

A Searchlight
ON THE
Armenian Question
(1878 -- 1950)



BY

J. MISSAKIAN

A SEARCHLIGHT ON THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

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What is the Armenian question? How did the Turks treat the Armenians? Why did the Armenians resort to revolutionary acts in Turkey? What effective support did the Armenians receive from the Powers? Did Armenia fight in two World Wars for or against the Allies? Was the Turkish Government responsible for the massacres of 1915? What is the Treaty of Sevres and why was it not ratified? How did the Russian and Turkish Revolutions affect the Armenian Problem? What is the Dashnak Party? What are the aspirations of the Armenian people?

The present volume answers these questions. It is not the exhaustive story of a problem which has yet to be solved, but an outline for the general reader and particularly for those who are searching for truth in contemporary international affairs.

The author is a well-known British-Armenian journalist from London thoroughly conversant with the problem which he so vividly and objectively presents.

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
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A SEARCHLIGHT
ON THE
ARMENIAN QUESTION

(1878-1950)



BY
J. MISSAKIAN

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ON THE

ARMENIAN QUESTION

(1927-1928)

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
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FOREWORD



This is not a history of Armenia. It is an introduction, painted in broad strokes, to the Armenian Problem which has been so prolific in controversy and falsifications.

Material on the Armenian massacres compiled mainly by British, French, Russian, and German authorities is available in abundance, but the inner aspects of what is internationally known as the Armenian Question are much less known owing to the fact that no concise, yet objective, study on the subject exists.

The purpose of our brief, sad story is to supply details bearing upon the state of Armenian affairs such as may satisfy the legitimate curiosity of the student of world politics.

Our sketch may also be regarded as an appeal to the reason and conscience of the civilized world whose sympathy for the Armenian people was aroused by the gruesome atrocities of 1894, 1909, 1915, and 1920, but whose default from its obligations in the hour of triumph resulted in what may rightly be described as the Tragedy of Armenia.

With ideals of Justice and Righteousness being loudly proclaimed in each international Areopagus, it seems timely to bare to the world the facts of the Armenian question, and relate frankly the heinous wrongs and cruelties that have been wreaked, openly and secretly, upon an ancient and noble people. This we do in the hope that the leading statesmen of the day who hold the destiny of mankind in their hands may ere long tackle the Armenian problem with honor and courage, and restore Armenia to her rightful owners.

My obligation to many writers whose books — listed in the Bibliography—have been valuable sources for reference during the preparation of this narrative is hereby acknowledged.

J. MISSAKIAN

London, England.

CHAPTER I.

THE TURKISH FLAIL

Sultan Mohammed II., the conqueror of Constantinople, was not only a daring warrior, but also a shrewd statesman and administrator. When at the head of his Asiatic hordes he captured the Byzantine capital in 1453 he at once realized that he was undertaking to govern a great mass of Christian subjects. He was aware of the schism existing between the Roman Church and the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, and of the latter's determination to maintain complete independence in matters ecclesiastical. It was essential, on economic and political grounds, to devise an administrative machinery capable of making docile and co-operating citizens of the Orthodox Christians.

Therefore, in 1453, he conferred by royal decree special privileges on the Greek Patriarch, with the definite purpose of binding to his throne the most important Christian institution of the East. The Patriarch was accorded jurisdiction over all Christians of the realm, irrespective of denominations and rites.

During the ensuing eight years, however, the influence of the Oecumenical Patriarchate grew to such an extent that Mohammed, "fearful of so much power in the hands of one authority" (1), appointed an Armenian Patriarch with jurisdiction not only over the Armenians, but also over the Copts, the Latins, the

Jacobites, and the Nestorians. The Armenians were thus granted special prerogatives for administering their national and ecclesiastical affairs. This beneficial arrangement they undoubtedly much appreciated; it enabled them to maintain their religious and cultural institutions practically unhindered for about four hundred years. Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876) went a step still further in 1863 by ratifying the Armenian Constitution, an instrument governing the internal and non-political affairs of the nation, which the Armenian National Convention had drafted two years earlier.

It can be safely said that Mohammed made no attempt to assimilate his Christian subjects; on the contrary he endowed them with a limited measure of autonomy, retaining, as might be expected of an Oriental potentate, the right to revoke these privileges if and when he deemed their exercise inexpedient for the safety of his kingdom.

* * *

Mohammed's apparent tolerance towards his non-Moslem minorities was, however, destined in later centuries to provoke his own co-religionists to outbursts of fanaticism — especially during the periods when Turkey was engaged in bitter warfare with Russia and the Western nations. This fanaticism resulted, at the beginning of the 19th century, in outrageous persecutions of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, particularly of the Armenians. Terror and tyranny overtook Armenia in the first decade of the 16th century when the growing power of the Sultan was finally established in Armenia proper. The heavy blows suffered by the Turks during the 18th and 19th centuries as the result of incessant wars, and their

continuing decline of power, along with inevitable social and economic decadence, helped to intensify in increasing degree their religious fanaticism and latent hatred towards the Armenians.

Moreover, the success of the Balkan peoples during the 19th century in freeing themselves from the Ottoman yoke, together with the so-called protection said to be enjoyed by the Armenians, as well as the gradual awakening of national consciousness among the latter, served the Turks as first-class pretexts for embarking on a policy aimed at crushing any possible emancipatory movement.

* * *

As a result of the Russo-Persian war of 1828 and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, Armenia was finally partitioned between Russia and Turkey. Under the comparatively tolerable rule of the Czars, the Armenians were allowed ample opportunity to attain a high level of economic prosperity and cultural advancement, especially in Transcaucasia. But the history of the Armenian minority in Turkey has been a ceaseless drama, marked by periodical massacres perpetrated with the connivance of succeeding Turkish Governments.

Exposed to the outrageous tyranny of an Asiatic race, and deprived of any potential means of self-defense, the Armenians made incessant urgent appeals for protection both to their fellow-Christians of the West and to Russia. The cruelties wreaked by the Turkish Government upon its loyal and unoffending Armenian subjects aroused profound sympathy and indignation in Europe, but history bears witness that the Powers made no genuine effort whatever to deliver the Armenians from the Turkish scourge.

* * *

The Drama of Reforms

Several attempts were made to introduce social and administrative reforms in Turkey for the benefit of all the races of the Empire. The severe crisis through which the Ottoman Empire had passed during the 18th century had exposed the pressing need for changes in its administrative machinery, if a complete break-up of the Empire was not to ensue.

In the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) by which the Balkan principalities were erected into practically independent states, it was provided that Turkey should undertake reforms in connection with her treatment of the Christians. She did nothing of the kind.

Ten years later on November 3, 1839, Sultan Abdul Mejid promulgated the **Hatti-Sherif of Gulhane**, an Imperial Rescript embodying comprehensive reforms commonly known as the **Tanzimat**. The Rescript affected to remove the disabilities to which the non-Moslems were subjected under the four-hundred-year-old charter of the Conqueror. Security of life, honor, and property, were to be guaranteed, arbitrary and unbridled authority of state officials was to be abolished, the system of taxation regularized, and the principle of complete equality for all Ottoman subjects of whatever race or creed laid down.

These reforms, so promising in theory, proved abortive in practice.

On November 15, 1847, the grand vizier Reshid, on the advice of the British Government, issued a **firman**, declaring that the "Christian subjects of the Ottoman Government professing Protestantism" should constitute a separate community, with all the rights and privileges belonging to others, and that "no interference whatever be permitted in their temporal or spirit-

ual concerns on the part of the patriarch, monks, or priests of other sects." This charter, lacking the authority of the Sultan, was liable to be repealed. Accordingly, two more Charters were granted to the Protestants by Sultan Abdul Mejid, in 1850 and 1853, confirming and completing the provisions of the original document

In March 1856, the Crimean Allies of Turkey wrested another important concession from the Turkish Government on the subject of reforms. The Sultan in his **Hatti Humayoun** (Illustrious Rescript) of February 18, 1856, "confirmed and consolidated" the guarantees promised "to all the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of class or religion, for the security of their persons and property and the preservation of their honor. . . . Effective measures shall be taken in order that these guarantees may have full and entire effect."

In the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) the Powers expressly renounced their right "to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of his Empire."

This express and unequivocal disclaimer on the part of the Powers of all idea of intervention in Turkey emphasized the futility of the whole project of reforms. The Sultan was given a free hand to deal with his Christian subjects in a manner consistent with his Imperial pleasure.

The bitter disappointment of the Christians of Turkey upon reading the clauses of the Treaty of Paris is echoed in the lamentations of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador in Turkey. "I would rather have cut off my right hand than have signed that treaty," he wrote in a private letter. "How

are the Sultan's reforms to be carried through with the allied troops all gone and no power of foreign interference reserved? What means shall we possess of allaying the discordant elements, if our credit is to decline and our influence to be overlaid by the persevering artifices of a jealous and artful ally? In short, when I hear the politicians of the country remark that the troubles of Europe with respect to this Empire are only beginning, I know not how to reply." (2)

Nor could His Majesty's Ambassador be accused of over-sensitiveness. The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Paris — indeed, in the very next year, 1857, —before massacres took place in Bosnia. Three years later, in 1860, widespread barbarities occurred in the Lebanon, with the complicity of Turkish authorities.

* * *

Political events in Europe in those fateful years were not without effect on the course of the project of reforms.

By the 1870's, it had become more and more doubtful whether Turkey would show any willingness at all to carry out the reforms embodied in two Imperial Rescripts, and implicitly guaranteed by the Powers. In 1861, Turkey was warned by Great Britain against counting on British support if massacres were permitted by the Turkish Government in various parts of the Empire.

In 1876, following the defeat of Austria by Prussia, and with the adoption by Russia of Pan Slavism as a fresh weapon of penetration into the Sultan's Balkan dominions, the Western Powers recognized the unwisdom of their policy of non-intervention in Turkey that had been proclaimed in Paris some ten years earlier.

A revolt broke out in Herzegovina in the summer of 1875, spreading in the ensuing months into Bosnia and Bulgaria. The French, Austrian and Italian Governments jointly increased their pressure on the Sultan and demanded an armistice, — without consulting Great Britain where a new pro-Turkish Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli (later Lord Beaconsfield) was at the helm.

The British statesman's reluctance to co-operate with the five Great Powers was motivated by his anxiety to secure "support of the Moslems of India, and also by his racial dislike of Czarist Russia."⁽³⁾ By that time, France's role in the "cold war" was considerably weakened as a result of her disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, and Turkey was once more left free to follow her own inclinations, under a new monarch, Sultan Abdul Hamid II.

* * *

In June 1876, an insurrection flared up in Bulgaria, where the Turkish soldiery slaughtered some twenty thousand Christians of all ages. The severity of this inhuman punishment shocked the British; Prussia, Austria, Italy and France seemed indifferent, but it produced widespread indignation in Russia.

Turkey, encouraged by Disraeli's friendly attitude, resisted the legitimate demands of the Russian Government. On April 24th, 1877, the Czar declared war on Turkey, reassuring Great Britain that he would not occupy Constantinople nor endanger the safety of the Suez Canal Zone.

By the end of the year Turkish resistance rapidly collapsed, and on March 3, 1878, Russia dictated to the Porte the Treaty of San Stefano, which provided for the creation of a Great Bulgaria, including Macedonia, and for the complete independence of Serbia,

Roumania and Montenegro. Russia was to receive Batum, Ardahan and Kars in Western Armenia.

In the protocol for an armistice, signed at Adrianople on January 31, 1878, no mention was made of the situation of the Armenian Provinces. However, Article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty made the following provision for the introduction of reforms in Armenia:

“As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte undertakes to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.”

Disraeli found the Treaty of San Stefano wholly unacceptable, and the provision made by Article 16 was definitely not of a nature to relieve British anxieties. “This is carrying things too far” whispered the noble Lord to Her Imperial Majesty, and following a lead from the Austro-Hungarian Government he demanded that the treaty be submitted to a European Congress. Russia hesitated at first, but finding that Bismarck’s Germany was too deeply pledged to Austro-Hungary to support her, she finally consented, and the Congress met at Berlin on June 13, 1878.

On June 4, Britain and Turkey concluded what is commonly known as the Cyprus Convention — officially termed “Convention of Defensive Alliance”

— whereby the British Government agreed that if Russia retained the districts of Batum, Ardahan and Kars, and attempted further encroachments in Asiatic Turkey, Great Britain would guarantee the Sultan the integrity of his territories and would defend him by force of arms. In return, the Sultan agreed to introduce necessary reforms, to protect his Christian subjects in his Asiatic territories, and to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by Britain.

The Treaty of Berlin signed on July 13, 1878 was substantially identical with that of San Stefano. Bulgaria was made an autonomous state under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with her San Stefano boundaries considerably curtailed; Serbia and Montenegro were granted complete independence; Macedonia remained under Turkish rule; Austria received a mandate over Bosnia and Herzegovina; Russia acquired Batum, Kars and Ardahan, and Great Britain was compensated with the island of Cyprus.

“This is peace with honor” announced Lord Beaconsfield on his return from Berlin. But was such the case?

