of all these living things the object that physically most resembled themselves they regarded as the least important. It became a common saying with them that a horse or a camel was far more valuable than a man; these animals cost money, whereas «infidel Christians» were plentiful in the Ottoman countries and could easily be forced to labour. It is true that the early Sultans gave the subject peoples and the Europeans in the empire certain rights, but these in themselves really reflected the contempt in which all non-Moslems were held. I have already described the «Capitulations,» under which foreigners in Turkey had their own courts, prisons, post-offices, and other institutions. Yet the early sultans gave these privileges not from a spirit of tolerance, but merely because they looked upon the Christian nations as unclean and therefore unfit to have any contact with the Ottoman administrative and judicial system. The sultans similarly erected the several peoples, such as the Greeks and the Armenians, into separate «millets,» or nations, not because they desired to promote their independence and welfare, but because they regarded them as vermin, and therefore disqualified for membership in the Ottoman state. The attitude of the Government toward their Christian subjects was illustrated by certain regulations which limited their freedom of action. The buildings in which Christians lived should not be conspicuous and their churches should have no belfry. Christians could not ride a horse in the city, for that was the exclusive right of the noble Moslem. The Turk had the right to test the sharpness of his sword upon the neck of any Christian.

Imagine a great government year in and year out maintaining this attitude toward many millions of its own subjects! And for centuries the Turks simply lived like parasites upon these overburdened and industrious people. They taxed them to economic extinction, stole their most beautiful daughters and forced them into their harems, took Christian male infants by the hundreds of thousands and brought them up as Moslem soldiers. I have no intention of describing the terrible vassalage and oppression that went on for centuries; my purpose is merely to emphasize this innate attitude of the Moslem Turk to people not of his own race and religion — that they are not human beings with rights, but merely chattels, which may be permitted to live when they promote the interest of their masters, but which may be pitilessly destroyed when they have ceased to be useful. This attitude is intensified by a total disregard for human life and an intense delight in inflicting physical human suffering which are not unusually qualities of primitive peoples.

Such were the mental characteristics of the Turks in his days of military greatness. In recent times his attitude toward foreigners and his subject peoples had superficially changed. His own military decline and the ease with which the infidel nations defeated his finest armies had apparently given the haughty descendants of Osman a respect at least for their prowess. The rapid disappearance of his own empire in a hundred years, the creation out of the Ottoman Empire of new states like Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, and the wonderful improvement which had followed the destruction of the Turkish yoke in these benighted lands, may have increased the Ottoman hatred for the unbeliever, but at least they had a certain influence in opening his eyes to his importance. Many Turks also now received their education in European universities; they studied in their pro-

fessional schools, and they became physicians, surgeons, lawyers, engineers, and chemists of the modern kind. However much the more progressive Moslems might despise their Christian associates, they could not ignore the fact that the finest things, in this temporal world at least, were the products of European and American civilization. And now that one development of modern history which seemed to be least understandable to the Turk began to force itself upon the consciousness of the more intelligent and progressive. Certain leaders arose who began to speak surreptitiously of such things as «Constitutionalism,» «Liberty,» «Self-government,» and to whom the Declaration of Independence contained certain truths that might have a value even for Islam. These daring spirits began to dream of overturning the autocratic Sultan and of substituting a parliamentary system for his irresponsible rule. I have already described the rise and fall of this Young Turk movement under such leaders as Talaat, Enver, Djemal, and their associates in the Committee of Union and Progress. The point which I am emphasizing here is that this movement presupposed a complete transformation of Turkish mentality, especially in its attitude toward subject peoples. No longer, under the reformed Turkish state, were Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, and Jews to be regarded as «filthy giaours.» All these peoples were henceforth to have equal rights and equal duties. A general love feast now followed the establishment of the new régime, and scenes of almost frenzied reconciliation, in which Turks and Armenians embraced each other publicly, apparently signalized the absolute union of the long antagonistic peoples. The Turkish leaders, including Talaat and Enver, visited Christian churches and sent forth prayers of thanksgiving for the new order, and went to Armenian cemeteries to shed tears of retribution over the bones of the martyred Armenians who lay there. Arme-

nian priests reciprocally paid their tributes to the Turks in Mohammedan mosques. Enver Pasha visited several Armenian schools, telling the children that the old days of Moslem-Christian strife had passed forever and that the two peoples were now to live together as brothers and sisters. There were cynics who smiled at all these demonstrations and yet one development encouraged even them to believe that an earthly paradise had arrived. All through the period of domination only the master Moslem had been permitted to bear arms and serve in the Ottoman army. To be a soldier was an occupation altogether too manly and glorious for the despised Christian. But now the Young Turks encouraged all Christians to arm, and enrolled them in the army on an equality with Moslems. These Christians fought, both as officers and soldiers, in the Italian and the Balkan wars, winning high praise from the Turkish generals for their valour and skill. Armenian leaders had figured conspicuously in the Young Turk movement; these men apparently believed that a constitutional Turkey was possible. They were conscious of their own intellectual and industrial superiority to the Turks, and knew that they could prosper in the Ottoman Empire if left alone, whereas, under European control, they would have greater difficulty in meeting the competition of the more rigorous European colonists who might come in. With the deposition of the Red Sultan, Abdul Hamid, and the establishment of a constitutional system, the Armenians now for the first time in several centuries felt themselves to be free men.

But, as I have already described, all these aspirations vanished like a dream. Long before the European War began, the Turkish democracy had disappeared. The power of the new Sultan had gone, and the hopes of regenerating Turkey on modern lines had gone also, leaving only a group of individuals, headed by Talaat and Enver, ac-

tually in possession of the state. Having lost their democratic aspirations these men now supplanted them with a new national conception. In place of a democratic constitutional state they resurrected the idea of Pan-Turkism; in place of equal treatment of all Ottomans, they decided to establish a country exclusively for Turks. I have called this a new conception; yet it was new only to the individuals who then controlled the destiny of the empire, for, in reality, it was simply an attempt to revive the most barbaric ideas of their ancestors. It represented, as I have said, merely an atavistic reversion to the original Turk. We now saw that the Turkish leaders, in talking about liberty, equality, fraternity, and constitutionalism, were merely children repeating phrases; that they had used the word «democracy» merely as a ladder by which to climb to power. After five hundred years' close contact with European civilization, the Turk remained precisely the same individual as the one who had emerged from the steppes of Asia in the Middle Ages. He was clinging just as tenaciously as his ancestors to that conception of a state as consisting of a few master individuals whose right it is to enslave and plunder and maltreat any peoples whom they can subject to their military control. Though Talaat and Enver and Djemal all came of the humblest families, the same fundamental ideas of master and slave possessed them that formed the statecraft of Osman and the early Sultans. We now discovered that a paper constitution and even tearful visits to Christian churches and cemeteries could not uproot the inborn preconception of this nomadic tribe that there are only two kinds of people in the world — the conquering and the conquered.

When the Turkish Government abrogated the Capitulations, and in this way freed themselves from the domination of the foreign powers, they were merely taking

one step toward realizing this Pan-Turkish ideal. I have alluded to the difficulties which I had with them over the Christian schools. Their determination to uproot these, or at least to transform them into Turkish institutions, was merely another detail in the same racial progress. Similarly, they attempted to make all foreign business houses employ only Turkish labour, insisting that they should discharge their Greek, Armenian, and Jewish clerks, stenographers, workmen, and other employees. They ordered all foreign houses to keep their books in Turkish, they wanted to furnish employment for Turks, and enable them to acquire modern business methods. The Ottoman Government even refused to have any dealings with representative of the largest Austrian munition maker unless he admitted a Turk as a partner. They developed a mania for suppressing all languages except Turkish. For decades French had been the accepted language of foreigners in Constantinople; most street signs were printed in both French and Turkish. One morning the astonished foreign residents discovered that all these French signs had been removed and that the names of streets, the directions on street cars, and other public notices, appeared only in those strange Turkish characters, which very few of them understood. Great confusion resulted from this change, but the ruling powers refused to restore the detested foreign language.

These leaders not only reverted to the barbaric conceptions of their ancestors, but they went to extremes that had never entered the minds of the early sultans. Their fifteenth and sixteenth century predecessors treated the subject peoples as dirt under their feet, yet they believed that they had a certain usefulness and did not disdain to make them their slaves. But this Committee of Union and Progress, led by Talaat and Enver, now decided to do away with them altogether. The old con-

quering Turks had made the Christians their servants, but their parvenu descendants bettered their instruction, for they determined to exterminate them wholesale and Turkify the empire by massacring the non-Moslem elements. Originally this was not the statesmanlike conception of Talaat and Enver; the man who first devised it was one of the greatest monsters known to history, the «Red Sultan,» Abdul Hamid.

This man came to the throne in 1876, at a critical period in Turkish history. In the first two years of his reign, he lost Bulgaria as well as important provinces in the Caucasus, his last remaining vestiges of sovereignty in Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania, and all his real powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Greece had long since become an independent nation, and the processes that were to wrench Egypt from the Ottoman Empire had already begun. As the Sultan took stock of his inheritance, he could easily foresee the day when all the rest of his domain would pass into the hand of the infidel. What had caused this disintegration of this extensive Turkish Empire? The real cause, of course, lay deep in the character of the Turk, but Abdul Hamid saw only the more obvious fact that the intervention of the great European Powers had brought relief to these imprisoned nations. Of all the new kingdoms which had been carved out of the Sultan's dominions, Serbia — let us remember this fact to her everlasting honour — is the only one that has won her own independence. Russia, France, and Great Britain have set free all the rest. And what had happened several times before might happen again. There still remained one compact race in the Ottoman Empire that had national aspirations and national potentialities. In the northeastern part of Asia Minor, bordering on Russia, there were six provinces in which the Armenians formed the largest element in the population. From the time of

Herodotus this portion of Asia has borne the name of Armenia. The Armenians of the present day are the direct descendants of the people who inhabited the country three thousand years ago. Their origin is so ancient that it is lost in fable and mystery. There are still undeciphered cuneiform inscriptions on the rocky hills of Van, the largest Armenian city, that have led certain scholars — though not many, I must admit — to identify the Armenian race with the Hittites of the Bible. What is definitely known about the Armenians, however, is that for ages they have constituted the most civilized and most industrious race in the eastern section of the Ottoman Empire. From their mountains they have spread over the Sultan's dominions, and form a considerable element in the population of all the large cities. Everywhere they are known for their industry, their intelligence, and their decent and orderly lives. They are so superior to the Turks intellectually and morally that much of the business and industry had passed into their hands. With the Greeks, the Armenians constitute the economic strength of the empire. These people became Christians in the fourth century and established the Armenian Church as their state religion. This is said to be the oldest Christian Church in existence.

In face of persecutions which have had no parallel elsewhere these people have clung to their early Christian faith with the utmost tenacity. For fifteen hundred years they have lived there in Armenia, a little island of Christians surrounded by backward peoples of hostile region and hostile race. Their long existence has been one unending martyrdom. The territory which they inhabit forms the connecting link between Europe and Asia, and all the Asiatic invasions — Saracens, Tartars, Mongols, Kurds, and Turks — have passed over their peaceful country. For centuries they have thus been the Belgium

of the East. Through all this period the Armenians have regarded themselves not as Asiatics, but as Europeans. They speak an Indo-European language, their racial origin is believed by scholars to be Aryan, and the fact that their religion is the religion of Europe has always made them turn their eyes westward. And out of that western country, they have always hoped, would some day come the deliverance that would rescue them from their murderous masters. And now, as Abdul Hamid, in 1876, surveyed his shattered domain, he saw that its most dangerous spot was Armenia. He believed, rightly or wrongly, that these Armenians, like the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Serbians, aspired to restore their independent medieval nation, and he knew that Europe and America sympathized with this ambition. The Treaty of Berlin, which had definitely ended the Turco-Russian War contained an article which gave the European Powers a protecting hand over the Armenians. How could the Sultan free himself permanently from this danger? An enlightened administration, which would have transformed the Armenians into free men and made them safe in their lives and property and civil and religious rights, would probably have made them peaceful and loyal subjects. But the Sultan could not rise to such a conception of statesmanship as this. Instead, Abdul Hamid apparently thought that there was only one way of ridding Turkey of the Armenian problem — and that was to rid her of the Armenians. The physical destruction of 2,000,000 men, women, and children by massacres, organized and directed by the state, seemed to be the one sure way of forestalling the further disruption of the Turkish Empire.

And now for nearly thirty years Turkey gave the world an illustration of government by massacre. We in Europe and America heard of these events when they reached especially monstrous proportions, as they did in

1895-96, when nearly 200,000 Armenians were most atrociously done to death. But through all these years the existence of the Armenians was one continuous nightmare. Their property was stolen, their men were murdered, their women were ravished, their young girls were kidnapped and forced to live in Turkish harems. Yet Abdul Hamid was not able to accomplish his full purpose. Had he had his will, he would have massacred the whole nation in one hideous orgy. He attempted to exterminate the Armenians in 1895 and 1896, but found certain insuperable obstructions to his scheme. Chief of these were England, France, and Russia. These atrocities called Gladstone, then eighty-six years old, from his retirement, and his speeches, in which he denounced the Sultan as «the great assassin,» aroused the whole world to the enormities that were taking place. It became apparent that unless the Sultan desisted, England, France, and Russia would intervene, and the Sultan well knew, that, in case this intervention took place, such remnants of Turkey as had survived earlier partitions would disappear. Thus Abdul Hamid had to abandon his satanic enterprise of destroying a whole race by murder, yet Armenia continued to suffer the slow agony of pitiless persecution. Up to the outbreak of the European War not a day had passed in the Armenian vilayets without its outrages and its murders. The Young Turk régime, despite its promises of universal brotherhood, brought no respite to the Armenians. A few months after the love feastings already described, one of the worst massacres took place at Adana, in which 35,000 people were destroyed.

And now the Young Turks, who had adopted so many of Abdul Hamid's ideas, also made his Armenian policy their own. Their passion for Turkifying the nation seemed to demand logically the extermination of all Christians — Greeks, Syrians, and Armenians. Much as they

admired the Mohammedan conquerors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they stupidly believed that these great warriors had made one fatal mistake, for they had had it in their power completely to obliterate the Christian populations and had neglected to do so. This policy in their opinion was a fatal error of statesmanship and explained all the woes from which Turkey has suffered in modern times. Had these old Moslem chieftains, when they conquered Bulgaria, put all the Bulgarians of the sword, and peopled the Bulgarian country with Moslem Turks, there would never have been any modern Bulgarian problem and Turkey would never have lost this part of her empire. Similarly, had they destroyed all the Rumanians, Serbians, and Greeks, the provinces which are now occupied by these races would still have remained integral parts of the Sultan's domain. They felt that the mistake had been a terrible one, but that something might be saved from the ruin. They would destroy all Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, and other Christians, move Moslem families into their homes and into their farms, and so make sure that these territories would not similarly be taken away from Turkey. In order to accomplish this great reform, it would not be necessary to murder every living Christian. The most beautiful and healthy Armenian girls could be taken, converted forcibly to Mohammedanism, and made the wives or concubines of devout followers of the Prophet. Their children would then automatically become Moslem and so strengthen the empire, as the Janissaries had strengthened it formerly. These Armenian girls represent a high type of womanhood and the Young Turks, in their crude, intuitive way, recognized that the mingling of their blood with the Turkish population would exert a eugenic influence upon the whole. Armenian boys of tender years could be taken into Turkish families and be brought up

in ignorance of the fact that they were anything but Moslems. These were about the only elements, however, that could make any valuable contributions to the new Turkey which was now being planned. Since all precautions must be taken against the development of a new generation of Armenians, it would be necessary to kill outright all men who were in their prime and thus capable of propagating the accursed species. Old men and women formed no great danger to the future of Turkey, for they had already fulfilled their natural function of leaving descendants; still they were nuisances and therefore should be disposed of.

Unlike Abdul Hamid, the Young Turks found themselves in a position where they could carry out this holy enterprise. Great Britain, France, and Russia had stood in the way of their predecessor. But now these obstacles had been removed. The Young Turks, as I have said, believed that they had defeated these nations and that they could therefore no longer interfere with their internal affairs. Only one power could successfully raise objections and that was Germany. In 1898, when all the rest of Europe was ringing with Gladstone's denunciations and demanding intervention, Kaiser Wilhelm the Second had gone to Constantinople, visited Abdul Hamid, pinned his finest decorations on that bloody tyrant's breast, and kissed him on both cheeks. The same Kaiser who had done this in 1898 was still sitting on the throne in 1915, and was now Turkey's ally. Thus for the first time in two centuries the Turks, in 1915, had Christian populations utterly at their mercy. The time had finally come to make Turkey exclusively the country of the Turks.

THE «REVOLUTION» AT VAN

The Turkish province of Van lies in the remote northeastern corner of Asia Minor; it touches the frontiers of Persia on the east and its northern boundary looks towards the Caucasus. It is one of the most beautiful and most fruitful parts of the Turkish Empire and one of the richest in historical associations. The city of Van, which is the capital of the vilayet, lies on the eastern shores of the lake of the same name; it is the one large town in Asia Minor in which the Armenian population is larger than the Moslem. In the fall of 1914, its population of about 30,000 people represented one of the most peaceful and happy and prosperous communities in the Turkish Empire. Though Van, like practically every other section where Armenians lived, had had its periods of oppression and massacre, yet the Moslem yoke, comparatively speaking, rested upon its people rather lightly. Its Turkish governor, Tahsin Pasha, was one of the more enlightened type of Turkish officials. Relations between the Armenians, who lived in the better section of the city, and the Turks and the Kurds, who occupied the mud huts in the Moslem quarter, had been tolerably agreeable for many years.

The location of this vilayet, however, inevitably made it the scene of military operations, and made the activities of its Armenian population a matter of daily suspicion. Should Russia attempt an invasion of Turkey one of the most accessible routes lay through this province. The war had not gone far when causes of irritation arose. The requisitions of army supplies fell far more heavily upon the Christian than upon the Mohammedan elements in Van, just as they did in every other part of Turkey. The Armenians had to stand quietly by while the Turkish

officers appropriated all their cattle, all their wheat, and all their goods of every kind, giving them only worthless pieces of paper in exchange. The attempt at general disarmament that took place also aroused their apprehension, which was increased by the brutal treatment visited upon Armenian soldiers in the Caucasus. On the other hand, the Turks made many charges against the Christian population, and, in fact, they attributed to them the larger share of the blame for the reverses which the Turkish armies had suffered in the Caucasus. The fact that a considerable element in the already changed forces was composed of Armenians aroused their unbridled wrath. Since about half the Armenians in the world inhabit the Russian provinces in the Caucasus and are liable, like Russians, to military service, there were certainly no legitimate grounds for complaint, so far as these Armenian levies were *bona fide* subjects of the Czar. But the Turks asserted that large numbers of Armenian soldiers in Van and other of their Armenian provinces deserted, crossed the border, and joined the Russian army, where their knowledge of roads and the terrain was an important factor in the Russian victories. Though the exact facts are not yet ascertained, it seems not unlikely that such desertions, perhaps a few hundred, did take place. At the beginning of the war, Union and Progress agents appeared in Erzeroum and Van and appealed to the Armenian leaders to go into Russian Armenia and attempt to start revolutions against the Russian Government; and the fact that the Ottoman Armenians refused to do this contributed further to the prevailing irritation. The Turkish Government has made much of the «treasonable» behaviour of the Armenians of Van and have even urged it as an excuse for their subsequent treatment of the whole race. Their attitude illustrates once more the perversity of the Turkish mind. After massacring hundreds of thousands

of Armenians in the course of thirty years, outraging their women and girls, and robbing and maltreating them in every conceivable way, the Turks still apparently believed that they had the right to expect from them the most enthusiastic «loyalty». That the Armenians all over Turkey sympathized with the Entente was no secret. «If you want to know how the war is going,» wrote a humorous Turkish newspaper, «all you need to do is to look in the face of an Armenian. If he is smiling, then the Allies are winning; if he is downcast, then the Germans are successful.» If an Ottoman Armenian soldier should desert and join the Russians that would unquestionably constitute a technical crime against the state, and might be punished without violating the rules of all civilized countries. Only the Turkish mind, however — and possibly the Junker — could regard it as furnishing an excuse for the terrible barbarities that now took place.

Though the air, all during the autumn and winter of 1914-15, was filled with premonitions of trouble, the Armenians behaved with remarkable self-restraint. For years it had been the Turkish policy to provoke the Christian population into committing overt acts, and then seizing upon such misbehaviour as an excuse for massacres. The Armenian clergy and political leaders saw many evidences that the Turks were now up to their old tactics, and they therefore went among the people, cautioning them to keep quiet, to bear all insults and even outrages patiently, so as not to give the Moslems the opening which they were seeking. «Even though they burn a few of our villages,» these leaders would say, «do not retaliate, for it is better that a few be destroyed than that the whole nation be massacred.»

When the war started, the Central Government recalled Tahsin Pasha, the conciliatory governor of Van, and replaced him with Djevdet Bey, a brother-in-law of

Enver Pasha. This act in itself was most disquieting. Turkish officialdom has always contained a minority of men who do not believe in massacre as a state policy and cannot be depended upon to carry out strictly the most bloody orders of the Central Government. Whenever massacres have been planned, therefore, it has been customary first to remove such «untrustworthy» public servants and replace them by men who are regarded as more reliable. The character of Tahsin's successor made his displacement still more alarming. Djevdet had spent the larger part of his life at Van; he was a man of unstable character, friendly to non-Moslems one moment, hostile the next, hypocritical, treacherous, and ferocious according to the worst traditions of his race. He hated the Armenians and cordially sympathized with the long-established Turkish plan of solving the Armenian problem. There is little question that he came to Van with definite instructions to exterminate all Armenians in this province, but, for the first few months, conditions did not facilitate such operations. Djevdet himself was absent fighting the Russians in the Caucasus and the near approach of the enemy made it a wise policy for the Turks to refrain from maltreating the Armenians of Van. But early in the spring the Russians temporarily retreated. It is generally recognized as good military tactics for a victorious army to follow up the retreating enemy. In the eyes of the Turkish generals, however, the withdrawal of the Russians was a happy turn of war mainly because it deprived the Armenians of their protectors and left them at the mercies of the Turkish army. Instead of following the retreating foe, therefore, the Turks' army turned aside and invaded their own territory of Van. Instead of fighting the trained Russian army of men, they turned their rifles, machine guns, and other weapons upon the Armenian women, children, and old men in the villages of Van.

Following their usual custom, they distributed the most beautiful Armenian women among the Moslems, sacked and burned the Armenian villages, and massacred uninterruptedly for days. On April 15th, about 500 young Armenian men of Akantz were mustered to hear an order of the Sultan; at sunset they were marched outside the town and every man shot in cold blood. This procedure was repeated in about eighty Armenian villages in the district north of Lake Van, and in three days 24,000 Armenians were murdered in this atrocious fashion. A single episode illustrates the unspeakable depravity of Turkish methods. A conflict having broken out at Shadak, Djevdet Bey, who had meanwhile returned to Van, asked four of the leading Armenian citizens to go to this town and attempt to quiet the multitude. These men made the trip, stopping at all Armenian villages along the way, urging everybody to keep public order. After completing their work these four Armenians were murdered in a Kurdish village.

And so when Djevdet Bey, on his return to his official post, demanded that Van furnish him immediately 4,000 soldiers, the people were naturally in no mood to accede to his request. When we consider what had happened before and what happened subsequently, there remains little doubt concerning the purpose which underlay this demand. Djevdet, acting in obedience to orders from Constantinople, was preparing to wipe out the whole population, and his purpose in calling for 4,000 able-bodied men was merely to massacre them, so that the rest of the Armenians might have no defenders. The Armenians, parleying to gain time, offered to furnish five hundred soldiers and to pay exemption money for the rest; now, however, Djevdet began to talk aloud about «rebellion,» and his determination to «crush» it at any cost. «If the rebels fire a single shot,» he declared, «I shall kill every

Christian man, woman, and» (pointing to his knee) «every child, up to here.» For some time the Turks had been constructing entrenchments around the Armenian quarter and filling them with soldiers and, in response to this provocation, the Armenians began to make preparations for a defense. On April 20th, a band of Turkish soldiers seized several Armenian women who were entering the city; a couple of Armenians ran to their assistance and were shot dead. The Turks now opened fire on the Armenian quarters with rifles and artillery; soon a large part of the town was in flames and a regular siege had started. The whole Armenian fighting force consisted of only 1,500 men; they had only 300 rifles and a most inadequate supply of ammunition, while Djevdet had an army of 5,000 men, completely equipped and supplied. Yet the Armenians fought with the utmost heroism and skill; they had little chance of holding off their enemies indefinitely, but they knew that a Russian army was fighting its way to Van and their utmost hope was that they would be able to defy the besiegers until these Russians arrived. As I am not writing the story of sieges and battles, I cannot describe in detail the numerous acts of individual heroism, the cooperation of the Armenian women, the ardour and energy of the Armenian children, the self-sacrificing zeal of the American missionaries, especially Doctor Ussher and his wife and Miss Grace H. Knapp, and the thousand other circumstances that made this terrible month one of the most glorious pages in modern Armenian history. The wonderful thing about it is that the Armenians triumphed. After nearly five weeks of sleepless fighting, the Russian army suddenly appeared and the Turks fled into the surrounding country, where they found appeasement for their anger by further massacres of unprotected Armenian villagers. Doctor Ussher, the American medical missionary whose hospital at Van

was destroyed by bombardment, is authority for the statement that, after driving off the Turks, the Russians began to collect and to cremate the bodies of Armenians who had been murdered in the province, with the result that 55,000 bodies were burned.

