

ARMENIA IN THE WORLD WAR

BY HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

AN APPEAL TO AMERICAN HONOR

1. Over 200,000 Armenians fought in the ranks of the Allied armies or as independent units, and 100,000 fell in battle. Of the 900 College and University students, who enlisted in the Foreign Legion and fought on the Western front, all but 55 were killed in action, and of the survivors every one received one or more decorations for gallantry in action.

Following the defection of Russia, Armenians took over the Caucasus front—600 miles long—and prevented the Turks from reaching the Baku oil fields for nine long months, or from December, 1917, to September, 1918. By their own efforts, they founded the Armenian Republic which we recognized.

Von Ludendorff, in his memoirs, says that the lack of fuel supply was one of the chief causes of the breakdown of the Western front, and blames the failure of the Turks to get to Baku in time.

Col. John Price Jackson, U. S. A. says that had the Armenian fighting men not done their duty so heroically at a critical place and time, the war would most likely have lasted another year, with the result that our losses in men and money would have been twice greater.

II. Of the 2,000,000 Armenians in Turkey in 1914, one million have been slaughtered, and of the survivors only 130,000 remain in Turkey and the rest are refugees and exiles. Armenian property losses are valued at over \$5,000,000,000, or more than three-fourths of the estimated wealth of the Armenian race.

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WORLD WAR

Armenia in the World War

BY HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D., LITT.D.

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“Lest we forget,” it is decidedly worth while to recall the services of the Armenian nation in the World War. The Armenian question has not yet been settled. It still confronts the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers in 1926 as it did in 1919, and considerations of expediency cannot hush it up. Therefore we call attention once more to a subject that is embarrassing to statesmen and that many are trying to avoid—the indebtedness of the Allied nations to the Armenian nation in the World War.

There is no better summary with which to start our survey than that given by Lord Robert Cecil, writing from the British Foreign Office on October 3, 1918. Lord Robert said that “*the military contributions made by the Armenians to the Allied armies most assuredly cannot be forgotten,*” and he mentioned four points which he thought “*the Armenians may well regard as the charter of their right to liberation at the hands of the Allies.*” Here are Lord Robert’s points:

“**One:** In the autumn of 1914, the national Congress of the Ottoman Armenians, then sitting at Erzerum, was offered autonomy by the Turkish emissaries, if it would actively assist Turkey in the war, but it replied that while they would do their duty individually as Ottoman subjects, they could not, as a nation, work for the cause of Turkey and her allies.

“**Two:** Following this courageous refusal, the Ottoman Armenians were systematically murdered by the Turkish Government in 1915, more than 700,000 people being exterminated by the most cold-blooded and fiendish methods.

“**Three:** From the beginning of the war, that half of the Armenian nation under Russian sovereignty organized volunteer forces and, under their heroic leader, General Andranig, bore the brunt of some of the heaviest fighting in the Caucasian campaign.

“Four: After the Russian army’s breakdown at the end of last year, these Armenian forces took over the Caucasian front and for five months delayed the Turks’ advance, thus rendering important services to the British army in Mesopotamia, these operations in the Alexandropol and Erivan region being, of course, unconnected with those of Baku. Armenian soldiers are still fighting in the ranks of the allied forces in Syria. They are to be found serving alike in the British, the French, and in the American armies, and have borne their part in General Allenby’s great victory in Palestine.”

The British Foreign Office had cognizance of all the facts. Culled by subordinates from official reports in the War Office and the Foreign Office, Mr. Balfour had studied the military contributions of Armenians during more than four years of fighting. After the collapse of Turkey, when thoughts were directed toward the reestablishment of peace, Mr. Balfour directed Lord Robert Cecil to make the above formal statement. At the time, the British undoubtedly had in mind giving strong diplomatic support to the Armenian claims for independent nationhood and the restoration of their historic lands. That British diplomacy took another course later makes it all the more important to recall this letter of Lord Robert Cecil, and to give some of the facts that corroborate each of the points in “the charter of the Armenian right to liberation at the hands of the Allies.”

Turkish Proposals to the Armenians in 1914

In August, 1914, a Turkish mission of 28 members, including Kurds, Persians, Georgians, Chechens, Lazes and Circassians, left Constantinople for the Middle East, with the purpose of arousing the peoples of that region against the Allies. This was nearly three months before Turkey entered the war. On the way, the mission stopped at Erzerum, where the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was holding its annual convention. The Turks, through Dr. Baha-Eddine Shakir, Nadji Bey and Hilmi Bey, proposed to the Federation that “if the Armenians of Turkey and of Russia made common cause with Turkey, Turkey would agree to create, with the guarantee of Germany, an autonomous Armenian state, comprising Russian Armenia and the provinces of Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis, in Turkish Armenia.”

The Federation answered that Russia was already at war and that all Armenians who were Russian subjects were

naturally fighting under the flag to which they owed allegiance. Similarly, if Turkey should go to war, the Armenians who were Ottoman subjects would do their duty loyally to the country to which they owed allegiance. This reply was, of course, a refusal to urge or incite Russian Armenians against Russia; but on the other hand, let it be remembered that the Federation was giving the Turks the only assurance they had the right to demand, i. e., that Turkish subjects remain loyal.

* * *

Massacres and Deportation of Armenians in Turkey in 1915

But the Turks refused to see this honorable distinction, and to accept the pledges that must have been made with heavy heart by a subject people to its oppressors. Angered because the Turkish Armenians would not tamper with the loyalty of the Russian Armenians and smarting under the series of setbacks received on the Russian frontier (largely, as we shall see, through the devoted fighting of Russian Armenians), the Constantinople Government ordered the deportation of Armenians from Turkish Armenia and elsewhere in Asia Minor. Massacres of the most horrible character took place.

Armenian Resistance to Massacres

As the Armenians in most places had no arms there was nothing they could do. This in itself was enough to disprove the Turkish excuse that they were a military menace and had to be got out of the way. But in eight localities, where the Armenians were numerous and had the conformation of the land to help them, they mustered what arms they could and resisted heroically. **Five Turkish divisions and 30,000 or more Turkish and Kurdish irregulars were employed in putting down the "rebellion."**

At Van, for example, on April 15, 1915, a Turkish regiment, supported by irregulars, numbering, in all, 12,000 men, attacked the Armenian quarter. The Armenians improvised a force of 2,500 men, manufactured smokeless powder, cast two pieces of artillery, captured cannon and ammunition from the Turks, mined a mile-long tunnel and blew up the barracks. On May 5, after three weeks of bitter

struggle, the Armenians expelled the Turks from the city. This uprising had not been intended or planned. It was provoked by the determination of men to protect their women and children and to save themselves from being butchered, if they could help it. It helped materially the Russian plans, and the influence of this event was felt all over the eastern front.