It might have been, had the Great Powers who had taken on the role of protecting the Sultan’s Christian subjects, fulfilled their promises, instead of letting their judgment be obscured by other motives.

During the Congress, secret negotiations took place between the British and Russian Plenipotentiaries with regard to Article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty. England would not agree to the evacuation of the Russian troops from Armenia being made conditional upon the implementation of the reforms. Russia would not insist, and Germany simply could not be bothered with such details as the safety of the Armenians in their homeland.

Consequently Article 16 of the original agreement was replaced by Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which reads:

“The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.”

A close study of Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano and Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, shows that while the former stipulated that the Armenian territories occupied by Russia were **not** to be evacuated until **after** the reforms had been implemented by the Sultan, no such effective pressure on Turkey was implied by the latter treaty. The Sultan had not the slightest intention of carrying out the reforms, despite the fact that in Berlin he had given his pledge, not to one Power (Russia) alone as was the case in San Stefano, but to an international Congress. This Berlin Congress made the protection of the Armenians an international question, and the whole machinery of the reforms could have been placed on a sound and well-ordered footing under the watchful eye of the Powers. Nothing of the kind happened, however.

The Cyprus Convention had secured for Great Britain a strategically important base in the Eastern Mediterranean for the safeguard of the Suez Canal, the majority of the shares of which Disraeli had purchased from the Khedive. The safety of the route to the Far East was as compelling in 1878 as it is to-day.

Humanitarian considerations might therefore be shelved, at least temporarily, in order to check Russia's expansion. This attitude constituted a noteworthy departure by England from her principles.

The Armenians returned from Berlin empty-handed and bitterly disappointed; they now realized that they were abandoned to their fate, in order that equilibrium of the Powers might be maintained in Europe.

Gladstone denounced the acquisition of Cyprus as "an act of duplicity unsurpassed and rarely equalled in the history of man."

In 1896, the Duke of Argyll published "Our Responsibilities for Turkey" in which, commenting on the British attitude towards the Armenians, he wrote:

"As for the unfortunate Armenians, the change (the substitution of Article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty by Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, J. M.) was simply one which must tend to expose them to the increased enmity of their tyrants, whilst it damaged and discouraged the only protection which was possible under the inexorable conditions of the physical geography of the country. . . We might as well have addressed our representations to a convict just released from a long service, and determined at once to renew his career of crime."⁽⁴⁾

These were prophetic words.

* * *

Indeed after the Berlin Congress, in the absence of any effective measures for enforcing the reforms, the Sultan took full advantage of the rivalries of the Powers and started on a policy of systematic reprisals against the Armenians. He excited the passions of

the Moslem masses, who went out under the banner of the Prophet on an "orgy of looting, raping and throat-cutting" in the Armenian provinces — and in Constantinople. The Armenian Patriarch on one occasion fell on his knees before the bloodthirsty Sultan and implored him to save his flock. The Sultan screamed in a thunderous voice: — "You seem to expect the warships of the British. Before they can reach Constantinople the waters of the Bosphorus will be red with the blood of your accursed race." (5)

The British Fleet never cast anchor in the Bosphorus to protect the Armenians, and by the close of the century the condition of the latter had deteriorated beyond measure; the Sultan was bent upon settling the Armenian Question by exterminating the race.

Unconcerned though they were with the fate of the Armenian people, the Great Powers could not openly and deliberately ignore the menace to which the bloody Sultan's perversity was exposing the Empire.

Consequently on June 11, 1879, they despatched a strong Note to the Foreign Minister of Turkey calling his "most serious attention to the grave responsibility the Porte would incur by any fresh delay in the measures which the Powers agree in considering to be essential to the interests of the Ottoman Empire and Europe."

The Turkish Government's reply contained no more than a vague assurance to the effect that the reforms were being proceeded with, and that some administrative changes had already commenced. Reports received in London during the ensuing months from the British Consuls in Armenia, revealed the utter falsehood of the Sultan's assurances.

On September 11, 1880, another collective Note (dated September 7) was sent to the Sublime Porte suggesting a new plan, again urging that "the reforms to be introduced into the provinces inhabited by the Armenians are, by Treaty engagements, to be adapted to local wants, and to be carried out under the supervision of the Powers."

On October 3, 1880, the Turkish Government, without referring to the Collective Note addressed to it three weeks earlier, notified the Powers of the despatch of inspectors to Armenia. In the meanwhile, arms were being distributed amongst the Kurds. "Their tribes were enrolled as squadrons of territorial cavalry; regimental badges and modern rifles were served out to them from the Government stores, and their retaining fee was a free hand to use their official status and their official weapons as they pleased against their Armenian neighbors." (6)

A British Circular dated January 12, 1881, was sent out to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg calling the attention of these Governments to the state of affairs in Armenia, and asking them whether it would not be advisable to make representations to the Sublime Porte on the subject. Germany thought there was no valid reason to indulge in such a step; Austria would not join in a collective *démarche*; Italy and Russia would do so only if the proceeding had the assent of all the Signatories of the Berlin Treaty, while France left the proposal to the reconsideration of the British Government.

This lukewarm and ineffective attitude of the Powers towards the Armenian Reforms continued until 1895. On May 11 of that year, the Turkish Government was presented with yet another complicated plan

of reforms. "In its final form it was a perfunctory project, and the counter-project which the Ottoman Government announced its intention of applying in its stead was more illusory still." (7) After twenty years of diplomatic exchanges between the Western Chancelleries and the Porte, the question of the reforms was to all intents and purposes shelved, inasmuch as Armenia's dubious friends showed no desire to press the matter beyond platonic preliminaries.

That the interest displayed by the Powers in the welfare of the Armenian people was no more than academic is evidenced by the fact that on no occasion did they seriously envisage repressive measures, and this for the obvious reason that enforcement of the reforms might entail the setting up in Turkey of foreign control and the inevitable dismemberment of the decaying Ottoman Empire. "British public opinion demanded Turkish reforms; British strategists and many British politicians insisted that Great Britain must defend the integrity of the Turkish empire. The two demands were really incompatible." (8)

Indeed, ever since Russia's seizure of the Caucasus, the policy of the interested Powers regarding the Eastern Question was subordinated to their dogma of maintaining Turkey's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This short-sighted policy, adhered to with singular consistency, was harmful beyond measure to the Armenians; it also enabled Turkey to rest complacently in the assurance that the powerful "Christians" of the West contemplated no recourse to drastic measures to protect their Christian brethren in Turkey. It was undoubtedly due to Turkey's keen appraisal of this basic fact that every tentative move by the Powers towards improving the lot of the non-Moslem elements of the Empire, was by consummate cunning,

(as we have seen in the foregoing pages), preceded or followed by a Turkish undertaking to introduce reforms. One advantage Turkey sought from this crafty policy was the gaining of time to complete the work of exterminating her Christian subjects. The Powers left the interpretation of the whole project of reforms to the Ottoman Government, and failed to see that the latter had neither the will nor the ability to carry them out.

* * *

With the year 1894 began a series of massacres in Armenia. Men, women and children were savagely slaughtered in Sassoun. In the following years, organized massacres took place in Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, Marash, Kharpout and Zeitun. To the Powers' demand that these outrages should cease, the Turkish Government brazenly replied that "there was a general rising in Armenia, a statement which everybody in Turkey knew to be untrue."

The arrogance of the Sultan was enhanced in those years by the Kaiser's friendship for him. He was very appreciative of the first State visit the German Emperor and the Empress had paid him in 1889. Germany's economic and political influence in Turkey was steadily growing; German capital was pouring into Constantinople; Germans from every walk of life were frequent visitors, while since 1883 the reorganization of the Turkish Army had been entrusted to a German General, Freiherr Colmar von der Goltz (Pasha). This dramatic situation caused serious apprehension in Great Britain and France, but it caused Abdul Hamid and his Teutonic Master to beam with satisfaction.

Armenian reaction to the viciousness and turpitude of the Sultan found expression in 1896 when a

daring attempt was made to attract European attention to their plight.

On August 26, a group of Armenian patriots, all members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation "Dashnaktsoutune," led by Armen Garo (Garegin Padermadjian) captured the Ottoman Bank without, however, "the slightest intention of doing injury to property which belonged mainly to the British and French." Abdul Hamid was quick to let loose on the Armenian populace of the Capital his Kurdish and Turkish desperadoes who massacred, in one day, some six thousand defenseless Armenians in various parts of Constantinople. The demonstrators were permitted to negotiate with the Ambassadors and were promised a fresh attempt by the Powers to enforce the reforms, also personal safety if they surrendered. They were immediately allowed to take refuge aboard a British yacht and to leave the country unharmed.

A few days later, the Ambassadors addressed to the Sultan a strongly-worded Note considering it their duty to demand that the instigators and the principal actors of the massacres be "discovered and punished with the utmost rigor." The German Kaiser, we are told by Mr. Philip Graves, seized this occasion to send the Sultan on his birthday a signed photograph of himself, the Kaiserin, and his children, a token of friendship that aroused bitter comment in Western Europe and much encouraged Abdul Hamid.

During 1894-1896, no less than 300,000 Armenians perished in Armenia at the hands of the Turks. The Powers having hopelessly failed to put an end to the Machiavellian policy of the bloodthirsty tyrant, the reforms were still a dead letter at the close of the century.

CHAPTER II.

THE ADVENT OF THE YOUNG TURKS

The introduction in 1908 (July 23) of the Ottoman Constitution, and the subsequent dethronement of Sultan Hamid, gave rise among the Armenians to the hope that security of life, honor and property would at last be guaranteed under a new and allegedly enlightened administration. Abdul Hamid had done everything to widen the breach between the Turks and the Armenians. Might not the Young Turks bridge the gap by making a genuine effort to establish a more liberal administration for the benefit of all the peoples of their decaying Empire? "The Armenians threw themselves wholeheartedly into the service of the new regime. As soon as the Ottoman Constitution was restored, the Armenian political parties abandoned their revolutionary program in favor of parliamentary action, and cooperated in Parliament with the Young Turkish bloc so long as Young Turkish policy remained in any degree liberal or democratic."⁽⁹⁾

Events, however, were soon to show that the new rulers of Turkey — some of them of Western culture — had not improved in the least on their predecessors' treatment of their Armenian subjects. In less than a year of their coming to power — on April 14 and 27, 1909 — some 30,000 Armenians were put to death in Adana. It is beyond question that this butchery was instigated and organized by the unscrupulous adventurers of the Union and Progress Party who were, at the time, loudly extolling the ideals of Freedom, Jus-

tice, Fraternity, and Equality, but were also eager to assert their authority over the non-Turkish elements, all ready to check any national ambitions the latter might nourish under a tolerant regime.

On April 27, 1909, Abdul Hamid's reign came to an end after a short rising in which took part the Army of Freedom and the fanatical mob of Reactionaries. "May Allah damn everlastingly all who have caused these troubles" screamed the Monster of Yildiz as he was being entrained for Salonika. On the same day his 63-year-old younger brother, Reshad Effendi, who had been detained in captivity for thirty years, ascended the Ottoman throne under the title of Mohammed V.

We will not tax our readers with the detailed narrative of the main events that overtook the insolent and overbearing Young Turks between 1908 and 1913. Suffice it to say that their stupidity and utter ineptitude for a rational policy of tolerance, together with their melodramatic chauvinism, caused not only the collapse of the popular enthusiasm their professed aims had first created, but also precipitated serious unrest and troubles in Syria, Arabia and the Balkans. The unwillingness of the Union and Progress Party to fall in with the principle of local autonomy, and its clumsy attempt at Turkification, alarmed the minorities. "By 'Union' of an Empire which was a medley, they meant their own ascendancy, and by 'Progress' they meant Turkification. They were not reconcilers but masters; not Liberals but Chauvinists; not emancipators but centralizers." (10)

* * *

Thus the opening years of Constitutional regime in Turkey saw the gradual dismemberment of the Empire.

On October 5, 1908, with the apparent approval of Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria proclaimed its independence. On October 6, with the consent of Germany Italy and Russia, the Dual Monarchy announced, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin. On October 7, the tiny Kingdom of Montenegro asserted "its freedom from the restraints of the Treaty of Berlin," and on the following day the Cretans voted the union of their island with Greece.

By the middle of 1911, the difficulties of the Turkish Government increased considerably through serious disturbances in Albania and Macedonia, whose confidence the Young Turks by their folly had failed to regain.

During the same year, yet another dramatic event hastened the break-up of the Ottoman Empire.

The Italian Government, less fortunate in the matter of colonial expansion than Great Britain, France and Germany, viewed with some concern the attempts of the Young Turks to strengthen their hold over their North African possessions. Rome's reaction to these attempts took the form of a more vigorous policy seeking to protect Italian interests against Turkish obstructionism. The diplomatic world was astounded when Italy, on September 26, 1911, sent an ultimatum to the Turkish Government accusing it of "a state of disorder and neglect in Tripoli," and summoned it to consent, within twenty-four hours, to the cession of that territory. The Italian action was the logical outcome of a secret treaty signed eight years earlier, between France, Great Britain and Italy whereby the contracting parties had agreed to give each other a free hand in Morocco, Egypt and Tripoli

respectively. In the ensuing war Turkey, badly beaten, ceded to Italy not only all her possessions in North Africa, but also the Dodecanese Islands.