I have told this story of the «Revolution» in Van not only because it marked the first stage in this organized attempt to wipe out a whole nation, but because these events are always brought forward by the Turks as a justification of their subsequent crimes. As I shall relate, Enver, Talaat, and the rest, when I appealed to them in behalf of the Armenians, invariably instanced the «revolutionists» of Van as a sample of Armenian treachery. The famous «Revolution,» as this recital shows, was merely the determination of the Armenians to save their women's honour and their own lives, after the Turks, by massacring thousands of their neighbours, had shown them the fate that awaited them.

THE MURDER OF A NATION

The destruction of the Armenian race in 1915 involved certain difficulties that had not impeded the operations of the Turks in the massacres of 1895 and other years. In these earlier periods the Armenian men had possessed little power or means of resistance. In those days Armenians had not been permitted to have military training, to serve in the Turkish army, or to possess arms. As I have already said, these discriminations were withdrawn when the revolutionists obtained the upper hand

in 1908. Not only were the Christians now permitted to bear arms, but the authorities, in the full flush of their enthusiasm for freedom and equality, encouraged them to do so. In the early part of 1915, therefore, every Turkish city contained thousands of Armenians who had been trained as soldiers and who were supplied with rifles, pistols, and other weapons of defense. The operations at Van once more disclosed that these men could use their weapons to good advantage. It was thus apparent that an Armenian massacre this time would generally assume more the character of warfare than those wholesale butcheries of defenseless men and women which the Turks had always found so congenial. If this plan of murdering a race were to succeed, two preliminary steps would therefore have to be taken: it would be necessary to render all Armenian soldiers powerless and to deprive of their arms the Armenians in every city and town. Before Armenia could be slaughtered, Armenia must be made defenseless.

In the early part of 1915, the Armenian soldiers in the Turkish army were reduced to a new status. Up to that time most of them had been combatants, but now they were all stripped of their arms and transformed into workmen. Instead of serving their country as artillerymen and cavalrymen, these former soldiers now discovered that they had been transformed into road labourers and pack animals. Army supplies of all kinds were loaded on their backs, and, stumbling under the burdens and driven by the whips and bayonets of the Turks, they were forced to drag their weary bodies into the mountains of the Caucasus. Sometimes they would have to plough their way, burdened in this fashion, almost waist high through snow. They had to spend practically all their time in the open, sleeping on the bare ground — whenever the ceaseless prodding of their taskmasters gave them an occasional opportunity to sleep. They were given only scraps of

food; if they fell sick they were left where they had dropped, their Turkish oppressors perhaps stopping long enough to rob them of all their possessions — even of their clothes. If any stragglers succeeded in reaching their destinations, they were not infrequently massacred. In many instances Armenian soldiers were disposed of in even more summary fashion, for it now became almost the general practice to shoot them in cold blood. In almost all cases the procedure was the same. Here and there squads of 50 or 100 men would be taken, bound together in groups of four, and then marched out to a secluded spot a short distance from the village. Suddenly the sound of rifle shots would fill the air, and the Turkish soldiers who had acted as the escort would sullenly return to camp. Those sent to bury the bodies would find them almost invariably stark naked, for, as usual, the Turks had stolen all their clothes. In cases that came to my attention, the murderers had added a refinement to their victims' sufferings by compelling them to dig their graves before being shot.

Let me relate a single episode which is contained in one of the reports of our consuls and which now forms part of the records of the American State Department. Early in July, 2,000 Armenian «amélés» — such is the Turkish word for soldiers who have been reduced to workmen — were sent from Harpoot to build roads. The Armenians in that town understood what this meant and pleaded with the Government for mercy. But this official insisted that the men were not to be harmed, and he even called upon the German missionary, Mr. Ehemann, to quiet the panic, giving that gentleman his word of honor that the ex-soldiers would be protected. Mr. Ehemann believed the Governor and assuaged the popular fear. Yet practically every man of these 2,000 was massacred, and his body thrown into a cave. A few escaped,

and it was from these that news of the massacre reached the world. A few days afterward another 2,000 soldiers were sent to Diarbekir. The only purpose of sending these men out in the open country was that they might be massacred. In order that they might have no strength to resist or to escape by flight, these poor creatures were systematically starved. Government agents went ahead on the road, notifying the Kurds that the caravan was approaching and ordering them to do their congenial duty. Not only did the Kurdish tribesmen pour down from the mountains upon this starved and weakened regiment, but the Kurdish women came with butcher's knives in order that they might gain that merit in Allah's eyes that comes from killing a Christian. These massacres were not isolated happenings; I could detail many more episodes just as horrible as the one related above; throughout the Turkish Empire a systematic attempt was made to kill all able-bodied men, not only for the purpose of removing all males who might propagate a new generation of Armenians, but for the purpose of rendering the weaker part of the population an easy prey.

Dreadful as were these massacres of unarmed soldiers, they were mercy and justice themselves when compared with the treatment which was now visited upon those Armenians who were suspected of concealing arms. Naturally the Christians became alarmed when placards were posted in the villages and cities ordering everybody to bring their arms to headquarters. Although this order applied to all citizens, the Armenians well understood what the result would be, should they be left defenseless while their Moslem neighbours were permitted to retain their arms. In many cases, however, the persecuted people patiently obeyed the command; and then the Turkish officials almost joyfully seized their rifles as evidence that a «revolution» was being planned and threw their victims

into prison on a charge of treason. Thousands failed to deliver arms simply because they had none to deliver, while an even greater number tenaciously refused to give them up, not because they were plotting an uprising, but because they proposed to defend their own lives and their women's honour against the outrages which they knew were being planned. The punishment inflicted upon these recalcitrants from one of the most hideous chapters of modern history. Most of us believe that torture has long ceased to be a administrative and judicial measure, yet I do not believe that the darkest ages ever presented scenes more horrible than those which now took place all over Turkey. Nothing was sacred to the Turkish gendarmes; under the plea of searching for hidden arms, they ransacked churches, treated the altars and sacred utensils with the utmost indignity, and even held mock ceremonies in imitation of the Christian sacraments. They would beat the priests into insensibility, under the pretense that they were the centres of sedition. When they could discover no weapons in the churches, they would sometimes arm the bishops and priests with guns, pistols, and swords, then try them before courts-martial for possessing weapons against the law, and march them in this condition through the streets, merely to arouse the fanatical wrath of the mobs. The gendarmes treated women with the same cruelty and indecency as the men. There are cases on record in which women accused of concealing weapons were stripped naked and whipped with branches freshly cut from trees, and these beatings were even inflicted on women who were with child. Violations so commonly accompanied these searches that Armenian women and girls, on the approach of the gendarmes, would flee to the woods, the hills, or to mountain caves.

As a preliminary to the searches everywhere, the strong men of the villages and towns were arrested and

taken to prison. Their tormentors here would exercise the most diabolical ingenuity in their attempt to make their victims declare themselves to be «revolutionists» and to tell the hiding places of their arms. A common practice was to place the prisoner in a room, with two Turks stationed at each end and each side. The examination would then begin with the bastinado. This is a form of torture not uncommon in the Orient; it consists of beating the soles of the feet with a thin rod. At first the pain is not marked; but as the process goes slowly on, it develops into the most terrible agony, the feet swell and burst, and not infrequently, after being submitted to this treatment, they have to be amputated. The gendarmes would bastinado their Armenian victim until he fainted; they would then revive him by sprinkling water on his face and begin again. If this did not succeed in bringing their victim to terms, they had numerous other methods of persuasion. They would pull out his eyebrows and beard almost hair by hair; they would extract his finger nails and toe nails; they would apply red-hot irons to his breast, tear off his flesh with red-hot pincers, and then pour boiled butter into the wounds. In some cases the gendarmes would nail hands and feet to pieces of wood — evidently in imitation of the Crucifixion, and then, while the sufferer writhed in his agony, they would cry:

«Now let your Christ come and help you!»

These cruelties — and many others which I forbear to describe — were usually inflicted in the night time. Turks would be stationed around the prisons, beating drums and blowing whistles, so that the screams of the sufferers would not reach the villagers.

In thousands of cases the Armenians endured these agonies and refused to surrender their arms simply because they had none to surrender. However, they could

not persuade their tormentors that this was the case. It therefore became customary, when news was received that the searchers were approaching, for Armenians to purchase arms from their Turkish neighbours so that they might be able to give them up and escape these frightful punishments.

One day I was discussing these proceedings with a responsible Turkish official, who was describing the tortures inflicted. He made no secret of the fact that the Government had instigated them, and, like all Turks of the official classes, he enthusiastically approved this treatment of the detested race. This official told me that all these details were matters of nightly discussion at the headquarters of the Union and Progress Committee. Each new method of inflicting pain was hailed as a splendid discovery, and the regular attendants were constantly ransacking their brains in the effort to devise some new torment. He told me that they even delved into the records of the Spanish Inquisition and other historic institutions of torture and adopted all the suggestions found there. He did not tell me who carried off the prize in this gruesome competition, but common reputation throughout Armenia gave a preeminent infamy to Djevdet, Bey, the Vali of Van, whose activities in that section I have already described. All through this country Djevdet was generally known as the «horseshoer of Bashkale» for this connoisseur in torture had invented what was perhaps the masterpiece of all — that of nailing horse-shoes to the feet of his Armenian victims.

Yet these happenings did not constitute what the newspapers of the time commonly referred to as the Armenian atrocities; they were merely the preparatory steps in the destruction of the race. The Young Turks displayed greater ingenuity than their predecessor, Abdul Hamid. The injunction of the deposed Sultan was merely «to kill,

kill», whereas the Turkish democracy hit upon an entirely new plan. Instead of massacring outright the Armenian race, they now decided to deport it. In the south and southeastern section of the Ottoman Empire lie the Syrian desert and the Mesopotamian valley. Though part of this area was once the scene of a flourishing civilization, for the last five centuries it has suffered the blight that becomes the lot any country that is subjected to Turkish rule; and it is now a dreary, desolate waste, without cities and towns or life of any kind, populated only by a few wild and fanatical Bedouin tribes. Only the most industrious labour, expended through many years, could transform this desert into the abiding place of any considerable population. The Central Government now announced its intention of gathering the two million or more Armenians living in the several sections of the empire and transporting them to this desolate and inhospitable region. Had they undertaken such a deportation in good faith it would have represented the height of cruelty and injustice. As a matter of fact, the Turks never had the slightest idea of reëstablishing the Armenians in this new country. They knew that the great majority would never reach their destination and that those who did would either die of thirst and starvation, or be murdered by the wild Mohammedan desert tribes. The real purpose of the deportation was robbery and destruction; it really represented a new method of massacre. When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact.

All through the spring and summer of 1915 the deportations took place. Of the larger cities, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo were spared; practically all other

places where a single Armenian family lived now became the scenes of these unspeakable tragedies. Scarcely a single Armenian, whatever his education or wealth, or whatever the social class to which he belonged, was exempted from the order. In some villages placards were posted ordering the whole Armenian population to present itself in a public place at an appointed time — usually a day or two ahead, and in other places the town crier would go through the streets delivering the order vocally. In still others not the slightest warning was given. The gendarmes would appear before an Armenian house and order all the inmates to follow them. They would take women engaged in their domestic tasks without giving them the chance to change their clothes. The police fell upon them just as the eruption of Vesuvius fell upon Pompeii; women were taken from the washtubs, children were snatched out of bed, the bread was left half baked in the oven, the family meal was abandoned partly eaten, the children were taken from the schoolroom, leaving their books open at the daily task, and the men were forced to abandon their ploughs in the mountain side. Even women who had just given birth to children would be forced to leave their beds and join the panic-stricken throng, their sleeping babies in their arms. Such things as they hurriedly snatched up — a shawl, a blanket, perhaps a few scraps of food — were all that they could take of their household belongings. To their frantic questions «Where are we going?» the gendarmes would vouchsafe only one reply: «To the interior.»

In some cases the refugees were given a few hours, in exceptional instances a few days, to dispose of their property and household effects. But the proceeding, of course, amounted simply to robbery. They could sell only to Turks, and since both buyers and sellers knew that they only a day or two to market the accumulations of

a lifetime, the prices obtained represented a small fraction of their value. Sewing machines would bring one or two dollars — a cow would go for a dollar, a houseful of furniture would be sold for a pittance. In many cases Armenians were prohibited from selling or Turks from buying even at these ridiculous prices; under pretense that the Government intended to sell their effects to pay the creditors whom they would inevitably leave behind, their household furniture would be placed in stores or heaped up in public places, where it was usually pillaged by Turkish men and women. The government officials would also inform the Armenians that, since their deportation was only temporary, the intention being to bring them back after the war was over, they would not be permitted to sell their houses. Scarcely had the former possessors left the village, when Mohammedan *mohadjirs* — immigrants from other parts of Turkey — would be moved into the Armenian quarters. — Similarly all their valuables — money, rings, watches, and jewellery — would be taken to the police stations for «safe keeping,» pending their return, and then parcelled out among the Turks. Yet these robberies gave the refugees little anguish, for far more terrible and agonizing scenes were taking place under their eyes. The systematic extermination of the men continued; such males as the persecutions which I have already described had left were now violently dealt with. Before the caravans were started, it became the regular practice to separate the young men from the families, tie them together in groups of four, lead them to the outskirts, and shoot them. Public hangings without trial — the only offense being that the victims were Armenians — were taking place constantly. The gendarmes showed a particular desire to annihilate the educated and the influential. From American consuls and missionaries I was constantly receiving re-

ports of such executions, and many of the events which they described will never fade from my memory. At Angora all Armenian men from fifteen to seventy were arrested, bound together in groups of four, and sent on the road in the direction of Caesarea. When they had travelled five or six hours and had reached a secluded valley, a mob of Turkish peasants fell upon them with clubs, hammers, axes, scythes, spades, and saws. Such instruments not only caused more agonizing deaths than guns and pistols, but, as the Turks themselves boasted, they were more economical, since they did not involve the waste of powder and shell. In this way they exterminated the whole male population of Angora, including all its men of wealth and breeding, and their bodies, horribly mutilated, were left in the valley, they were devoured by wild beasts. After completing this destruction, the peasants and gendarmes gathered in the local tavern, comparing notes boasting of the number of «giaours» that each had slain. In Trebizond the men were placed in boats and sent out on the Black Sea; gendarmes would follow them in boats, shoot them down, and throw their bodies into the water.

When the signal was given for the caravans to move, therefore, they almost invariably consisted of women, children, and old men. Any one who could possibly have protected them from the fate that awaited them had been destroyed. Not infrequently the prefect of the city, as the mass started on its way would wish them a derisive «pleasant journey.» Before the caravan moved the women were sometimes offered the alternative of becoming Mohammedans. Even though they accepted the new faith, which few of them did, their early troubles did not end. The converts were compelled to surrender their children to a so-called «Moslem Orphanage,» with the agreement that they should be trained as devout followers of the Prophet.

They themselves must then show the sincerity of their conversion by abandoning their Christian husbands and marrying Moslems. If no good Mohammedan offered himself as a husband, then the new convert was deported, however strongly she might protest her devotion to Islam.

At first the Government showed some inclination to protect these departing throngs. The officers usually divided them into convoys, in some cases numbering several hundred, in others several thousand. The civil authorities occasionally furnished ox-carts which carried such household furniture as the exiles had succeeded in scrambling together. A guard of gendarmerie accompanied each convoy, ostensibly to guide and protect it. Women, scantily clad carrying babies in their arms or on their backs, marched side by side with old men hobbling along with canes. Children would run along, evidently regarding the procedure, in the early stages, as some new lark. A more prosperous member would perhaps have a horse or a donkey, occasionally a farmer had rescued a cow or a sheep, which would trudge along at his side, and the usual assortment of family pets — dogs, cats, and birds — became parts of the variegated procession. From thousands of Armenian cities and villages these despairing caravans now set forth; they filled all the roads leading southward; everywhere, as they moved on, they raised a huge dust, and abandoned débris, chairs, blankets, bedclothes, household utensils, and other impedimenta, marked the course of the processions. When the caravans first started, the individuals bore some resemblance to human beings; in a few hours, however, the dust of the road plastered their faces and clothes, the mud caked their lower members, and the slowly advancing mobs, frequently bent with fatigue and crazed by the brutality of their «protectors,» resembled some new and strange animal species. Yet for the better part of six months, from April to October,

1915, practically all the highways in Asia Minor were crowded with these unearthly bands of exiles. They could be seen winding in and out of every valley and climbing up the sides of nearly every mountain — moving on and on, they scarcely knew whither, except that every road led to death. Village after village and town after town was evacuated of its Armenian population, under the distressing circumstances already detailed. In these six months, as far as can be ascertained, about 1,200,000 people started on this journey to the Syrian desert.

«Pray for us,» they would say as they left their homes — the homes in which their ancestors had lived for 2,500 years. «We shall not see you in this world again, but sometime we shall meet. Pray for us!»

The Armenians had hardly left their native villages when the persecutions began. The roads over which they travelled were little more than donkey paths; and what had started a few hours before as an orderly procession soon became a dishevelled and scrambling mob. Women were separated from their children and husbands from their wives. The old people soon lost contact with their families and became exhausted and footsore. The Turkish drivers of the ox-carts, after extorting the last coin from their charges, would suddenly dump them and their belongings into the road, turn around, and return to the village for other victims. Thus in a short time practically everybody young and old, was compelled to travel on foot. The gendarmes whom the Government had sent, supposedly to protect the exiles, in a very few hours became their tormentors. They followed their charges with fixed bayonets, prodding any one who showed any tendency to slacken the pace. Those who attempted to stop for rest, or who fell exhausted on the road, were compelled, with the utmost brutality, to rejoin the moving throng. They even prodded pregnant women with bayonets; if one, as

frequently happened, gave birth along the road, she was immediately forced to get up and rejoin the marchers. The whole course of the journey became a perpetual struggle with the Moslem inhabitants. Detachments of gendarmes would go ahead, notifying the Kurdish tribes that their victims were approaching, and Turkish peasants were also informed that their long-awaited opportunity had arrived. The Government even opened the prisons and set free the convicts, on the understanding that they should behave like good Moslems to the approaching Armenians. Thus every caravan had a continuous battle for existence with several classes of enemies — their accompanying gendarmes, the Turkish peasants and villagers, the Kurdish tribes and bands of *Chétés* or brigands. And we must always keep in mind that the men who might have defended these wayfarers had nearly all been killed or forced into the army as workmen, and that the exiles themselves had been systematically deprived of all weapons before the journey began.

When the victims had travelled a few hours from their starting place, the Kurds would sweep down from their mountain homes. Rushing up to the young girls, they would lift their veils and carry the pretty ones off to the hills. They would steal such children as pleased their fancy and mercilessly rob all the rest of the throng. If the exiles had started with any money or food, their assailants would appropriate it, thus leaving them a hopeless prey to starvation. They would steal their clothing, and sometimes even leave both men and women in a state of complete nudity. All the time that they were committing these depredations the Kurds would freely massacre, and the screams of women and old men would add to the general horror. Such as escaped these attacks in the open would find new terrors awaiting them in the Moslem villages. Here the Turkish roughs would fall upon

the women, leaving them sometimes dead from their experiences or sometimes ravingly insane. After spending a night in a hideous encampment of this kind, the exiles, or such as had survived, would start again the next morning. The ferocity of the gendarmes apparently increased as the journey lengthened, for they seemed almost to resent the fact that part of their charges continued to live. Frequently any one who dropped on the road was bayoneted on the spot. The Armenians began to die by hundreds from hunger and thirst. Even when they came to rivers, the gendarmes, merely to torment them, would sometimes not let them drink. The hot sun of the desert burned their scantily clothed bodies, and their bare feet, treading the hot sand of the desert, became so sore that thousands fell and died or were killed where they lay. Thus, in a few days, what had been a procession of normal human beings became a stumbling horde of dust-covered skeletons, ravenously looking for scraps of food, eating any offal that came their way, crazed by the hideous sights that filled every hour of their existence, sick with all the diseases that accompany such hardships and privations, but still prodded on and on by the whips and clubs and bayonets of their executioners.

And thus, as the exiles moved, they left behind them another caravan — that of dead and unburied bodies, of old men and of women dying in the last stage of typhus, dysentery, and cholera, of little children lying on their backs and setting up their last piteous wails for food and water. There were women who held up their babies to strangers, begging them to take them and save them from their tormentors, and failing this, they would throw them into wells or leave them behind bushes, that at least might die undisturbed. Behind was left a small army of girls who had been sold as slaves — frequently for a medjidie, or about eighty cents — and who, after serving

the brutal purposes of their purchasers, were forced to lead lives of prostitution. A string of encampments, filled by the sick and the dying, mingled with the unburied or half-buried bodies of the dead, marked the course of the advancing throngs. Flocks of vultures followed them in the air, and ravenous dogs, fighting one another for the bodies of the dead, constantly pursued them. The most terrible scenes took place at the rivers, especially the Euphrates. Sometimes, when crossing this stream, the gendarmes would push the women into the water, shooting all who attempted to save themselves by swimming. Frequently the women themselves would save their honour by jumping into the river, their children in their arms. «In the last week in June,» I quote from a consular report, «several parties of Erzeroum Armenians were deported on successive days and most of them massacred on the way, either by shooting or drowning. One, Madame Zarouhi, an elderly lady of means, who was thrown into the Euphrates, saved herself by clinging to a boulder in the river. She succeeded in approaching the bank and returned to Erzeroum to hide herself in a Turkish friend's house. She told Prince Argoutinsky, the representative of the 'All-Russian Urban Union' in Erzeroum, that she shuddered to recall how hundreds of children were bayoneted by the Turks and thrown into the Euphrates, and how men and women were stripped naked, tied together in hundreds, shot, and then hurled into the river. In a loop of the river near Erzinghan, she said, the thousands of dead bodies created such a barrage that the Euphrates changed its course for about a hundred yards.»

It is absurd for the Turkish Government to assert that it ever seriously intended to «deport the Armenians to new homes»; the treatment which was given the convoys clearly shows that extermination was the real purpose of Enver and Talaat. How many exiled to the south

under these revolting conditions ever reached their destinations? The experiences of a single caravan show how completely this plan of deportation developed into one of annihilation. The details in question were furnished me directly by the American Consul at Aleppo, and are now on file in the State Department at Washington. On the first of June a convoy of three thousand Armenians, mostly women, girls, and children, left Harpoot. Following the usual custom the Government provided them an escort of seventy gendarmes, under the command of a Turkish leader, a Bey. In accordance with the common experience these gendarmes proved to be not their protectors, but their tormentors and their executioners. Hardly had they got well started on the road when — Bey took 400 liras from the caravan, on the plea that he was keeping it safely until their arrival at Malatia; no sooner had he robbed them of the only thing that might have provided them with food than he ran away, leaving them all to the tender mercies of the gendarmes.

All the way to Ras-ul-Ain, the first station on the Bagdad line, the existence of these wretched travellers was one prolonged horror. The gendarmes went ahead, informing the half-savage tribes of the mountains that several thousand Armenian women and girls were approaching. The Arabs and Kurds began to carry off the girls, mountaineers fell upon them repeatedly, violating and killing the women, and the gendarmes themselves joined in the orgy. One by one the few men who accompanied the convoy were killed. The women had succeeded in secreting money from their persecutors, keeping it in their mouths and hair; with this they would buy horses, only to have them repeatedly stolen by the Kurdish tribesmen. Finally the gendarmes, having robbed and beaten and violated and killed their charges for thirteen days, abandoned them altogether. Two days afterward the

Kurds went through the party and rounded up all the males who still remained alive. They found about 150, their ages varying from 15 to 90 years, and these they promptly took away and butchered to the last man. But that same day another convoy from Sivas joined this one from Harpoot, increasing the numbers of the whole caravan to 18,000 people.

Another Kurdish Bey now took command, and to him, as to all men placed in the same position, the opportunity was regarded merely as one for pillage, outrage, and murder. This chieftain summoned all his followers from the mountains and invited them to work their complete will upon this great mass of Armenians. Day after day and night after night the prettiest girls were carried away; sometimes they returned in a pitiable condition that told the full story of their sufferings. Any stragglers, those who were so old and infirm and sick that they could not keep up with the marchers, were promptly killed. Whenever they reached a Turkish village all the local vagabonds were permitted to prey upon the Armenian girls. When the diminishing band reached the Euphrates they saw the bodies of 200 men floating upon the surface. By this time they had all been so repeatedly robbed that they had practically nothing left except a few ragged clothes, and even these the Kurds now took; and the larger part of the convoy marched for five days almost completely naked under the scorching desert sun. For another five days they did not have a morsel of bread or a drop of water. «Hundreds fell dead on the way,» the report reads, «their tongues were turned to charcoal, and when, at the end of five days, they reached a fountain, the whole convoy naturally rushed toward it. But here the policemen barred the way and forbade them to take a single drop of water. Their purpose was to sell it at from one to three liras a cup and sometimes they

actually withheld the water after getting the money. At another place, where there were wells, some women threw themselves into them, as there was no rope or pail to draw up the water. These women were drowned and, in spite of that, the rest of the people drank from that well, the dead bodies still remaining there and polluting the water. Sometimes, when the wells were shallow and the women could go down into them and come out again, the other people would rush to lick or suck their wet, dirty clothes, in the effort to quench their thirst. When they passed an Arab village in their naked condition the Arabs pitied them and gave them old pieces of cloth to cover themselves with. Some of the exiles who still had money bought some clothes; but some still remained who traveled thus naked all the way to the city of Aleppo. The poor women could hardly walk for shame; they all walked bent double.