At Suedia, Cilicia, the inhabitants of seven villages, comprising 4,058 men, women and children, defied the Turkish deportation edict, retreated to the mountain of El-Musa, and, for 53 days, in seven sanguinary battles, held at bay 15,000 Turks. On Sept. 12th, 1915, they were rescued by the French cruiser St. Joan d'Arc, which, assisted by British ships, were taken to Port Said.

At Sassoon, 10,000 mountaineers—men, women and children—from July to September, 1915, held off, with antiquated weapons, two Turkish divisions and 30,000 Kurds. When their ammunition was exhausted and the men were exterminated, their women, according to Lord Bryce, fought the Turks with knives, forks, pins, and rocks until death came to save them.

At Urfa, the Armenians resisted a Turkish Division for forty days, but finally succumbed under artillery fire. Here, in the ruins, were found the mangled bodies of women, arms in hand, side by side with those of men.

At Shabin Kara Hissar, 5,000 Armenians, for 27 days, engaged, during July, 1915, a whole Division. Here was enacted one of the most tragic, yet sublime, episodes of the war. When the ammunition gave out, 3,000 women and girls drank poison, and when the supply of poison gave out, those who were left, with hymns on their lips, hurled themselves from the mountain into the canyon to escape falling into the hands of the Turks.

We shall not comment further upon the fate of the Armenians in Turkey in 1915. All the horrible details have been given to the world over and over again. We want simply to emphasize the fact that the virtual extermination of Armenians in many regions of the Ottoman Empire were provoked by circumstances over which they had no control. Being hostages in the hands of the Turks they were victims of the Turkish wrath over setbacks on the Caucasian front that had been largely due to the skill and valor of Armenian

contingents in the Russian army. These were fighting for Russia because they were Russian subjects. It was their duty to do so. But to the Turks all Armenians were simply Armenians, and they wreaked their vengeance upon their own defenseless subjects, who had committed no overt act against them. In 1916 the Russian press published the diary found on the body of a Turkish officer. In explanation of the massacres it read: "*We are asked why we kill the Armenians. The reason is quite plain. Had not the Armenians fought against us, we would have reached Tiflis and Baku long ago.*"

This is what Lord Robert meant when he said that the massacre of Armenians in Turkey was the second point in Armenia's "charter of the right to liberation at the hands of the Allies."

Nearly a million Armenians died in Turkey as the direct result of two things that were vital to the success of the Entente Powers:

(a) The refusal of Turkish Armenians to try to persuade Russian Armenians to be disloyal to Russia in return for an autonomous Armenian state, guaranteed by Germany; and

(b) The success of the Russian Armenians in preventing a Turkish victory that would have had a disastrous effect on the Entente cause.

And in the process of resisting their butchers, where they possibly could, they contributed to the Allied cause by holding up for months a number of divisions whose presence on other fronts would have helped materially against the Russians and the British.

* * *

Armenians in the Russian Army from the Beginning of the War to the Russian Debacle

All who are studying the military history of the World War, with the perspective of a decade, now realize how much more important was the Caucasus front from 1914 to 1916 than we believed it to be at the time. From the very first month of the war Russia proved herself to be weaker than had been anticipated.

Germany struck heavy blows, one after the other, freeing East Prussia of the invaders, conquering Poland, re-

lieving the pressure upon Austria-Hungary, and reducing Russia to impotence in the Balkans. A similar serious situation, which might have turned the war had it come early enough, would undoubtedly have arisen had it not been for Armenian aid in the Caucasus. We have many more facts in our possession than Lord Robert Cecil had in 1918, and consequently we are able to elaborate his third point, and give some revelations of the extent of the obligation of the Entente Powers to the Armenians in this particular field.

Russian Proposal to the Armenians

Before the entry of Turkey into the war, in October, 1914, Russia, through Count Varantzoff Dachkoff, proposed to Armenian political organizations that, if Turkey should enter the war, and if the Armenians made common cause with Russia, thereby contributing to a Russian victory over Turkey, Russia would incorporate in the peace treaty stipulations for the complete autonomy of the six Armenian vilayets (provinces) of Turkey. This indicates how vital the Russians regarded possible Armenian support to be. There would have been no serious movement of Armenians in Turkey, to the advantage of Russia, had the Turks not turned on their Armenian fellow-citizens. Armenians who were Ottoman subjects remained loyal as long as they could. They were determined to give no excuse for massacre. But when the Turks tried to exterminate them, many thousands succeeded in getting away across the mountains, and swelled the number of Armenians in the Russian army. These were already numerous, as Russia had 2,000,000 Armenian subjects, who had contributed over 160,000 regulars to the Russian army. By their knowledge of the country, by their excellent fighting qualities, especially when in the presence of an hereditary enemy, these troops really made the difference between success and failure to the Russians in the Caucasus.

Turco-German Aims in Asia Minor

In his memoirs General von Ludendorff indicates the five fixed purposes of Germany in Asia Minor, after Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers. These were:

- (1) To expel Russia from Transcaucasia and Great Britain from Mesopotamia;

(2) To prevent the British from invading Palestine to protect the Suez Canal and cut off Egypt from contamination of a Holy War;

(3) To join hands with the Turanian-Mohammedan world on both sides of the Caspian Sea and thus have the means of carrying the torch of revolt to India;

(4) To seize the Baku oil fields, whose product was sorely needed by Germany; and to force Russia and Great Britain (and perhaps also France) to deflect from the main fronts in Europe troops to the Asia Minor front and to make necessary immobilizing large bodies of soldiers in India and Egypt.

We do not have to emphasize the far-reaching character of these designs, and what a disastrous effect success in carrying them out would have had upon the fortunes of the Entente Powers.

That the Armenians frustrated some of these designs and retarded the consummation of others, is admitted by von Ludendorff and von Sanders. Lord Robert Cecil emphasizes it in his third and fourth points. Let us go a little more into detail.

* * *

First Turkish Offensive on the Caucasus Front—1914

In 1914 the Turkish army of the Caucasus had three Corps of combat troops—the ninth, tenth, and eleventh—under the personal command of Enver Pasha, Minister of War. Enver's strategy was bold in conception. The tenth Army was to attack the Russian center at Sari Kamish, which was weakly held; the eleventh was to strike farther east toward the Persian frontier; and the ninth was to advance on the left, capture Ardahan, cut the Batum-Tiflis-Baku railway line, and thus force the Russians out of Transcaucasia.