* * *

Nor was this the end of Turkey's troubles. In 1912, the Balkan League had become a reality. What the Great Powers had failed to accomplish because of mutual distrust, was brought about by the Young Turks' stupid policy of repression.

On March 13, 1912 a treaty of alliance was signed between Bulgaria and Serbia, followed on May 29 by a similar understanding between Bulgaria and Greece. The first of these important documents provided for the partition of Macedonia, "the arbitration of Russia to be invoked in case of dispute and about certain districts"; the second was a scheme between Greece and Bulgaria for mutual assistance in case of war and "contained no territorial compact."

By that time, the Turkish Government's aggressiveness had grown still harsher in Macedonia. It was evident that the Young Turks could not be induced to concede the partition of Macedonia except by force of arms. The mobilization of the Balkan armies was completed on September 30.

On October 8, Montenegro declared war on Turkey. On the 13th, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece delivered their ultimatum at Constantinople demanding radical reforms in the European vilayets of the Sultan. "Filled with sublime contempt for those who had been their slaves or vassals for centuries, the Turks disdained to reply" (11)

On October 18, the very day the Italo-Turkish Treaty of Peace was signed at Ouchy, the Balkans were ablaze with war.

After almost two month's bitter fighting during

which the League inflicted crushing blows on the Turkish army, the Great Powers and the belligerents assembled in London to seek a solution of the conflict. An armistice was actually concluded on December 3. Turkey was strongly recommended to surrender all her territories in Europe. "The map of Eastern Europe has to be recast, and the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which have cost them so dear," the Liberal Minister of Great Britain said in his Guildhall speech on November 9.

Kiamil Pasha's readiness to fall in with the Powers' recommendation was followed by a coup d'état in Constantinople, and the resumption of hostilities on February 3, 1913.

Turkey, severely mauled during the ensuing two months, bowed to the inevitable, and accepted on May 30 the terms of the Treaty of London surrendering all her dominions in the Balkan Peninsula.

But then occurred the break-up of the Balkan League. Bulgaria, not content with her territorial acquisitions, suddenly attacked Greece and Serbia. Roumania joined in the fray and invaded Bulgarian Dobrouja. The Turks were quick to take advantage of this dog-fight — officially termed the Second Balkan War — and occupied Adrianople and Eastern Thrace.

Another Peace Conference met at Bucharest on July 30, and by the resulting Treaty, signed on August 10, Turkey was stripped of her European possessions, with the exception of the regions she had recaptured.

Thus ended a conflict which European diplomacy succeeded, though only temporarily, in saving from becoming a general conflagration with even more fearful consequences. Turkey emerged from the war severely battered, and greatly diminished in prestige.

The Last Attempt

The situation in the Armenian provinces, during those fateful years, had not improved in the least. The Young Turks were bent on continuing the Red Sultan's infamous policy of persecuting a peaceful and industrious people whom it was their duty to protect. Hideous cases of looting, rape and murder were of daily occurrence on the Armenian plateau, and the Government showed no inclination whatever to put an end to these outrages. The Committee of Union and Progress knew only too well that Armenia was not within striking distance of the British Fleet. Nor were they inclined to forget that in all their actions they could count on the support of the German Emperor — and his Imperial armies.

By the end of 1912, however, there was no apparent reason to believe that Russia's attitude would be one of friendship towards the Power holding control of Constantinople and the Straits.

In January 1913, while the statesmen of Europe were assembled in London to confer on the Balkan and Turkish problems, the Armenians seized the opportunity and made one more desperate appeal to the Powers, reminding them of their pledges for the introduction of reforms in Armenia.

Once more, the "chivalrous friends" of Armenia turned a deaf ear to her dire wrongs.

On June 8, 1913, the Russian Government took the initiative and presented to the Powers concerned a scheme for reforms in Armenia based on the following documents:

- (1) **The Memoir on Armenian reforms of the French, Russian and British Ambassadors in Constantinople (March and April 1895).**

- (2) The scheme for administrative reforms for the province of Armenia drawn up by the French, Russian and British Ambassadors (March and April 1895).
- (3) The Armenian reform decree issued by His Majesty the Sultan, on October 20, 1895.
- (4) The draft of a vilayet law for European Turkey of August 11 to 23, 1880 drawn up by the European Commission.
- (5) The vilayet law of 1913.
- (6) Orders and negotiations with regard to Syria.

After protracted and strenuous negotiations conducted at Constantinople by the Ambassadors of the principal Powers, a comprehensive plan of reforms was signed, on February 8, 1914, between Gulkievitch, the Charge d' Affaires of the Russian Embassy, and Said Halim Pasha, the Grand Vizier of Turkey.

In its final shape, the ambitious Russian plan embodied the following main stipulations: the affected provinces were to be divided into two parts — Erzeroum, Trebizond, Sivas, and Van, Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir, each part to be placed under a European Inspector. The latter would be in charge of the entire administration of the two regions, and would have a police at their disposal. Moslems and Armenians were to be equal before the law, and the Armenian language would be a recognized medium in the Courts and public offices. A census would be taken under the direction of the Inspectors within a year, and the minority of the population would be accorded representation in the General Councils.

Subsequently, a Dutchman, Mr. Westenenk, and a Norwegian, Mr. Hoff, were selected as Inspectors.

They were not yet within sight of Armenian land when the First World War flared up in Europe, and the Turkish Government promptly denounced the agreement bearing its signature; and, finding itself entirely free of European restraint, resumed its policy of repression against the Armenians.

The latter found themselves, at the close of 1914, in a much worse situation than on the morrow of the Congress of Berlin.

“I made a mistake when I wished to imitate my father, Abdul Mejid, who sought reforms by persuasion and by liberal institutions. I shall follow in the footsteps of my grandfather, Sultan Mahmud. Like him I understand that it is only by force that one can move the peoples with whose guardianship Allah has entrusted me.” (12)

Thus spake his mind Sultan Abdul Hamid on February 12, 1878, in a special assembly that he had summoned, composed of his Ministers and notables. He did not, however, have enough time to “finish the job,” and the interpretation of Divine Guardianship was relegated to his more scientifically minded Young Turkish successors as will be seen in another chapter.

CHAPTER III.

FROM TORPOR TO SELF-DEFENSE

Unkind criticism has often been leveled against the Armenians for their resort to revolutionary acts during the three decades preceding the 1915 catastrophe. Certain pro-Turkish circles both in America and in England profess the belief that Armenian agitation in Turkey after the Congress of Berlin, was not the effect, but the cause that incited the Turkish people and their Government to take drastic measures to forestall a possible widespread Armenian revolution that might, in due course, endanger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This is tantamount to the contention that Turkey was a paradise before the advent of Armenian revolutionary societies, and that the Armenians were happily enjoying security of life, honor, and property together with free exercise of personal freedom. Some zealous Turcophiles even declare that the Armenians would have escaped the culminating tragedy that befell them in 1915 had they not, by their folly, aroused the bitter antagonism of their rulers.

No responsible person at all familiar with Turkish history will be deceived by such reckless distortion of the facts. It is hardly conceivable that a minority enjoying the full benefits of freedom, democracy, fair-play and justice in any country, would be tempted to swerve from loyalty to its government.

Had not the Turks raped Armenian womenfolk, murdered Armenian peasants and their children in

their thousands, desecrated Armenian churches, encroached upon Armenian property and established their rule of grinding tyranny with the ingenuity of barbarians of ancient times, no Armenian insurrection would have been imaginable in the Ottoman Empire. Unceasing oppression and massacres perpetrated by any government against defenseless citizens must, ultimately, drive the latter to open rebellion. It was the oppressive and outrageous misrule of the Turks that kindled Armenian wrath, because even they could not indefinitely bear the cruelties to which they were subjected.

The impotence or reluctance of the Powers to enforce the projected reforms was a contributing factor in rousing the Armenians from inert submission. All peaceful methods of liberation from the hideous yoke having proved futile, they had no alternative but recourse to revolutionary acts if they were to preserve their physical existence and their national heritage. The example of the Balkan peoples, who had obtained their freedom from Turkish tyranny by their own efforts and with the moral and material assistance of the Western Powers, was a prime incentive to the Armenians to revolt.

* * *

The nineteenth century witnessed the gradual awakening of national consciousness among the Armenians. It was during this period that enlightened writers among them, deeply influenced by the principles of the French and American Revolutions, sought to waken their kinsmen from the torpor of despair.

The forerunners of the movement for freedom were the "Defenders of the Fatherland," a group of Armenian artisans, peasants and tradesfolk who sat

in conclave in Ezeroum in 1880, with the avowed object of seeking means whereby to remedy the plight of their fellow-countrymen in the Armenian provinces. This was the first, yet ill-starred, signal for revolt. The clandestine activity of this patriotic group lasted only two years; in 1882 the Turkish Government crushed the movement and sentenced the leaders to long terms of imprisonment.

In 1885, in the Armenian city of Van, the foundations were laid for another underground organization — the “Armenakans” — who sought to gather together all the militant elements of the race in order to prepare for more effective forms of revolutionary activity. This movement too met with the same fate, but it helped somewhat to foster among the Armenians the conviction that their only hope of liberation lay in revolution.

A third attempt was made in 1877 when a group of Armenian patriots, inspired mainly by the tenets of German and Russian Social-Democrats, founded the Hunchakian Party with the aim of delivering the Armenian people from the Turkish and Czarist rule. During the first two years of its existence, the Party succeeded in organizing various action Committees throughout Armenia and in Constantinople, and made a demonstration in the capital for the purpose of drawing the Powers' attention to the intolerable conditions in Armenia.

The unusual interest the Hunchaks displayed in Marxian ideology and the somewhat confused and inchoate polemics in which their leaders indulged soon caused disillusionment. True, the Party maintained a steady growth up to the opening years of the century, but inside bickering reduced it to opposing factions and eventually deprived it of any influence among

Armenians. As we indite these lines, the remnants of the so-called Social-Democratic Hunchakian Party represent, for all practical purposes and as evidenced by their press and platform, the Armenian cell of the Communist International, their pro-Soviet policy being completely alien to the true democratic aims of the overwhelming majority of the nation.

* * *

The revolutionary movement gathered momentum in 1890 when, under the guidance of three Armenians, Christapor Michaelian, Rostom Zorian, and Simon Zavarian, the militant patriots assembled under one banner, and founded in the summer of that year the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsootune, commonly known as the Dashnaks) which to this day is the strongest and the most popular and democratic political organization of Armenians throughout the world. Its authority is unchallenged in the body politic of the nation.

With the inception of this Party, the emancipation movement entered a new phase; it gained consistency and became more rational and considerably more effective.

The avowed purpose of the Federation was the liberation of the Armenian people from the tyranny of the Sultan, and their survival as a distinct national entity. The resort, to revolutionary tactics during the ensuing two decades, only stressed their determination to overthrow the Sultan's arbitrary regime, and establish if possible in its stead a liberal and democratic administration throughout the Empire. Violent measures were not an end in themselves, as is unfairly insinuated, but were designed to promote freedom and security in Turkey. That the Party entertained no

separatist aims is evidenced by the resolution it adopted in its 1907 Convention, to the effect that Turkish Armenia forms an inseparable part of the Constitutional Ottoman State enjoying local autonomy.

The renaissance of the Armenian people constituted no threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as the problem confronting the Armenians was not how to overthrow the latter, but how to arrest its downfall. No one who enquires into the relations between the Turks and the Armenians should overlook the fact that the latter, along with the Greeks and the Jews, had at their command the economic resources of the country, and they would be among the first to benefit from the Empire remaining as a sovereign entity.

That the Party believed in liberal democracy and the inalienable right of the citizen to life and liberty is borne out by its program of 1892, which embodies the principles of equality of all races and creeds before the law, security of life, honor and property, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of religion, universal suffrage, compulsory education for all, free enterprise and fair distribution of land among the peasantry. We need hardly point out that the Federation has for sixty years fervently championed these ideals, and political maturity has only strengthened its firm belief in free and democratic institutions. Hence the Dashnaks' bitter opposition today to Communist ethics.

* * *

During the first decade of its existence, the Federation's activity was confined to Turkey proper. However, as a result of the Czarist Government's arbitrary seizure in 1903 of the estates of the Armenian Church and the closing of all Armenian schools, it extended its field of activity to Russia, in order to combat by all

the means at its disposal the policy of Russification implied by these coercive measures. It was, consequently, under the leadership of the Dashnaks that the resistance put up by the Armenians resulted after two years of bitter struggle in the "surrender" of the Czar who rescinded his arbitrary edict, to avert troublesome developments.

The Federation took active part in the first Russian Revolution, and was not without its modest share in the promulgation of the Constitution in 1905. The Armenian members of the Russian Parliament were mainly adherents of the Party.