On the seventieth day a few creatures reached Aleppo. Out of the combined convoy of 18,000 souls just 150 women and children reached their destination. A few of rest, the most attractive, were still living as captives of the Kurds and Turks; all the rest were dead.

My only reason for relating such dreadful things as this is that, without the details, the English-speaking public cannot understand precisely what this nation is which we call Turkey. I have by no means told the most terrible details, for a complete narration of the sadistic orgies of which these Armenian men and women were the victims can never be printed in an American publication. Whatever crimes the most perverted instincts of the human mind can devise, and whatever refinements of persecution and injustice the most debased imagination can conceive, became the daily misfortunes of this devoted people. I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this.

The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared with the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915. The slaughter of the Albigenses in the early part of the thirteenth century has always been regarded as one of the most pitiful events in history. In these outbursts of fanaticism about 60,000 people were killed. In the massacre of St. Bartholomew about 30,000 human beings lost their lives. The Sicilian Vespers, which has always figured as one of the most fiendish outbursts of this kind, caused the destruction of 8,000. Volumes have been written about the Spanish Inquisition under Torquemada, yet in the eighteen years of his administration only a little more than 8,000 heretics were done to death. Perhaps the one event in history that most resembles the Armenian deportations was the expulsion of the Jews from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella. According to Prescott 160,000 were uprooted from their homes and scattered broadcast over Africa and Europe. Yet all these previous persecutions seem almost trivial when we compare them with the sufferings of the Armenians, in which at least 600,000 people were destroyed and perhaps as many as 1,000,000. And these earlier massacres, when we compare them with the spirit that directed the Armenian atrocities, have one feature that we can almost describe as an excuse: they were the product of religious fanaticism and of the men and women who instigated them sincerely believed that they were devoutly serving their Maker. Undoubtedly religious fanaticism was an impelling motive with the Turkish and Kurdish rabble who slew Armenians as a service to Allah, but the men who really conceived the crime had no such motive. Practically all of them were atheists, with no more respect for Mohammedanism than for Christianity, and with them the one motive was cold-blooded, calculating state policy.

The Armenians are not the only subject people in Turkey which have suffered from this policy of making Turkey exclusively the country of the Turks. The story which I have told about the Armenians I could also tell with certain modifications about the Greeks and the Syrians. Indeed the Greeks were the first victims of this nationalizing idea. I have already described how, in the few months preceding the European War, the Ottoman Government began deporting its Greek subjects along the coast of Asia Minor. These outrages aroused little interest in Europe or the United States, yet in the space of three or four months more than 100,000 Greeks were taken from their age-long homes in the Mediterranean littoral and removed to the Greek Islands and the interior. For the larger part these were bona-fide deportations; that is, the Greek inhabitants were actually removed to new places and were not subjected to wholesale massacre. It was probably for the reason that the civilized world did not protest against these deportations that the Turks afterward decided to apply the same methods on a larger scale not only to the Greeks but to the Armenians, Syrians, Nestorians, and others of its subject peoples. In fact, Bedri Bey, the Prefect of Police at Constantinople, himself told one of my secretaries that the Turks had expelled the Greeks so successfully that they had decided to apply the same method to all the other races in the empire.

The martyrdom of the Greeks, therefore, comprised two periods: that antedating the war, and that which began in the early part of 1915. The first affected chiefly the Greeks on the seacoast of Asia Minor. The second affected those living in Thrace and in the territories surrounding the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and the coast of the Black Sea. These latter, to the extent of several hundred thousand, were sent to the

interior of Asia Minor. The Turks adopted almost identically the same procedure against the Greeks as that which they had adopted against the Armenians. They began by incorporating the Greeks into the Ottoman army and then transforming them into labour battalions, using them to build roads in the Caucasus and other scenes of action. These Greek soldiers, just like the Armenians, died by thousands from cold, hunger, and other privations. The same house-to-house searches for hidden weapons took place in the Greek villages, and Greek men and women were beaten and tortured just as were their fellow Armenians. The Greeks had to submit to the same forced requisitions, which amounted in their case, as in the case of the Armenians, merely to plundering on a wholesale. The Turks attempted to force the Greek subjects to become Mohammedans; Greek girls, just like Armenian girls, were stolen and taken to Turkish harems and Greek boys were kidnapped and placed in Moslem households. The Greeks, just like the Armenians, were accused of disloyalty to the Ottoman Government; the Turks accused them of furnishing supplies to the English submarines in the Marmora and also of acting as spies. The Turks also declared that the Greeks were not loyal to the Ottoman Government, and that they also looked forward to the day when the Greeks inside of Turkey would become part of Greece. These latter charges were unquestionably true; that the Greeks, after suffering for five centuries the most unspeakable outrages at the hands of the Turks, should look longingly to the day when their territory should be part of the fatherland, was to be expected. The Turks, as in the case of the Armenians, seized upon this as an excuse for a violent onslaught on the whole race. Everywhere the Greeks were gathered in groups and, under the so-called protection of Turkish gendarmes, they were transported, the larger part on foot, into the interior.

Just how many were scattered in this fashion is not definitely known, the estimates varying anywhere from 200,000 up to 1,000,000. These caravans suffered great privations, but they were not submitted to general massacre as were the Armenians, and this is probably the reason why the outside world has not heard so much about them. The Turks showed them this greater consideration not from any motive of pity. The Greeks, unlike the Armenians, had a government which was vitally interested in their welfare. At this time there was a general apprehension among the Teutonic Allies that Greece would enter the war on the side of the Entente, and a wholesale massacre of Greeks in Asia Minor would unquestionably have produced such a state of mind in Greece that its pro-German king would have been unable longer to keep his country out of the war. It was only a matter of state policy, therefore, that saved these Greek subjects of Turkey from all the horrors that befell the Armenians. But their sufferings are still terrible, and constitute another chapter in the long story of crimes for which civilization will hold the Turk responsible.

TALAAAT TELLS

WHY HE «DEPORTS» THE ARMENIANS

It was some time before the story of the Armenian atrocities reached the American Embassy in all its horrible details. In January and February fragmentary reports began to filter in, but the tendency was at first

to regard them as mere manifestations of the disorders that had prevailed in the Armenian provinces for many years. When the reports came from Urumia, both Enver and Talaat dismissed them as wild exaggerations, and when, for the first time, we heard of the disturbances at Van, these Turkish officials declared that they were nothing more than a mob uprising which they would soon have under control. I now see, what was not apparent in those early months, that the Turkish Government was determined to keep the news, as long as possible, from the outside world. It was clearly the intention that Europe and America should hear of the annihilation of the Armenian race only after that annihilation had been accomplished. As the country which the Turks particularly wished to keep in ignorance was the United States, they resorted to the most shameless prevarications when discussing the situation with myself and with my staff.

In early April the authorities arrested about two hundred Armenians in Constantinople and sent them into the interior. Many of those who were then deported were educational and social leaders and men who were prominent in industry and in finance. I knew many of these men and therefore felt a personal interest in their misfortunes. But when I spoke to Talaat about their expulsion, he replied that the Government was acting in self-defense. The Armenians at Van, he said, had already shown their abilities as revolutionists; he knew that these leaders in Constantinople were corresponding with the Russians and he had every reason to fear that they would start an insurrection against the Central Government. The safest plan, therefore, was to send them to Angora and other interior towns. Talaat denied that this was part of any general concerted scheme to rid the city of its Armenian population, and insisted that the Armenian masses in Constantinople would not be disturbed.

But soon the accounts from the interior became more specific and more disquieting. The withdrawal of the Allied fleet from the Dardanelles produced a distinct change in the atmosphere. Until then there were numerous indications that all was not going well in the Armenian provinces; when it at last became definitely established, however, that the traditional friends of Armenia, Great Britain, France, and Russia, could do nothing to help that suffering people, the mask began to disappear. In April I was suddenly deprived of the privilege of using the cipher for communicating with American consuls. The most rigorous censorship also was applied to letters. Such measures could mean only that things were happening in Asia Minor which the authorities were determined to conceal. But they did not succeed. Though all sorts of impediments were placed to travelling, certain Americans, chiefly missionaries, succeeded in getting through. For hours they would sit in my office and, with tears streaming down their faces, they would tell me of the horrors through which they had passed. Many of these, both men and women, were almost broken in health from the scenes which they had witnessed. In many cases they brought me letters from American consuls, confirming the most dreadful of their narrations and adding many unprintable details. The general purport of all these first-hand reports was that the utter depravity and fiendishness of the Turkish nature, already sufficiently celebrated through the centuries, had now surpassed themselves. There was only one hope of saving nearly 2,000,000 people from massacre, starvation, and even worse, I was told — that was the moral power of the United States. These spokesmen of a condemned nation declared that, unless the American Ambassador could persuade the Turk to stay his destroying arm, the whole Armenian nation would disappear. It was not only American and Canadian mis-

sionaries who made this personal appeal. Several of their German associates begged me to intercede. These men and women confirmed all the worst things which I had heard, and they were unsparing in denouncing their own fatherland. They did not conceal the humiliation which they felt, as Germans, in the fact that their own nation was allied with a people that could perpetrate such infamies, but they understood German policy well enough to know that Germany would not intercede. There was no use in expecting aid from the Kaiser, they said — America must stop the massacres, or they would go on.

Technically, of course, I had no right to interfere. According to the cold-blooded legalities of the situation, the treatment of Turkish subjects by the Turkish Government was purely a domestic affair; unless it directly affected American lives and American interests, it was outside the concern of the American Government. When I first approached Talaat on the subject, he called my attention to this fact in no uncertain terms. This interview was one of the most exciting which I had had up to that time. Two missionaries had just called upon me, giving the full details of the frightful happenings at Konia. After listening to their stories, I could not restrain myself, and went immediately to the Sublime Porte. I saw at once that Talaat was in one of his most ferocious states of mind. For months he had been attempting to secure the release of one of his closest friends, Ayoub Sabri, and Zinnoun, who were held as prisoners by the English at Malta. His failure in this matter was a constant grievance and irritation; he was always talking about it, always making new suggestions for getting his friends back to Turkey, and always appealing to me for help. So furious did the Turkish Boss become when thinking about his absent friends that we usually referred to these manifestations as Talaat in his «Ayoub Sabri moods.» This par-

ticular morning the Minister the Interior was in one of his worst «Ayoub Sabri moods.» Once more he had been working for the release of the exiles and once more he had failed. As usual, he attempted to preserve outer calm and courtesy to me, but his short, snappy phrases, his bull-dog rigidity, and his wrists, planted on the table, showed that it was an unfavourable moment to stir him to any sense of pity or remorse. I first spoke to him about a Canadian missionary, Dr. McNaughton, who was receiving harsh treatment in Asia Minor.

«The man is English agent,» he replied, «and we have the evidence for it.»

«Let me see it,» I asked.

«We'll do nothing for any Englishman or any Canadian,» he replied, «until they release Ayoub and Zinnoun.»

«But you promised to treat English in the employ of Americans as Americans,» I replied.

«That may be,» rejoined the Minister, «but a promise is not made to be kept forever. I withdraw that promise now. There is a time limit on a promise.»

«But if a promise is not binding, what is?» I asked.

«A guarantee,» Talaat answered quickly.

This fine Turkish distinction had a certain metaphysical interest, but I had more practical matters to discuss at that time. So I began to talk about the Armenians at Konia. I had hardly started when Talaat's attitude became even more belligerent. His eyes lighted up, he brought his jaws together, leaned over toward me, and snapped out:

«Are they Americans?»

The implications of this question were hardly diplomatic; it was merely a way of telling me that the matter was none of my business. In a moment Talaat said this in so many words.

«The Armenians are not to be trusted,» he said, «besides, what we do with them does not concern the United States.»

I replied that I regarded myself as the friend of the Armenians and was shocked at the way that they were being treated. But he shook his head and refused to discuss the matter. I saw that nothing could be gained by forcing the issue at that time. I spoke in behalf of another British subject who was not being treated properly.

«He's English, isn't he?» answered Talaat. «Then I shall do as I like with him!»

«Eat him, if you wish!» I replied.

«No,» said Talaat, «he would go against my digestion.»

He was altogether in a reckless mood. «**Gott strafe England!**» he shouted — using one of the few German phrases that he knew. «As to your Armenians, we don't give a rap for the future! We live only in the present! As to the English, I wish you would telegraph Washington that we shall not do a thing for them until they let out Ayoub Sabri and Zinnoun!»

Then leaning over, he struck a pose, pressed his hand to his heart, and said, in English — I think this must have been almost all the English he knew:

«Ayoub Sabri — he — my — brudder!»

Despite this I made another plea for Dr. McNaughton.

«He's not American,» Said Talaat, «he's a Canadian.»

«It's almost the same thing,» I said.

«Well,» replied Talaat, «if I let him go, will you promise that the United States will annex Canada?»

«I promise,» said I, and we both laughed at this little joke.

«Every time you come here,» Talaat finally said, «you always steal something from me. All right, you can have your McNaughton!»

Certainly this interview was not an encouraging beginning, so far as the Armenians were concerned. But Talaat was not always in an «Ayoub Sabri mood.» He went from one emotion to another as lightly as a child; I would find him fierce and unyielding one day, and uproariously good-natured and accommodating the next. Prudence indicated, therefore, that I should await one of his more congenial moments before approaching him on the subject that aroused all the barbarity in his nature. Such an opportunity was soon presented. One day, soon after the interview chronicled above, I called on Talaat again. The first thing he did was to open his desk and pull out a handful of yellow cablegrams.

«Why don't you give this money to us?» he said, with a grin.

«What money?» I asked.

«Here is a cablegram for you from America, sending you a lot of money for the Armenians. You ought not to use it that way; give it to us Turks, we need it as badly as they do.»

«I have not received any such cablegram,» I replied.

«Oh, no, but you will,» he answered. «I always get all your cablegrams first, you know. After I have finished reading them I send them around to you.»

This statement was the literal truth. Every morning all uncoded cablegrams received in Constantinople were forwarded to Talaat, who read them, before consenting to their being forwarded to their destinations. Even the cablegrams of the ambassadors were apparently not exempt, though, of course, the ciphered messages were not interfered with. Ordinarily I might have protested against this infringement of my rights, but Talaat's engaging frankness about pilfering my correspondence and in even waving my own cablegrams in my face gave me an excellent opening to introduce the forbidden subject.

But on this occasion, as on many others, Talaat was evasive and non-committal and showed much hostility to the interest which the American people were manifesting in the Armenians. He explained his policy on the ground that the Armenians were in constant correspondence with the Russians. The definite conviction which these conversations left upon my mind was that Talaat was the most implacable enemy of this persecuted race. «He gave me the impression,» such is the entry which I find in my diary on August 3d, «that Talaat is the one who desires to crush the poor Armenians.» He told me that the Union and Progress Committee had carefully considered the matter in all its details and that the policy which was being pursued was that which they had officially adopted. He said that I must not get the idea that the deportations had been decided upon hastily; in reality, they were the result of prolonged and careful deliberation. To my repeated appeals that he should show mercy to these people, he sometimes responded seriously, sometimes angrily, and sometimes flippantly.

«Some day,» he once said, «I will come and discuss the whole Armenian subject with you,» and then he added in a low tone in Turkish:

«But that day will never come!»

«Why are you so interested in the Armenians, anyway?» he said, on another occasion. «You are a Jew; these people are Christians. The Mohammedans and the Jews always get on harmoniously. We are treating the Jews here all right. What have you to complain of? Why can't you let us do with these Christians as we please?»

I had frequently remarked that the Turks look upon practically every question as a personal matter, yet this point of view rather stunned me. However, it was a complete revelation of Turkish mentality; the fact that, above all considerations of race and religion, there are such

things as humanity and civilization, never for a moment enters their mind. They can understand a Christian fighting for a Christian and a Jew fighting for a Jew, but such abstractions as justice and decency form no part of their conception of things.

«You don't seem to realize,» I replied, «that I am not here as a Jew but as American Ambassador. My country contains something more than 97,000,000 Christians and something less than 3,000,000 Jews. So, at least in my ambassadorial capacity, I am 97 per cent. Christian. But after all, that is not the point. I do not appeal to you in the name of any race or any religion, but merely as a human being. You have told me many times that you want to make Turkey a part of the modern progressive world. The way you are treating the Armenians will not help you to realize that ambition; it puts you in the class of backward, reactionary peoples.»

«We treat the Americans all right, too,» said Talaat «I don't see why you should complain.»

«But Americans are outraged by your persecutions of the Armenians,» I replied. «You must base your principles on humanitarianism, not racial discrimination, or the United States will not regard you as a friend and an equal. And you should understand the great changes that are taking place among Christians all over the world. They are forgetting their differences and all sects are coming together as one. You look down on American missionaries, but don't forget that it is the best element in America that supports their religious work, as well as their educational institutions. Americans are not mere materialists, always, chasing money — they are broadly humanitarian, and interested in the spread of justice and civilization throughout the world. After this war is over you will face a new situation. You say that, if victorious, you can defy the world, but you are wrong. You will have to meet

public opinion everywhere, especially in the United States. Our people will never forget these massacres. They will always resent the wholesale destruction of Christians in Turkey. They will look upon it as nothing but wilful murder and will seriously condemn all the men who are responsible for it. You will not be able to protect yourself under your political status and say that you acted as Minister of the Interior and not as Talaat. You are defying all ideas of justice as we understand the term in our country.»

Strangely enough, these remarks did not offend Talaat, but they did not shake his determination. I might as well have been talking to a stone wall. From my abstractions he immediately came down to something definite.

«These people,» he said, «refused to disarm when we told them to. They opposed us at Van and at Zeitoun, and they helped the Russians. There is only one way in which we can defend ourselves against them in the future, and that is just to deport them.»

«Suppose a few Armenians did betray you,» I said. «Is that a reason for destroying a whole race? Is that an excuse for making innocent women and children suffer?»

«Those things are inevitable,» replied.

This remark to me was not quite so illuminating as one which Talaat made subsequently to a reporter of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, who asked him the same question. «We have been reproached,» he said, according to this interviewer, «for making no distinction between the innocent Armenians and the guilty; but that was utterly impossible, in view of the fact that those who were innocent to-day might be guilty to-morrow»!

One reason why Talaat could not discuss this matter with me freely, was because the member of the embassy staff who did the interpreting was himself an Armenian.

In the early part of August, therefore, he sent a personal messenger to me, asking if I could not see him alone — he said that he himself would provide the interpreter. This was the first time that Talaat had admitted that his treatment of the Armenians was a matter with which I had any concern. The interview took place two days afterward. It so happened that since the last time I had visited Talaat I had shaved my beard. As soon as I came in the burly Minister began talking in his customary bantering fashion.

«You have become a young man again,» he said; «you are so young now that I cannot go to you for advice any more.»

«I have shaved my beard,» I replied, «because it had become very gray — made gray by your treatment of the Armenians.»

After this exchange of compliments we settled down to the business in hand. «I have asked you to come to-day,» began Talaat, «so that I can explain our position on the whole Armenian subject. We base our objections to the Armenians on three distinct grounds. In the first place, they have enriched themselves at the expense of the Turks. In the second place, they are determined to domineer over us and to establish a separate state. In the third place, they have openly encouraged our enemies. They have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus and our failure there is largely explained by their actions. We have therefore come to the irrevocable decision that we shall make them powerless before this war is ended.»

On every one of these points I had plenty of arguments in rebuttal. Talaat's first objection was merely an admission that the Armenians were more industrious and more able than the dull-witted and lazy Turks. Massacre as a means of destroying business competition was certainly an original conception! His general charge that the Armenians were «conspiring» against Turkey and that

they openly sympathized with Turkey's enemies merely meant, when reduced to its original elements, that the Armenians were constantly appealing to the European Powers to protect them against robbery, murder, and outrage. The Armenian problem, like most race problems, was the result of centuries of ill-treatment and injustice. There could be only one solution for it, the creation of an orderly system of government, in which all citizens were to be treated upon an equality, and in which all offenses were to be punished as the acts of individuals and not as of peoples. I argued for a long time along these and similar lines.

«It is no use for you to argue,» Talaat answered, «we have already disposed of three quarters of the Armenians; there are none at all left in Bitlis, Van, and Erzeroum. The hatred between the Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with them. If we don't, they will plan their revenge.»

«If you are not influenced by humane considerations,» I replied, «think of the material loss. These people are your business men. They control many of your industries. They are very large tax-payers. What would become of you commercially without them?»

«We care nothing about the commercial loss,» replied Talaat. «We have figured all that out and we know that it will not exceed five million pounds. We don't worry about that. I have asked you to come here so as to let you know that our Armenian policy is absolutely fixed and that nothing can change it. We will not have the Armenians anywhere in Anatolia. They can live in the desert but nowhere else.»

I still attempted to persuade Talaat that the treatment of the Armenians was destroying Turkey in the eyes of the world, and that his country would never be able to recover from this infamy.

«You are making a terrible mistake,» I said, and I repeated the statement three times.

«Yes, we may make mistakes,» he replied, «but» — and he firmly closed his lips and shook his head — «we never regret.»

I had many talks with Talaat on the Armenians, but I never succeeded in moving him to the slightest degree. He always came back to the points which he had made in this interview. He was very willing to grant any request I made in behalf of the Americans or even of the French and English, but I could obtain no general concessions for the Armenians. He seemed to me always to have the deepest personal feeling in this matter, and his antagonism to the Armenians seemed to increase as their sufferings increased. One day, discussing a particular Armenian, I told Talaat that he was mistaken in regarding this man as an enemy of the Turks; that in reality he was their friend.

«No Armenian,» replied Talaat, «can be our friend after what we have done to them.»

One day Talaat made what was perhaps the most astonishing request I had ever heard. The New York Life Insurance Company and the Equitable Life of New York had for years done considerable business among the Armenians. The extent to which this people insured their lives was merely another indication of their thrifty habits.

«I wish,» Talaat now said, «that you would get the American life insurance companies to send us a complete list of their Armenian policy holders. They are practically all dead now and have left no heirs to collect the money. It of course all escheats to the State. The Government is the beneficiary now. Will you do so?»

This was almost too much, and I lost my temper.

«You will get no such list from me,» I said, and I got up and left him.

One other episode involving the Armenians stirred Talaat to one of his most ferocious moods. In the latter part of September, Mrs. Morgenthau left for America. The sufferings of the Armenians had greatly preyed upon her mind and she really left for home because she could not any longer endure to live in such a country. But she determined to make one last intercession for this poor people on her own account. Her way home took her through Bulgaria, and she had received an intimation that Queen Eleanor of that country would be glad to receive her. Perhaps it was Mrs. Morgenthau's well-known interest in social work that led to this invitation. Queen Eleanor was a high-minded woman, who had led a sad and lonely existence, and who was spending most of her time attempting to improve the condition of the poor in Bulgaria. She knew all about social work in American cities, and, a few years before, she had made all her plans to visit the United States in order to study our settlements at first hand. At the time of Mrs. Morgenthau's visit the Queen had two American nurses from the Henry Street Settlement of New York instructing a group of Bulgarian girls in the methods of the American Red Cross.

My wife was mainly interested in visiting the Queen in order that, as one woman to another, she might make a plea for the Armenians. At that time the question of Bulgaria's entrance into the war had reached a critical stage, and Turkey was prepared to make concessions to gain her as an ally. It was therefore a propitious moment to make such an appeal.

The Queen received Mrs. Morgenthau informally, and my wife spent about an hour telling her all about the Armenians. Most of what she said was entirely new to the Queen. Little had yet appeared in the European press on

this subject, and Queen Eleanor was precisely the kind of woman from whom the truth would be concealed as long as possible. Mrs. Morgenthau gave her all the facts about the treatment of Armenian women and children and asked her to intercede in their behalf. She even went so far as to suggest that it would be a terrible thing if Bulgaria, which in the past had herself suffered such atrocities at the hands of the Turks, should now become their allies in war. Queen Eleanor was greatly moved. She thanked my wife for telling her these truths and said that she would investigate immediately and see if something could not be done.

Just Mrs. Morgenthau was getting ready to leave she saw the Duke of Mecklenburg standing near the door. The Duke was in Sofia at that time attempting to arrange for Bulgaria's participation in the war. The Queen introduced him to Mrs. Morgenthau; His Highness was polite, but his air was rather cold and injured. His whole manner, particularly the stern glances which he cast on Mrs. Morgenthau, showed that he had heard a considerable part of the conversation. As he was exerting all his efforts to bring Bulgaria in on Germany's side, it is not surprising that he did not relish the plea which Mrs. Morgenthau was making to the Queen that Bulgaria should not ally herself with Turkey.