The ninth Army easily achieved its first objective. Assisted by most of the local Moslem inhabitants, it took Ardahan. The eleventh Army, deployed on the right, in mountainous country, waited to come up on the flank, near the Persian frontier, when the main force in the center advanced. But the tenth Army, on its way from Olti to Sari-Kamish, was held up for thirty-six hours at Barduz Pass by the first Armenian battalion, under the Armenian

Colonel Keri. This delay enabled the Russians to concentrate their forces at Sari Kamish, where Enver Pasha failed utterly in his offensive. The Turks lost 30,000, largely from freezing in the snow. General Ali Ihsan Pasha and his staff were all captured, and shipped to Siberia.¹

When Enver returned to Constantinople, he publicly announced that his failure was due to the intervention of the Armenians. It was for the purpose of arousing passion against the Armenians in Turkey that he made this admission. But Enver told the truth. The part which the Armenian volunteers played in these operations is given by the Russian generals.²

¹ Gen. Ihsan Pasha, who fled from his prison camp in Siberia in November, 1915, made this statement upon the battle of Sari Kamish:

"We were advancing victoriously into the Caucasus when, with the intervention of Armenian volunteers, the Russians stiffened up their resistance. I ordered a fresh Army Corps. This was held up for nearly three days by Armenian volunteers and arrived too late to the scene of battle to save us from the terrible defeat we suffered. Had it not been for the Armenians, we would have conquered the Caucasus. We will do that yet. When we do, the Allies can't win the war . . ."—Ed.

² Here are literal translations of extracts from these reports:

" . . . The 3rd Armenian Legion, under command of Hamazasp, from Nov. 22 to Dec. 15, 1914, took part in all the battles and distinguished itself by its signal bravery, particularly at Sangmane, Alagueze, Mirkhasane and Kapanak. On the night of Dec. 6th the Armenians opposed a determined Turkish attack and repulsed the enemy. The Armenian wounded persisted in marching in front . . ."

(Signed) GOULIGHA, Brigadier-General.
Col. BOUKRETOFF, Chief of Staff.

" . . . The Armenian Legion faced the first Turkish attacks at Alagueze on November 9, and from 10 to 23rd December. In a fierce combat at Alagueze, which was the prelude of the operations around Sari Kamish, the Armenians engaged the enemy in a terrific hand to hand combat until the arrival of reinforcements and inflicted a cruel punishment upon him. These battles resulted in the great victory of Sari Kamish. For a period of 3 months, the 3rd Armenian Legion accomplished a heavy task full of responsibility. It protected our left flank at Sari Kamish, did reconnoissance in the most difficult and snow covered mountainous region of Palantakene, and fought, with signal bravery, side by side with the Brigades of General Gouligha, Prjevalski and Baratoff. It gives me great pleasure to thank them for their self-abnegation and for the excellent services which they rendered at Sari Kamish . . ."

(Signed) KALITINE, Brig-Gen.,
Commander, 1st Army Corps of the Caucasus.

Second Turkish Offensive—1915

In April, 1915, the Turks tried again. This time they attempted to turn the left wing of the Russian army by violating the neutrality of Persia, marching to Julfa. They relied upon the cooperation of the local Tartars along the Azerbaidjan frontier to open the way for them to cut the Batum-Baku line east of Tiflis and march on Baku. Opposing them was only one Russian brigade under the Armenian general Nazarbekoff, and the first Armenian battalion of volunteers under Andranik. General Khalil Bey had one of the crack Turkish divisions, sent especially from Constantinople, and about 10,000 Kurds. He easily captured Urumia, took a thousand Russian prisoners, and marched on Salamast. Here Andranik fought off Khalil for three days. When Russian reinforcements arrived 3,600 Turks lay dead and wounded in front of the Armenian trenches. The part which the Armenians played, not only as volunteers, but as Russian regulars, is given in the official report of General Troukhine to the Ministry of War. We quote in part:


“. . . the detachments of Andranik and Dro attacked vigorously the enemy positions . . . The detachment of Hamazasp attacked under most difficult conditions, without any artillery protection and in snow covered mountains, and vigorously pursued the enemy. After two days' fighting, the enemy is dislodged from his entrenched position and defeated decisively. The victory is due principally to the precise and obstinate fire of our infantry of which three-fourths are composed of Armenian detachments . . .”

* * *

Third Turkish Offensive—1915

Once more Khalil Bey launched an offensive in July, 1915. Disposing of eleven divisions, most of them fresh troops who had not suffered a severe winter in camp, he attacked the Russian center and hurled it back 62 miles. It would have gone hard with the Russians had not the Armenian volunteers attacked Khalil's reinforcements, virtually in his rear. And then the Armenian general Nazarbekoff hurried reinforcements to the front, stopped the retreat, and the Russians began a counter-offensive. Because of the vigorous attacks of the Armenian volunteers, who threatened his line of communication, Khalil fell back. Thus

A Few Armenian Leaders in the World War



ARMEN GARO.

An organizer of Armenian volunteer movement. Commander, 2nd Legion. Diplomatic Representative of Armenian Republic in Washington, 1920. Died in Geneva, 1923.



MAJOR-GEN. ANDRANIK.

Commander, 1st Legion, 1914-15. Later fought in Russian Army, with rank of Major General. Following Russia's defection, continued fighting.



MAJOR-GENERAL BAKRATUNI.

Commander, Third Russian Army, which defended Warsaw. Commander, Petrograd Military District, 1917. Commander, Armenian forces at Baku, 1918.



BRIG-GEN. SEBOUH.

Commander of Legion until 1918. Brigadier-General in the Army of the Armenian Republic until 1921.

ended the last of the three principal Turkish offensives, the success of any one of which might have had a disastrous repercussion on the other Russian fronts, and, politically, at St. Petersburg.

* * *

The Turkish Campaign of 1916

Throughout this year the Turks fought, but they had given up any hope of penetrating the Caucasus. The mountains swarmed with Armenian irregulars. When the impotence of the Turks to repeat their formidable movements of 1915 was realized, the Russian general staff drew off the best regular divisions, which included large Armenian contingents, and sent them to the Galician and Polish fronts. This was possible because the Armenian volunteer legions, which were bearing the brunt of the fighting, seemed capable of preventing any further attempt at a Turkish offensive.