In Persia, during the Revolution of 1907, the nationalist forces fought against the dynasty, under the command of two Armenians, Ephrem and Keri, also members of the Federation.

We do not propose to narrate, in the short limits of this survey, the long series of heroic acts to which the Federation resorted during the two decades preceding the First World War, in an endeavor to liberate the Armenian people from the grinding tyranny of the Sultan or the autocratic rule of the Czar. These acts enhanced the Party's prestige and influence and aroused the nation from the lethargy into which it had fallen through ceaseless woes. Its liberalism and democratic spirit achieved amazing popularity among the intellectual and working classes, and its presence and influence are today felt in every phase of Armenian life, outside the confines of Soviet Armenia.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation is looked upon by the leaders of the democratic nations as the only organization really directing the political, cultural, and social life of Armenian communities in free and hospitable lands. It should also be added that it is

the only Armenian organization passionately devoted to the ideology of democracy that is combating Communist propaganda among Armenians in the United States and in other countries.

The First World War ushered in a new era for the Armenian people marked, on the one hand, by the unparalleled tragedy of 1915, and on the other, by the foundation in 1918 of the Armenian Republic under the heroic leadership of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. These events are of sufficient moment to deserve separate chapters.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

On the eve of the cataclysm of 1914, the Great Powers were entrenched in two rival camps: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy), and the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia). The first came into existence in 1882 when Italy joined the "defensive alliance" concluded three years earlier between Germany and Austria; the second was formally "completed" in 1907 by Russia's adherence to the Anglo-French Entente signed in 1904, that is, when "the drifting apart of England and Germany had become a clearly marked process, and the time seemed ripe for a better understanding with France."⁽¹³⁾

This sinister alignment of forces fraught with grave perils developed after the Congress of Berlin, and led eventually to what was believed, by an optimistic world, to be the last of all wars.

The War of 1914 was the fatalistic culmination of a perilous situation prevailing in Europe ever since the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1871. The period is marked by a multiplicity of international disputes embittered by intolerant nationalism, and by lack of coordination of interests among the Great Powers.

The chief factor, however, in disrupting the normal order in Europe was the German challenge. Her bid for a place in the sun, her amazing industrial evolution, her hazardous efforts to acquire supremacy in all fields of human activity, her Naval Bill of 1898, her ambitious colonial program, her attempts to achieve

ascendancy in the Mohammedan world by patronizing Turkey, her hostility towards a resurgent France, her watchful eye on Russia, and the conceit and self-assertiveness of her Emperor, caused serious apprehensions, and brought about more and more anarchy in international relations.

The accession to the throne in 1888 of Kaiser Wilhelm II. a nephew of Queen Victoria of England, was destined to create a highly dangerous situation in Europe. All hopes of maintaining the equilibrium the Iron Chancellor succeeded in establishing, vanished with the latter's dismissal by the Kaiser in 1890. "The master who had dropped the pilot would wreck the ship."⁽¹⁴⁾ The publication in 1885 of the terms of the Triple Alliance and the increase of the German armed forces in 1888, made it abundantly clear that the German menace was directed not only against France, whose rapid recovery after the debacle of 1871 had caused sharp misgivings in Germany, but also against Russia. Germany intended to support Austria against Russian encroachments in the Balkans, and Italy against French advance eastward along the North African coast.

The conclusion, in January, 1894, of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia was, therefore, a security measure taken by the two Powers to ward off the Teutonic menace.

The antagonism of Great Britain and Germany grew apace during the last decade of the century, largely owing to Germany's increasing interest in the Ottoman Empire. The Bagdad Railway project was a direct threat to the safety of the British Empire routes and the Suez Canal.

In 1898, the Kaiser paid his second state visit to the Sultan, followed by an spectacular tour in Palestine. In Damascus, he proclaimed himself "the friend and protector of three hundred million Musulmans who hon-

ored Sultan Abdul Hamid as Caliph," an assertion not only of Germany's interest in the future of Turkey, but also of her opposition to British rule in India and French rule in North Africa.

Germany's uncalled-for interference in South Africa in 1895, and her expansionist policy in China and the Pacific Islands, shown up two years later, were minor incidents compared to the alarming situation facing Great Britain in 1900, when Germany disclosed her purpose of doubling the Navy's fighting strength laid down in her Navy Bill of 1898. The plan directly challenged British supremacy of the seas. "I will not rest until I have brought my navy to the height whereat my army stands," proclaimed the Kaiser, emphasizing further the threat contained in the Preamble of the Bill; "In order, under existing conditions, to protect Germany's maritime trade and Colonies, there is only one means: Germany must possess a battle-fleet so strong that a war would involve dangers of such a kind, even for the mightiest of naval antagonists, as to bring its own power into question." Britain replied to this challenge by steadily increasing her naval power during the ensuing years, also by the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, and by the Anglo-Russian agreement concluded in 1907.

In 1905, the bombastic Emperor of Germany proclaimed at Tangier his "resolve to do all in my power to safeguard German interests in Morocco." His threats, however, resulted in a slight modification only of French administration in Morocco, agreed on at the Algeciras Conference of 1906.

Five years later, at Agadir, Germany once again unsheathed her shining sword. She fared better this time, obtaining territorial compensations in Equatorial Africa at the expense of France.

Keen disappointment was felt in Germany at the

failure of the Turkish arms during the Tripoli and Balkan wars. In 1913 the Kaiser was more than ever anxious to extend his control over the Turkish army, and in the autumn of that year a German military mission under General Liman von Sanders was despatched to Constantinople. After representations made by the Powers to the Sublime Porte, von Sanders was appointed Inspector-General of the Turkish Army, instead of Commander of the 1st Army Corps as was originally intended.

“It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily.”

These ominous words, uttered by the German Crown Prince in 1913, were not calculated to quiet British, French, and Russian apprehensions.

In 1914, tension reached such a climax that only a spark was needed to set the world afire. On June 28 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, nephew of the Austrian Emperor and heir to the throne, was assassinated with his consort at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within a month of this foul murder, Europe was ablaze with an unprecedented — yet not unexpected — conflagration.

With so much at stake is it to be wondered that the European Powers took only a half-hearted interest during those fateful years in the welfare of the Armenian people?

* * *

Turkey Enters the War

The outbreak of the First World War precipitated a serious crisis in Turkey which, by the end of 1913, had fallen into the economic orbit of an industrialized Germany and virtually become a German protectorate.

If Turkey were called upon to choose sides in the European conflict, there were fundamental reasons, according to the Committee of Union and Progress, why she could not and would not join the Entente Powers.

Russia would, in the event of an Allied victory, infringe upon the sovereignty of the Empire and certainly occupy the Straits and Constantinople, also the Armenian provinces generally claimed by her to be a Russian sphere of influence. Great Britain and France could not be regarded as true friends on account of their agreements with Russia, and they would not hesitate to support the latter against Turkey. A war-time understanding with the Entente would carry no safe guarantee for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

However, by associating herself with an "invincible" Germany, Turkey might not only offset the Russian menace, but undermine British influence in the Near and Middle East by a Pan-Islamic revival in all Mohammedan countries east of the Suez Canal. National honor and security demanded, so the Young Turks claimed, that Turkey go into the European War as an ally of Germany.

On August 2, a Treaty of Alliance was actually signed between Germany and Turkey. The Entente Powers offered to respect the independence of Turkey and after the war cancel the Capitulations, provided Turkey agreed to remain neutral. Germany offered the Turks Transcaucasia, effective sovereignty over Egypt and financial and economic assistance if they would undertake to fight the Allies.

Two major incidents brought to pass that which diplomacy had failed to achieve.

During August, the British Government impounded two battleships that Turkey had ordered in England

and which were ready for sea. The two units added to the Turkish Fleet would disturb the balance of naval power in the Black Sea at the expense of Russia.

On August 11, the German battle-cruiser **Goeben** and the cruiser **Breslau**, evading British pursuit in the Mediterranean, cast anchor in the Bosphorus and two months later, on October 29, made a raid on the Russian Port of Odessa. On October 31, the Young Turk Government took the fatal step of declaring war on Russia and her Allies.

In a proclamation to his armed forces, the Sultan affirmed that "the war was to be waged in defense of the Caliphate and for the emancipation of the Fatherland." The Jihad or the Sacred War of the Young Turks proved, however, a complete fiasco, for it did not prevent the Arab world from placing itself on the side of the Entente Powers.

Great Britain and France declared war on Turkey on November 6, and Russia followed suit on the 11th.

* * *

The Armenian Attitude

In August 1914, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was holding its eighth quadrennial Convention at Erzeroum in Armenia, to examine, among other problems, the political situation arising out of the Serajevo murder and the repercussions the armed conflict in Europe might have on Turkey's behavior.

"As soon as they heard of this Congress, the Young Turks hastened to send their representatives to Erzeroum to propose that the Party declare its intention of aiding and defending Turkey, by organizing an insurrection in the Caucasus in the event of a declaration of war between Turkey and Russia. According to the project of the Young Turks, the Armenians were to

pledge themselves to form legions of volunteers and send them to the Caucasus with the Turkish propagandists, to prepare the way there for the uprising.

“The Young Turk representatives had already brought their propagandists with them to Erzeroum—27 individuals of Persian, Turkish, Lesghian and Circassian nationality. Their chief was Emir Hechmet. The Turks tried to persuade the Armenians that the Caucasian insurrection was inevitable; that very shortly the Tartars, Georgians, and Mountaineers would revolt and that the Armenians would consequently be obliged to follow them.

“They even sketched the future map of the Caucasus.

“The Turks offered to the Georgians the provinces of Koutais and Tiflis, the Batoum district and a part of the province of Trebizond; to the Tartars, Shousha, the mountain country as far as Vladikavkaz, Bakou, and a part of the province of Elisavetopol; while to the Armenians they offered Kars, the province of Erivan, a part of Elisavetopol, a fragment of the province of Erzeroum, Van, and Bitlis. According to the Young Turk scheme, all these groups were to become autonomous under a Turkish protectorate.

“The Erzeroum Congress refused these proposals, and advised the Young Turks not to hurl themselves into the European conflagration—a dangerous adventure which would lead Turkey to ruin.

“The Young Turks were irritated by this advice.

“This is treason, cried Behaeddin-Shakir, one of the delegates from Constantinople: “You take sides with Russia in a moment as critical as this; you refuse to defend the Government; you forget that you are enjoying its hospitality.”

“But the Armenians held to their decision.

“Once more before the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, the Young Turks tried to obtain the Armenians’ support. This time they opened their pourparlers with more moderate proposals, and negotiated with the Armenian representatives of each vilayet. . . . The project of an Armenian rising in the Caucasus was abandoned. Instead, the Ottoman Armenians were to unite with the Transcaucasian Tartars, whose insurrection was, according to the Young Turks, a certainty.

“Once more the Armenians refused.”(15)

If the Turks were working on the credulity of the Armenian people, they certainly were rudely awakened by the refusal of the Dashnak Party to let the nation fall into the Turkish trap.

While no effort was spared by this Party during the ensuing three months to dissuade the Turkish Government from entering the War on the side of the Central Powers, it was made abundantly clear to them that in the event of an armed conflict between Turkey and Russia, the Armenians on both sides of the frontier would fulfill their duty to their respective governments.

Turkey remained, however, unshaken in her resolution and entered the War as an ally of Germany.

CHAPTER V.

THE MASSACRES OF 1915-1916

Infuriated by the downright refusal of the Armenians to acquiesce in their anti-Russian policy, the Turks attacked the Armenian people with diabolical barbarism, and massacred, during 1915-16, no less than one million men, women and children, hoping thus to settle the Armenian problem once and for all.

The war offered the Young Turks a first-class opportunity to finish what the bloodthirsty Sultan had left undone.

The contention of Turkish and German apologists that the Armenians took up arms to undermine the security of the Ottoman Empire, and joined the Russians as soon as the Czar's armies crossed the frontier in Armenia, is altogether baseless.

There was no provocation on the part of the Armenians, and certainly no conspiracy to create internal unrest at a time when Turkey was engaged on the battlefield. The plan of mass extermination of the Armenians was devised long prior to 1915. The war, far from being the cause, was the opportunity that the Turks were quick to seize, because "the best way to get rid of the Armenian problem was to get rid of the Armenians."

Armenian evidence in this connection may be suspected of bias. In the interest of historic truth, therefore, we quote passages from the impartial testimony of no less an authority than Mr. Arnold J. Toynbee, the distinguished British historian who pleaded the Armenian case with exemplary courage:

“The Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire were everywhere uprooted from their homes, and deported to the most remote and unhealthy districts that the Government could select for them. Some were murdered at the outset, some perished on the way, and some died after reaching their destination. The death-roll amounts to upwards of six hundred thousand; perhaps six hundred thousand more are still alive in their places of exile; and the remaining six hundred thousand or so have either been converted forcibly to Islam, gone into hiding in the mountains, or escaped beyond the Ottoman frontier. The Ottoman Government cannot deny these facts, and they cannot justify them. No provocation or misdemeanor on the part of individual Armenians could justify such a crime against the whole race. But it might be explained and palliated if the Armenians, or some of them, were originally in the wrong; and therefore the Ottoman Government and its German apologists have concentrated their efforts on proving that this was the case. There are three main Turkish contentions, none of which will bear examination.