Queen Eleanor immediately interested herself in the Armenian cause, and, as a result, the Bulgaria Minister to Turkey was instructed to protest against the atrocities. This protest accomplished nothing, but it did arouse Talaat's momentary wrath against the American Ambassador. A few days afterward, when routine business called me to the Sublime Porte, I found him in an exceedingly ugly humour. He answered most of my questions savagely and in monosyllables, and I was afterward told that Mrs. Morgenthau's intercession with the Queen had put

him into this mood. In a few days, however, he was as goodnatured as ever, for Bulgaria had taken sides with Turkey.

Talaat's attitude toward the Armenians was summed up in the proud boast which he made to his friends: «I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian problem in three months than Abdul Hamid accomplished in thirty years!»

ENVER PASHA DISCUSSES

THE ARMENIANS

All this time I was bringing pressure upon Enver also. The Minister of War, as I have already indicated, was a different type of man from Talaat. He concealed his real feelings much more successfully; he was usually suave, coldblooded, and scrupulously polite. And at first he was by no means so callous as Talaat in discussing the Armenians. He dismissed the early stories as wild exaggerations, declared that the troubles at Van were merely ordinary warfare, and attempted to quiet my fears that the wholesale annihilation of the Armenians had been decided on. Yet all the time that Enver was attempting to deceive me, he was making open admissions to other people — a fact of which I was aware. In particular he made no attempt to conceal the real situation from Dr. Lepsius, a representative of German missionary interests. Dr. Lepsius was a high-minded Christian gentleman. He had been all through the Armenian massacres of 1895, and he had raised considerable sums of money to build orphanages

for Armenian children who had lost their parents at that time. He came again in 1915 to investigate the Armenian situation in behalf of German missionary interests. He asked for the privilege of inspecting the reports of American consuls and I granted it. These documents, supplemented by other information which Dr. Lepsius obtained, largely from German missionaries in the interior, left no doubt in his mind as to the policy of the Turks. His feelings were aroused chiefly against his own government. He expressed to me the humiliation which he felt, as a German, that the Turks should set about to exterminate their Christian subjects, while Germany, which called itself a Christian country, was making no endeavours to prevent it. Dr. Lepsius was simply staggered by his frankness, for Enver told him in so many words that they at last had an opportunity to rid themselves of the Armenians and that they proposed to use it.

By this time Enver had become more frank with me — the circumstantial reports which I possessed made it useless for him to attempt to conceal the true situation further — and we had many long and animated discussions on the subject. One of these I recall with particular vividness. I notified Enver that I intended to take up the matter in detail and he laid aside enough time to go over the whole situation.

«The Armenians had a fair warning,» Enver began, «of what would happen to them in case they joined our enemies. Three months ago I sent for the Armenian Patriarch and I told him that if the Armenians attempted to start a revolution or to assist the Russians, I would be unable to prevent mischief from happening to them. My warning produced no effect and the Armenians started a revolution and helped the Russians. You know what happened at Van. They obtained control of the city, used bombs against government buildings and killed a large

number of Moslems. We knew that they were planning uprisings in other places. You must understand that we are now fighting for our lives at the Dardanelles and that we are sacrificing thousands of men. While we are engaged in such a struggle as this, we cannot permit people in our own country to attack us in the back. We have got to prevent this no matter what means we have to resort to. It is absolutely true that I am not opposed to the Armenians as a people. I have the greatest admiration for their intelligence and industry, and I should like nothing better than to see them become a real part of our nation. But if they ally themselves with our enemies, as they did in the Van district, they will have to be destroyed. I have taken pains to see that no injustice is done; only recently I gave orders to have three Armenians who had been deported returned to their homes, when I found that they were innocent. Russia, France, Great Britain, and America are doing the Armenians no kindness by sympathizing with and encouraging them. I know what such encouragement means to a people who are inclined to revolution. When our Union and Progress Party attacked Abdul Hamid, we received all our moral encouragement from the outside world. This encouragement was of great help to us and had much to do with our success. It might similarly now help the Armenians and their revolutionary programme. I am sure that if these outside countries did not encourage them, they would give up all their efforts to oppose the present government and become law-abiding citizens. We now have this country in our absolute control and we can easily revenge ourselves on any revolutionists.»

«After all,» I said, «suppose what you say is true, why not punish the guilty? Why sacrifice a whole race for the alleged crimes of individuals?»

«Your point is all right during peace times,» replied

Enver. «We can then use Platonic means to quiet Armenians and Greeks, but in time of war we cannot investigate and negotiate. We must act promptly and with determination. I also think that the Armenians are making a mistake in depending upon the Russians. The Russians really would rather see them killed than alive. They are as great a danger to the Russians as they are to us. If they should form an independent government in Turkey, the Armenians in Russia would attempt to form an independent government there. The Armenians have also been guilty of massacres; in the entire district around Van only 30,000 Turks escaped, all the rest were murdered by the the Armenians and Kurds. I attempted to protect the non-combatants at the Caucasus; I gave orders that they should not be injured, but I found that the situation was beyond my control. There are about 70,000 Armenians in Constantinople and they will not be molested, except those who are Dashnaguists and those who are plotting against the Turks. However, I think you can ease your mind on the whole subject as there will be no more massacres of Armenians.»

I did not take seriously Enver's concluding statement. At the time that he was speaking, massacres and deportations were taking place all over the Armenian provinces and they went on almost without interruption for several months.

As soon as the reports reached the United States the question of relief became a pressing one. In the latter part of July, I heard that there were 5,000 Armenians from Zeitoun and Sultanié who were receiving no food whatever. I spoke about them to Enver, who positively declared that they would receive proper food. He did not receive favourably any suggestion that American representatives should go to that part of the country and assist and care for the exiles.

«For any American to do this,» he said, «would encourage all Armenians and make further trouble. There are twenty-eight million people in Turkey and one million Armenians, and we do not propose to have one million disturb the peace of the rest of the population. The great trouble with the Armenians is that they are separatists. They are determined to have a kingdom of their own, and they have allowed themselves to be fooled by the Russians. Because they have relied upon the friendship of the Russians, they have helped them in this war. We are determined that they shall behave just as Turks do. You must remember that when we started this revolution in Turkey there were only two hundred of us. With these few followers we were able to deceive the Sultan and the public, who thought that we were immensely more numerous and powerful than we were. We really prevailed upon him and the public through our sheer audacity, and in this way we established the Constitution. It is our own experience with revolutions which makes us fear the Armenians. If two hundred Turks could overturn the Government, then a few hundred bright, educated Armenians could do the same thing. We have therefore deliberately adopted the plan of scattering them so that they can do us no harm. As I told you once before, I warned the Armenian Patriarch that if the Armenians attacked us while we were engaged in a foreign war, that we Turks would hit back and that we would hit back indiscriminately.»

Enver always resented any suggestion that American missionaries or other friends of the Armenians should go to help or comfort them.

«They show altogether too much sympathy for them,» he said over and over again.

I had suggested that particular Americans should go to Tarsus and Marsovan.

«If they should go there, I am afraid that the local people in those cities would become angry and they would be inclined to start some disturbance which might create an incident. It is better for the Armenians themselves, therefore, that the American missionaries should keep away from them.»

«But you are ruining the country economically,» I said at another time, making the same point that I had made to Talaat. And he answered it in almost the same words, thus showing that the subject had been completely canvassed by the ruling powers.

«Economic considerations are of no importance at this time. The only important thing is to win. That's the only thing we have on our mind. If we win, everything will be all right; if we lose, everything will be all wrong anyhow. Our situation is desperate, I admit it, and we are fighting as desperate men fight. We are not going to let the Armenians attack us in the rear.»

The question of relief to the starving Armenians became every week a more pressing one, but Enver still insisted that Americans should keep away from the Armenian provinces.

«How can we furnish bread to the Armenians,» Enver declared, «when we can't get enough for our own people? I know that they are suffering and that it is quite likely that they cannot get bread at all this coming winter. But we have the utmost difficulty in getting flour and clothing right here in Constantinople.»

I said that I had the money and that American missionaries were anxious to go and use it for the benefit of the refugees

«We don't want the Americans to feed the Armenians,» he flatly replied. «That is one of the worst things that could happen to them. I have already said that it is their belief that they have friends in other countries which

leads them to oppose the Government and so brings down upon them all their miseries. If you Americans begin to distribute food and clothing among them, they will then think that they have powerful friends in the United States. This will encourage them to rebellion again and then we shall have to punish them still more. If you will give such money as you have received to the Turks, we shall see that it is used for the benefit of the Armenians.»

Enver made this proposal with a straight face, and he made it not only on this occasion but on several others. At the very moment that Enver suggested this mechanism of relief, the Turkish gendarmes and the Turkish officials were not only robbing Armenians of all their household possessions, of all their food and all their money, but they were even stripping women of their last shreds of clothing and prodding their naked bodies with bayonets as they staggered across the burning desert. And the Minister of War now proposed that we give our American money to these same guardians of the law for distribution among their charges! However, I had to be tactful.

«If you or other heads of the Government would become personally responsible for the distribution,» I said. «of course we would be glad to entrust the money to you. But naturally you would not expect us to give this money to the men who have been killing the Armenians and outraging their women.»

But Enver returned to his main point.

«They must never know,» he said, «that they have a friend in the United States. That would absolutely ruin them! It is far better they starve, and in saying this I am really thinking of the welfare of the Armenians themselves. If they can only be convinced that they have no friends in other countries, then they will settle down, recognize that Turkey is their only refuge, and become quiet citizens. Your country is doing them no kindness

by constantly showing your sympathy. You are merely drawing upon them greater hardships.»

In other words, the more money which the Americans sent to feed the Armenians, the more Armenians Turkey intended to massacre! Enver's logic was fairly maddening; yet he did relent at the end and permit me to help the sufferers through certain missionaries. In all our discussions he made this hypocritical plea that he was mercy in disguise. Since Enver always asserted that even the severity of the measures which he had adopted was mercy in disguise. Since Enver always asserted that he wished to treat the Armenians with justice — in this his attitude to me was quite different from that of Talaat, who openly acknowledged his determination to deport them — I went to the pains of preparing an elaborate plan for bettering their condition. I suggested that, if he wished to be just, he should protect the innocent refugees and lessen this suffering as much as possible, and that for that purpose he should appoint a special committee of Armenians to assist him and send a capable Armenian, such as Oskan Effendi, formerly Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, to study conditions and submit suggestions for remedying the existing evils. Enver did not approve either of my proposals; as to the first, he said that his colleagues would misunderstand it, and, as to Oskan, he said that he admired him for his good work while he had been in the Cabinet and had backed him in his severity toward the inefficient officials, yet he could not trust him because he was a member of the Armenian Dashnagist Society.

In another talk with Enver I began by suggesting that the Central Government was probably not to blame for the massacres. I thought that this would not be displeasing to him.

«Of course I know that the Cabinet would never or-

der such terrible things as have taken place,» I said. «You and Talaat and the rest of the Committee can hardly be responsible. Undoubtedly your subordinates have gone much further than you have ever intended. I realize that it is not always easy to control your underlings.»

Enver straightened up at once. I saw that my remarks, far from smoothing the way to a quiet and friendly discussion, had greatly offended him. I had intimated that things could happen in Turkey for which he and his associates were not responsible.

«You are greatly mistaken,» he said. «We have this country absolutely under our control. I have no desire to shift the blame on to our underlings and I am entirely willing to accept the responsibility myself for everything that has taken place. The Cabinet itself has ordered the deportations. I am convinced that we are completely justified in doing this owing to the hostile attitude of the Armenians toward the Ottoman Government, but we are the real rulers of Turkey, and no underling would dare proceed in a matter of this kind without our orders.»

Enver tried to mitigate the barbarity of his general attitude by showing mercy in particular instances. I made no progress in my efforts to stop the programme of wholesale massacre, but I did save a few Armenians from death. One day I received word from the American Consul at Smyrna that seven Armenians had been sentenced to be hanged. These men had been accused of committing some rather vague political offense in 1909; yet neither Rahmi Bey, Governor General of Smyrna, nor the Military Commander believed that they were guilty. When the order for execution reached Smyrna these authorities wired Constantinople that under the Ottoman law the accused had the right to appeal for clemency to the Sultan. The answer which was returned to this communica-

tion well illustrated the extent to which the rights of the Armenians were regarded at that time:

«Technically, you are right; hang them first and send the petition for pardon afterward.»

I visited Enver in the interest of these men on Bairam, which is the greatest Mohammedan religious festival; it is the day that succeeds Ramazan, their month of fasting. Bairam has one feature in common with Christmas, for on that day it is customary for Mohammedans to exchange small presents, usually sweets. So after the usual remarks of felicitation, I said to Enver:

«To-day is Bairam and you haven't sent me any present yet.»

Enver laughed.

«What do you want? Shall I send you a box of candies?»

«Oh, no,» I answered, «I am not so cheap as that. I want the pardon of the seven Armenians whom the court-martial has condemned at Smyrna.»

The proposition apparently struck Enver as very amusing.

«That's a funny way of asking for a pardon,» he said. «However, since you put it that way, I can't refuse.»

He immediately sent for his aide and telegraphed to Smyrna, setting the men free.

Thus fortuitously is justice administered and decision involving human lives made in Turkey. Nothing could make clearer the slight estimation in which the Turks hold life, and the slight extent to which principle controls their conduct. Enver spared these men not because he had the slightest interest in their cases, but simply as a personal favour to me and largely because of the whimsical manner in which I had asked it. In all my talks on the Armenians the Minister of War treated the whole matter more or less casually; he could discuss the fate

of a race in a parenthesis, and refer to the massacre of children as nonchalantly as we would speak of the weather.

One day Enver asked me to ride with him in the Belgrade forest. As I was losing no opportunities to influence him, I accepted this invitation. We autoed to Buyukdere, where four attendants with horses met us. In our ride through the beautiful forest, Enver became rather more communicative in his conversation than ever before. He spoke affectionately of his father and mother; when they were married, he said, his father had been sixteen and his mother only eleven, and he himself had been born when his mother was fifteen. In talking of his wife, the Imperial Princess, he disclosed a much softer side to his nature than I had hitherto seen. He spoke of the dignity with which she graced his home, regretted that Mohammedan ideas of propriety prohibited her from entering social life, but expressed a wish that she and Mrs. Morgenthau could meet. He was then furnishing a beautiful new palace on the Bosphorus; when this was finished, he said, the Princess would invite my wife to breakfast. Just then we were passing the house and grounds of Senator Abraham Pasha, a very rich Armenian. This man had been an intimate friend of the Sultan Abdul Aziz, and, since in Turkey a man inherits his father's friends as well as his property, the Crown Prince of Turkey, a son of Abdul Aziz, made weekly visits to this distinguished Senator. As we passed through the park, Enver noticed with disgust, that woodmen were cutting down trees and stopped them. When I heard afterward that the Minister of War had bought this park, I understood one of the reasons for his anger. Since Abraham Pasha was an Armenian, this gave me an opportunity to open the subject again.

I spoke him of the terrible treatment from which the Armenian women were suffering.

«You said that you wanted to protect women and children,» I remarked, «but I know that your orders are not being carried out.»

«Those stories can't be true,» he said. «I cannot conceive that a Turkish soldier would ill-treat a woman who is with child.»

Perhaps, if Enver could have read the circumstantial reports which were then lying in the archives of the American Embassy, he might have changed his mind.

Shifting the conversation once more, he asked me about my saddle, which was the well-known «General McClellan» type. Enver tried it and liked it so much that he afterward borrowed it, had one made exactly like it for himself — even including the number in one corner — and adopted it for one of his regiments. He told me of the railroads which he was then building in Palestine, said how well the Cabinet was working, and pointed out that there were great opportunities in Turkey now for real-estate speculation. He even suggested that he and I join hands in buying land that was sure to rise in value! But I insisted in talking about the Armenians. However, I made no more progress than before.

«We shall not permit them to cluster in places where they can plot mischief and help our enemies. So we are going to give them new quarters.»

This ride was so successful, from Enver's point of view, that we took another a few days afterward, and this time Talaat and Dr. Gates, the President of Robert College, accompanied us. Enver and I rode ahead, while our companions brought up the rear. These Turkish officials are exceedingly jealous of their prerogatives, and, since the Minister of War is the ranking member of the Cabinet, Enver insisted on keeping a decorous interval between ourselves and the other pair of horsemen. I was somewhat amused by this, for I knew that Talaat was

the more powerful politician; yet he accepted the discrimination and only once did he permit his horse to pass Enver and myself. At this violation of the proprieties, Enver showed his displeasure, whereat Talaat paused, reined up his horse, and passed submissively to the rear.

«I was merely showing Dr. Gates the gait of my horse,» he said, with an apologetic air.

But I was interested in more important matters than such fine distinctions in official etiquette; I was determined to talk about the Armenians. But again I failed to make any progress. Enver found more interesting subjects of discussion.

He began to talk of his horses, and now another incident illustrated the mercurial quality of the Turkish mind — the readiness with which a Turk passes from acts of monstrous criminality to acts of individual kindness. Enver said that the horse races would take place soon and regretted that he had no jockey.

«I'll give you an English jockey,» I said. «Will you make a bargain? He is a prisoner of war; if he wins will you give him his freedom?»

«I'll do it,» said Enver.

This man, whose name was Fields, actually entered the races as Enver's jockey, and came in third. He rode for his freedom, as Mr. Philip said! Since he did not come in first, the Minister was not obliged, by the terms of his agreement, to let him return to England, but Enver stretched a point and gave him his liberty.

On this same ride Enver gave me an exhibition of his skill as a marksman.

At one point in the road I suddenly heard a pistol shot ring out in the air. It was Enver's aide practising on a near-by object. Immediately Enver dismounted, whipped out his revolver, and, trusting his arm out rigidly and horizontally, he took aim.

«Do you see that twig on that tree?» he asked me. It was about thirty feet away.

When I nodded, Enver fired — and the twig dropped to the ground.

The rapidity with which Enver could whip his weapon out of his pocket, aim, and shoot, gave me one convincing explanation for the influence which he exercised with the piratical crew that was then ruling Turkey. There were plenty of stories floating around that Enver did not hesitate to use this method of suasion at certain critical moments of his career; how true these anecdotes were I do not know, but I can certainly testify to the high character of his marksmanship.

Talaat also began to amuse himself in the same way, and finally the two statesmen started shooting in competition and behaving as gaily and as carefree as boys let out of school.

«Have you one of your cards with you?» asked Enver. He requested that I pin it to a tree, which stood about fifty feet away.

Enver then fired first. His hand was steady; his eye went straight to the mark, and the bullet hit the card directly in the centre. This success rather nettled Talaat. He took aim, but his rough hand and wrist shook slightly — he was not an athlete like his younger, wiry, and straight-backed associate. Several times Talaat hit around the edges of the card, but he could not duplicate Enver's skill.

«If it had been a man I was firing at,» said the bulky Turk, jumping on his horse again, «I would have hit him several times.»

So ended my attempts to interest the two most powerful Turks of their day in the fate of one of the most valuable elements in their empire!

I have already said that Saïd Halim, the Grand Vizier, was not an influential personage. Nominally, his office was the most important in the empire; actually, the Grand Vizier was a mere place-warmer, and Talaat and Enver controlled the present incumbent, precisely as they controlled the Sultan himself. Technically the ambassadors should have conducted their negotiations with Saïd Halim, for he was Minister for Foreign Affairs; I early discovered, however, that nothing could be accomplished this way, and, though I still made my Monday calls as a matter of courtesy, I preferred to deal directly with the men who had the real power to decide all matters. In order that I might not be accused of neglecting any means of influencing the Ottoman Government, I brought the Armenian question several times to the Grand Vizier's attention. As he was not a Turk, but an Egyptian, and a man of education and breeding, it seemed not unlikely that he might have a somewhat different attitude toward the subject peoples. But I was wrong. The Grand Vizier was just as hostile to the Armenians as Talaat and Enver. I soon found merely mentioning the subject irritated him greatly. Evidently he did not care to have his elegant ease interfered with by such disagreeable and unimportant subjects. The Grand Vizier showed his attitude when the Greek Chargé d'Affaires spoke to him about the persecutions of the Greeks. Saïd Halim said that such manifestations did the Greeks more harm than good.

«We shall do with them just the opposite from what we are asked to do,» said the Grand Vizier.

To my appeals the nominal chief minister was hardly more statesmanlike. I had the disagreeable task of sending him, in behalf of the British, French, and Russian governments, a notification that these Powers would hold personally responsible for the Armenian atrocities the men who were then directing Ottoman affairs. This meant,

of course, that in the event of Allied success, they would treat the Grand Vizier, Talaat, Enver, Djemal and their companions as ordinary murderers. As I came into the room to discuss this somewhat embarrassing message with this member of the royal house of Egypt, he sat there, as usual, nervously fingering his beads, and not in a particularly genial frame of mind. He at once spoke of this telegram; his face flushed with anger, and he began a long diatribe against the whole Armenian race. He declared that the Armenian «rebels» had killed 120,000 Turks at Van. This and other of his statements were so absurd that I found myself spiritedly defending the persecuted race, and this aroused the Grand Vizier's wrath still further, and, switching from the Armenians, he began to abuse my own country, making the usual charge that our sympathy with the Armenians was largely responsible for all their troubles.

Soon after this interview Saïd Halim ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs; his successor was Halil Bey, who for several years had been Speaker of the Turkish Parliament. Halil was a very different type of man. He was much more tactful, much more intelligent, and much more influential in Turkish affairs. He was also a smooth and oily conversationalist, good natured and fat, and by no means lost to all decent sentiments as most Turkish politicians of the time. It was generally reported that Halil did not approve the Armenian proceedings, yet his official position compelled him to accept them and and even, as I now discovered, to defend them. Soon after obtaining his Cabinet post, Halil called upon me and made a somewhat rambling explanation of the Armenian atrocities. I had already had experiences with several official attitudes toward the persecutions; Talaat had been blood-thirsty and ferocious, Enver subtly calculating, while the Grand Vizier had been testy. Halil now regarded the eli-

mination of this race with the utmost good humour. Not a single aspect of the proceeding, not even the unkindest things I could say concerning it, disturbed his equanimity in the least. He began by admitting that nothing could palliate these massacres, but, he added that, in order to understand them, there were certain facts that I should keep in mind.

«I agree that the Government has made serious mistakes in the treatment of the Armenians», said Halil, «but the harm has already been done. What can we do about it now? Still, if there are any errors we can correct, we should correct them. I deplore as much as you the excesses and violations which have been committed. I wish to present to you the view of the Sublime Porte; I admit that this is no justification, but I think there are extenuating circumstances that you should take into consideration before judgment is passed upon the Ottoman Government.»

And then, like all the others, he went back to the happenings at Van, the desire of the Armenians for independence, and the help which they had given the Russians. I had heard it all many times before.

«I told Vartkes» (an Armenian deputy who, like many other Armenian leaders, was afterward murdered), «that, if his people really aspired to an independent existence, they should wait for a propitious moment. Perhaps the Russians might defeat the Turkish troops and occupy all the Armenian provinces. Then I could understand that the Armenians might want to set up for themselves. Why not wait, I told Vartkes, until such a fortunate time had arrived? I warned him that we would not let the Armenians jump on our backs, and that, if they did engage in hostile acts against our troops, we would dispose of all Armenians who were in the rear of our army, and that

our method would be to send them to a safe distance in the south. Enver, as you know, gave a similar warning to the Armenian Patriarch. But in spite of these friendly warnings, they started a revolution.»

I asked about methods of relief, and told him that already twenty thousand pounds (\$100,000) had reached me from America.

«It is the business of the Ottoman Government,» he blandly answered, «to see that these people are settled, housed, and fed until they can support themselves. The Government will naturally do its duty! Besides, the twenty thousand pounds that you have is in reality nothing at all.»

«That is true,» I answered, «it is only a beginning, but I am sure that I can get all the money we need.»

«It is the opinion of Enver Pasha,» he replied, «that no foreigners should help the Armenians. I do not say that his reasons are right or wrong. I merely give them to you as they are. Enver says that the Armenians are idealists, and that the moment foreigners approach and help them, they will be encouraged in their national aspirations. He is utterly determined to cut forever all relations between the Armenians and foreigners.»

«Is this Enver's way of stopping any further action on their part?» I asked.

Halil smiled most good-naturedly at this somewhat pointed question and answered:

«The Armenians have no further means of action whatever!»

Since not far from 500,000 Armenians had been killed by this time, Halil's genial retort certainly had one virtue which most of his other statements in this interview had lacked — it was the truth.

«How many Armenians in the southern provinces are in need of help?» I asked.

«I do not know; I would not give you even an approximate figure.»

«Are there several hundred thousand?»

«I should think so,» Halil admitted, «but I cannot say how many hundred thousand.»

«A great many suffered,» he added, «simply because Enver could not spare troops to defend them. Some regular troops did accompany them and these behaved very well; forty even lost their lives defending the Armenians. But we had to withdraw most of the gendarmes for services in the army and put in a new lot to accompany the Armenians. It is true that these gendarmes committed many deplorable excesses.»

«A great many Turks do not approve these measures,» I said.

«I do not deny it,» replied the ever-accommodating Halil, as he bowed himself out.