In his ordre du jour, dated April 15, 1916, Col. Obrastzoff, Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division of the Chasseurs of the Caucasus, says:

“ . . . During the assault upon the snow-covered chain of mountains around Elneff, the Armenian detachments displayed remarkable audacity. The Corps of officers particularly conducted itself with signal valor and was nearly put hors du combat. The 3rd Armenian Legion, after hand to hand fighting, captured the whole line of enemy trenches and seized their stores of ammunition . . . ”

General Koulebiakine, Commander of the Russian Division, addressed the following telegram to Col. Ossepian, Commander of the 4th Armenian Legion:

“ . . . I congratulate your battalion upon its brilliant victory . . . To-day, I visited personally the inaccessible position and appreciated the task and bravery of the Armenian sharpshooters who conquered it . . . ”

Ex-Premier Kerensky, on August 20, 1918, made this statement:

“ . . . At the outbreak of the War, the Turks captured Ardahan, and were marching on Tiflis. All the high officials, including the Viceroy, were preparing for a hasty flight. Of all the races of the Caucasus, the Armenians alone stuck to their

posts, organized volunteer forces and, by the side of their Russian comrades faced the formidable assaults of the enemy, and turned his victorious march into a disastrous rout."

* * *

Following the Russian Defection

After the revolution, the Kerensky Government created a special administrative body for Transcaucasia. This Commissariate lost its influence when the Bolsheviki came into power in November, 1917. It was a situation of utmost confusion that lasted for months. But the Turks and Germans, hard pressed on other fronts, or devoting their energies to other products, did not take advantage of it. Transcaucasia repudiated the Bolsheviki, and on April 22, 1918, an independent state was set up under the name of the "Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia," including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidjan. It broke up in five weeks.¹ The Tartars were openly with the Turks; the Georgians sought German protection; and the Armenians alone resolved to remain faithful to the Allies, and to continue the war.

During December, 1917, and January, 1918, the Bolsheviki, having concluded an armistice with the Central Powers, recalled the Russian army from the Caucasus front, which had been 600 miles long, manned by 250,000 troops. Thus the four provinces of Turkish Armenia, which had been conquered by Russian and Armenian troops, had no more protection against the Turks—it was a virtual abandonment—and the 2,000,000 Armenians of Transcaucasia were exposed to a new Turkish menace.

It was the remarkable activity and courage of the Armenians, in the face of this crisis—so unexpected and so stupendous—that Lord Robert Cecil refers to at the beginning of his fourth point. The Armenians improvised a volunteer force of about 20,000 men, who were soon reinforced by several thousand Armenian regulars, who had just returned after the debacle on the Russo-German front. With these few troops the Armenians undertook to take over the whole line. Not only did they have the Turks in

¹ The Turks had violated the terms of the armistice with the Bolsheviki, and sent forward 50,000 troops, to Kars, which the President of the Transcaucasian Federation (a Georgian) ordered the Armenian commander to surrender. This led to the dissolution of the confederation that had loosely bound Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and Armenia.—Ed.

front of them, but all the Moslems behind them were hostile, and they had to fight facing both directions.

Battle of Sardarabad

In June, 1918, the Turks, who had already occupied Alexandropol, concentrated their forces around Karakliss and Sardarabad, within a few miles of Erivan, the capital of Armenia. Here a fierce battle was waged. After five days of fighting at Karakliss, the Turks left 6,000 dead and wounded on the field, and were driven back to Alexandropol. The immediate objectives of the Turks were to reach Baku, and, through the control of the Alexandropol-Tabriz line, to attack the British left flank in Mesopotamia. The Armenians retarded the attainment of the first objective, and prevented the latter.

Gen. von Ludendorff, in his memoirs, says:

“ . . . Now, (following the defection of Russia) the opportunity presented itself to harass and attack the British in Northern Persia. The Batum-Tiflis-Tabriz line rendered this plan possible. In Northern Persia, the Turks could easily establish numerical superiority over the English, arouse the population of Azerbaidjan, and thus render us invaluable service . . . ”

The Armenians, however, engaged five Turkish divisions. The Turks could not hold the Tiflis-Tabriz line and, at the same time, fight the Armenians. On the other hand, they were forced to deflect considerable forces from the Palestine front to the Caucasus, against the advice of Gen. von Sanders, German commander on that front.

Both von Ludendorff and von Sanders speak in bitter terms against Enver's pig-headedness.

“The duty of Enver was to fight the English on the Palestine front,” writes von Ludendorff.

Gen. von Sanders, following Turkey's surrender, made this statement:

“ . . . The collapse of the Turkish Palestinian front was due to the fact that the Turks, against my orders and advice, sent all their available forces to the Caucasus and Azerbaidjan, where they fought the Armenians . . . ”

Senator Etienne Flandain, in the French Senate, in January, 1922, declared:

" . . . The Armenians who fought in the Russian Army, following the accession to power of the Bolsheviks and the consequent defection of Russia, continued to defend the Caucasus front, and for eight months, did not let the Germans enter Baku. According to Ludendorff, the lack of fuel supply contributed greatly toward the defeat of the German armies . . ."

On January 15, 1922, 116 members of the French Parliament—Senators and Deputies—presented a Memorandum to Premier Poincaré, in which they said in part:

" . . . The Armenians of Russia, like those of Turkey, turned a deaf ear to the proposals made to them by Turk and Tartar leaders to hoist the flag of rebellion against Russia. More than 200,000 of them fought, with signal bravery and loyalty, in the Russian Army. Following the defection of Russia, the Armenians took over the Caucasus front and, for five months, delayed the advance of the Turks, and thus became a screen of protection for the British army in Mesopotamia. Also, the Armenians took over the defense of Baku and, for months, prevented the Germans from securing the most vital fuel supply from the oil fields of Baku for their Western armies. In fine, France cannot deny the signal bravery with which the Armenian Legion under our officers, fought on the Palestinian front."

Armenian Republic Recognized

In the meantime the Germans had desperately endeavored to get the Turks to see that it was sheer madness to exhaust their energies to destroy the Armenians—which they had found a task beyond their power—when there were pressing needs on other fronts, and when the Germans needed so sorely the Baku oil. There was much sentiment in Germany, also, in favor of doing something to prevent the total disappearance of the Armenian nation. The battle of Sardarabad made both Turks and Armenians realize the suicidal nature of continuing to fight through the summer. The Turks were now ready to listen to German advice. An armistice was concluded between Armenia and Turkey in Batum on June 14, 1918; and five days later delegates of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan met in Constantinople, and concluded peace with Turkey, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. For Armenia—alone with no possibility of any aid reaching her—this course, after four years of honorable fighting, was the only one left open to her. It was the same

course that Rumania followed shortly afterwards. It was either peace or extinction, just as later, in December, 1920, the same alternatives confronted little Armenia when she was called upon to make peace with the Moscow Soviet.