“The first contention is that the Armenians took up arms and joined the Russians as soon as the latter crossed the Ottoman frontier. The standard case cited is the “Revolt of Van.” The deportations, they maintain, were ordered only after this outbreak, to forestall its repetition elsewhere. This contention is easily rebutted. In the first place, there was no Armenian revolt at Van. The Armenians merely defended the quarter of the city in which they lived, after it had been besieged and attacked by Turkish troops, and the outlying villages visited with massacre by Turkish patrols. The outbreak was on the Turkish side, and the responsibility lies with the Turkish governor, Djevdet Bey. In the second place, the deportations

had already begun in Cilicia before the fighting at Van broke out. . .

“There were several instances in which the Armenians took up arms, but none of them are relevant to the case. They were all subsequent in date to these cardinal instances (Van, Zeitoun, J. M.), and were simply attempts at self-defense by people who had seen their neighbors massacred or deported, and were threatened with the same fate themselves. The Armenians of Moush resisted when they were attacked by Djevdet Bey, who had already tried to massacre the Armenians of Van and had succeeded in massacring those of Sairt and Bitlis. The Armenians of Sasoun resisted when the Kurds had destroyed their kinsmen in the plain of Diyarbekir and were closing in upon themselves. . . Further west, a few villages took up arms in the Vilayet of Sivas, after the rest of the Sivas Armenians had been deported; and at Shabin. Karahissar the Armenians drove out their Turkish fellow-townsmen and stood for several weeks at bay, when they heard how the exiles from Trebizond and Kerasond had been murdered on the road. The defence of Jebel-Moussa in August was similarly inspired by the previous fate of Zeitoun. The resistance at Ourfa in September was another act of despair, provoked by the terrible procession of exiles from Harpout and the north-east, which had been filing for three months through Ourfa before the Armenian colony there was also summoned to take the road. These. . . were all a consequence of the deportations, and not their cause. It may be added that, wherever resistance was offered, the Turks suppressed it with inconceivable brutality, not merely retaliating upon the fighting men, but, in most cases, massacring every Armenian man, woman

and child in cold blood after the fighting was over. These cases were not palliations of the atrocities, but occasions of the worst excesses.

“The second contention is that there was a general conspiracy of Armenians throughout the Empire to bring about an internal revolution at a moment when all the Ottoman military forces were engaged on the frontiers, and so deliver the country into the hands of the Allies. The prompt action of the Ottoman Government in disarming, imprisoning, executing and deporting the whole people — innocent and guilty alike — is alleged to have crushed this movement before it had time to declare itself. This is an insidious line of argument, because it refuses to be tested by the evidence of what actually occurred. . . The revolution, it is alleged, was to break out when the Allies landed in Cilicia; — but such a landing was never made. Or it was arranged in conjunction with the landing at the Dardanelles — but the landing was made and the outbreak never happened. Indeed, it is hard to see what the Armenians could have done, for nearly all their able-bodied men between twenty and forty-five years of age were mobilized at the beginning of the war. . .

“ . . . we are left with the third, which lays little stress on justice or public safety and bases the case on revenge. The Armenian civil population in the Ottoman Empire, it is alleged, owes its misfortunes to the Armenian volunteers in the Russian Army. “Our Armenians in Turkey,” say the Turks in effect, “have certainly suffered terribly from the measures we have taken; they may even have suffered innocently; but can you blame us? Was it not human nature that we should revenge ourselves on the Armenians at home for the injury we had received from their compatriots fighting against us at the front in the Rus-

sians ranks — men who actually volunteered to fight against us in the enemy's cause?

"This is almost the favorite argument of the apologists, and yet it is surely the most monstrous of any, for these Armenian volunteers owed no allegiance to the Turks at all, but were ordinary Russian subjects. . . The loyalty of the Russian Armenians to Russia cast no imputation upon the Ottoman Armenians, and was no concern of the Turks.

"The various Turkish contentions thus fail, from first to last, to meet the point. They all attempt to trace the atrocities of 1915 to events arising out of the war; but they not only cannot justify them on this ground, they do not even suggest any adequate motive for their perpetration." (16)

* * *

In his open letter addressed, in January 1919, to the President of the United States, Mr. Armin T. Wegner, a German eye-witness to the Armenian massacres, furnishes the following commentary on Turkish "civilization":

“. . . Parties which on their departure from the homeland of High Armenia consisted of thousands, numbered on their arrival in the outskirts of Aleppo only a few hundreds, while the fields were strewed with swollen, blackened corpses, infecting the air with their odor, lying about desecrated, naked, having been robbed of their clothes, or driven, bound back to back, to the Euphrates to provide food for the fishes. Sometimes gendarmes in derision threw into the emaciated hands of starving people a little meal which they greedily licked off, merely

with the result of prolonging their death-agony. Even before the gates of Aleppo they were allowed no rest. For incomprehensible and utterly unjustifiable reasons of war, the shrunken parties were ceaselessly driven barefooted, hundreds of miles under the burning sun, through stony defiles, over pathless steppes, enfeebled into the wilderness of desolation. Here they died — slain by Kurds, robbed by gendarmes, shot, hanged, poisoned, stabbed, strangled, mown down by epidemics, drowned, frozen, parched with thirst, starved — their bodies left to putrefy or to be devoured by jackals.

“Children wept themselves to death, men dashed themselves against the rocks, mothers threw their babies into brooks, women with child flung themselves, singing, into the Euphrates. They died all the deaths on the earth, the deaths of all the ages.”

Should Mr. Wegner's description be adjudged as mere generalizations, we refer the reader to the British Blue Book (The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire), a compilation of 149 official documents, emanating mainly from neutral witnesses in which will be found devastating evidence of Turkish barbarism. Here are some horrifying instances which strike the eye as one turns over its pages:

“. . . Many Armenian women preferred to throw themselves into the Euphrates with their infants, or committed suicide in their homes. The Euphrates

and Tigris have become the sepulchre of thousands of Armenians." (Page 14).

" . . . The girls have been outraged mercilessly; we have seen their mutilated corpses tied together in batches of four, eight or ten, and cast into the Euphrates . The majority had been mutilated in an indescribable manner." (Page 21).

" . . . In the village of Tel-Armen and in the neighboring villages about 500 people were massacred, leaving only a few women and children. The people were thrown alive down wells or into the fire." (Page 26).

" . . . In the Armenian villages, the whole male population above the age of twelve was led out in batches and shot before the eyes of the women and children." (Page 81).

" . . . It was a very common thing for them to rape our girls in our presence. Very often they violated eight or ten-year-old girls, and as a consequence many would be unable to walk, and were shot." (Page 92).

" . . . She told Prince Argoutian. . . that she shuddered to recall how hundreds of children were bayoneted by the Turks and thrown into the Euphrates, and how men and women were stripped naked, tied together in hundreds, shot and then hurled into the river." (Page 239).

“ . . . He told how, at each village, the women had been violated; . . . how children had had their brains battered out when they cried or hindered the march.” (Page 249).

“ . . . On the road to Aleppo from Ourfa she passed numbers of corpses lightly buried under a layer of soil. The extremities of the limbs were protruding, and had been gnawed by dogs.” (Page 260).

“ . . . A Turk said that this boat was not far from Trebizond by another boat containing gendarmes, who proceeded to kill all the men and throw them overboard. . . . A number of such caiques (boats, J.M.) have left Trebizond loaded with men, and usually they returned empty after a few hours.” (Page 287).

“ . . . The condemned were stripped of all but their underclothing and led to the brink of a great ditch. There they knelt with their hands bound behind their backs and were despatched by axe-blows on the head.” (Page 373).

“ . . . Women with little children in their arms, or in the last days of pregnancy, were driven along under the whip like cattle. Three different cases came under my knowledge where the woman was delivered on the road and, because of her brutal driver hurried her along, she died of haemorrhage.” (Page 472).

* * *

Nor did the insatiable savagery of the Turk stop with the destruction of human lives. Unparalleled vandalism accompanied these hideous atrocities throughout Armenia. With an uncompromising zeal,

the Turks obliterated all traces of Armenian culture and civilization. Over two thousand churches out of a total of 2120, three hundred convents, over two thousand schools and a large number of architectural monuments were either set on fire or converted into stables or military depots.

* * *

The prelude to these diabolical orgies of cold-blooded barbarism was staged in the Turkish capital, shortly after the defeat of the Ottoman armies on the Caucasian front.

On April 24, 1915, the Turkish police rounded up some 250 prominent Armenians — the very flower of Armenian intellectual life including deputies, lawyers, clergy, writers, poets, professors, doctors, many of them of academic distinction — and exiled them, within two days, to the wilderness of Anatolia. A very small number were subsequently returned to Constantinople through the influence of friends. The rest were dastardly murdered on the specific orders of the Turkish Government. Then followed the slaughter of the population in Armenia proper.

To the pleas of the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople on behalf of his flock, the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha, replied with characteristic Turkish insolence:

“Before the war you approached the Entente Powers, wishing to cut loose from the Ottoman Empire. What is happening to the Armenians is in pursuance of a plan that will be carried out.”

Incontrovertible evidence is on record to prove that the orders for the mass extinction of the Armen-

ian people were issued to the provincial Governors from Constantinople.

In support of this affirmation, we quote a few dispatches for the benefit of those apologists who indulge in panegyrics of the virtues of the Turk, and acclaim him as a humane and civilized creature (17):

Order No. 691.

To the Government of Aleppo.

Nov. 23, 1915 — Destroy by secret means the Armenians of the Eastern Provinces who pass into your hands there.

**Minister of Interior
Talaat**

* * *

A cipher-telegram from the Ministry of the Interior, sent to the Government of Aleppo.

Dec. 1, 1915 — In spite of the fact that it is necessary above all to work for the extermination of the Armenian Clergy, we hear that they are being sent to suspicious places like Syria and Jerusalem. Such a permit is an unpardonable delinquency. The place of exile of such seditious people is annihilation. I recommend you to act accordingly.

**Minister of Interior
Talaat**

* * *

Order to the Government of Aleppo.

Sept. 21, 1915 — There is no need for an orphanage. It is not the time to give way to sentiment and feed the orphans. Send them away to the desert and inform us.

Minister of Interior
Talaat

* * *

Order No. 830.

Dec. 25, 1915 — Collect and keep only those orphans who cannot remember the tortures to which their parents have been subjected. Send the rest away with the caravans.

Minister of Interior
Talaat

* * *

Order to the Government of Aleppo.

Sept. 16, 1915 — It was at first communicated to you that the Government, by order of the Jemiet (Committee of Union and Progress, J.M.) had decided to destroy completely all the Armenians living in Turkey. Those who oppose this order and decision cannot remain on the official staff of the Empire. An end must be put to their exist-

ence, however criminal the measures taken may be, and no regard must be paid to either age or sex nor to conscientious scruples.

Minister of Interior
Talaat

* * *

A cipher-telegram from the War Office sent to all the commanding officers of the army.

Feb. 27, 1916 — In view of present circumstances, the Imperial Government has issued an order for the extermination of the whole Armenian race. The following operations are to be made with regard to them:

(1) All the Armenians in the country who are Ottoman subjects, from five years of age upwards, are to be taken out of towns and slaughtered.

(2) All the Armenians serving in the Imperial Armies are to be separated from their divisions without making any disturbance; they are to be taken into solitary places away from the public eye, and shot.

(3) Armenian officers in the army are to be imprisoned in the barracks belonging to their regiments until further orders.

Forty-eight hours after these three orders are communicated to the commanders of each regiment, a special order will be issued for their execution. You are not to undertake any operations except those indispensable for the execution of these orders.

Representative of the
High Command, and
Minister of War
Enver

Need we add more to convince our readers that the Armenian massacres of 1915-1916 were not the work of a handful of brigands as some superficial observers think, but the sequence of a systematic plan devised and executed by a criminal government?

In the year of grace 1950, the Turks whose sole distinction for centuries has been a career of crime and an unquenchable thirst for Christian blood, are hailed as "civilized gentlemen." They are welcomed in the United Nations and other international assemblies where their "expert" counsel is sought on such matters as justice, freedom, equality, humanity and democracy.

Never have the annals of history recorded such tragic and abominable mockery.

* * *

What of Germany's share of responsibility in the Armenian tragedy?

"I had never felt fully convinced, by the protestations of the German Embassy that they had done their utmost to put a check on the murderous attacks on harmless Armenians far from the theater of war, who from their whole surroundings and their social class could not be in a position to take an active part in politics, and on the cold-blooded neglect and starvation of women and children apparently deported for no other reason than to die. The attitude of the German Government towards the Armenian question had impressed me as a mixture of cowardice and lack of conscience on the one hand and the most short-sighted stupidity on the other."