Enver, Halil, and the rest were ever insistent on the point which they constantly raised, that no foreigners should furnish relief to the Armenians. A few days after this visit the Under-Secretary of State called at the American Embassy. He came to deliver to me a message from Djemal to Enver. Djemal, who then had jurisdiction over the Christians in Syria, was much annoyed at the interest which the American consuls were displaying in the Armenians. He now asked me to order these officials «to stop busying themselves in Armenian affairs.» Djemal could not distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, this messenger said, and so he had to punish them all! Some time afterward Halil complained to me that the American consuls were sending facts about the Armenians to America and that the Government insisted that they should be stopped.

As a matter of fact, I was myself sending most of this information — and I did not stop.

«I SHALL DO NOTHING FOR THE ARMENIANS»

SAYS THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR

I suppose that there is no phase of the Armenian question which has aroused more interest than this: Had the Germans any part in it? To what extent was the Kaiser responsible for the wholesale slaughter of this nation? Did the Germans favour it, did they merely acquiesce, or did they oppose the persecutions? Germany, in the last four years, has become responsible for many of the blackest pages in history; is she responsible for this, unquestionably the blackest of all?

I presume most people will detect in the remarks of these Turkish chieftains certain resemblances to the German philosophy of war. Let me repeat particular phrases used by Enver and other Turks while discussing the Armeinan massacres: «The Armenians have brought this fate upon themselves.» «They had a fair warning of what would happen to them.» «We were fighting for our national existence.» «We were justified in resorting to any means that would accomplish these ends.» «We have no time to separate the innocent from the guilty.» «The only thing we have on our mind is to win the war.»

These phrases somehow have a familiar ring, do they not? Indeed, I might rewrite all these interviews with Enver, use the word Belgium in place of Armenia, put the words in a German general's mouth instead of Enver's, and we should have almost a complete exposition of the German attitude toward subject peoples. But the teaching of the Prussians go deeper than this. There was one feature about the Armenian proceedings that was new — that was not Turkish at all. For centuries the Turks have ill-treated their Armenians and all their other subject peoples with inconceivable barbarity. Yet their

methods have always been crude, clumsy, and unscientific. They excelled in beating out an Armenian's brains with a club, and this unpleasant illustration is a perfect indication of the rough and primitive methods which they applied to the Armenian problem. They have understood the uses of murder, but not of murder as a fine art. But the Armenian proceedings of 1915 and 1916 evidenced an entirely new mentality. This new conception was that of **deportation**. The Turks, in five hundred years, had invented innumerable ways of physically torturing their Christian subjects, yet never before had it occurred to their minds to move them bodily from their homes, where they had lived for many thousands of years, and send them hundreds of miles away into the desert. Where did the Turks get this idea? I have already described how, in 1914, just before the European War, the Government moved not far from 100,000 Greeks from their age-long homes along the Asiatic littoral to certain islands in the Aegean. I have also said that Admiral Usedom, one of the big German naval experts in Turkey, told me that the Germans had suggested this deportation to the Turks. But the all-important point is that this idea of deporting peoples *en masse* is, in modern times, exclusively Germanic. Any one who reads the literature of Pan-Germany constantly meets it. These enthusiasts for a German world have deliberately planned, as part of their programme, the ousting of the French from certain parts of France, of Belgians from Belgium, of Poles from Poland, of Slavs from Russia, and other indigenous peoples from the territories which they have inhabited for thousands of years, and the establishment in the vacated lands of solid, honest Germans. But it is hardly necessary to show that the Germans have advocated this as a state policy; they have actually been doing it in the last four years. They have moved we do not know how many thousands of

Belgians and French from their native land. Austria-Hungary has killed a large part of the Serbian population and moved thousands of Serbian children into her own territories, intending to bring them up as loyal subjects of the empire. To what degree this movement of populations has taken place we shall not know until the end of the war, but it has certainly gone on extensively.

Certain German writers have even advocated the application of this policy to the Armenians. According to the *Paris Temps*, Paul Rohrbach «in a conference held at Berlin, some time ago, recommended that Armenia should be evacuated of the Armenians. They should be dispersed in the direction of Mesopotamia and their places should be taken by Turks, in such a fashion that Armenia should be freed of all Russian influence and that Mesopotamia might be provided with farmers which it now lacked.» The purpose of all this was evident enough. Germany was building the Bagdad railroad across the Mesopotamian desert. This was an essential detail in the achievement of the great new German Empire, extending from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. But this railroad could never succeed unless there should develop a thrifty and industrious population to feed it. The lazy Turk would never become such a colonist. But the Armenian was made of just the kind of stuff which this enterprise needed. It was entirely in accordance with the German conception of statesmanship to seize these people in the lands where they had lived for ages and transport them violently to this dreary, hot desert. The mere fact that they had always lived in a temperate climate would furnish no impediment in Pan-German eyes. I found that Germany had been sowing those ideas broadcast for several years; I even found that German savants had been lecturing on this subject in the East. «I remember attending a lecture by a well-known German professor,»

an Armenian tells me. «His main point was that throughout their history the Turks had made a great mistake in being too merciful toward the non-Turkish population. The only way to insure the prosperity of the empire, according to this speaker, was to act without any sentimentality toward all the subject nationalities and races in Turkey who did not fall in with the plans of the Turks.»

The Pan-Germanists are on record in the matter of Armenia. I shall content myself with quoting the words of the author of «Mittel-Europa,» Friedrich Naumann, perhaps the ablest propagator of Pan-German ideas. In his work on Asia, Naumann, who started life as a Christian clergyman, deals in considerable detail with the Armenian massacres of 1895-96. I need only quote a few passages to show the attitude of German state policy on such infamies: «If we should take into consideration merely the violent massacre of from 80,000 to 100,000 Armenians,» writes Naumann, «we can come to but one opinion — we must absolutely condemn with all anger and vehemence both the assassins and their instigators. They have perpetrated the most abominable massacres upon masses of people, more numerous and worse than those inflicted by Charlemagne on the Saxons. The tortures which Lepsius has described surpass anything we have ever known. What then prohibits us from falling upon the Turk and saying to him: 'Get thee gone, wretch!?' Only one thing prohibits us, for the Turk answers: 'I, too, I fight for my existence!' — and indeed, we believe him. We believe, despite the indignation which the bloody Mohammedan barbarism arouses in us, that the Turks are defending themselves legitimately, and before anything else we see in the Armenian question and Armenian massacres a matter of internal Turkish policy, merely an episode of the agony through which a great

empire is passing, which does not propose to let itself die without making a last attempt to save itself by bloodshed. All the great powers, excepting Germany, have adopted a policy which aims to upset the actual state of affairs in Turkey. In accordance with this, they demand for the subject peoples of Turkey the rights of man, or of humanity, or of civilization, or of political liberty — in a word, something that will make them the equals of the Turks. But just as little as the ancient Roman despotic state could tolerate the Nazerene's religion, just as little can the Turkish Empire, which is really the political successor of the eastern Roman Empire, tolerate any representation of western free Christianity among its subjects. The danger for Turkey in the Armenian question is one of extinction. For this reason she resorts to an act of a barbarous Asiatic state; she has destroyed the Armenians to such an extent that they will not be able to manifest themselves as a political force for a considerable period. A horrible act, certainly, an act of political despair, shameful in its details, but still a piece of political history, in the Asiatic manner. . . . In spite of the displeasure which the German Christian feels at these accomplished facts, he has nothing to do except quietly to heal the wounds so far as he can, and then to let matters take their course. For a long time our policy in the Orient has been determined: we belong to the group that protects Turkey, that is the fact by which we must regulate our conduct. . . . We do not prohibit any zealous Christian from caring for the victims of these horrible crimes, from bringing up the children and nursing the adults. May God bless these good acts like all other acts of faith. Only we must take care that deeds of charity do not take the form of political acts which are likely to thwart our German policy. The internationalist, he who belongs to the English school of thought,

may march with the Armenians. The nationalist, he who does not intend to sacrifice the future of Germany to England, must, on questions of external policy, follow the path marked out by Bismarck, even if it is merciless in its sentiments. . . . National policy: that is the profound moral reason why we must, as statesmen, show ourselves indifferent to the sufferings of the Christian peoples of Turkey, however painful that may be to our human feelings. . . . That is our duty, which we must recognize and confess before God and before man. If for this reason we now maintain the existence of the Turkish state, we do it in our own self-interest, because what we have in mind is our great future. . . . On one side lie our duties as a nation, on the other our duties as men. There are times, when, in a conflict of duties, we can choose a middle ground. That is all right from a human standpoint, but rarely right in a moral sense. In this instance, as in all analogous situations, we must clearly know on which side the greatest and most important moral duty. Once we have made such a choice we must not hesitate. William II has chosen. He has become the friend of the Sultan, because he is thinking of a greater, independent Germany.»

Such was the German state philosophy as applied to the Armenians, and I had the opportunity of observing German practice as well. As soon as the early reports reached Constantinople, it occurred to me that the most feasible way of stopping the outrages would be for the diplomatic representatives of all countries to make a joint appeal to the Ottoman Government. I approached Wangenheim on this subject in the latter part of March. His antipathy to the Armenians became immediately apparent. He began denouncing them in unmeasured terms; like Talaat and Enver, he affected to regard the Van episode as an unprovoked rebellion, and, in his eyes,

as in theirs, the Armenians were simply traitorous vermin.

«I will help the Zionists,» he said, thinking that this remark would be personally pleasing to me, «but I shall do nothing whatever for the Armenians.»

Wangenheim pretended to regard the Armenian question as a matter that chiefly affected the United States. My constant intercession in their behalf apparently created the impression, in his Germanic mind, that any mercy shown this people would be a concession to the American Government. And at that moment he was not disposed to do anything that would please the American people.

«The United States is apparently the only country that takes much interest in the Armenians,» he said. «Your missionaries are their friends and your people have constituted themselves their guardians. The whole question of helping them is therefore an American matter. How, then, can you expect me to do anything as long as the United States is selling ammunition to the enemies of Germany? Mr. Bryan has just published his note, saying that it would be unneutral not to sell munitions to England and France. As long as your government maintains that attitude we can do nothing for the Armenians.»

Probably no one except a German logician would ever have detected any relation between our sale of war materials to the Allies and Turkey's attacks upon hundreds of thousands of Armenian women and children. But that was about as much progress as I made with Wangenheim at that time. I spoke to him frequently, offset my pleas for mercy to the Armenians by references to the use of American shells at the Dardanelles. A coolness sprang up between us soon afterward, the result of my refusal to give him «credit» for having stopped the deportation of French and British civilians to the Gallipoli peninsula. After our somewhat tart conversation over the

telephone, when he had asked me to telegraph Washington, that he had not hetzed the Turks in this matter, our visits to each other ceased for several weeks.

There were certain influential Germans in Constantinople who did not accept Wangenheim's point of view. I have already referred to Paul Weitz, for thirty years the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, who probably knew more about affairs in the Near East than any other German. Although Wangenheim constantly looked to Weitz for information, he did not always take his advice. Weitz did not accept the orthodox imperial attitude toward Armenia, for he believed that Germany's refusal effectively to intervene was doing his fatherland everlasting injury. Weitz was constantly presenting this view to Wangenheim, but he made little progress. Weitz told me about this himself, in January, 1916, a few weeks before I left Turkey. I quote his own words on this subject:

«I remember that you told me at the beginning,» said Weitz, «what a mistake Germany was making in the Armenian matters. I agreed with you perfectly. But when I urged this view upon Wangenheim, he threw me twice out of the room!»

Another German who was opposed to the atrocities was Neurath, the Conseiller of the German Embassy. His indignation reached such a point that his language to Talaat and Enver became almost undiplomatic. He told me, however, that he had failed to influence them.

«They are immovable and are determined to pursue their present course,» Neurath said.

Of course no Germans could make much impression on the Turkish Government as long as the German Ambassador refused to interfere. And, as time went on, it became more evident that Wangenheim had no desire to stop the deportations. He apparently wished, however,

to reestablish friendly relations with me, and soon sent third parties to ask why I never came to see him. I do not know how long this estrangement would have lasted had not a great personal affliction befallen him. In June, Lieutenant Colonel Leipzig, the German Military Attache, died under the most tragic and mysterious circumstances in the railroad station at Lule Bourgas. He was killed by a revolver shot; one story said that the weapon had been accidentally discharged, another that the Colonel had committed suicide, still another that the Turks had assassinated him, mistaking him for Liman von Sanders. Leipzig was one of Wangenheim's intimate friends; as young men they had been officers in the same regiment, and at Constantinople they were almost inseparable. I immediately called on the Ambassador to express my condolences. I found him very dejected and careworn. He told me that he had heart trouble, that he was almost exhausted, and that he had applied for a few weeks' leave of absence. I knew that it was not only his comrade's death that was preying upon Wangenheim's mind. German missionaries were flooding Germany with reports about the Armenians and calling upon the Government to stop massacres. Yet, overburdened and nervous as Wangenheim was this day, he gave many signs that he was still the same unyielding German militarist. A few days afterward, when he returned my visit, he asked:

«Where's Kitchener's army?

«We are willing to surrender Belgium now,» he went on. «Germany intends to build an enormous fleet of submarines with great cruising radius. In the next war, we shall therefore be able completely to blockade England. So we do not need Belgium for its submarine bases. We shall give her back to the Belgians, taking the Congo in exchange.»

I then made another plea in behalf of the persecuted

Christians. Again we discussed this subject at length.

«The Armenians,» said Wangenheim, «have shown themselves in this war to be enemies of the Turks. It is quite apparent that the two peoples can never live together in the same country. The Americans should move some of them to the United States, and we Germans will send some to Poland and in their place send Jewish Poles to her Armenian provinces — that is, if they will promise to drop their Zionist schemes.»

Again, although I spoke with unusual earnestness, the Ambassador refused to help the Armenians.

Still, on July 4th, Wangenheim did present a formal note of protest. He did not talk to Talaat or Enver, the only men who had any authority, but to the Grand Vizier, who was merely a shadow. The incident had precisely the same character as his *proforma* protest against sending the French and British civilians down to Gallipoli, to serve as targets for the Allied fleet. Its only purpose was to put Germans officially on record. Probably the hypocrisy of this protest was more apparent to me than to others, for, at the very moment when Wangenheim presented this so-called protest, he was giving me the reasons why Germany could not take really effective steps to end the massacres. Soon after this interview, Wangenheim received his leave and went to Germany.

Callous as Wangenheim showed himself to be, he was not quite so implacable toward the Armenians as the German naval attaché in Constantinople, Humann. This person was generally regarded as a man of great influence; his position in Constantinople corresponded to that of Boy-Ed in the United States. A German diplomat once told me that Humann was more of a Turk than Enver or Talaat. Despite this reputation I attempted to enlist his influence. I appealed to him particularly because he was a friend of Enver, and was generally looked upon

as an important connecting link between the German Embassy and the Turkish military authorities. Humann was a personal emissary of the Kaiser, in constant communication with Berlin and undoubtedly he reflected the attitude of the ruling powers in Germany. He discussed the Armenian problem with the utmost frankness and brutality.

«I have lived in Turkey the larger part of my life,» he told me, «and I know the Armenians. I also know that both Armenians and Turks cannot live together in this country. One of these races has got to go. And I don't blame the Turks for what they are doing to the Armenians. I think that they are entirely justified. The weaker nation must succumb. The Armenians desire to dismember Turkey; they are against the Turks and the Germans in this war, and they therefore have no right to exist here. I also think that Wangenheim went altogether too far in making a protest; at least I would not have done so.»

I expressed my horror at such sentiments, but Humann went on abusing the Armenian people and absolving the Turks from all blame.

«It is a matter of safety,» he replied; «the Turks have got to protect themselves, and, from this point of view, they are entirely justified in what they are doing. Why, we found 7,000 guns at Kadikeuy which belonged to the Armenians. At first Enver wanted to treat the Armenians with the utmost moderation, and four months ago he insisted that they be given another opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty. But after what they did at Van, he had to yield to the army, which had been insisting all along that it should protect its rear. The Committee decided upon the deportations and Enver reluctantly agreed. All Armenians are working for the destruction of Turkey's power — and the only thing to do is to deport them. Enver is really a very kind-hearted

man; he is incapable personally of hurting a fly! But when it comes to defending an idea in which he believes, he will do it fearlessly and recklessly. Moreover, the Young Turks have to get rid of the Armenians merely as a matter of self-protection. The Committee is strong only in Constantinople and a few other large cities. Everywhere else the people are strongly 'Old Turk'. And these old Turks are all fanatics. These Old Turks are not in favour of the present government, and so the Committee has to do everything in their power to protect themselves. But don't think that any harm will come to other Christians. Any Turks can easily pick out three Armenians among a thousand Turks!»

Humann was not the only important German who expressed this latter sentiment. Intimations began to reach me from sources that my «meddling» in behalf of the Armenians was making me more and more unpopular in German officialdom. One day in October, Neurath, the German Conseiller, called and showed me a telegram which he had just received from the German Foreign Office. This contained the information that Earl Crewe and Earl Cromer had spoken on the Armenians in the House of Lords had laid the responsibility for the massacres upon the Germans, and had declared that they had received their information from an American witness. The telegram also referred to an article in the *Westminster Gazette*, which said that the German consuls at certain places had instigated and even led the attacks, and particularly mentioned Resler of Aleppo. Neurath said that his government had directed him to obtain a denial of these charges from the American Ambassador at Constantinople. I refused to make such a denial, saying that I did not feel called upon to decide officially whether Turkey or Germany was to blame for these crimes.

Yet everywhere in diplomatic circles there seemed

to be a conviction that the American Ambassador was responsible for the wide publicity which the Armenian massacres were receiving in Europe and the United States. I have no hesitation in saying that they were right about this. In December, my son, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., paid a visit to the Gallipoli peninsula, where he was entertained by General Liman von Sanders and other German officers. He had hardly stepped into German headquarters when an officer came up to him and said:

«Those are very interesting articles on the Armenian question which your father is writing in the American newspapers.»

«My father has been writing no articles,» my son replied.

«Oh,» said this officer, «just because his name isn't signed to them doesn't mean that he is not writing them!»

Von Sanders also spoke on this subject.

«Your father is making a great mistake,» he said, «giving out the facts about what the Turks are doing to the Armenians. That really is not his business.»

As hints of this kind made no impression on me, the Germans evidently decided to resort to threats. In the early autumn, a Dr. Nossig arrived in Constantinople from Berlin. Dr. Nossig was a German Jew, and came to Turkey evidently to work against the Zionists. After he had talked with me for a few minutes, describing his Jewish activities, I soon discovered that he was a German political agent. He came to see me twice; the first time his talk was somewhat indefinite, the purpose of the call apparently being to make my acquaintance and insinuate himself into my good graces. The second time, after discoursing vaguely on several topics, he came directly to the point. He drew his chair close up to me and began to talk in the most friendly and confidential manner.

«Mr. Ambassador,» he said, «we are both Jews and I want to speak to you as one Jew to another. I hope you will not be offended if I presume upon this to give you a little advice. You are very active in the interest of the Armenians and I do not think you realize how very unpopular you are becoming, for this reason, with the authorities here. In fact, I think that I ought to tell you that the Turkish Government is contemplating asking for your recall. Your protests for the Armenians will be useless. The Germans will not interfere for them and you are just spoiling your opportunity for usefulness and running the risk that your career will end ignominiously.»

«Are you giving me this advice,» I asked, «because you have a real interest in my personal welfare?»

«Certainly,» he answered; «all of us Jews are proud of what you have done and we would hate to see your career end disastrously.»

«Then you go back to the German Embassy,» I said, «and tell Wangenheim what I say — to go ahead and have me recalled. If I am to suffer martyrdom, I can think of no better cause in which to be sacrificed. In fact, would welcome it, for I can think of no greater honour than to be recalled because I, a Jew, have been exerting all my powers to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Christians.»

Dr. Nossig hurriedly left my office and I have never seen him since. When next I met Enver I told him that there were rumours that the Ottoman Government was about to ask for my recall. He was very emphatic in denouncing the whole story as a falsehood. «We would not be guilty of making such a ridiculous mistake,» he said. So there was not the slightest doubt that this attempt to intimidate me had been hatched at the German Embassy.

Wangenheim returned to Constantinople in early October. I was shocked at the changes that had taken place in the man. As I wrote in my diary, «he looked the perfect picture of Wotan.» His face was almost constantly twitching; he wore a black cover over his right eye, and he seemed unusually nervous and depressed. He told me that he had obtained little rest; that he had been obliged to spend most of his time in Berlin attending to business. A few days after his return I met him on my way to Haskey; he said that he was going to the American Embassy and together we walked back to it. I had been recently told by Talaat that he intended to deport all the Armenians who were left in Turkey and this statement had induced me to make a final plea to the one man in Constantinople who had the power to end the horrors. I took Wangenheim up to the second floor of the Embassy, where we could be entirely alone and uninterrupted, and there, for more than an hour, sitting together over the tea table, we had our last conversation on this subject.

«Berlin telegraphs me,» he said, «that your Secretary of State tells them that you say that more Armenians than ever have been massacred since Bulgaria has come in on our side.»

«No, I did not cable that,» I replied. «I admit that I have sent a large amount of information to Washington. I have sent copies of every report and every statement to the State Department. They are safely lodged there, and whatever happens to me, the evidence is complete, and the American people are not dependent on my oral report for their information. But this particular statement you make is not quite accurate. I merely informed Mr. Lansing that any influence Bulgaria might exert to stop the massacres has been lost, now that she has become Turkey's ally.»

We again discussed the deportation.

«Germany is not responsible for this,» Wangenheim said.

«You can assert that to the end of time,» I replied «but nobody will believe it. The world will always hold Germany responsible; the guilt of these crimes will be your inheritance forever. I know that you have filed a paper protest. But what does that amount to? You know better than I do that such a protest will have no effect. I do not claim that Germany is responsible for these massacres in the sense that she instigated them. But she is responsible in the sense that she had the power to stop them and did not use it. And it is not only America and your present enemies that will hold you responsible. The German people will some day call your government to account. You are a Christian people and the time will come when Germans will realize that you have let a Mohammedan people destroy another Christian nation. How foolish is your protest that I am sending information to my State Department. Do you suppose that you can keep secret such hellish atrocities as these? Don't get such a silly, ostrich-like thought as that — don't think that by ignoring them yourselves, you can get the rest of the world to do so. Crimes like these cry to heaven. Do you think I could know about things like this and not report them to my government? And don't forget that German missionaries, as well as American, are sending me information about the Armenians.»

«All that you say may be true,» replied the German Ambassador, «but the big problem that confronts us is to win this war. Turkey has settled with her foreign enemies; she has done that at the Dardanelles and at Gallipoli. She is now trying to settle her internal affairs. They still greatly fear that the Capitulations will again be forced upon them. Before they are again put under this restraint, they intend to have their internal problems

in such shape that there will be little chance of any interference from foreign nations. Talaat has told me that he is determined to complete this task before peace is declared. In the future they don't intend that the Russians shall be in a position to say that they have a right to intervene about Armenian matters because there are a large number of Armenians in Russia who are affected by the troubles of their coreligionists in Turkey. Giers used to be doing this all the time and the Turks do not intend that any ambassador from Russia or from any other country shall have such an opportunity in the future. The Armenians anyway are a very poor lot. You come in contact in Constantinople with Armenians of the educated classes, and you get your impressions about them from these men, but all the Armenians are not of that type. Yet I admit that they have been treated terribly. I sent a man to make investigations and he reported that the worst outrages have not been committed by Turkish officials but by brigands.»

Wangenheim again suggested that the Armenians be taken to the United States, and once more I gave him the reasons why this would be impracticable.

«Never mind all these considerations,» I said. «Let us disregard everything — military necessity, state policy, and all else — and let us look upon this simply as a human problem. Remember that most of the people who are being treated in this way are old men, old women, and helpless children. Why can't you, as a human being, see that these people are permitted to live?»

«At the present stage of internal affairs in Turkey,» Wangenheim replied, «I shall not intervene.»

I saw that it was useless to discuss the matter further. He was a man who was devoid of sympathy and human pity, and I turned from him in disgust. Wangenheim rose to leave. As he did so he gave a gasp, and

his legs suddenly shot from under him. I jumped and caught the man just as he was falling. For a minute he seemed utterly dazed; he looked at me in a bewildered way, then suddenly collected himself and regained his poise. I took the Ambassador by the arm, piloted him down stairs, and put him into his auto. By this time he had apparently recovered from his dizzy spell and he reached home safely. Two days afterward, while sitting at his dinner table, he had a stroke of apoplexy; he was carried upstairs to his bed, but he never regained consciousness. On October 24th, I was officially informed that Wangenheim was dead. And thus my last recollection of Wangenheim is that of the Ambassador as he sat in my office in the American Embassy, absolutely refusing to exert any influence to prevent the massacre of a nation. He was the one man, and his government was the one government, that could have stopped these crimes, but, as Wangenheim told me many times, «our one aim is to win this war.»