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Armenians at Baku—1918

Peace was made with the Armenian Republic—not with all the Armenians, a good many of whom were still fighting with the Allies, on other fronts. The Turks were loath to turn from the effort to crush Armenia to the more practical goal of Baku. But when they got there, they found that they still had Armenians facing them.

Beginning November, 1917, in accordance with an agreement entered into in April between the Kerensky Government and the Armenian National Council, nearly 35,000 Armenian troops from the Eastern front started out to join the Armenian Army. A number of these—about 7,000—became stranded at Baku, and the local Armenian Committee, in anticipation of a possible attack by the Turco-Tartars, held these men in readiness, under the command of the Armenian Major-General Bakratuni, formerly Commander of the Russian Third Army on the Eastern front and Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Army during the Kerensky regime.

On March 31, 1918, the Tartars, led by Turkish officers, attacked the Armenians. After a week's fighting, the Tartars suffered over 8,000 casualties, and the Armenians, 2,500, the Armenians remaining in full possession of the city. On August 17, the British landed 1,500 troops, but before that the Armenians had to wage constant battles against one Division of Turkish troops and tens of thousands of Tartars, Circassians and Mountaineers.

On September 15, 1918, 15,000 Turkish regulars, under Khalil Bey, supported by a larger number of irregulars, made a grand assault. The British withdrew and, 12 hours later, were followed by the Armenians. The Turks entered the city and massacred over 20,000 Armenian non-combatants.

Von Ludendorff, in his memoirs, after referring to the lack of fuel supply as being one of the factors for the breakdown of the Western front, makes this observation:

“ . . . We could not depend upon the Baku oil unless we took it ourselves. I cannot speak too often of the lack of fuel supply in Germany and the consequent difficulties which we suffered. Following the offensive of the 7th Army, the oil reserves of the Army became exhausted . . . ”

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The brief account we have given, supported by statements of those whose plans were most seriously affected by the Armenian resistance, is sufficient to demonstrate the tremendous military aid brought to the Allies by the Armenians in the Caucasus. The extreme point reached by the Russian army in Asia Minor was about 220 miles beyond their frontier. The distance from the Russian frontier to Erivan, which the Russians connected by a narrow gauge with the Tiflis-Baku line, is about 50 miles. *The Russian army quit the Caucasus front in December, 1917.* It took the Turks six months, or until June, 1918, to cover the distance of 220 miles, and nine months to reach Baku. *The Armenians delayed the attainment of the chief Turkish objective—Baku—for nine months.* They were the critical months of the war. When the objective was reached, the Germans were already retreating in France, and they were forced to throw up the sponge before Baku oil could be a factor for airplanes and motor-trucks on the Western front.¹

¹ Col. John Price Jackson, of the Harbord Military Mission to the Near East, has recently written as follows:

“ . . . There is another phase of this subject (the Lausanne Treaty) which demands consideration and which cannot fail to touch every red-blooded American. Gen. Allenby has said that the small, ragged army of Armenians operating on the northern flank (Caucasus) of the Turkish army so worried his antagonist that he was able to cause the early capitulation of the Turkish nation. This little army fought under almost insuperable difficulties and with but meagre supplies and suffered enormous losses. If we ratify this Treaty without an amendment we, as a nation, will be turning our backs upon those in that valiant army. Further, had they not done their duty so heroically and well at a critical place and time the war would most likely have lasted another year. The result of this would have been that grave markers for five or ten Americans would now be standing overseas where one now stands and instead of a debt of twenty billions of dollars, we would now be laboring under one of twice that size . . . ”

Armenians in Palestine and Syria

By an agreement entered into between France and the Armenian National Delegation in 1916, the latter furnished France 8 battalions of volunteers (5,100 men) for service in Palestine.

In a fierce assault which General Allenby made on the Turks, whose armies were commanded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Kutchuk Djemal Pash and Djevad Pasha, on September 19, 1918, the backbone of Turkish resistance was broken, followed by Turkey's capitulation.

The Armenians took a leading part in this victory. I shall quote from French and British sources.

On December 24, 1920, M. Bellet, in the French Chamber of Deputies, said:

" . . . I lived in the East 25 years . . . In 1916, when M. Briand was President of the Council, it was decided to organize a Legion to fight in the East. The Legion of the Orient, which was subsequently called the "Armenian Legion" was formed of Armenian emigres in America, Egypt, and other parts of the world. They numbered 5,000 to 6,000.

" . . . The Legion was formed upon the following conditions:

"1. . . . To enable the Armenians to contribute toward the liberation of Cilicia, and to furnish additional rights upon which to base the realization of their national aspiration;

"2. The Armenian Legion would constitute the nucleus of the Armenian Army in Cilicia.

"These negotiations were conducted in London by a French representative, who was then negotiating with the British Government the accord since known as the Sykes-Picot Compact.

" . . . That is why the Armenian Legion fought in Syria, and fought brilliantly . . ."

Le Temps, in its issue of October, 1918, published the following communiqué:

"Among the troops who took an active part in the liberation of Syrian territories there is the Armenian Legion. During all the operations which have taken place during the last few weeks, these Armenian fighters have given proofs of the best military qualities and greatest merit . . ."

Captain **Gautherot**, Chief of Operations of the French Army in the Levant, in his book, *France in Syria and Cilicia* (pp. 43-44), says:



Left: An Armenian officer in the British Army.

Center: Capt. Melikian—a Sorbonne graduate. A volunteer-private in Russian Caucasus Army, 1914. Received Order of St. George, ordinarily conferred upon officers of high rank, for extraordinary valor and distinguished service; promoted. Captain in Armenian Army, 1918. Executed by Bolsheviks, in 1921, who, later wrote a letter of apology to his parents, in Paris, for the "unfortunate mistake."

Right: Major-General Areshian, formerly of the Russian Army. General of Division in the Armenian Army, 1918.

“ . . . Our infantry held on to the pivotal sector of Rafat, dominated by two formidable centers of resistance, bristling with machine guns—the Mount of Arara—defended by the only 701st, 702nd and 703rd German battalions.