These words were written not by an Armenian, but a German, Dr. Harry Stuermer, the Constantinople correspondent of the *Koelnische Zeitung* during 1915-1916. (18)

Germany did not lift a finger to deliver the Armenians from the Turkish scimitar. Aggressive Turkish nationalism was no immediate threat to her, and the nefarious scheme of massacres fitted conveniently into her "Drang nach Osten" policy, the realization of which would indeed be advanced by wiping out the Armenians — the chief stumbling block to the German expansion in the Near East. Furthermore, it was imperative that the political and territorial stability of the Ottoman Empire remain intact. This ambitious design could not, however, be achieved while the Ar-

menian element had at its command the economic resources of the Empire.

Consequently, the Kaiser did not demur when his Young Turk lackeys submitted to him their sinister plan of massacres. On the contrary, he gave it his royal assent and blessing; it would help eliminate Russia's pretext for future encroachments on Turkish sovereignty. The untiring efforts of the American Ambassador, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, to enlist the co-operation of his German colleague, Baron von Wangenheim, in bringing the Turks to their senses, proved fruitless. The exigencies of German "Weltpolitik" demanded that the Armenians be exterminated. While the Turks were slaughtering the Armenians in their hundreds of thousands, the German Emperor was presenting a sword of honor to the Sultan of Turkey and showering honors upon Enver Pasha.

CHAPTER VI

RUSSIA AND THE ARMENIANS

Turkey was not alone in her anxiety to secure the co-operation of the Armenian people in her struggle with the Entente.

During the early stages of the War, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Count Vorontzoff-Dashkoff, made a dramatic appeal to the Armenians. If the Armenians were prepared to fight wholeheartedly for the Russian Fatherland and Throne, and co-operate with the Imperial armies against the common enemy, His Imperial Majesty the Czar would be graciously pleased to reward their loyalty by setting up, after the inevitable destruction of the Ottoman Empire, an autonomous Armenia within the confines of the six provinces of Turkish Armenia. The Czar gave a similar assurance to the Supreme Head of the Armenian Church, Catholicos George V., during his official visit to Tiflis in November 1914.

These were undoubtedly messages of comfort and hope, and it would have been perfectly normal for the romantically inclined Armenians to greet them with unbounded enthusiasm.

However, what the Emperor of all the Russias and his emissary had forgotten to remember was that the Armenians always remembered not to forget. Indeed, this was not the first time that the "Russian Uncle" had made promises. During the course of the nineteenth century similar glittering pledges were

given by him, each time to be promptly forgotten. Had not the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lobanoff Rostowsky, cynically declared in 1896, in reply to a question put to him by a foreign correspondent who wanted to know why Russia did not occupy Armenia in order to save the Armenians from the Turkish flail — “We need Armenia, but without the Armenians”!

Nevertheless, in 1914, the Armenians had a good excuse to let bygones be bygones — Russia was not alone in her fight against the evil power of the Teutons; England and France, together with the rest of the civilized world, were on her side; a new era of human destinies would emerge from the mighty struggle, and Armenia would regain her place among free nations. Assuredly, this was no time to hurl recriminations at the Russian Government. The Armenians in Russia would remain loyal to the Fatherland and would fight for her.

Therefore, from the very beginning of the Russo-Turkish War, the Armenians in Russia, under the leadership of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnak), had the political acumen and courage to overlook their grievances against the Czarist regime, and espouse the cause of Russia and her allies. They were, as we have seen in a previous chapter, completely uninfluenced by Turkish propaganda, and responded wholeheartedly to the Emperor's call to arms.

By 1915, in addition to some 200,000 Armenian regulars, 20,000 Armenians expressed their eagerness to take up arms against Turkey; an Armenian National Bureau was set up in the Georgian capital to organize the volunteer movement. The Armenians were elated with the initial successes of the Russian armies, and were looking forward to political and

territorial compensations for their unflinching loyalty to the Russians. Their optimism, however, was to receive a shattering blow during 1916.

The massive Russian onslaught on Turkey, under the command of General Yudenitch, began in the winter of 1915. "The Russian columns advanced southward from the Russo-Turkish Caucasian frontier, and about the middle of January, 1916, began their march through bleak mountain passes leading into Turkish Armenia. The northern column isolated one Turkish corps and drove it rapidly northward to the shores of the Black Sea; the southern column cut off two divisions from the main Turkish army; while the central column, following the highway from Sarikamish toward Erzeroum, inflicted a crushing defeat on three Turkish divisions at Keuprukeui, January 16-18, and forced the crossing of the Araxes River in the midst of a blinding snowstorm. Ruthlessly pursued by Cossack cavalry, the Turkish infantry retired in disorder, strewing the road from Keuprikeui to Erzeroum with discarded rifles, abandoned cannon, and half-frozen stragglers." (19)

The triumphant Russian armies captured Erzeroum on February 16, Moush on the 18th, Bitlis on March 2, and Trebizond on April 18. By the end of April, the four provinces of Turkish Armenia were in Russian hands. This shining feat of Russian arms brought, however, no promise of final victory over Turkey. There came dramatic reversal in the summer of 1916.

In April 1915, the Allies had made a daring yet ill-starred attempt to force their way through the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople in order to deliver Russia from her isolation. They had failed

completely, and on December 10, began to evacuate the rocky shores of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

In October, Bulgaria whose army might have altered the fate of the Dardanelles expedition, joined the Central Powers. Serbia was overrun by the German and Bulgarian armies, while Greece, under Germanophile King Constantine, was still observing "a very benevolent neutrality." The British campaign in Mesopotamia came to an inglorious end with the surrender, on April 29, 1916, of General Townshend and his famished garrison at Kut-El-Amara. In the spring of 1916, the Ottoman columns were launching an attack against the Suez Canal Zone, threatening the safety of Egypt.

German strategy had thus secured for the Turks an unbroken line of defense stretching from the shores of the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf, enabling them to release their Gallipoli and Mesopotamia divisions and bring pressure to bear upon the Czar's armies on the Caucasian front and stay their further advance to the West.

During the ensuing battles, the Russians, by a vigorous counter-attack, gained more ground and captured Erzinjan, but this initial victory marked the limit of their exploits in Armenia. They were forced to retreat slowly northeastward "according to plan."

It was at this stage of the Russo-Turkish War that the Russian Government's seemingly benevolent attitude towards the Armenians underwent a notable transformation. In June 1916, it was officially announced that the Armenian provinces, then occupied by the Imperial Armies, were to be annexed to the Czar's dominions, but the Armenians were to obtain cultural and ecclesiastical autonomy. This proclamation was tantamount to adding insult to injury — there

were no Armenians left in Armenia in 1916. Anyhow, this was as far as the Russian Government was prepared to go, to reward the Armenians gallantly fighting at the front. Meanwhile, all high-ranking Armenian officers were drafted to the Western Front, with the exception of General Nazarbekoff who was sent to Persia where a Turkish column was hard pressing the Russians.

This sudden reversal of policy — intrinsically a vague intimation of what was in store for the Armenians — was due to no incidental causes. It clearly showed the Czar's fear lest the promises he made at the outbreak of the war be interpreted by the Armenians as true intentions, and stimulate their nationalism, thus endangering the integrity of his Empire. Undoubtedly, the Emperor and his Government had been greatly influenced by the warning whispers of the royal uncle, the Grand Duke Nicholas, now the Viceroy of Transcaucasia, and of the Georgian and Russian officials in the Caucasus, who looked on the Armenians with unconcealed hostility and jealousy.

The fatuity of trusting in any of the Powers' promises was once again, in this dramatic fashion, brought home to the Armenians. Russia had spuriously exploited the credulity and loyalty of a gallant and noble people. As will be seen in the succeeding chapters, however, the ordeal was not, to crush the indomitable spirit of the Armenians.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

On the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 we need not dwell long, but a brief summary is useful because of its tremendous bearing on the course of events in Transcaucasia and Armenia.

By 1917, Russia was skirting the abyss in consequence of her catastrophic debacle on the Eastern Front, and the treasonable activities of military leaders. It was the year of supreme crisis, as it marked the downfall of the Monarchy, and the advent of the grinding tyranny of the Bolsheviks.

Russia had shown herself hopelessly unfit for, and unprepared to meet, the test of a universal war. "Swaying like a drunken giant," she was about to disappear as an ally. The popular enthusiasm awakened by the first call to arms, was as significant as delusive. The war was welcomed by the masses not as an opportunity to assert their patriotism and their fealty to the dynasty, but as a means of deliverance from the intolerable rule of a corrupt and inefficient administration.

The Government lacked the vigor needed to prosecute the war, and had proved itself unequal to the task of keeping the armies furnished with munitions and organizing the food supply. The situation was particularly serious in urban districts.

The Czar was dominated by his neurotic consort of German blood. The latter was under the spell of a brutal and erotic maniac, Rasputin, who acted as

"physician" to the Court, but actually was the dark power behind the Throne.

The disintegration of the Russian army in 1916 had only intensified popular discontent and demoralization; a terrible catastrophe loomed large on the horizon. The Government, fast losing control of the situation, was vehemently assailed in the Duma. The deposition of the Czar and the establishment of a constitutional monarch were openly discussed in party conclaves.

On December 29, 1916, the sinister monk was assassinated by Prince Youssouppoff, and the news of his demise was received amid popular rejoicings. However, his evil spirit still lingered over the entourage of the Royal Family. The Czar, completely impervious to the urgent appeals of his ministers that he surrender his prerogatives was determined to make no concessions. His stubbornness was exasperating to the people, and in early 1917 revolution seemed inevitable.

The outbreak of riots in the capital accompanied by violent mutinous acts in the barracks preluded graver events still. On February 27 the Speaker of the Duma made a final appeal to the Emperor to save the dynasty:—"Measures must be taken immediately, for tomorrow it will be too late; the last hour has arrived; the fate of the country and of the dynasty is at stake."

Things came to a head on March 15 when, as a result of protracted negotiations between the leaders of the Duma and Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies (knowns as the Soviets), the Czar was deposed, and a Provisional Government set up in Petrograd with all parties participating.

The overthrow of the Czar's autocratic regime,

instead of inaugurating for Russia a period of calm and regeneration, opened on the contrary the road to chaos that was to wind up in Communism. The intransigence of the Soviets in trying to force their program of social and economic changes, coupled with their determination to bring the war to a speedy end, gradually widened the breach between the Provisional Government and the Workmen's Committee. While the former was bent upon championing the ambitious territorial designs of the old regime, and rejected the idea of a separate peace with the Central Powers, the Soviets were loudly proclaiming the formula of "no annexations and no indemnities."

Thenceforward, events moved with whirlwind speed, and on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviki, led by two powerful ringleaders, Lenin and Trotsky, struck the final blow which established them in power. Two months later, Russia was proclaimed a Republic of the Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Soviets.

On November 22, Trotsky, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, proposed to the Western Allies a three months armistice on all fronts and a restatement of Allied war aims. The Powers took no notice of the proposal, they having refused to recognize the Bolshevik "Government."

In consequence, Lenin published the four secret Treaties signed during the war by the principal Allies for the partition of the Ottoman Empire.

The immediate publication of these Treaties on the heel of their repudiation by the Allies was undoubtedly for the purpose of justifying the Bolsheviki in concluding a separate peace with Germany and her Associates. Russia could not possibly continue fighting. An armistice was signed on December 15,

and the Peace Conference formally opened on the 22nd at Brest-Litovsk.

On March 3, 1918, after weeks of protracted negotiations, Russia supinely signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, an instrument of shameful submission. She promised to evacuate the Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and to surrender to Turkey the districts of Batoum, Kars and Ardahan. The Treaty was ratified by the Congress of the Soviets on March 15, and the Republic of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants was definitely out of the war.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARMENIA

Russia's defection ushered in a period of utmost tension for the Transcaucasian peoples, particularly for the Armenians.

Before the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Lenin gave orders to evacuate the provinces of Turkish Armenia. The Turks were pressing hard on the Russian positions at their deepest point of penetration, and making desperate efforts to break the front. The task of holding the gains of the Imperial Armies was therefore left to Armenian, Georgian, and Tartar detachments. These latter left nothing undone in their fierce resistance to drive back the Turks but it was extremely hard for them to hold to their positions without reinforcements which never reached them. Their means of supply and communications were unequal to the task. Moreover, absence of mutual confidence and of cooperation among the three Transcaucasian peoples had a paralyzing effect on their operations. Lack of determination to carry on the struggle was markedly noticeable among the Georgians and the Tartars; the latter even viewed with unconcealed complacency the advance of their co-religionists of the West.

In March 1918, the Turkish columns were battering through the Transcaucasian Front and threatening the very heart of Russian Armenia.

It was in these tragic circumstances that the defenders succumbed under the superior pressure of the enemy, and sued for peace.

At the ensuing Peace Conference at Trebizond (March 1 to April 1, 1918), the Turkish Delegation carried on its policy of evasions and threats, and conceded practically nothing. Turkey demanded immediate implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The negotiations broke up as a result of the Transcaucasian Delegation's refusal to surrender the strategically important districts of Kars, Batoum and Ardahan, and the war was resumed under still more chaotic conditions for the Armenians.