A few days afterward official Turkey and the diplomatic force paid their last tribute to this perfect embodiment of the Prussian system. The funeral was held in the garden of the German Embassy at Pera. The inclosure was filled with flowers. Practically the whole gathering, excepting the family and the ambassadors and the Sultan's representatives, remained standing during the simple but impressive ceremonies. Then the procession formed; German sailors carried the bier upon their shoulders, other German sailors carried the huge bunches of flowers, and all members of the diplomatic corps and the officials of the Turkish Government followed on foot.

The Grand Vizier led the procession; I walked the whole way with Enver. All the officers of the Goeben and the Breslau, and all the German generals, dressed in full uniform, followed. It seemed as though the whole

of Constantinople lined the streets, and the atmosphere had some of the quality of a holiday. We walked to the grounds of Dolma Bagtche, the Sultan's Palace, passing through the gate which the ambassadors enter when presenting their credentials. At the dock a steam launch lay awaiting our arrival, and in this stood Neurath, the German Conseiller, ready to receive the body of his dead chieftain. The coffin, entirely covered with flowers, was placed in the boat. As the launch sailed out into the stream Neurath, a six-foot Prussian, dressed in his military uniform, his helmet a waving mass of white plumes, stood erect and silent. Wangenheim was buried in the park of the summer embassy at Therapia, by the side of his comrade Colonel Leipzig. No final resting-place would have been more appropriate, for this had been the scene of his diplomatic successes, and it was from this place that, a little more than two years before, he had directed by wireless the **Goeben** and the **Breslau**, and safely brought them into Constantinople, thus making it inevitable that Turkey should join forces with Germany, and paving the way for all the triumphs and all the horrors that have necessarily followed that event.

of Constantinople lined the streets, and the atmosphere had some of the quality of a holiday. We walked to the grounds of Dolma Bagtche, the Sultan's Palace, passing through the gate which the ambassadors enter when presenting their credentials. At the dock a steam launch by awaiting our arrival, and in this stood Neuraith, the German Consul, ready to receive the body of his dead abetain. The coffin, entirely covered with flowers, was placed in the boat. As the launch pulled out into the stream, Neuraith, a six-foot Prussian, dressed in his military uniform, his helmet a waving mass of white plumes, stood erect and silent. Wagnersheim was buried in the park of the summer embassy at Therapia, by the side of his comrade Colonel Leipzig. No final resting-place would have been more appropriate, for this had been the scene of his diplomatic success, and it was from this place that a little more than two years before, he had directed by wireless the Goeben and the Breslau, and safely brought them into Constantinople, thus making it inevitable that Turkey should join forces with Germany, and paving the way for all the tragedies and all the horrors that have necessarily followed that event.

FRIDTJOF NANSEN (1861-1930)

Norwegian explorer, scientist, statesman and humanitarian. Winner of the 1922 Nobel Peace Prize.

High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations.

THE ARMENIANS DURING THE GREAT WAR

On the outbreak of the Great War the Armenians held, at the end of July 1914, a conference in Erzerum, at which they discussed their attitude in case of war, in view of the fact that their country was divided into two portions by the frontier. Then some Young Turkish delegates arrived and, stating that their Government intended to go to war with Russia, endeavoured by golden promises of future autonomy to get the Armenians to rebel against the Russians. But the Armenians refused, expressing themselves strongly against Turkey's participation in the war, though they promised to do their duty if war came.

The Young Turkish leaders were furious, and gradually evolved a plan for exterminating the intractable Armenian «vermin.» A letter, dated February 18, 1915, from a member of the central committee of the Young Turks to Jemal Bey at Adana (Cilicia) — who was the dictator in Syria during the war — and written «by order of a responsible authority,» states that the central committee had «decided to liberate the fatherland from the tyranny of this accursed race, and to bear upon its

patriotic shoulders the disgrace which that step will bring upon Osmanli history. The committee . . . have decided to exterminate all Armenians living in Turkey, without permitting a single soul to escape, and have therefore granted the Government plenary powers. The Government will give to the *valis* and commanders of the army the necessary hints as to the arrangement of the massacres.»

Careful preparations were made for carrying this plan into effect. Force of gendarmes, selected for their anti-Christian bias, were dispatched all over East Anatolia to look for arms in the houses of the Christians; numbers of the more prominent Armenians were arrested, some being examined under torture in order to force them to reveal information about stores of arms and espionage. Bands of all sorts of roughs and hooligans — afterwards notorious as *teetas* — recruited from the prisons and elsewhere, formed under Young Turk leadership. All the Muhammedan men who had not already been called up were organized as militia; and arms were served out to them — but not to the Christians. The Kurds, who had been much annoyed by the efforts of the Young Turks to introduce a regime of law and order which made their usual looting difficult, were appeased by hints that the new Sultan would not protect infidels.

By November 21, 1914, the irreligious Young Turks were able to proclaim a **Jihad**, or holy war, which made it a duty to kill all infidels who refused to embrace the faith of Islam. This step seems to have been taken at the request of the Germans in the hope of raising the Moslems of India and Africa against their Christian rulers, but it had the effect of increasing the Turkish hatred of the Christians in Anatolia. All Christian men between the ages of twenty and forty-three, and afterwards between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight, were gradually called up, although only those under twenty-seven were

legally liable to service. Those who were incapable of work had to act as beasts of burden, and between Much and Erzerum alone three thousand of them are said to have succumbed under the weight of their loads.

Accounts of the Turkish persecution and extermination of the Armenians in Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia during the Great War have now been received from many eyewitnesses — from members of the various American, German, Swiss, and Danish missions and organizations stationed there, and above all from the German consuls and officers in Asia Minor, and the German ambassadors. These accounts and documents have been collected and published by the wellknown German friend of Armenia, Dr. Johannes Lepsius, in his book entitled *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918, Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke*, Potsdam, 1919. The following narrative is largely based upon these documents, which may presumably be regarded as reliable. The German officials would not have wished unnecessarily to blacken their allies the Turks, and they had no reason to represent the Armenians as being better than they really were.

The persecution of the Armenian population concentrated first on **Zeitun** in Cilicia, which had remained comparatively independent and had escaped Abdul Hamid's massacres. Under pretext of trying to capture a robber band in the neighbourhood, which had been joined by several deserters, four thousand men were sent against Zeitun in March 1915, and the whole Armenian population of between ten and twenty thousand people was deported to the marshy country in the vilayet of Konja and to the Arabian desert region of Der es Zor near the Euphrates. In similar fashion the men of the village of Dortjol, on the coast of Cilicia — who had successfully defended themselves during massacres in 1909 — were

deported to Aleppo to do forced labour on the roads, on the pretext that here had been some espionage in the town, which in any case was of trifling importance. The inhabitants of the village of Suedije, which had also escaped in the massacres of 1909, were to have been deported likewise, but made their escape to a cliff on the coast, where they defended themselves for several weeks with feeble weapons (even flint-loks!) against a superior force of Turks until a French warship rescued the whole number — 4,058 men, women, and children. In East Anatolia the Armenians — mostly women and children, because the men had been taken to do military service — were grossly maltreated and expelled, and the distress and misery among these homeless people was terrible.

Then came the so-called «rebellion» in Van, which the Turks have tried to exploit as the best proof of Armenian treachery. The American and German missionaries who went through it all have now furnished authentic accounts of what actually happened. In February 1915 Jevdet Bey, Enver's brother-in-law, who was the *vali* of Van, declared at a meeting of Turks that «We have cleared out the Armenians and Syrians in Azerbaijan, and we must do the same with the Armenians in Van.» On the pretext of making requisitions for the army the Armenians were plundered in the most scandalous fashion, the peasants in the villages being robbed with brutal violence by Kurds and gendarmes. After some disturbances, in which gendarmes were involved, at a village called Shatakh on April 14th, Jevdet Bey induced one of the chief Armenian leaders and three other Armenians, under the cloak of friendship, to go there and pacify the villages; but on the way he had them murdered while they were asleep. At the same time (April 16th) he enticed another Armenian leader to come to him, and had him thrown into prison, and then sent away, and

murdered *en route*. Next day he prepared to attack the Armenian quarters in the town of Van simultaneously with the commencement of massacres in Ardjesh and the villages in the Hayoz-dzor Valley. In order to save their women and children the Armenians fortified themselves in their quarters in Van. The *vali* had ordered them to surrender three thousand men for the army; but they knew only too well what the fate of these men would be, so they answered that it was impossible; they could raise four hundred, and would purchase the exemption of the rest by degrees. But the *vali* refused to agree in this proposal.

On the morning of April 20th some Turkish soldiers tried to rape an Armenian woman, and when some Armenian soldiers came to the rescue the Turks shot them dead. The German missionary, Herr Spôrri, was an eyewitness. Thereupon the shooting began; the Turks shelled the Armenian part of the town, and swept it with rifle-fire. The Armenians defended themselves; they had some rifles, but not much ammunition, and had therefore to use this sparingly, while they encouraged the Turks to expend theirs. They made bullets, and manufactured three thousand cartridges a day, besides gunpowder, and even in the end a couple of mortars. Meanwhile Turkish soldiers and Kurds ravaged the country round, massacring or mutilating men, women, and children, and burning their houses. Some villages were unprepared, others defended themselves as long as they had anything to defend themselves with. Refugees and their wounded flocked to the mission stations in Van, which were soon filled to overflowing.

The siege and bombardment lasted for four weeks, until May 16th; then it suddenly came to an end, and Jevdet Bey and the Turks retired. It turned out that unknown to the Armenians a Russian army was approach-

ing; and its outposts arrived on May 18th quite unaware of what had been happening, as the Armenians had not been in touch with them.

According to the Armenian computation twelve thousand shells were fired at the town, but with very little effect. On the Armenian side there were only eighteen killed, but many wounded. and the Turkish losses were probably about the same. When the Russian army shortly afterwards (July 31st) retired northwards for a time, the whole Armenian population of the Vilayet of Van, numbering nearly 200,000, fled to Russian Armenia.

This attempt of the Armenians to defend themselves against the Turkish attack in Van was promptly misrepresented in a communiqué which was sent by Enver Pasha and the Turkish Government to Berlin, and thence spread all over the world, as an attack by bands of Armenian insurrectionists who, in the rear of the Turkish army, had fallen upon the Muhammedan population. Out of 180,000 Moslems in the Vilayet of Van only 30,000 had succeeded in escaping! In a later report issued by the Turkish embassy in Berlin on October 1, 1915, the story was further embellished: «No fewer than 180,000 Moslems had been killed. It was not surprising that the Moslems had taken vengeance for this.» Some eighteen Turks, answering to the number of Armenians they had killed in Van, had turned into 180,000! This astonishingly impudent lie has a kind of foundation. According to statistics there should be 180,000 Moslems, including 30,000 Turks and 150,000 Kurds, in the Vilayet of Van. The Turks fled westwards when the Russian army advanced, while the 150,000 Kurds remained where they were, and were molested neither by the Russians nor the Armenians.

The whole episode is a typical example of the way the Turks treated the Armenians and tried to pretend

that the Armenians were rebels and traitors. The other «proofs» of Armenian guilt produced by the Young Turkish Government in order to justify themselves are of the same kind. The reports of Germany's consuls in Asia Minor and ambassadors in Constantinople show quite clearly that there is no proof whatever of Armenian treachery, or that they had any insurrectionist plans. The latter would in any case have been out of the question, for they had no arms, and most of the men had been taken away to serve in the army.

A few days after the Armenians in Van had dared to defend themselves against the Turkish onslaught, Tala'at Bey, the Minister for the Interior, suddenly had all the chief Armenians in Constantinople arrested on the night before April 25th. Deputies, teachers, writers, doctors, lawyers, editors, and priests were seized; on the following night more arrests were made, and altogether nearly six hundred people were deported to Asia Minor without inquiry or trial. Tala'at declared it was merely a temporary measure of precaution — some of them might be dangerous — and promised that most of them should speedily be released. Only eight of them returned after suffering great hardships; the remainder disappeared. Thus all who were capable of pleading the Armenians' cause were conveniently put out of the way.

Then the Turks had what they considered the splendid idea of carrying out the whole plan of extermination as a «necessary military measure.» They would have deportations of all unreliable elements from the neighbourhood of the front, on the lines of the German deportations in Belgium and France. Enver Pasha expounded to Baron Wangenheim, the German ambassador in Constantinople, his plan for carrying out these necessary deportations «of all not absolutely trustworthy families from the rebellious Armenian centres.» The ambassador

sent a telegram on May 31, 1915, to Berlin, reporting the project, and saying that Enver «earnestly begs us not to prevent him. . . . These measures will certainly involve great hardship for the Armenian population. I am, however, of the opinion that we can alleviate them in practice though we cannot prevent them in principle. . . .» He still believed in the Turkish accounts of the treacherous Armenian agitation, supported by Russia, which «threatened the existence» of Turkey. It was not until a latter date that he, too, discovered that these accusations were baseless.

Then in June 1915, the horrors began to which we know no parallel in history. From all the villages and towns of Cilicia, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia the Armenian Christians were driven forth on their death march; the work was done systematically, clearing out one district after another, whether the population happened to be near the scene of war or hundreds of kilometres away from it. There was to be a clean sweep of all Armenians. As the majority of men had already been taken for war work, it was chiefly a matter of turning women, children, and the aged and crippled out of house and home. They were only given a few days' or hours' notice. They had to leave behind all their property: houses, fields, crops, cattle, furniture, tools, and implements. Everything was confiscated by the Turkish authorities. The things they managed to carry with them, such as money, jewellery, or other valuables, and even clothes, were subsequently taken away from them by the gendarmes; and if any of them had been allowed to take their wagons and draught animals, the gendarmes appropriated them on the way. The poor creatures were rounded up from the different villages and driven in long columns across the mountains to the Arabian desert plains, where no provision had been made for the reception and mainte-

nance of these herds of starving wretches, just as nothing had been done to keep them alive on the march. The idea was that those who did not succumb or get killed on the way should at any rate die of starvation.

As soon as the columns had fairly started, the callous indifference of the guards turned into vicious brutality. The few men and elder lads were assembled, taken aside and killed. The women, children, and old people were driven, on suffering agonies of hunger and thirst; the food, if there were any, was scanty and bad; those who could not keep up were flogged on till they collapsed, or were killed. Gradually columns became smaller and smaller, as hunger, thirst, disease, and murder did their work. Young women and girls were raped or sold by auction in places where the Moslem population had assembled; 20 piastres (3s.) was paid for a girl who had not been violated, 5 piastres (9d.) for one who had been violated or for a widow, and children went for practically nothing. Often bands of teetas and Kurds swooped down upon the columns, robbing, maltreating, murdering, and violating the women.

A foreign witness has said that these deportation columns were merely «a polite form of massacre»; but in reality they were infinitely worse and more heartless; for instead of instant death they forced the victims to undergo all sorts of inhuman sufferings, while this cowardly and barbarous plan was to save the face of the authorities by posing as «a necessary military measure»! From June till August 1915, the hottest time of year, when the victims were most likely to succumb, these processions of death wended their way endlessly from all the vilayets and towns where there were Armenians, southwards in the direction of the desert. Strange to say, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo were spared — or practically so — no doubt because there

were too many Europeans to see what was going on, and because the proceedings in Smyrna were stopped by German officers.

As an insistance of what these marches meant I may mention on the authority of a German eyewitness that out of 18,000 expelled from Kharput and Sivas, only 350 reached Aleppo, and that out of 19,000 from Erzerum there were eleven survivors.

According to the estimates of Dr. Lepsius, an average of more than two-thirds of the people in these doomed processions succumbed and disappeared on the way; of the survivors — emaciated, almost naked skeletons — who managed to struggle on to Syria and Mesopotamia, the majority were driven out into the desert, there to die in fearful agonies. The columns marched on for months, and even at the end of their death march they were not left in peace, but were driven round in circles for weeks. The concentration camps were filled and emptied again while the cold-blooded taskmasters allowed their unhappy victims to die of starvation and disease, or massacred them by the thousand. Typhus raged among them. The corpses by the roadside poisoned the atmosphere.

In several the *valis* and the Turkish authorities considered it unnecessary to resort to the subterfuge of these deportations and had the Armenians massacred without further ado, as, for instance, in Nisibin (July 1st), Bitlis (July 1st), Musch (July 10th), Malatia (July 15th), Urfa (August 19th and October 16th), Jesire (September 2nd), Diarbekr, Midiat, etc. This was at least more merciful than the unspeakable sufferings entailed by the other method. On June 10, 1915, the German consul at Mosul telegraphed that 614 Armenian men, women, and children, sent down the Tigris by raft from Diarbekr, had been butchered: only empty rafts had arrived at Mosul, the river was full of corpses and human limbs, and several

other transports of the same kind were on the way. On the 18th of June the German consul at Erzerum reported massacres near the garrison town of Erzinjan: Government troops of the 86th cavalry brigade, aided by their officers and some Kurds, had butchered between 20,000 and 25,000 deported women and children in the Kemakh gorge. In the town of Bitlis most of the Armenians were massacred: 900 women and children were carried off and drowned in the Tigris. And so it went on — a never-ending tale of the most disgusting cruelties. In some cases the Christians were burnt in their houses. The Armenian soldiers who had fought so bravely in the Turkish army that even Enver Pasha had to compliment them publicly on their bravery and loyalty were afterwards disarmed, set to hard labour behind the front, and ultimately shot by their comrades and by command of their own officers.

As soon as the German consular reports showed what the «deportations» really meant, the German ambassadors handed the Sublime Porte a series of vigorous notes of protest, but without result. The Turkish leaders partly denied the facts, and partly gave it pretty clearly to be understood that they did not consider their allies competent to instruct them in humanity. Tala'at Bey cynically remarked to Count Metternich, the German ambassador, on December 18, 1915, that he was sure that the Germans would have done the same thing in the like circumstances. For rest, the Porte deprecated German interference in their domestic concerns. The German Government's efforts to put a stop to the atrocities came to nothing. But although the German ambassadors and consuls could do little or nothing in that respect, their reports furnish a pitiless exposure of the misdeeds of their ally. The long list of ghastly documents and the unparalleled inhumanity of the atrocities committed make

it perfectly clear that the whole thing was carried out in accordance with a plan carefully laid by the Young Turkish leaders and their committee. The cowardly fashion in which the Turks subsequently denied that there had been any atrocities, and that everything had been done intentionally and according to plan, does not make their case any better.

The German ambassador, Baron Wangenheim, wrote to Berlin on June 17, 1915, that «Tala'at Bey has . . . openly stated that the Porte wished to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the war to make a clean sweep of their enemies at home without being troubled by foreign diplomatic intervention.» And on July 7, 1915, he writes again that the fact of the deportations also taking place in provinces which are not in danger of a hostile invasion, and the way in which they are being carried out, «show that the Government is really aiming at the extermination of the Armenian race in the Ottoman Empire.» On July 10, 1916, Count Metternich telegraphed to Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Cancellor, that the Turkish Government had refused to be deterred by the German representations «from carrying out their programme of solving the Armenian problem by exterminating the Armenian race.»

A telegram in cipher sent on September 15, 1915, runs as follows:

To the Police Office at Aleppo.

It has already been reported that by the order of the Committee the Government have determined completely to exterminate the Armenians living in Turkey. Those who refuse to obey this order cannot be regarded as friends of the Government. Regardless of women, children, or invalids, and however deplorable the methods

of destruction may seem, an end is to be put to their existence without paying any heed to feeling or conscience.

Minister for Interior.

TALA'AT.

By order of the same minister only the Armenian children under five years of age were to be spared. They could be brought up as good Turks.

On August, 31, 1915, Tala'at Bey declared to the German ambassadors that «La question arménienne n'existe plus.» His statement was fairly correct, inasmuch as nearly all the deportations had by then been carried out. Little remained but to see that any survivors of the death marches were wiped out, too. As we have seen, no attempt was made to receive or feed them; they were merely collected in concentration camps on the edge of the Arabian desert, practically without food and without any chance of earning a living.

In January 1916 between five and six thousand Armenians from Aintab were sent «into the wilderness»; and in April 14,000 deportees were massacred in the camp at Ras ul Ain. By order of the **Kaimakan**, companies numbering 300-500 were conducted every day by bands of Circassians to the river, ten kilometres away, and there killed, their corpses being thrown into the water.

At Meskne on the Euphrates, east of Aleppo, where the Armenians were starved to death in one of the great concentration camps, 55,000 people, according to Turkish figures, lie buried. It is estimated that during 1915 60,000 deportees were sent to Der es Zor on the Euphrates; and the majority of them disappeared. On April 15, 1916, 19,000 were sent in four batches to Mosul, three hundred kilometres across the desert; but only 2,500 arrived on May 22nd. Some of the women and girls had been sold

to Bedouins on the way; the rest had died of hunger and thirst. In July 1916 20,000 were deported to Der es Zor; eight weeks later, according to the testimony of a German officer, only a few artisans were left. The rest had disappeared — they had been sent off in batches of two or three hundred at a time to be killed by Circassian bands. But death by starvation was still worse; and an eyewitness has related that 1,029 Armenians died of it during two and a half days that he spent at Bab.

There are descriptions by eyewitnesses of the scenes among these starving and dying people which are so full of heart-rending horror that they read like a nightmare. Miserable shadows of what had once been human beings — often men and women of high culture — would eat anything they could lay hands on, while the gendarmes sat indifferently gazing at their sufferings, keeping watch over them until they dropped dead. It was a hell. And the Turkish authorities did everything in their power to prevent any relief from being sent, even by Germany, to these unfortunate creatures. When Dr. Lepsius applied to Enver Pasha in Constantinople, as early as August 1915, for permission to bring relief to the suffering «deportees,» the latter answered that the Turks would relieve them; if the Germans wished to help they could send gifts and money to the Turkish Government, which would see that they were delivered to the right address. What the «right address» meant, it is not difficult to guess. As for the Americans who brought relief, they were simply refused permission to land.

The Armenians who were still left were given the choice of conversion to Islam or death, and all Armenians in military service would have to be circumcised. Furthermore, all Armenians would have to adopt Turkish names. Many became Muhammedans and agreed to be circumcised; and the authorities made a point of getting

hold of as many children as possible. The Turkish programme was to stamp out the Christian religion and replace all Christian names by Muhammedan names throughout Asia Minor from the Black Sea to Syria.

Enemies of the Armenians pretend to regard it as a proof of degenerate feebleness that such large numbers of people allowed themselves, without resistance, to be massacred or driven away to certain death; though this argument is directly contradictory to the trumped-up Turkish accusation that their victims were dangerous rebels. As most of the able-bodied men had already been taken for war service, and the entire Armenian population had been systematically disarmed, it was not such an easy matter for them to offer resistance to well-armed gendarmes, soldiery, and «volunteers.» None the less, the Armenians defended themselves bravely and with a certain amount of success in some cases where there was an opportunity, as for instance in Van, and in the mountains near Suedije in Cilicia, where some of them were armed with old flint-locks. In Urfa the Armenians perished after a gallant but hopeless struggle. For the rest, a people who could fight for what they believed to be a righteous cause with such reckless valour as the thousands of Armenian volunteers on the Caucasian and Syrian fronts can safely ignore all accusations of cowardice.

When the frightful events in Anatolia came to the knowledge of the peoples of Europe towards the end of the summer of 1915, the story raised a perfect storm of indignation — even amid all the horrors of the Great War — against the Turks, and against Germany, which was blamed for allowing such things to happen. It found vent in strong words and solemn promises that, when the cause of justice and liberty was won, the Armenians should receive full compensation in the form of their independence and freedom, provided they joined the En-

tente and sent their able-bodied men to fight. From all parts of the world came a steady stream of Armenian volunteers. Armenian legions were formed in the Syrian army — and on this basis an independent State of Armenia was to be secured. On the Russian front in the Caucasus young Armenians, inflamed with fierce zeal by the Turkish atrocities, flocked to the colours. In addition to 150,000 Armenians in the Russian regular army, companies of Armenian volunteers were formed which fought magnificently under their own leaders, notably the heroic Andranik. After the massacres in Anatolia there were many Armenians from Turkey among the volunteers, and the Turks had the audacity to call these companies traitors and rebels because they fought against the executioners of their fellow-countrymen! Upwards of 200,000 Armenian volunteers gave their lives for the cause of the Allies.

Meanwhile the war dragged on. When the Russian army advanced and took in succession Van, Bitlis, and Mush, then Erzerum and Erzinjan in Junary 1916, and Trebizond two months later, it was the turn of the Turkish population to flee, lest the Armenians should take vengeance for past massacres. In a wild panic of fear the Turks streamed westward in the cold of winter, many of them dying after incredible sufferings and privations in the pathless mountain country. In some places, no doubt, the Armenian volunteer companies avenged their countrymen by killing Muhammedans; but certainly not to any extent that can be compared with the Turkish massacres. Thousands of Armenian fugitives now returned to their homes from the mountains where they had been hiding, from the Russian side of the frontier, and even from Mesopotamia. Without delay they set about rebuilding their devastated villages and farms.