“The sector 26, attacked by our 4th battalion, was taken in 20 minutes; the ‘Three Thickets’, in 45 minutes by the 8th battalion. The German machine gunners of Arara, supported by heavy batteries which poured an avalanche of shots, resisted longer, but, in their superb sweep, our battalions soon attained all their objectives and exceeded a few . . .”

On September 20, 1918, on the occasion of the funeral ceremonies of the Armenians, who had fallen on September 19, Col. **Romieu**, French Commander, who led his men in person, delivered this oration:

“In the name of all the Commanders, officers and men of my command, I greet our Armenians who fell in yesterday’s battle.

“They all fell on this spot, where we have come to make this sad pilgrimage.

“The Armenian battalion approached the objective assigned to it by an obstinate assault; it maintained itself stubbornly under the shadow of the hills of Arara, which the Germans had converted into the most powerful point of Turkish resistance in this sector, and it was right at this point that the Turkish line of resistance was broken.

“The magnificent behavior of the battalion, notwithstanding its losses, made it possible for us to fulfill the mission which had been entrusted to us.

“The tenacity of your race, which has survived through centuries of bitter trials, has never been shown to a better advantage.

“On this sacred spot, where every movement meant death yesterday, we have the proud consolation to-day to lay in their resting places our Armenian heroes, who fell in the first line, facing the enemy. They all deserve a cross of war; they are all the patrons, the saints, of the Legion of the Orient.

“Rest in your glory. You have opened the way to Justice and to Right—long banished from these regions. We shall become worthy of you, so that this reparation may be made complete and lasting.

“I take a solemn oath upon this grave—before this cemetery, which we shall make unto a monument of glory, and which we shall hereafter name ‘Cemetery of Arara,’ to unite in this name the memory of our departed, of their sacrifices, of their victory, and of the horizon which it unfolds to the national aspirations of their compatriots.”

When he entered Jerusalem, General **Allenby** telegraphed Boghos Nubar Pasha, President of the Armenian National Delegation: *“I am proud to have Armenian con-*

tingents under my command. They fought brilliantly and took a leading part in the victory."

* * *

Armenians in the French Foreign Legion

When the war broke out at the beginning of August, 1914, I can think of only one Armenian student in Paris who did not immediately and unhesitatingly enlist in the French army. That boy's lame arm barred him. Of course the feeling that they must do something for France was well-nigh universal among students of all nations, and the record was a remarkable one. But the situation with the Armenians—especially of those whose families were in Turkey—was a peculiarly difficult one. There was an excuse. And yet the boys did not hesitate. Nine hundred of them enlisted in the Foreign Legion and fought on the Western front. All but 55 were killed in action, and of the survivors every one received one or more decorations for gallantry in action or distinguished service. Could there be a more wonderful record?¹

¹ The Chief of the Bureau of Operations of the French troops in the Levant, says of the military qualities of the Armenian:

" . . . Undoubtedly, the men of the Armenian Legion possessed precious qualities for a soldier: intelligent, informed and often a solid citizen in civil life. He was capable of quick training and had a passion to bear arms and for military exercises. He was proud of his volunteer's uniform, and impatient to meet the Turks. In this regard he was quite the opposite of the pacific Syrian . . ." (*FRANCE IN SYRIA AND CILICIA*, Capt. GAUTHEROT, p. 135.)

Major-General Bagratuni, formerly Chief of the Russian Army Intelligence service in Turkestan, says of the Armenian soldier:

" . . . I am acquainted with all the races and nationalities of the Near and Middle East, and can say that the Armenian makes a better soldier than the men of any race in those regions. The Turanians, the Persians, the Kurds and others have considerable power of physical endurance, but they lack the dash, the skill, the discipline and the patriotic idealism of the Armenian soldier, who is the equal of the best Aryan soldier . . . "

Also, Major-General Thompson, Chief of the British Military Mission to the Trans-Caucasus, following the defection of Russia, in a report to the War Office, extols the valor, fortitude and extraordinary power of endurance of the Armenian soldier.—Ed.

Armenia's Sacrifices and Her "Reward"

Over 200,000 Armenians fought in the World War, and suffered over 100,000 casualties. Over 1,000,000 non-combatant Armenians were slaughtered or perished from privation and disease. Seeing that there are only a little over 3,000,000 Armenians left in the world, one is safe in making the assertion that the Armenian loss of life in the World War was proportionately greater than that of any other belligerent. And it was the same with property losses, which are estimated at over \$5,000,000,000. I mean billions and not millions! They lost most of their possessions in Turkey and also in Transcaucasia. None has spoken for them at any of the conferences following the war, when the question of reparations came up.

* * *

A Last Word

Is it nothing to us? Armenia lies prostrate and forsaken. Most Armenians are people without a country, suffering frightful privations and are everywhere buffeted about by the shifting winds of political upheavals. Why? Simply because we whom they trusted have betrayed them. Is it nothing to us?



Armenian Language and Prehistory

BY HAROLD H. BENDER, PH.D., LITT.D., PHIL.L.D.

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To the ethnologist and the philologist no part of the world is more puzzling than Asia Minor. The woods are obscured by the trees. A peninsula, almost, an isthmus, connecting Europe and Asia, hemmed in by seas, mountains, and deserts, in contact with Greece, Egypt, Arabia, Phoenicia, Palestine, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, and the Caucasus, its long valleys have been for thousands of years great highways of migration, commerce, and conquest. One people after another has claimed its soil, resulting in an ever shifting political history, an almost hopeless mixture of races, and a babel of tongues. No other region has so often heard "the last sighs of dying peoples and their gods."¹

To modern scholarship the picture is still a blurred and distorted one, always changing its focus. But many phases are becoming clearer, and much more light is promised for the near future, especially with recent and prospective excavations and the decipherment of languages like the Hittite, Luvian, and Lydian. Many corrections of former beliefs can already be made. Among other things, we know now whence and approximately when the Armenians came to Armenia. It is unnecessary to mention here various attempts to connect the Armenian speech with Hittite, Etruscan, or other obscure tongue. But the view that it was an Iranian dialect, closely related to the Persian, has been widely held until recently and still appears in the Standard Dictionary and other works of reference. Thus, the latest edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica assumes that the progenitors of the Armenians were of Medo-Persian race, an error that is made either more or less pardonable by the fact that the author of the article, published in 1910, died in

¹ Asia Minor is marked off from Europe by the Dardanelles—a narrow channel from one-half mile to four miles in width—a formation due, probably, to a seismic upheaval. The boundaries of Asia Minor, also known as Anatolia, are ill-defined, but, ordinarily, it is meant to include a peninsula about 700 miles long and from 350 to 700 miles wide. In its physical characteristics and climatic variations, Asia Minor is merely an extension of the European continent, and not a few geographers include it in Europe.—Ed.