During the ensuing operations, the Turks succeeded in recapturing the whole of Turkish Armenia. Confronted as they were with a desperate situation, the Transcaucasian League (Seym) again appealed for peace on the basis of the stringent terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, with a view to staying further advances of the Turkish armies into Transcaucasia.

At the second Peace Conference which opened on May 11, 1918, at Batoum, the Turks presented a new set of terms even more severe than those rejected at Trebizond. The whole of Transcaucasia was to become virtually a Turkish Protectorate; Georgia was "favored" with an area of some six thousand square miles around Erivan.

All hopes for a peaceful settlement were, however, dashed in the early stages of the negotiations. On May 15, the Turks unleashed their army, and after a fierce encounter with the Armenians, entered Alexandropol (now Leninakan). They then made an unsuccessful attempt to outflank the Armenian forces by a pincer movement, their left wing aiming at Karakilisse, the central columns moving towards Bash Aba-

ran, while their main detachments converged on Sardarabat, forty miles west of Erivan.

The Armenians employed what strength they could muster and, under the command of General Silikian, counter-attacked the exposed Turkish positions. They fought, for five days, from May 23 to May 28, with heroic grandeur, and forced the Turks to reel under their crushing blows. The battle of Sardarabat, in particular, will remain one of the glorious pages of Armenia's history. The indomitable fortitude in sacrifice of the Armenian soldiers apparently saved the country from irretrievable disaster. The joy of the nation was unbounded, and the Armenian High Command now issued orders to thrust onwards to recapture Alexandropol.

Political events of great moment intervened, however, gravely impairing the military situation in Armenia.

The Peace Conference was still in progress in Batoum. On May 26, the Turks had presented to the three Transcaucasian Delegations and ultimatum framed in terms calculated to make acceptance impossible. In addition to their demands for territorial concessions, they now insisted that the Transcaucasian League be dissolved, and Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan declare their independence. By skillful maneuvering, they successfully worked on Georgian and Tartar fears of Armenian victories at Karakilisse, Bash Aparan and Sardarabat, undermining the unity of the three peoples. Stealthy parleys had taken place between the Georgians and the Turks, and the German Government had expressed its readiness to protect Georgia's independence and territorial integrity against possible Turkish incursions.

The same day, on Georgian initiative, the Peace Treaty was signed, Armenian interests and consent being dispensed with. Simultaneously, in Tiflis, the Georgian representative of the Transcaucasian League announced the dissolution of the League, and the Georgian National Council proclaimed Georgia an independent Republic. Azerbaijan followed suit the next day.

With indignant consternation the Armenians learned of Georgia's betrayal of the Transcaucasian Union. Nevertheless, even this desertion would not have meant so much had not the Tartars and the Caucasian Mountaineers likewise abandoned the Armenians to their fate in this critical hour. There was no possibility of saving Transcaucasian unity after the defection of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Consequently the Armenians on May 28, 1918, deserted by their neighbors, and confronted with the ominous prospect of facing their mortal enemy single-handed, declared their independence.

* * *

The Battle of Baku

Turco-German operations against Russia had for their main objective the Baku oilfields. The city of Baku was strategically of the utmost importance not only as a rich source of the precious liquid, but also as a spring-board for advance into Central Asia.

As early as 1915, a German military force of no mean strength had been dispatched to Persia entrusted with the ambitious task of gaining a foothold on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, with intent to invest the Russian port of Baku at the opportune moment. So effectively had Germany maneuvered that by the end of that year British and Russian influence had virtually disappeared in Persia.

The defeat of the British in Mesopotamia in 1916 had enabled the Turks to release a considerable number of troops. These were advancing to Teheran, pursuing back into Persia a Russian column that had gone to the relief of the British in Mesopotamia.

Meanwhile the British, deeply concerned with this dangerous situation, raised a contingent from among Persian and Indian troops, and were successfully opposing the Turks. The capture of Baghdad in March 1917 by the British markedly improved the military situation; the Turks ran the risk of being cut off by the Allied forces.

However, the outbreak that same month of the Russian Revolution, together with the demoralization of the army and the homeward journey in utter confusion of the Russian soldiers, was a very serious blow to the British. The advance of the Germans and the Turks to Baku via Batoum and Northern Persia constituted a very real danger.

In the spring of 1918, Baku became a hotbed of Bolshevik activity, and Lenin issued strict orders to his men there to remain in the city at all costs, to prevent German and Turkish interference in Azerbaijan and beyond.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Bolsheviks were not a politically important element in Transcaucasia, and they certainly were not in a position to repulse a Turkish thrust on the city of Baku without the help of the Armenians. Bolshevik subversive activity was confined to rousing the religious and racial feelings of the Mohammedan natives of Azerbaijan and Northern Caucasus against the Armenians, and to bringing about a strife among these different peoples.

There were at the time some 12,000 Armenian troops in Baku whom the Armenian National Council

had not yet been able to send home after the collapse of the Russian army, owing to lack of communications, so completely disorganized by the civil war. The onerous task of defending the city during the subsequent months against the Turks and the Tartars apparently fell on Armenian shoulders, with the help of non-Bolshevik Russian soldiers and marines.

On May 28, the Georgian Government had signed an agreement with the German representative in Tiflis whereby all rail and road communications of Georgia were to be surrendered to the Germans for the duration of the war. Simultaneously, Georgia gave the Turks the right to transport oil free of charge by the Baku-Batoum pipe-line. A German detachment, three thousand strong, had landed at the Georgian port of Poti, on the very day — May 26 — that the Transcaucasian Union was dissolved under Turkish pressure.

In the spring and early summer of 1918, bloody encounters took place between the Armenian defenders of Baku and the Tartar mob. Thousands of innocent lives were lost, and a considerable amount of property destroyed. As a result of these operations, the Armenians finally occupied the oilfields and the whole city fell into their hands.

At the beginning of July, however, it became evident that despite the stubborn resistance of the Armenians, the city could not be held indefinitely without outside help. A Turkish column had succeeded in penetrating into one sector of Baku, and the Mountaineers of Daghestan had come to the assistance of their co-religionists.

Consequently, on July 27, the Armenian National Council made an urgent appeal to the British Command in Persia for immediate assistance. The Bol-

sheviks fiercely opposed this step, while the Turks presented to the Armenians an ultimatum demanding the unconditional surrender of the city. Undaunted, the Armenians continued the fighting during the first three weeks of August, holding fast to their positions.

On August 19, a small British detachment under Major-General L. C. Dunsterville reached Baku. On the 29th, the Turks counter-attacked the Armenians who were now receiving some lukewarm support from the British. Two weeks later, however, Dunsterville "calmly took to his ships" without warning. The British General had apparently proceeded to Baku, not to help the gallant defenders, but to replenish his depleted oil supply, trying meanwhile to turn over to Denikin what military equipment he could lay his hands on.

No amount of resistance to the combined forces of Tartars, Turks, and the Mountaineers could now save the "oil city."

On September 15, the Turks occupied Baku and, as might be expected, exterminated some 30,000 Armenian civilians.

Costly though it had been to the Armenians, the Battle of Baku, which continued unabated from March to September 1918, proved of decisive consequence not only for Armenia but also for the outcome of the war in Europe. As a result of this Armenian resistance, the Turks were prevented from organizing further massacres in Armenia, while the Germans were delayed six months from reaching the oilfields at the most critical stage of the war when military supremacy on all fronts was passing into the hands of the Allies.

Turkey, in those fateful months of 1918 "was staggering under her defeats" in Palestine, Syria and

Iraq, and was no longer in a position to carry out the orders of her German masters.

By the autumn of 1918, the First World War was fast approaching its logical conclusion. Bulgaria, the smallest of the European belligerents, submitted to the terms of surrender on September 30. Catastrophe finally engulfed the Hapsburg Empire on October 29. Turkey was struck out of the war on October 30, while the bombastic Kaiser bowed to the inevitable on November 11 in the forest of Compiegne.

Out of world chaos, the ancient land of Armenia was reborn as a free and independent state, physically exhausted, yet spiritually unconquered.

CHAPTER IX

THE MAKING OF A NEW STATE

After five centuries of foreign domination, the Armenians were now as a result of their own valiant efforts permitted to rule themselves, and became a sovereign nation, master of its own destiny. Armenia had lost, during the world-wide conflagration, one-third of her people, also earthly wealth beyond reckoning. Nevertheless, the cynical boast of the Turks that they would settle the Armenian problem by exterminating the entire race had not been realized. By the end of the war there were still over three million Armenians within Soviet Russia and other friendly countries.

The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, had been utterly overthrown as a consequence of its corruption and degeneracy. The "sick man of Europe" was in extremis, and entirely at the mercy of the victorious Allies. He should be compelled to expiate his manifold crimes against humanity. "He had taken the sword, and by the sword he should perish." This, at least, was what the Entente Powers and the United States undertook to achieve in their hour of triumph.

* * *

Armenia ushered in her independence under extremely difficult circumstances. The cessation of hostilities closed one period of hardship, only to inaugurate another.

Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan which had gorged the lion's share of what the retreating Russian armies had left behind, and secured for themselves vast ex-

panses in Transcaucasia, Armenia had inherited very little from her "uncle." Her territory was confined to one of the most undeveloped regions of Russia. The Government, led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, was confronted with the gigantic task of building a modern state on ruins. The chances of recovery seemed, in 1918, extremely remote. Armenia had no administrative structure and no economic system of her own, no productive resources and no national revenue, no industrial equipment and certainly no means of transport commensurate with her immediate needs. The standard of living of her agricultural population, very poor before the war, was now distressingly low. Her food supplies were well-nigh exhausted. Disease and famine were rampant and death was ravaging the population throughout the country at a terrible rate. The influx of some 300,000 Armenian refugees who had escaped the massacres in Turkish Armenia added much to the gravity of the situation. Emergency measures had to be taken to solve the problem of feeding, clothing and sheltering this pitiful multitude. Obviously the Armenian Government alone could not furnish the necessary funds and supplies to cope with the appalling situation.

The people of Armenia will forever gratefully remember the generous assistance of the Americans and British who appropriated public and private funds for Armenia in her hour of trial, and who, through the Near East Relief, the Lord Mayor's Fund, and the Friends of Armenia, rushed regular supplies of foodstuffs, clothing and medical aid, and spared no effort for the care of thousands of Armenian orphans. Nor did the Armenian communities in other lands fail in their patriotic duty to alleviate the distress and agony of their countrymen and co-operate wholeheart-

edly with the Government, which was straining every nerve to steer the country out of chaos. The proclamation of independence had rekindled a spirit of nationalism among Armenians everywhere. The hour of freedom had struck, and their sublime patriotic purpose was to reconstruct their fatherland and restore it, under a democratic regime, to its ancient glory.

By the middle of 1919, the economic situation of Armenia was slowly, yet appreciably, improving, thanks to the endurance and unremitting labor of its people and the leadership of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.

During this eventful period of their modern history, the Armenians witnessed the flowering of true democracy in their homeland. The time had come for the largest and strongest political organization of the Armenians — the Dashnak — to put into practice its avowed concept of liberalism and democracy, and establish, by a natural process, a parliamentary system of government based on consent.

The Constitutional Law was to be drafted after the termination of the war, but the system adopted in 1918 provided for a Ministry responsible to a Chamber of Deputies elected on a very wide franchise, freedom of speech, right of assembly, freedom of faith, free and compulsory education, and personal liberty for all, without distinction of race, creed, or social status. The Government believed in free enterprise in commerce and industry, and repudiated the philosophy of Communism as un-Christian and immoral.

* * *

The attention of the Armenian Government, absorbed during 1918 by internal problems, was by the end of the year directed to the question of foreign

policy. Armenia was not yet accorded formal recognition by the Allies as an independent and sovereign State, and the boundaries of the Republic were not internationally defined.

Consequently, in January 1919, an Armenian Delegation, headed by the distinguished writer Avetis Aharonian, went to Paris to present Armenia's claims to the Peace Conference opening at Versailles on January 18, 1919.

On February 12, M. Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha — the latter representing, through the Armenian National Delegation, the Turkish Armenians — jointly submitted Armenia's desiderata to the Peace Conference. These may be summarized as follows: recognition of an independent Armenian State formed by the union of Turkish Armenia and Cilicia with the territories of the Republic; placing of Armenia under the collective guarantee of the Allies and the United States, or that of the League of Nations; financial assistance to Armenia for the duration of the transitional period; and indemnity to make good the damages suffered by the Armenians during the war; punishment of those who had taken part in the massacres, and steps to return to their Christian faith all Armenian women, young girls and children converted by force to Islamism and kept in captivity in Turkish harems.

On February 26, M. Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha were received in audience by the Council of Ten, and given full opportunity to present their case.

Eleven months later, on January 19, 1920, the Allied Supreme Council took action on the proposal of Lord Curzon, the British delegate, that "it would be just and wise to give it (Armenia, J.M.) recognition on the clear understanding that this does not prejudice

the ultimate delimitation of Armenia, the boundaries of which have still to be decided in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey." (20)

The Council decided:

- a—that the Government of the Armenian State should be recognized as a *de facto* government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudices the question of the eventual frontiers of that state;
- b—that the Allied Governments are not prepared to send to the Trans-Caucasian states the three divisions contemplated by the Inter-allied Military Council;
- c—to accept the principle of sending to the Trans-Caucasian States arms, munitions, and, if possible, food;
- d—that Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson are requested to consider of what these supplies should consist and the means for their dispatch.