Then came the Russian revolution of March 1917. I may add here a few details regarding Armenia. At the beginning

of 1918 the Turks advanced again to attack Turkish Armenia. The Armenian troops, abandoned by the Russians, resisted desperately, while the Georgians retired, unwilling to fight save for their own country. On March 11, 1918, the Turks took Erzerum, and after occupying the rest of Turkish Armenia advanced against Kars. Then the Transcaucasian Republic declared its independence — i.e. of Russia (April 22, 1918) — and agreed at last to accept the conditions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which handed over the Kars region to Turkey. On April 27th the Turks occupied Kars and looted it. New peace negotiations were begun at Batum on May 11, 1918; and the Turks now refused to keep the conditions they had accepted at the peace of Brest-Litovsk, demanding much larger concessions. They attacked Alexandropol and captured it on May 15, 1918. Wherever they advanced there were fresh massacres of Armenians and fresh horrors, notwithstanding the strongest protests from the German Government and the Supreme Command, which peremptorily demanded that the Turks should adhere to the peace conditions already accepted, and retire to the frontiers defined in them. But the Turks pushed on, looting and massacring as they went. The atrocities became steadily worse, the sufferings and starvation of the Armenians were indescribable, and the country was overrun by several hundred thousand refugees. All the corn was carried off or destroyed, all Armenian property wrecked, all movables taken away. Clearly the Turkish leaders intended to exterminate the Armenians in Russian Armenia as well.

Following the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Republic (May 26, 1918), Armenia proclaimed itself an independant republic. After the Tatars of Azerbaijan joined Turkey, the Armenians, who till then had borne the brunt of the defence, stood quite alone, and were obliged to

make peace with Turks on June 4, 1918. They were allowed to keep the Novo-Bajazet region and part of the districts of Alexandropol, Echmiadzin, and Erivan (9,000 square kilometres, with population of 350,000, but in spite of the peace the Turks went on pillaging the country.

Aided by the Tatars of Azerbaijan they next attacked Baku, and took it on September 15, 1918. Nuri Pasha, the general in command and a younger brother of Enver Pasha, allowed the Tatars to sack the town for three days and massacre the Christians, who were chiefly Armenians. While the streets re-echoed to the shooting and the screams of the victims, Nuri Pasha held a review outside the town, and then sat down with his officers to a banquet in the Hôtel Métropole. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Armenians were massacred in Baku during the three days. This was done as a reprisal because the Armenians and Russian Bolsheviks had killed several hundred Tatars during the short time they were in power in Baku, and that in turn was a reprisal because the Tatar militia, after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Republic (May 26, 1918), had looted the Armenian villages near Erivan.

Then came the collapse of Germany and Turkey; and after the armistice on October 30, 1918, the Turks had to retire behind the frontiers they had held before the war. The Armenians were able to return to Alexandropol, Kars, Ardahan, and Ardanuch. But in order to secure to them the independent country and freedom from the Turkish yoke that the Allies had so often promised, the Allied forces would have had to occupy Turkish Armenia. This, however, was too much trouble for the Governments; there were no oil-wells in Anatolia. Accordingly the Turks got the upper hand in the country, which meant that the cause of the Armenians was lost. Soon a new and serious peril arose owing to the Turkish national re-

vival under Mustapha Kemal's leadership, with its point of departure in Turkish Armenia itself. But this is not the place to explain how «rotten» Turkey, which the Allies in the flush of victory regarded as utterly paralysed, was able to regain sufficient strength to defy the victors, and once more to become a belligerent Power with which they had to negotiate.

Meanwhile the Armenians in Erivan, with their usual indefatigable energy, began restoring their sorely devastated country, crowded with homeless refugees. Under an enterprising Government, presided over by the Armenian doctor Khatissian, formerly mayor of Tiflis, they worked with great vigour, reintroducing order, cultivating the land, settling refugees, and restarting various industries. The Government obtained a loan of 20 million dollars, and received other help from abroad, especially from the American Near East Relief organization, which, under the direction of Mr. Vickrey, has saved the lives of thousands of Armenian children.

On the 28th of May 1919 the Government of Erivan proclaimed the independence and unity of the Armenian lands in what had been Russian Transcaucasia and in the Ottoman empire, declaring itself to be the Government of this united Armenian republic. But in July and August of the same year Turkish nationalist conferences called by Mustapha Kemal at Erzerum and Sivas declared that «not an inch of the land in our vilayets» should be given to «Armenia or any other State.»

During this time the peace negotiations in Paris were slowly dragging on. A pan-Armenian conference of Armenians from all countries met in Paris under the joint presidency of Avetis Aharonian, the poet and popular leader, and of Boghos Nubar Pasha, the indefatigable and self-sacrificing spokesman of the Armenians in the Entente countries throughout the war. An address to the

Peace Conference, signed on February 12, 1919, by these two presidents, formulated the grounds for claiming the independent State that the Allies had pledged themselves to give to the Armenian people. On January 19, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference decided to recognize *de facto* the Government of the Armenian State, and proposed that the League of Nations should protect this independent State as a Mandate. The Council of the League answered on April 11, 1920, that it had not the necessary means (e.g. military and financial) for undertaking such a duty, which moreover, was not in accordance with the purposes for which it existed. The proper way to safeguard the future of the Armenian nation was to find a Power which would accept the Mandate under the control and with the moral support of the League. On April 25, 1920, the Supreme Council, through President Wilson, requested the United States to take over the Mandate for Armenia. On May 31, 1920, the Senate of the United States refused the Mandate; but President Wilson undertook to arbitrate on the question of Armenia's frontiers. Subsequent applications to order Powers requesting them to accept the Mandate were equally fruitless.

The Treaty of Sèvres between Turkey and the Allies, which was signed on August 10, 1920, with the President of Armenia as one of the signatories, recognized Armenia (*de jure*) as a free, independent, and sovereign State; and left to the arbitrament of the President of the United States the definition of the frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. The Powers would «approve his decision and likewise all dispositions that he might recommend with regard to Armenia's access to the sea and the disarmament of the whole Ottoman territory adjoining the frontier in question,» etc., etc. This sounds nothing short of ludicrous

when we remember that they had not disarmed even the territories which were to belong to the Armenians. About three months later President Wilson defined the frontiers (made public November 22, 1920), and Armenia received an area on the map embracing about 127,000 square kilometres. This was a good deal less than what had originally been contemplated; but it would have been sufficient for the Armenians. Unfortunately, however, the Turco-Armenian territories in question were still in Turkish occupation. The Allies did not explain how the Armenians were to get them; nor did they take any steps whatsoever to carry out the new obligations they had undertaken, and secure to the Armenians the area they had given them on paper. The whole transaction strikes one as a sorry farce — as if the statesmen of the Great Powers took it for granted that obligations undertaken in respect of a small people, with no natural sources of wealth, are of no importance if they prove inconvenient. Encouraged by their strange indifference, Mustapha Kemal refused to be bound by the treaty, although the legal Government of Turkey had signed it; and he attacked the Armenians instead. The Powers took no notice; they had allowed the Armenians to shed their blood in the Allied cause, and had rewarded them with a worthless document.

With the collapse of Denikin's «volunteer army» at the beginning of 1920, the position in Transcaucasia was entirely changed. On April 27, 1920, the Bolsheviks took Baku. When the British troops were withdrawn from Batum on July 6, 1920, Georgia and Armenia were left entirely to their own resources in their struggle for independence. In September of the same year the Turks advanced again from the west. The Armenians lacked ammunition, provisions, uniforms; and no one helped them. The Georgians had their hands full, and the Allied

Powers, as usual, did nothing. Kars was taken almost without a shot being fired, and once more there were ghastly massacres; Alexandropol was also taken, the country was pillaged, and the people massacred. Erivan escaped the same fate at the last moment by forming a soviet and accepting an alliance with the Government at Moscow, while the Government under Khatissian fled to the mountains.

On December 2, 1920, the treaty of peace between the Governments in Erivan and Angora was signed at Alexandropol, and the territory of the Armenian republic was reduced from 60,000 square kilometres to less than half that size, while at the same time it had been overrun by fresh hosts of refugees. This happened a few days after the President of the United States had with great solemnity defined the frontiers of the independent Armenian State; while just at the same time the League of Nations, in session at Geneva, was discussing the possibility of admitting that State to the League, and strong opinions were being expressed in favour of helping the hard-pressed Armenians in their unequal struggle against Mustapha Kemal and the Turks. But it came to nothing, except that two members of the League — Spain and Brazil — and President Wilson stated that they were willing to intervene in favour of Armenia in its struggle with Turkey. By an irony of fate this offer was communicated to the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva on the day the peace of Alexandropol was signed.

The new Bolshevik administration at Erivan under the Communist Kassian did not work well, and after a few months he was expelled and the old Government recalled. But in April 1921 the Red forces entered Erivan. A new Government, with an Armenian named Miasnikian at its head, was formed, and they acted with wise moderation; a general amnesty was proclaimed, and the educated

classes were summoned to participate in the sorely needed work of regenerating the country. The distress was naturally great in a land devastated by constant wars and crowded with refugees; in the autumn it developed into a regular famine; hundreds perished, and the streets of towns like Alexandropol and Erivan were littered with corpses. But energetic measures were taken, and it is really incredible to see how much has been done in a few years with extremely limited means. Chaos, misery, and famine have been replaced by order, and even a certain degree of prosperity; and the nation is going ahead steadily, taking in hand many new and important undertakings under the direction of its capable Government.

A conference held at Kars in October-November 1921 settled the points at issue between the Angora Government and the Armenian Bolshevik Government, and Turkey was allowed to retain Kars and Ardahan. By decree of the Soviet Government in Moscow a federation of the three soviet republics of Transcaucasia — Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan — was formed. This federation is affiliated to the great Russian Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the seat of government in Moscow.

This was the only solution which could save the peoples concerned from destruction. But, strange to say, the nations who failed to perform their obligations, who forgot all their promises, and did nothing to help the hard-pressed Armenians while there was still time to do so, have blamed them for accepting a soviet form of government in order to save their country and its people. This accusation is used as an excuse for doing nothing more; for these nations have lost interest in the Armenian people, as they lost interest in their own promises.

As time went on, many Armenians who had survived the deportations and massacres returned to the Armenian territories in Anatolia. With the encouragement of the

Allies, 200,000 refugees had also come back to their former homes in Cilicia, where they were protected by French troops. But in February 1920 they were attacked by Kemal Pasha, and 30,000 Armenians were massacred at Hadjin and Marash. Then, when the French made an agreement in October 1921 to evacuate Cilicia — notwithstanding the previous promises of the Powers to protect the Armenians there — nothing could induce the population to remain, and there were mass emigrations to Syria and other countries.

Then came the last grim act in the sombre tragedy of the Armenians. In the autumn of 1922 the Turks, under Mustapha Kemal, drove the Greeks out of Asia Minor. Once more thousands and thousands of Armenians were driven out of the country like pariahs, and fresh scenes of cruelty were enacted. Stripped of everything, the fugitives arrived in Greece, Bulgaria, Constantinople, and Syria; while great numbers fled again to Russian Armenia. All the real property and movables that they had to leave behind has been appropriated by the Turks and their rulers!

The number of Armenians that the Young Turks managed to exterminate in the persecution of 1915 and 1916 cannot be ascertained with complete certainty. Starting from the statistics before the war, which showed that there were then 1,845,450 Armenians in Turkey, Dr. Lepsius came to the conclusion in 1919 that about one million of these had been killed or had died during the interval as 845,000 were still alive. Of these latter, about 200,000 were living in their homes in Turkey, about 200,000 had fled to Transcaucasia, and about 200,000 were supposed to be still surviving as famine-stricken beggars in the concentration camps of Syria and Mesopotamia. According to this computation the Turks exterminated,

during the years in question, more than one-third of the whole Armenian people.

Not content with driving out and destroying endless hosts of despairing people, the Turkish authorities took all the property of the Armenians in Anatolia, valued at hundreds of millions of pounds. Their inhumanity was due to no religious fanaticism in the leaders or in the Turkish people. The Young Turks were indifferent to religion, and to give the Turkish-speaking population their due, they were not as ready to begin looting and massacring as the authorities wished; in some places they even resisted the deportation of the Armenians, and some Turkish officials refused to obey orders and tried to save the Armenian population. But the authorities soon overcame such difficulties, and too compassionate officials were either removed or murdered. The whole plan of extermination was nothing more nor less than a cold-blooded, calculated political measure, having for its object the annihilation of a superior element in the population which might prove troublesome. And to this must be added the motive of greed.

These were atrocities which far exceed any we know in history, both in their extent and their appalling cruelty. It could hardly be otherwise when a nation, whose public morality was that of the Middle Ages, became possessed of modern appliances and methods. The letter previously mentioned shows that the committee which issued the orders was ready to accept responsibility for «the disgrace which that step will bring upon Osmanli history» for exterminating a people who were Turkish subjects (!!). Enver Pasha declared, in response to the representations of the German ambassador, that he accepted responsibility for everything that happened in Anatolia. He and the other leaders must bear the whole blame for having added to the bloodstained history of Turkey a

chapter so frightful that it puts all the rest into the shade. Abdul Hamid's massacres were trifles compared to the deeds of these «modern» Turks.

On June 30, 1916, Count Metternich, the German ambassador, writes to the Imperial Chancellor that «the committee demands the destruction of the last remnant of the Armenians. . . .» When nothing is left to take from them, «the hounds are already waiting impatiently for the moment when Greece, egged on by the Entente, will turn against the Turks or their allies,» so that they may fall upon the Greeks and their property. «To Turkify (*türkisieren*) is to expel or kill all that is not Turkish, to destroy and misappropriate by violence other people's property. In this, and the blatant repetition of French phrases about liberty, consists at present the famous renaissance of Turkey. . . .» Such is the verdict of a friendly ally. To complete picture, it should be borne in mind that the Armenians, whom the Young Turks exterminated in such a revolting manner, were their old friends and allies, whom they had made use of and cooperated with as long as they were struggling for power. And now they even murdered prominent Armenians who, at the risk of their own lives, had saved the Young Turkish leaders when Abdul Hamid regained his power in 1909 and massacred the Young Turks. Fortunately history does not offer many examples of such treacherous and unmitigated baseness.

But the Young Turks have done what they set out to do; they have wiped out the Armenian population of Anatolia, and can say with Tala'at Pasha that the Armenian question *n'existe plus*. No European or American Government or statesman troubles now about what has happened; to them the everlasting Armenian problem seems finally and definitely obliterated in blood.

We have seen that the Western Powers of Europe

and the United States of America have given words, and nothing else, by way of fulfilling the promises to the Armenian people which they made with such solemnity when they needed support in the war. And what of the **League of Nations**? Even its **first Assembly** in 1920 resolved unanimously that something must be done by the Powers «to put a stop to the terrible Armenian tragedy as soon as possible,» and to safeguard the future of the Armenian nation. At the **second Assembly** in September 1921 Lord Robert Cecil's draft resolution was unanimously adopted, emphasizing the desirability that the Supreme Council of the Powers should «safeguard the future of Armenia, and especially to give the Armenians a national home (**foyer national**), completely independent of Ottoman rule.» The **third Assembly** in September 1922 again passed a unanimous resolution declaring that «in the peace negotiations with Turkey the necessity of founding a national home for the Armenians must not be left out of sight. The Assembly requested the Council to take whatever measures it deemed necessary for this purpose.»

Then came the peace negotiations at Lausanne from November 1922 to June 1923. The representatives of the Powers at once departed from the provisions about Armenia in the Treaty of Sèvres; but on their behalf Lord Curzon demanded an independent national home or country for the Armenians, and characterized the Armenian question as «one of the great scandals of the world.» This proposal was categorically rejected by the Turks. After passing through various stages the demand was whittled away till it merely suggested a home for the Armenians «in Turkey,» which would not even have an autonomous Government, and would practically be an area «under Turkish law and administration, where the Armenians could be assembled and preserve their race, language, and culture.» But even this was rejected

by the Turkish negotiators; whereupon the representatives of the Powers considered that they had done enough for a people which had shed its blood for them. When the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed on July 24, 1923, it did not contain a word about a home for the Armenians. In fact, this treaty was made «just as though they had never existed,» as their protest against it very justly observes.

Thus ended the feeble efforts of the West-European and American Powers to honour the promises of freedom and independence they had given to the Armenians when they wished to induce them to fight for their cause.

Why does the League of Nations set up committees to see whether anything can be done, at least for the homeless Armenian refugees? Is it meant as a salve for tender consciences, if any such still remain? But what is the good of it, when the proposals, made after conscientious inquiry and recommended by all the experts, cannot secure the support of the Governments of the Powers; and when the Powers coldly refuse to make even the most modest sacrifice to relieve the destitute refugees for whom they have promised to do so much? The usual answer is that it is unreasonable to expect people to make sacrifices for others in these difficult times, when it is all they can do to look after their own affairs. But ought not the Powers to have thought of that before, when by their golden promises and pledges of honour they induced these unfortunate people, who were far worse off than they were, to sacrifice not only their money and goods, but even their lives for the cause of the Entente?

Mr. Stanley Baldwin, the leader of the British Conservative Party and present Prime Minister, and Mr. Asquith, the leader of the Liberal Party, sent in September 1924 to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the then head of

the Government, a warmhearted address urging that Great Britain ought to give a large sum to help the Armenian refugees in Greece, the Balkans, etc.. The reasons why this should be done were summarized in the following points:

«1. Because the Armenians were encouraged by promises of freedom to support Allied cause during the war, and suffered for this cause so tragically.

It is recalled that as far back as the autumn of 1914 the Armenians at their National Congress in Erzerum rejected the alluring offers of the Turks, and refused as a nation to work for the cause of Turkey and her Allies, though they were willing to do their duty; that partly because of this courageous refusal they were systematically massacred by the Turkish Government in 1915; that organized volunteer forces, and, under their heroic leader Andranik, bore the brunt of some of the heaviest fighting in the Caucasian campaigns; that the Armenians, after the breakdown of the Russian Army in 1917, took over the Caucasian front and delayed the Turkish advance for five months, thus rendering an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia; that Lord Bryce's Blue book, entitled **Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire**, was widely used for Allied propaganda in 1916-1917, and had an important influence upon American opinion and upon President Wilson's ultimate decision to enter the war.

2. Because during the war and since the Armistice, the statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers have given repeated pledges to secure the liberation and independence of the Armenian nation.

These obligations were undertaken on November 9, 1916, by Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister; on January 5,

1918, by Mr. Lloyd George; on January 8, 1918, by President Wilson; on July 23, 1918, by M. Clemenceau; on March 11, 1920, by the Marquis of Curzon as Foreign Secretary, etc.

3. Because in part Great Britain is responsible for the final dispersion of the Ottoman Armenians after the sack of Smyrna in 1922.

The Greek war against Turkey, which led to the final destruction and expulsion of the Christian minorities in Asia Minor, was initiated and protracted under the direct encouragement of the British Government.

4. Because the £5,000,000 (Turkish gold) deposited by the Turkish Government in Berlin, 1916, and taken over by the Allies after the Armistice, was in large part (perhaps wholly) Armenian money.

5. Because the present conditions of the refugees are unstable and demoralizing; and constitute a reproach to the Western Powers . . .

The document goes on to ask, «What can be done?»

We recognize with deep regret that it is impossible now to fulfil our pledges to the Armenians. . . . But there is open to us another method of expressing our sense of responsibility and of relieving the desperate plight of the scattered remnants of the Turkish Armenians. The most appropriate territory for their settlement would surely be in Russian Armenia. Facilities are offered by the local Government. . . »

Here follows an account of the plan which was then under consideration, but which had not been so completely worked out as the present project, and was more difficult to put into practice. In conclusion the address says:

«It is in our opinion the duty of Great Britain to

give substantial support to this scheme. We desire to express our view that, as some compensation for unfulfilled pledges is morally due to the Armenians, the British Government should forthwith make an important grant....

(Signed) H. H. ASQUITH.

STANLEY BALDWIN.>

One should think that this concise and challenging appeal by two of the leading statesmen of Great Britain could not be ignored; no doubt Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the Labour Party would gladly have done what was asked. But he was shortly afterwards defeated, and the Conservative Party, led by Mr. Baldwin, came into power. Surely the time had come at last! But Mr. Baldwin's Government refused to do anything whatsoever for the Armenian nation, or for the refugees to whom some compensation was «morally due.»

In despair one can only ask what it all meant. Was it, in reality, nothing but a gesture — mere empty words with no serious intention behind them?

And the League of Nations — has it no feeling of responsibility either? By compelling its High Commissioner for Refugees, in spite of his repeated refusals, to take up the cause of the Armenian refugees, the League has almost certainly prevented others from organizing effective measures to help the Armenians; for it was assumed that the League of Nations would not espouse a cause of this nature without being able to deal with it satisfactorily, especially after all the pledges given by the Powers. Does the League consider that it has now done its duty, and does it imagine that it can let the


matter drop without undermining the prestige of the League, especially in the East?

The nations of Europe and the statesmen of Europe are tired of the everlasting Armenian question. Of course. It has only brought them one defeat after another, the very mention of it recalling to their slumbering consciences a grim tale of broken or unfulfilled promises which they have never in practice done anything to keep. And after all, it was only a massacred, but gifted little nation, with no oil-fields or gold-mines.

Woe to the Armenians, that they were ever drawn into European politics! It would have been better for them if the name of Armenia had never been uttered by any European diplomatist.

But the Armenian people have never abandoned hope; they have gone on bravely working, and waiting... waiting year after year.

They are waiting still.



BIBLIOGRAPHY (*)

- Adonts A., *Arménians et Grecs dans Les montagnes de Cilicie*, Paris, 1910.
- Abram Jann, *Arménie*, Paris, 1917.
- Les Alpes et l'Arménie, ouvrage de A. Méral, G. Marville, E. de Goussier, illustré par Charles Maillard. Pour l'Arménie par Albert Thomas, Paris, 1918.
- Andréon Aram, *Documents officiels relatifs aux négociations arméniennes*. Trad. de l'arménien arménien, avec l'illustration de l'éditeur par M.A. Derjandj, Paris, 1920.
- Arménien d'Israël, *Chronique de l'empire ottoman quatre mille ans*, Paris, 1919.
- Arménie, *Langues et dialectes des Arméniens en Arménie*, Leipzig, 1877.
- Armenian Study, *Les montagnes d'Arménie*, Bruxelles, 1907.
- D'Asp R., *La fin de la persécution arménienne et l'union du chrétientisme*, Louvain, 1919.
- Armenia, *Les montagnes et le lac de Mouch-Gastogh (Arménie)*, 1915, Genève, 1916.
- Les Arméniens en Turquie, *Rapport du Patriarcat arménien de Constantinople à la Sublime Porte*, traduit de l'arménien par M.A. Adigouat, Paris, 1877.
- Les Arméniens en Arménie, *Le rôle de l'empire ottoman d'un Cénocèle*, Deyrouh, (1909).
- Armenian A., *Comment la justice a été introduite à Ararat*, Le Caire, 1920.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(*) Prepared by Prof. M.A. Derjandj.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (*)

- Adossidès A.**, Arméniens et Jeunes-Turcs. Les massacres de Cilicie, Paris, 1910.
- Aicard Jean**, Arménie. La plainte arménienne. Venise, 1917.
- Les Alliés et l'Arménie.** Messages de A. Meillet, B. Bareilles, E. Doumergue. L'héroïque Arménie par Camille Mauclair. Pour l'Arménie par Albert Thomas. Paris, 1918.
- Andonian Aram**, Documents officiels concernant les massacres arméniens. Trad. du manuscrit arménien, avec l'autorisation de l'auteur par M.S. David-Beg. Paris, 1920.
- Andréasian Dikran**, Comment un drapeau sauva quatre mille Arméniens. Paris, [s.a.].
- Anonyme**, Rapports sur l'oppression des Arméniens en Arménie. Londres, 1877.
- Antoine Emile**, Les massacres d'Arménie. Bruxelles, 1897.
- D'Any K.**, La fin de la politique de massacres et l'heure du châ-timent. Lausanne, 1919.
- Aramaïs**, Les massacres et la lutte de Mouch-Sassoun (Arménie) 1915. Genève, 1916.
- Les Arméniens en Turquie.** Rapport du Patriarcat arménien de Constantinople à la Sublime Porte. Traduit de l'arménien par K.S. Achguerd. Paris. 1877.
- Les Arméniens se souviennent . . .** 1915. Le cinquantième d'un Génocide. Beyrouth, (1965).
- Arslanian A.**, Comment la justice a été condamnée à Adana. Le Caire, 1909.

(*) Prepared by Prof. M.K. Nercissian.