1897. The assumption itself, however, was natural enough, for Armenian is heavily overcrusted by Persian influence, including loan-words even of the everyday sort, and some inflectional elements.

Armenian—An Indo-European Tongue Member of Same Family as English

But it has been thoroughly established by the German philologist, Heinrich Hübschmann, that Armenian is an Indo-European tongue, and thus belongs to the same family of languages to which English belongs; further, that it is an independent member of the family, and not an Iranian dialect.¹ Nor, of course, is it related to the language of the Turks, whose forebears came from central Asia, and who have kept themselves and their speech remarkably free from the influence of Western peoples and cultures.² A few Latin parallels will illustrate the Indo-European nature of Armenian. Compare Armenian *berem* "I bear" with Latin *fero*; *ail* "other" with *alius*; *aur* (*Aror*) "a plow" with *aro* "I plow"; *akn* "eye" with *oculus*; *malem* "I crush" with *molo* "I grind"; *lam* "I weep" with *lamentum*.

The Indo-European family is divided into two great groups of languages, a western and an eastern. The former, or *centum*, includes the Greek; Italic (Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Rumanian); Celtic (Irish, the Gaelic of Scotland, Welsh, Breton); and Germanic (German, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Icelandic, and English). To the eastern or *satem*, group belong Indo-Iranian (Sanskrit, Avestan, Old Persian, and various later languages of India and Persia); Albanian; and Balto-Slavic (Old Church Slavonic, Great Russian, Little Russian, White Russian, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, Czechoslovakian, Polish; Lithuanian and Lettish). It is to this eastern, or *satem*, group that Armenian belongs, standing closest to the Albanian and the Balto-Slavic.

¹ Hübschmann, St. Martin, Villefroi, Dore recognize the Armenian as one of the Indo-European languages that has attained the highest degree of development, by a varied and ancient intellectual culture.—Ed.

² The Turks, a Mongoloid people from Central Asia, established contact with the Near East in the 11th century. The Turks of Turkey are a hybrid race, composed of Yellow, Semitic, White and Black. They speak a Mongoloid dialect, profusely interwoven with Arabic and Persian, and use Arabic characters and numerals.—Ed.

In the Later Stone Age, presumably in the great plain of eastern central Europe, between the Vistula and the Volga, the Indo-Europeans dwelt as one people, or as closely connected groups of peoples, united by a more or less common manner of life and government, language, and religion. By them were laid the foundations of European civilization, and those of the Indian and Persian cultures. Before the dawn of history they began to break up into distinct groups, guided doubtless to some extent by different pursuits, cattle-raising on the plains to the east, and primitive agriculture in the river-valleys and the borders of the forests to the west. One by one, and very slowly, these groups began their migrations, that were to take them, still in early times, as far as the Atlantic in Europe and the Bay of Bengal in Asia.

The Asiatic members of the family show in their linguistic inheritance an impressive presence of words and ideas relating to cattle and an absence of agricultural words. Among the European members the situation is reversed, and we find common words for plow, harrow, furrow, seed, arable field, sickle, chaff, millstone, and the like. Although the Armenian belongs to the eastern group it shares this agricultural vocabulary of the west and thus looks to Europe as its place of origin. Its vocalism likewise is more European, at least it does not share the Indo-Iranian reduction of *a*, *e*, and *o* to *a*. And there are a number of other, more technical, linguistic features that show the European character of the language.

Armenians Migrated from Southeastern Europe to Asia Minor About 10th Century B. C.

These linguistic indications of European origin stand by no means alone. According to Greek tradition the Phrygians of Anatolia and other peoples whom we know to have been Indo-European crossed the Hellespont into Asia Minor from Europe, especially from Thrace, at about the dawn of history. Herodotus and Eudoxus agree in the statement that the Armenians came from Phrygia, were descendants of the Phrygians, and had much Phrygian in their language. Modern philological research has made it certain that in very early times Indo-Europeans from Europe began to penetrate into Asia Minor, but the largest migrations did not occur until the overthrow of the great Hittite empire, which dom-

inated the peninsula until the beginning of the 12th century B. C. To these migrations belonged those of the Phrygians from Thrace, a large and vaguely defined region north of Greece.

Several centuries later, the Armenians, who called themselves, at least in after-years, by the name Haikh, or Hayq, left Phrygia and, in the 7th century B. C., settled in the plateau which was first designated, in the 6th century B. C., by the old Persian cuneiform inscriptions of the Achaemenian kings as Armina, whence the name Armenia. In this tableland, the Ararat of the Old Testament, they found an allophylian people whom the Greeks called the Alarodians, and whose speech, as we know from numerous cuneiform inscriptions, was not Indo-European. With this people they blended and merged.

All this receives negative confirmation from Assyrian inscriptions, which clearly indicate that as late as the 8th or 9th century B. C. there were no Indo-Europeans in Armenia. But for the Thraco-Phrygian origin of the Armenians we have ample linguistic as well as historico-traditional evidence. The language of the Thracians is known from proper names and glosses, that of the Phrygians in the same way, and also from a number of inscriptions, in Greek letters, which date from before Christ. The Armenian language, however, is not known from literary sources back of 400 A. D. Indeed, classical Armenian literature is practically bounded by the 5th and 14th centuries. It is largely Christian, and consists for the most part of theological and historical translations from the Syrian and Greek.¹

After the Armenians settled in their plateau and mingled with an alien people, began their long centuries of turbulent history. They were subjected first by the Medes and then by the Persians. Often a bone of contention, buffeted back and forth, first between Parthians and Romans, then between Persians and Byzantines, they were in large measure under Persian sovereignty down to the fall of the Sassanian dynasty in the middle of the 7th century A. D. From then on they were ruled, wholly or in part, by Arabs, kings of their own, Mongols, Persians, Turks, and Russians.

¹ Sir Henry Norman considers the ancient, mediæval and modern Armenian literature, including works of imagination, novels, romance and poetry, in their limited form, comparable to any other literature.—Ed.