- Barby Henri**, Au pays de l'épouvante. L'Arménie martyre. Préface de M. Paul Deschanel. Paris, 1917.
- Bernstein Edouard**, Les souffrances du peuple arménien et le devoir de l'Europe. Conférence publique faite à Berlin le 28 juin 1902. Genève, 1902.
- Brandès Georges**, L'Arménie et l'Europe. Conférence faite à Berlin le 2 février 1903. Genève, 1903.
- Brézol Georges**, Les Turcs ont passé là . . . Recueil de documents, dossiers, rapports, requêtes, protestations, suppliques et enquêtes établissant la vérité sur les massacres d'Adana en 1909. Paris, 1911.
- Bricaud Joanny**, L'Arménie qui agonise. Les massacres arméniens. Paris, 1916.
- Captanian P.**, Mémoires d'une déportée. Paris, 1919.
- Carra de Vaux**, Les massacres d'Arménie. Conférence faite au salon bibliographique le 9 mars 1896 par M. le Baron Carra de Vaux. Paris, 1896.
- Charmetant**, L'Arménie agonisante et l'Europe chrétienne. Appel aux chefs d'état par le Père F. Charmetant. Paris, (s.a.).
- Coulbault Paul**, Les massacres d'Arménie et le rôle des puissances européennes. Alger, 1899.
- Crime, Procès, Verdict**, Le cinquantenaire d'un Génocide. 1915. — 1965. Beyrouth, (1965).
- Decazis A.C.**, Les voix éplorées de l'Arménie. Paris, 1897.
- Denys Cochin**, Contre les barbares. Paris, 1899.
- Des Coursions R.**, La rébellion arménienne. Son origine — son but. Paris, 1895.
- La défense héroïque de Van (Arménie). Trad. de différents journaux arméniens par M.G. Genève, 1916.
- Documents diplomatiques. Affaires arméniennes. (Supplément). 1895-1896. Paris, 1897.
- Documents diplomatiques. Affaires arméniennes. Projets de réformes dans l'Empire Ottoman. 1893-1897. Paris, 1897.
- Donikian R., Nazarian J., Solakian V.**, Le deuil national arménien. Paris, 1964.
- Doumergue E.**, L'Arménie, les massacres et la question d'Orient. Conférences, études et documents. Paris, 1917.
- Episodes des massacres arméniens de Diarbekir. Faits et documents. Constantinople, 1920.
- Faïz el-Ghocéin**, Témoignage d'un Arabe musulman sur l'innocence et le massacre des Arméniens. Trad. de l'arabe par A. El-G. (Bombay), 1917.

- Gibbons H. A.**, Les derniers massacres d'Arménie. Les responsabilités. Trad. de l'anglais. Paris-Nancy, (1916).
- Gibbons H.D.**, Les Turcs ont passé par là . . . journal d'une Américaine pendant les massacres d'Arménie. Trad. de l'anglais par F. De Jessen. Préface de Fr. Thiébault-Sisson. Paris, 1918.
- Gilles Roy**, Abdul Hamid. Le sultan rouge. Paris, 1936.
- Godet G.**, Les souffrances de l'Arménie. 3ème ed. Neuchâtel, 1896.
- Griselle E.**, L'Arménie martyre Paris, 1916.
- Hommage à l'Arménie. Compte-rendu de la manifestation qui eut lieu le 9 avril 1916 dans le Grand Amphithéâtre de la Sorbonne. Discours de MM. P. Deschanel, P. Painlevé, l'Abbé Wetterlé, Anatole France. Paris, 1919.
- Hudry-Menos**, La femme arménienne. Les massacres en Arménie. Paris, 1896.
- Khlebof Twerdo**, Notes d'un officier supérieur russe sur les atrocités d'Erzeroum. Extrait des mémoires du lieutenant-colonel Twerdo Khlebof, commandant du 2-me régiment d'artillerie de forteresse russe qui a tenu garnison à Erzeroum, jusqu'à la reprise de la ville par les Turcs le 27 février 1918. Trad. du manuscrit original russe, (.1.) 1919.
- Krafft-Bonnard A.**, Sans foyers. Le cri de détresse de l'Arménie. Genève, 1921.
- Léart Marcel**, La question arménienne à la lumière des documents. Paris, 1913.
- Leclère I.**, La question arménienne. Bruxelles, 1897.
- Lepsius J.**, L'Arménie et l'Europe. Un acte d'accusation contre les Grandes Puissances Chrétiennes. Lausanne, 1896.
- Leroy-Beaulieu Anatole**, Les Arméniens et la question arménienne. Paris. 1896.
- Macler Frédéric**, La nation arménienne. Son passé, ses malheurs. Paris. 1923.
- Malcolm Mac Coll**, L'Arménie devant l'Europe. Le gouvernement turc est une théocratie. Paris, 1897.
- Malcolm Mac Coll**, Le sultan et les Grandes Puissances. Trad. de l'anglais par Jean Longuest. Préface d'Urbain Gohier. Paris, 1899.
- Mandelstam André**, La Société des Nations et les Puissances devant le problème arménien. Paris, 1925.
- Marillier L.**, La question arménienne. Paris, 1897.
- Marzbed**, Quelques épisodes des événements de Césarée. (Faits et documents). Constantinople, 1919.
- Les massacres d'Adana et nos missionnaires. Récit de témoins. Lyon, 1900.

- Les massacres d'Arménie. Témoignages des victimes. Préface de G. Clémenceau.** Paris, 1896.
- Les massacres en Arménie. Aperçu général sur la question arménienne.** Paris, 1896.
- Mayewski, Les massacres d'Arménie. D'après les constatations authentiques du général russe Mayewski, consul de Russie à Van, puis à Erzeroum... Statistique des provinces de Van et de Bitlis. Fragments fotogr. et traduction. SpB, (s.a.).**
- Mécérian J., Le génocide du peuple arménien, Beyrouth, 1965.**
- Morgan Jacques de, Contre les barbares de l'Orient. Etudes sur la Turquie.** Paris-Nancy, 1918.
- Morgenthau Henri, Les faits les plus horribles de l'histoire.** Paris, 1918.
- Morgenthau Henri, Mémoires de l'ambassadeur Morgenthau.** Paris, 1919.
- Mouchegh Mgr., Les vèpres ciliciennes. Les responsabilités. Faits et documents. (Les massacres d'Adana et le gouvernement des Jeunes-Turcs).** Alexandrie, 1909.
- Naayem J., Les Assyro-Chaldéens et les Arméniens massacrés par les Turcs. Documents inédits recueillis par un témoin oculaire.** Paris. Barcelone, 1920.
- Nansen Fridtjof, L'Arménie et le Proche Orient.** Paris, 1928.
- Naslian Jean, Les mémoires de Mgr. Jean Naslian, Evêque de Trébizonde, sur les événements politico-religieux en Proche Orient de 1914 à 1928 Vol. 1 2. Beyrouth-Vienne, (1955).**
- Les persécutions contre les médecins arméniens, pendant la guerre générale en Turquie. Constantinople, 1919.**
- Pinon René, La suppression des arméniens. Methode allemande — travail Turc.** Paris, 1916.
- Poidebard Antoine, Carnet de route d'un aumônier de cavalerie. D'Arménie au front français, mai 1914 — décembre 1917. (Dédicace à la mémoire des arméniens massacrés...). Paris 1919.**
- Pour l'Arménie martyre. Lausanne, 1918.**
- Pour l'Arménie et la Macédoine. Préface de Victor Berard. Introduction de Pierre Quillard. Rapport de Francis de Pressensé.** Paris, 1904.
- Pressensé F. de, l'Arménie et la Macédoine, Paris, 1903.**
- Quillard Pierre, Pour l'Arménie. Mémoire et dossier. Paris, 1902.**
- Quillard Pierre & Louis Mergery, La question d'Orient et la politique personnelle de M. Hanotaux. Ses résultats en dix-huit mois. Les atrocités arméniennes.... Paris, 1897.**
- Rapport du Comité Américain de New York sur les atrocités com-**

- mises en Arménie. Trad. de l'anglais. Paris, 1915.
 Rapport sur l'œuvre des Comités Suisses de Secours en faveur
 des Arméniens 1896 - 1897. Neuchâtel, 1897.
 Réponse au mémoire de la Sublime Porte en date du 12 février 1919.
Rizas G., Abdul Hamid, Sa vie politique et intime. 33 ans de
 tyrannie-Constantinople, 1909.
 Sassoun et les atrocités hamidiennes. Interpellation, les atrocités,
 rapport officiel. Genève, 1904.
 La situation des Arméniens en Turquie exposée par des documents-
 1908-1912. Paris I-IX. Constantinople, 1909-1912.
Steen de Jehay V., De la situation légale des sujets ottomans non-
 musulmans. Bruxelles, 1906.
 Témoignages inédits sur les atrocités turques commises en Ar-
 ménie suivis d'un récit de l'épopée arménienne Chabin-Kara-
 hissar. Paris-1920.
Thoumanian Garabed, Le cri de l'Arménie. Lausanne, 1896.
Thoumanian G., Les massacres d'Arménie. Paris, 1897.
Toynbee Arnold J., Les massacres arméniens, Préface par Lord Bry-
 ce. Paris, 1916.
 Le traitement des Arméniens dans l'Empire Ottoman (1915 - 1916).
 Documents présentés au Vicomte Grey of Fallodon par le
 Vicomte Bryce, Paris. 1916.
Tutundjian M.T., Du pacte politique entre l'Etat Ottoman et les
 nations non-musulmans de la Turquie. Lausanne, 1913.
Vandal A., Les Arméniens et les réformes en Turquie. Paris, 1897.
Véou Paul de, Chrétiens en péril au Moussa Dagh. Paris, 1939.
 La vérité sur les massacres d'Arménie. Documents nouveaux ou peu
 connus. Par un Philarmène. Paris, 1896.

- An appeal on behalf of armenian orphans. Manchester, 1899.
 Armenia. (The massacres of Sassoun). London, (w.d.)
 The Armenian atrocities. London, 1916.
 The Armenian question. The cry of Armenia, (w.p.) 1895.
 The Armenians remember.... 1915 Fiftieth commemoration of a
 Genocide-Beirut, (1965).
 Betrayal of Armenia. A reply to Lord Salisbury. Documentary
 and historical evidence of England's responsibility for the hor-
 rors inflicted by the Turks upon the armenian people. Man-
 chester, 1896.
Bliss Edwin, Turkey and the armenian atrocities. With an introduc-
 tion by Miss F.E. Willard. London, 1896.

- Bravley Hadgetts**, Round about Armenia. London, 1896.
- Bryce Lord**, Armenia's charter. A plea by Lord Bryce... London, 1918. Correspondence relating to the Asiatic provinces of Turkey. 1892 - 1893. Turkey No. 3 (1896), London (1896).
- Correspondence respecting the condition of the population in Asiatic Turkey, 1888-89, London, (1889).
- Correspondence respecting the condition of the proceedings in the case of Moussa Bey. London, (1891).
- Correspondence respecting the condition of the populations in Asiatic Turkey and the trial of Moussa Bey. London, (1890).
- Correspondence respecting the disturbances at Constantinople in August 1896. London, (1897).
- Crime, Trial, Verdict. Fiftieth commemoration of a Genocide. 1915-1965.** Beirut, (1965).
- The cry of Armenia. 800.000 martyrs.** New York, (1919).
- Davison Roderic H.**, The armenian crisis, 1912 — 1914. New York, 1948.
- Des Coursons R., Vte.**, The armenian rebellion. London, 1896.
- Edward James Patrick**, An Asiatic Poland or the vicissitudes of Armenia with a suggested redistribution of moslem property. St. Petersburg. 1895.
- Faiz el-Gusein**, a bedouin. Martyred Armenia. London, 1917.
- Ferrman Z. Duckett**, The Young Turks and the truth about the holocaust at Adana in Asia Minor during april 1909. London, 1913. Further correspondence respecting the Asiatic provinces of Turkey and events in Constantinople. London, (1897).
- Gabriel M.S.**, Christian Armenia and the Christian Powers. New York, 1897.
- Gabrielian M.C.**, Armenia a martyr nation. A historial sketch of the armenian people. New York, 1918.
- Gembarski Bohdan.** A letter to my Turkish friend. Transl. from armenian by Matthew A. Callender. New York, 1963.
- Germany, Turkey and Armenia.** A selection of documentary evidence relating to the Armenian atrocities from German and other sources. London, 1917.
- Gibbons Helen Davenport**, The red rugs of Tarsus. New York, 1917.
- Gibbons Herbert Adams**, The blackest page of modern history. Events in Armenia in 1915. The facts and the responsibilities. New York, 1916.
- Greene Frederik Davis**, The armenian crisis in Turkey. The massacres of 1894, its antecedents and significance. New York-London, 1895.

- Greene Frederick Davis**, *The rule of the Turk*. New York-London, 1897.
- Guinness Walter**, *Impressions of Armenia*. London, 1918.
- Guttman Joseph**, *The beginnings of Genocide. A brief account of the armenian massacres in World War 1*. New York, 1948.
- Hacopian A. P.**, *Armenia and the war. An Armenian's point of view with an appeal to Britain and the coming Peace Conference. With a preface by the Rt. Hon. Viscount Bryce*. London-New York-Toronto, 1917.
- Harris J. R. and Harris H. B.**, *Letters from the scenes of the recent massacres in Armenia*. London, 1897.
- Horton George**, *The blight of Asia. With a foreward by James W. Gerard, former ambassador of Germany*. Indianapolis, 1926.
- Howard William Willard**, *Horrors of Armenia. The story of an eye-witness*. New York, 1896.
- Kazarian Haigaz K.**, *Minutes of secret meeting organizing the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians. What Turkish sources say on the subject*. Boston, 1965.
- King William**, *Turkish atrocities in Asia Minor, Speech of Hon. William H. King in the Senate of the United States, Dec. 22, 1921*. Washington, 1922.
- Knapp Grace H.**, *The tragedy of Bitlis. Being mainly the narratives of Grisell M. McLaren and Myrtle O. Shane*. New York, 1919.
- Lambert Rose**, *Hadjin and the armenian massacres*. New York, 1911
- Lepsius J.**, *Armenia and Europe. An indic'ment*. London, 1897.
- Lynch H. F. B.**, *Armenia. Travels and studies. Vol. 1 & 2*. London, 1901.
- MacColl Malcolm**, *The Sultan and the Powers*. London-New York-Bombay, 1896.
- MacColl Malcolm**, *England's responsibility towards Armenia*. London New York, 1895.
- Mardiganian Aurora**, *Ravished Armenia. Introd. by L. Gates*. New York, 1918.
- Martyrdom and Rebirth**. *Fateful events in the recent history of the armenian people. Preface by G. P. Gooch*. New York,
- The Memoirs of Naim Bey**. *Turkish official documents relating to the deportations and massacres of Armenians. Compiled by Aram Andonian*. London, 1920.
- Minas Setrak Benjamin**, *April 24, Armenian memorial day. Why Armenians commemorate this day*. Boston, 1965.

- Morgenthau Henry**, Ambassador Morgenthau's story. Garden City. New York, 1918.
- Morgenthau Henry**, The tragedy of Armenia. London, 1918.
- Mugerditchian Esther**, From Turkish toils. The narrative of an Armenian family's escape. Transl. from the Armenian. New York, [w.d.].
- The murderous tyranny of the Turks. London, 1917.
- Nansen C. B.**, Armenia and the campaign of 1877. London, 1888.
- Papazian Bertha**, The tragedy of Armenia. A brief study and interpretation. Boston — Chicago, 1918.
- Report of the international conference on the situation in the Near East, held in London on 29th June 1904. London, 1904.
- Robinson Emily**, The Armenians. London, [1918].
- Rockwell William Walker**, The deportation of the Armenians, [w. p.] 1918.
- Rolin-Jacquemyns Gustave**, Armenia, the Armenians, and the treaties. London, 1891.
- Sadik Shahid Bey**; Islam, Turkey and Armenia and how they happened. St. Louis, 1898.
- Sarkisian E. K. and Sahakian R. G.**, Vital issues in modern Armenian history. A documented exposé of misrepresentations in Turkish historiography. Translated and edited with an introduction, maps and postscript by Elisha B. Chrakian. Watertown, Massachusetts, 1965.
- Sarkissian Leo**, 1915. Before and after. Boston, 1965.
- Tashian James H.**, Turkey: Author of genocide. Boston, 1965.
- Toynbee Arnold J.**, Armenian atrocities. The murder of a nation. With a speech delivered by Lord Bryce in the House of Lords. London — New York — Toronto, 1915.
- Toynbee Arnold J.**, The murderous tyranny of the Turks. With a preface by Viscount Bryce. London, 1917.
- Toynbee Arnold J.**, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. London, 1922.
- Tozer H. F.**, Turkish Armenia and Eastern Asia Minor. London, 1881. The treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915 — 16. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce. With a preface of Viscount Bryce. London, 1916.
- Turkish misrule in Armenia. Town's meeting in Manchester, held Tuesday Nov. 25th 1890. Manchester, 1890.
- Ward M. H.**, The deportations of Asia Minor 1921-22. London, 1922.
- Werfel Franz**, The forty days of Musa Dagh. Transl. from the

- German by Geoffrey Dunlop. New York, 1935.
- Williams A. W. and Gabriel M. S.**, Bleeding Armenia : Its history and horrors. London, 1896.
- Wintle W. J.**, Armenia and its sorrows. 2nd ed. London, 1896.
- Zahigian Krikor M.**, One page of Armenia's tragedy. A story of the years wherein we have seen evil. The testimony of an eye witness. With a foreward by Henry Turner Baily. Cleveland Ohio, 1923.
- Arzruni Grigor**, Die Hungersnoth in Türkisch-Armenien. Tiflis, 1880.
- Arzruni Krikor**, Die ökonomische Lage der Armenier in der Türkei St. Petersburg, 1879.
- Bernstein Eduard**, Die Leiden des armenischen Volkes und die Pflichten Europas. Berlin, 1902.
- Brandes Georg**, Armenien und Europa. Vortrag, gehalten zu Berlin am 2 Februar 1903. Genf (Genève), 1903.
- Bratter G. U.**, Die Armenische Frage. 1915.
- Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918. Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Dr. Johannes Lepsius. Potsdam 1919.
- Eckart Bruno**, Meine Erlebnisse in Urfa, Potsdam, 1922.
- Faiz el Ghusein**, Armenisches Martiertum von einem Muhammedaner. Übers. aus dem arabischen. Potsdam, 1922.
- Faiz el-Ghusein, Scheik**, Die Turkenherrschaft und Armeniens Schmerzenschrei. Von Faiz el Ghasein, Advokat und Beduinschefe in Damaskus. Zürich, 1918.
- Frapan Ilse**, Die Armenische Frage und das europäische Gewissen. Öffentlicher Vortrag von Ilse Frapan. Veranstalt zu Hamburg, den 22. Mai 1903. Genf (Genève), 1903.
- Für Armenien und Macedonien. Eine Manifestation. Übers. und mit einem Vorwort für deutsche Leser versehen von Ilse Frapan. Genf (Genève), 1903.
- Künzler Jacob**, Im Lande des Blutes und der Tränen. Potsdam, 1921.
- Lepsius Johannes**, Armenien und Europa. Eine Anklagschrift wider die christlichen Grossmächte und ein Aufruf an das christliche Deutschland. 2. Aufl. Berlin-Westend, 1896.
- Lepsius Johannes**, Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei. Potsdam, 1916.

- Lepsius Johannes**, Der Todesgang des armenischen Volkes. Bericht über das Schicksal des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei während des Weltkrieges. 2-te verm. Aufl., Potsdam, 1919.
- Lepsius Johannes**, Druftte man dazu schweigen? (Aus dem armenischen Hungerlegern). Potsdam, 1918.
- Lepsius Johannes**, Über die armenische Frage sind der schienen. Potsdam, 1919.
- Mandelstam A. N.**, Das armenische Problem im Lichte Volker und Menschenrechte. Berlin, 1931.
- Marquart Jos.**, Die Entstehung und Wiederherstellung der armenischen Nations. Berlin-Schöneberg, 1919.
- Nansen Fridjof**, Betrogenes Volk. Leipzig, 1928.
- Niepage Martin**, Eindrück eines deutschen Oberlehrers aus der Türkei. Potsdam, 1919.
- Piranian M.**, Das Martyrium des armenischen Volkes. Heft 1-3. Thalwil, 1915.
- Der Prozess Talaat Pascha**. Stenographischer Bericht mit einem Vorwort von Armin T. Wegner einem Anhang. Berlin, 1921.
- Schwarzhaupt Paul**, Die Wahrheit über die Türkei. Die Armenier greuel und Deutsche Bedruckungen durch die Jungturken. Berlin, 1919.
- Sommer, Ernst**, Oberlehrer, Die Wahrheit über die Leiden des armenischen Volks in der Türkei während des Weltkrieges, Frankfurt a/M, 1919.
- Wegner Armin T.**, Offener Brief an den Präsidenten... Herrn Woodrow Wilson über die Austreibung des armenischen Volkes in die Wüste. Berlin-Schöneberg, 1919.
- Werfel Franz**, Die vierzig Tage des Musa Dagh. Roman. B. 1 — 2. Berlin Wien Leipzig, 1933.
- Wierbucher Heinrich**, Armenien 1915. Hambourg Berdorf, 1930.
- Armenia Arrasada**. «Subasta de Almas» El relato de Aurora Mardiganian, la joven cristiana, superviviente de las terribles matanzas. Interpr. por H. L. Gates, prologo de Nora Waln. Versione Castellana de J. R. Lopez Sena... New York, 1919.
- De Armeniske raedslser**. De sande martyrer. Kjobenhavn, 1917.
- Clobanian Arslag**, L'Armenia sotto il giogo turco. Torino, 1917.
- Gimorri Adriano**, Per la nazione Armena. Conferenza... detta all Universita Popolare di Milano, il 2 maggio 1916. Torino, 1916.
- Latino Anatollo**, Gli Armeni e Zeitun. Vol. 1 — 2. Firenze, 1899.

- Nalbandian Inga, De Hjemsogte. Kjobenhavn. 1917.
- Nalbandian Inga, Den store jammer. Kjobenhavn, 1917.
- Nalbandian Inga, Den Hvide Mark. Armeniens store lammer. Kjobenhavn, 1917.
- Nazariantz Hrand, L'Armenia. II suo martirio e le sue rivendicazioni
Con introd, di Giorgio d'Acandia. Catania, 1916.
- Nogales Rafael de, Cuatro bajo la media luna. Buenos-Aires, 1924.
- Romanelli Pietro, Armenia: Conferenza illustrata del Dott. Pietro
Romanelli. Con una lettera di adesione del Visonte Lord Bryce.
Roma. 1918.
- Werfel F., Styridast dni Musa Daghu, Bratislava, 1951.
- Werfel Franz, i Quaranta giorni del Mussa Dagh. Edizione integrale
in quattro volumi. Roma, 1937.
- Werfel Franz, A Musa Dagh negyven napia. Budapest, 1965.

APPENDICES

- I — CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (9 December 1948)
- II — UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (10 December 1948)
- III — RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (26 November 1948)

CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND
REPRESSION OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(9 December 1948)

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 26 (I) dated 11 December 1948 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required;

APPENDICES

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

- I — CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND REPRESSION OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (9 December 1948)
- The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, as defined in article II of the Convention, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
- II — UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (10 December 1948)
- III — RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (26 November 1968)

**CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND
REPRESSION OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE**

(9 December 1948)

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (1) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required:

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in

whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

Article IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.

Article VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article VII

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.

Article IX

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION

OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(10 December 1948)

Article III

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article IV

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article V

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article IX

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article XVII

- (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
- (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CONCERNING THE CONVENTION ON
THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
(26 November 1968)**

The General Assembly,

Having considered the draft Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,

Adopts and opens for signature, ratification and accession the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution.

**CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY**

Preamble

The States Parties to the present Convention,

Recalling resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 170 (II) of 31 October 1947 on the extradition and punishment of war criminals, resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 affirming the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal Nürnb erg and the judgement of the Tribunal, and resolutions 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2202 (XXI) of 16 December 1966 which expressly condemned as crimes against humanity the violation of the economic and political rights of the indigenous population on the one hand and the policies of **apartheid** on the other,

Recalling resolutions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 1074 D (XXXIX) of 28 July 1965 and 1158 (XLI) of 5 August 1966 on the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity,

Noting that none of the solemn declarations, instruments or conventions relating to the prosecution and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity made provision for a period of limitation,

Considering that war crimes and crimes against humanity are among the gravest crimes in international law,

Convinced that the effective punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity is an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence, the furtherance of co-operation among peoples and the promotion of international peace and security,

Noting that the application to war crimes and crimes against humanity of the rules of municipal law relating to the period of limitation for ordinary crimes is a matter of serious concern to world public opinion, since it prevents the prosecution and punishment of persons responsible for those crimes,

Recognizing that it is necessary and timely to affirm, in international law, through this Convention, the principle that there is no period of limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to secure its universal application,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of their commission:

(a) War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly the «grave breaches» enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims;

(b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid, and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.

Article II

If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this Convention shall apply to representatives of the State authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.

Article III

The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to adopt all necessary domestic measures, legislative or otherwise, with a view to making possible the extradition in accordance with international law, of the persons referred to in article II of this Convention.

Article IV

The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, any legislative or other measures necessary to ensure that statutory or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes referred to in articles I and II of this Convention

and that, where they exist, such limitations shall be abolished.

Article V

This Convention shall, until 31 December 1969, be open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by any State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to this Convention.

Article VI

This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention shall be open to accession by any State referred to in article V. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article VIII

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-Ge-

neral of the United Nations of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.

Article IX

1. After the expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which this Convention enters into force, a request for the revision of the Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.

Article X

1. This Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of this Convention to all States referred to in article V.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in article V of the following particulars:

(a) Signatures of this Convention, and instruments

of ratification and accession deposited under articles V, VI and VII;

(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with article VIII;

(c) Communications received under article IX.

Article XI

This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 26 November 1968.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized for that purpose, have signed this Convention.

HAMASKAINE Press
10, Hussein Beyum street
Beirut - Lebanon

PRINTED IN LEBANON