Despite all these vicissitudes, and despite a flood of loan-words from Persian, Arabic, Syriac, Greek, Caucasian, and other sources, the Armenian language still shows to-day unmistakable evidence of its Indo-European character and its European origin. As for the racial origin of the Armenians, we already know that they are a member of the white (Alpine) race, and that, like most other peoples, they are of mixed blood, in spite of their great racial and national tenacity.¹

¹ Prof. Bender, who is one of the world's foremost philologists, by his clear and able exposition of the parenthood of the Armenian tongue, has removed that subject from the realm of controversy. But, for the benefit of the layman, three points, perhaps, may be elaborated:

1. Armenia, in its entirety, was never subject to any one nation. Roman and Arab domination of Upper Armenia was evidenced only by the payment of tribute by Armenia to the Suzerain. Persian rule, however, was, at times, visible by presence of Persian administrators. Mongols tarried for a while in parts of western Armenia; so, also, the Kurds, who, subsequently, became the settled neighbors of the Armenians in the Central and Southern parts of the Plateau. Following the fall of the Kingdom of Ani, at the foot of Ararat, in 1080, the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, or Lesser Armenia, along the Mediterranean, was set up, which was overwhelmed by the Mamelukes of Egypt in 1375. Thereafter, parts of Armenia fell under Persian rule in 1472; under Turkish, in 1451, and under Russian, in 1828, 1878. Parts of Russian Armenia (Kara-Bagh), however, maintained, for nearly 150 years, four autonomous principalities; also, the Armenians of Zeitun (Cilicia) were not wholly conquered until 1915. According to Lord Bryce, these latter, during the 19th century, won 65 battles against the Turks (in 1896, they fought, for three months, a Turkish Army of 60,000 men under Zeki Pasha), and preserved their autonomy.

2. Classical Armenian, which syntactically follows Latin, is free from corruptions, solecisms and alien infiltrations. As for the vernacular, the Armenians of Turkey, Russia and Persia, like those of America and France, in recent years, have borrowed a number of words from the languages of their neighbors, but such peculiar words are marked and have not been engrafted upon the body of the Armenian tongue. The Armenian, like German, possesses an elastic system of compounding, and draws upon itself in coining new scientific or other words.

3. Neither habitat nor language determines race. The ethnologist determines the white race by four chief characteristics, namely, eye color, hair color, shape of skull and stature. Twenty per cent., perhaps, of Armenians have blue, gray or green eyes, and a larger percentage, light hair. (Light color alway yields to dark.) The average skull shape is brachycephalic, but the dolichocephalic is not at all uncommon. This mingling of headshapes seems to be the peculiarity confined to the white race. In stature, they are generally tall or about average height.

We possess already reliable evidence, drawn from recent archæological discoveries, and reinforced by the physical characteristics of the Armenian of to-day, that, about 2,000 years B. C. (exact date not yet ascertained) an Aryan people from the basin of the Caspian invaded the region of Van and gradually pushed its way toward the Euphrates, in the region of Harput. They called their country Ar-Meni, Ar-Mina, meaning Aryan land.

Centuries later, perhaps between the 10th and 12th Centuries B. C., a new wave of invasion, proceeding from Thrace, by a kindred people of European origin, reached Ar-Meni, and became merged with its inhabitants. These Thracians, however, in the course of their easterly movement, settled for several centuries in Northern Cilicia and Southeastern Cappadocia (present Cesarea), in the lands of the vanished Hittite Empire and of the Hads. The Armenians call themselves Hai (High), and their country Hâikh, in classical, and Hââsdân, in the vernacular, which appellation is believed to be derived from Had—the racial title of the inhabitants of that region. The Armenian race of to-day is a mixture of the two invading races and of the natives whom they assimilated, and is now recognized, like the Swiss, most French, South Germans, Austrians and most Greeks, as a member of the Alpine branch of the European family. "Grant"; "Dixon"; "Boas".

Three things, however, are obvious: that the Thracian invaders, who subsequently called themselves Hai-Armenian, imposed their own tongue upon the natives whom they assimilated; that all the natives were Aryans, but that one or more of these elements were of a darker hue than the Thracians; and, also, that these natives were culturally of a high standard. That the Armenian of to-day still retains the marked physical characteristics of the Alpine-Armenoid and that he is the peer, in intellectual capacity, of the best developed members of the white race, constitute visible proofs, within the interpretation of the Mendelian Law, of the logic of our conclusion. No voluntary crossing has taken place during the Christian era, except that in Christian countries, like Poland, Austria and Italy, and in recent years, in America, France and England, the Armenian disappears in the third generation.—Ed.

Sir Edwin Pears:

"They (Armenians) are physically a fine race. The men are usually tall, well built and powerful. The women have a healthy look about them which suggests good motherhood. They are an ancient people of the same Indo-European race as ourselves, and speak an allied language. During long centuries, they held their own against Persians, Arabs, Turks and Kurds. Whenever they have had a fighting chance they proved their courage. . . . A large proportion of them remained tillers of the soil. In commerce they are succesful not only in Turkey, but in France, England and India. Though subject to persecution for centuries under Moslem rule (because of their Christian faith, their superior intelligence, their industry and thrift), they have always managed to have their race respected."

For their services to the cause of the Allied and Associated nations and for their appalling sacrifices, the Armenians have received nothing. No one has spoken for them. They have been betrayed by their former Allies. Apparently, however, conscious of their terrible responsibility for the plight of Armenia, the Allies, in their Lausanne Treaties with Turkey, have left undefined the boundary between Turkey and Armenia.

The full story of our own responsibility for the misfortunes of Armenia has been told elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that the failure of the Allies to fulfil their responsibility cannot absolve us of our responsibility, and that, omission on our part to fulfil that responsibility, to the extent of our opportunity, can only mean that, we, like the Allies, do not hesitate to evade an obligation of honor to those who lack physical power to enforce their rights.

III. What do the Armenians now ask of America? They ask that in any treaty with Turkey there shall be inserted a provision, preserving their rights, as defined by President Wilson and endorsed by President Harding—rights which the late Senator Lodge, even after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, promised to preserve and assert, if and when that Treaty came up for consideration.

By that modest action, which our pledges and honor impose upon us, we can, in due time and through diplomatic negotiations, secure for them a fraction of their national lands, now deserted, so that nearly 1,000,000 refugees and expatriates may return to their homes and, united with their kinsmen of Erivan, may have an opportunity for "a free and unmolested autonomous development."

It is inconceivable that America should be unwilling to do so little for a people which has suffered so much for the cause and faith of America,—and has trusted America.

JAMES W. GERARD.

New York
June, 1926.