On April 23, 1920 the Government of the United States concurred in the decision of the Supreme Council. On that date the Secretary of State addressed the following communication to the representative in Washington of the Armenian Republic, M. Garegin Pasdermadjian: (21)

860j. 01/242 a Washington, April 23, 1920

Sir: Referring to communications heretofore received from you on the subject of the proposed recognition of your Government by the Government of the United States, I am

pleased to inform you, and through you, your Government, that, by direction of the President, the Government of the United States recognizes, as of this date, the **de facto** Government of the Armenian Republic. This decision is taken, however, with the understanding that this recognition in no way predetermines the territorial frontiers which, it is understood, are matters for later determination.

Accept etc.

Bainbridge Colby

CHAPTER X

THE TREATY OF SEVRES

The final settlement of the Armenian problem depended in a very large measure on the settlement of the Turkish problem; the two issues were inextricably interwoven.

During the earlier stages of the war, the unanimous feeling among the Allies was that the Turkish problem, "this perennial ulcer of the Levant", would be solved once and for all, and Turkey be made harmless.

Premier Aristide Briand of France in a Note presented on behalf of the Allies to the American Ambassador in Paris on January 10, 1917, stated as one of the objects of war, "the liberation of the populations subjected to the bloody tyranny of the Turks, and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire as foreign to Western civilization."

Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons on December 21, 1917, declared:

"... The question of Mesopotamia must be resolved by the Peace Conference, with the clear understanding, however, that neither that region nor Armenia can ever be put back under the blighting domination of the Turks..."

The British Premier repeated his pledge two weeks later, on January 5, 1918, before the Trades Union Conference:

“. . . We do not question the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in the regions inhabited by Turks. We insist, however, that Armenia, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine have the right to separate national existence. . .”

Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary of State, in the House of Lords, on November 18, 1918, declared on behalf of His Majesty's Government:

“. . . As to the extension of the frontiers of the present Government of Armenia, we will not permit the Turks, by their misdeeds, to abate the heritage of the Armenians. There must not be any division of Armenia. It must be treated as an indivisible entity. . .I think, I can say for the Government that I would be most deeply disappointed if even a shadow or an atom of Turkish rule should be allowed in Armenia. . .”

President Wilson of the United States in his address delivered at the Joint Session of Congress, on January 8, 1918, clearly stated the terms upon which the Central Powers could obtain peace. Point Twelve of his Fourteen Points program contained the following passage:

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now un-

der Turkish rule should be assured undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. . .”

Just how much came of these and other glittering promises will be seen in subsequent chapters.

* * *

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was, therefore, one of the war aims of the Allies, and a prerequisite to consolidating permanent peace in the Near East. The three principal allies — Great Britain, France and Russia — were unanimous on this essential point of their program. Italy had become an interested and active party after she formally denounced the Triple Alliance and declared war on Austro-Hungary in May 1915.

The Ottoman Empire was to be carved up on the basis of the following four secret treaties which were negotiated *in camera*:

1—The Constantinople Agreement, 12 March 1915:

By this instrument Great Britain and France agreed that Russia should obtain the City of Constantinople, the Western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace, as far as Enos-Media line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the River Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Izmid to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmara, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of France and Great Britain in the above territories should remain inviolate. In return, the neutral zone in Persia established by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907

should be included in the British sphere of influence.

This Treaty was denounced by the Soviet Government in November, 1917, and was formally cancelled by the Russo-Persian Agreement of February 1921, and by the Russo-Turkish Treaty (Moscow) of March 16, 1921.

2—The Treaty of London, 26 April, 1915

By virtue of Article 8 of this Treaty, "Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is at present occupying."

Article 9 reads: Generally speaking, France, Great Britain, and Russia recognize that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that, in the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey-in-Asia, she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention. . . . If France, Great Britain, and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey-in-Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the province of Adalia within the limits indicated above shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it .

As a result of this Treaty, Italy on May 3, 1915 formally denounced the Triple Alliance, and entered the War, on May 23, on the side of the Allies.

3—The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 16 May, 1916

By virtue of this instrument drawn up between Sir Mark Sykes, the British representative, and M. Georges Picot, representing the French Government, Russia was to obtain the provinces of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, as well as territory in the southern part of Kurdistan. The limit of Russian acquisition on the Black Sea was to be fixed later. France was to have the coastal strip of Syria, the Vilayet of Adana, and the territory bounded on the south by a line Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the north, by a line Ala Dagh-Egin-Harpout. Great Britain was allotted the southern part of Mesopotamia with Baghdad, and for herself the ports of Haifa and Acre in Syria.

By agreement between France and England, the zone between the French and the British territories was to form a confederation of Arab States, or one independent Arab State, the spheres of influence in which were to be determined at the same time. With a view to safeguarding the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the Holy Places, was to be separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France, and England.

4—The St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, 17 April 1917

Under this agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy, the signatories undertook to make Smyrna a free port, enjoying the

rights and privileges which France and Great Britain had reciprocally guaranteed each other in the ports of Alexandretta, Haifa, and Acre. Mersina was also to be a free port. In case it were not possible, at the conclusion of the war, to secure to one or more of the said Powers the whole of the advantages set forth in the agreements between them as regards their several allotments of portions of the Ottoman Empire, the Mediterranean equilibrium should be equitably maintained, in conformity with Article 9 of the Pact of London of 26 April, 1915. The agreement should be communicated to the Russian Government in order to enable it to express its opinion.

These agreements concerning the partition of the Ottoman Empire were, however, vitally affected by two important events: the entrance of the United States into the war in April 1917, and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

The American plan of settlement as crystallized in President Wilson's Fourteen Points conflicted with the provisions of the four Treaties. On the other hand, the Soviet Government had signed in March 1918 the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, deserting the Allied camp, and had meanwhile denounced all treaties to which the Czarist Government had been a signatory.

On January 5, 1918, the British Government presented a considerably modified plan of peace based upon the principle of self-determination. The British formula contained no promise for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

Consequently, when the Peace Conference opened in Paris in January 1919, all expectations for the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the four Secret Treaties had completely vanished.

The Turkish problem was brought up for preliminary consideration shortly after the ceremonial opening of the Conference. As early as December, 1918, General Smuts of South Africa had drafted a memorandum setting forth the principle on the basis of which "peoples and territories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria, and Turkey were to be placed under the mandate of the League of Nations." The victorious Powers were to annex no territories, and the rule of self-determination was to be applied to such territories as Mesopotamia, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Armenia.

President Wilson had, on January 10, 1919, amplified the Smuts plan in his first draft of the League of Nations by stating: "In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to Austro-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly under the domination of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain fundamental principles. . .

The British Government held the view that the system of mandates should be applicable to civilized regions, yet unorganized, to tropical countries, and only to conquered parts of the Turkish Empire. Meanwhile, Great Britain had clearly pointed out that she had no intention of accepting a mandate over Armenia.

On January 30, 1919, the Supreme Council adopted, after sharp discussions, a resolution where-

by "the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. . .without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire."

During the early stages of the Conference, bitter controversy between Great Britain and France over Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and the Straits seriously disturbed the smooth progress of the negotiations. The Turkish problem was not being treated with the necessary caution it deserved, and the clash of interests of the two leading Powers was soon to obscure the political horizon in the Near East.

On May 15, 1919, the British Government celebrated the landing in Smyrna of the Greek Army, not foreseeing the repercussions that a Greek penetration into Anatolia might entail.

In the fifth month of the Peace Conference, the question of mandates was still unsettled. On May 21, Lloyd George submitted a new scheme whereby the United States was to have the mandate over Constantinople, the Straits, Armenia, and Cilicia, France was to receive a mandate for Syria, and Great Britain would assume responsibility for Mesopotamia. According to the British plan, the United States was also to obtain a mandate for the Caucasus. The underlying motive of the British project was to oust the French and the Italians from Anatolia. President Wilson was doubtful whether the American Congress would accept any responsibility in Turkey, while France was opposed to the ejection of the Turks from Constantinople.

Obviously, the Allies were not united on the Turkish settlement, and by the end of 1919 no Turkish

Treaty was yet in sight, owing to the conflicting interests of the Powers, the Greco-Turkish War, and the "gathering storm" in the wilderness of Anatolia.

Nor were the Ottoman Government's views on the disposal of the Sultan's dominions totally ignored during these chequered negotiations. On June 17, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allies received in audience a Turkish Delegation headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who stated in his introductory speech:

"In the course of the war nearly the whole civilized world was shocked by the recital of crimes alleged to have been committed by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror forever; still less will I endeavor to minimize the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. . .The Turkish people. . . showed itself able to respect the lives, the honor, and the sacred feelings of the Christian nationals subject to its laws. . ." (22)

The nauseating arrogance of the Turkish Premier was supplemented by his demand for the "maintenance, on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which during the last years, has been reduced to the least possible limits."

Notwithstanding this presumptuous claim, the Allies continued to deliberate on the Turkish problem throughout 1919.

On February 20, 1920, the British Prime Minister

announced that the Allies had agreed to let the Turks remain in Constantinople.

On March 16, the Allied forces formally occupied the Turkish capital in order to forestall Kemalist disturbances.

On March 24, the United States Government, in a communication addressed to the French Government, stated that "there can be no question as to the genuine interest of this Government in the plans for Armenia, and the Government of the United States is convinced that the civilized world demands and expects the most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country. Its boundaries should be drawn in such a way as to recognize all the legitimate claims of the Armenian people and particularly to give them easy and unencumbered access to the sea."

At the San Remo Conference of April 19-26, 1920, the Allied statesmen drew up the draft of the Turkish Treaty, and submitted for the United States Government's consideration the following resolution in regard to Armenia:

1 — to make an appeal to President Wilson that the United States of America accept a mandate for Armenia.

2 — that whatever the answer of the United States Government on the subject of the mandate, the President of the United States be asked to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia.

3 — that an article in regard to Armenia be inserted in the Treaty of Peace to the effect

that Turkey and Armenia and the other High Contracting parties agree to refer to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of boundaries between Turkey and Armenia, in the vilayets of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereon, as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent State of Armenia. Pending the arbitration the boundaries of Turkey and Armenia shall remain as at present. The boundaries of Armenia on the north and east, that is, between Armenia and Georgia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, shall be laid down by the Supreme Council at the same time as those between Armenia and Turkey, failing a spontaneous agreement on this subject between the three Caucasian States." (23)

At San Remo, during the apportioning of the mandates, it was not proposed to invite the League of Nations to assume a mandate for Armenia, for the sufficient reason that this international organization neither was a State nor had the physical means or the funds to discharge such function. Besides, the Council of the League, while indicating the fullest sympathy with the object of the Allied Powers, pointed out that this could best be assured if either a member of the League or some other Power could be found, willing to accept the mandate for Armenia.

A month later, on May 24, 1920, the President of the United States "earnestly advised and requested" the United States Senate to accept the mandate for Armenia. Indeed, in his Presidential message conceived

in the highest and most generous spirit of friendship for the Armenian people, Mr. Wilson said:

"It was recognized that certain Communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. It is in pursuance of this principle and with a desire of affording Armenia such advice and assistance that the statesmen conferring at San Remo have formally requested this Government to assume the duties of mandatory in Armenia. . .

I urgently advise and request that the Congress grant the Executive power to accept for the United States a mandate over Armenia. I make this suggestion in the earnest belief that it will be the wish of the people of the United States that this should be done. . . At their hearts this great people have made the cause of Armenia their own. It is to this people and to their Government that the hopes and earnest expectations of the struggling people of Armenia turn as they now emerge from a period of indescribable suffering and peril, and I hope that the Congress will think it wise to meet this hope and expectation with the utmost liberality."

Unfortunately, however, the United States Senate did not "think it wise to meet" the hope and expectation of the Armenian people.

On June 1, 1920, the Senate — the House of Representatives concurring — by 52 to 23 resolved “that the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive power to accept a mandate over Armenia as requested in the message of the President, dated May 24, 1920.”

Meanwhile, the Allies concluded their labors approving the British terms of peace which were presented to the Turkish Delegation on May 11, 1920. Damad Ferid Pasha's bitter reply of July 8 being of no avail, the Turks were compelled to sign, on August 10, 1920, the document thereafter known as the Treaty of Sevres.

It contained the following articles concerning Armenia:

Article 88. — Turkey, in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognizes Armenia as a free and independent State.

Article 89. — Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.

Article 90. — In the event of the determination of the frontier under Article 89 involving the

transfer of the whole or any part of the territory of the said vilayets to Armenia, Turkey hereby renounces as from the date of such decision all rights and title over the territory so transferred. . .

Articles 91 and 92 provided for the delimitation of the frontiers between Armenia and Turkey, and between Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, in the first instance by a Boundary Commission, and in the second, by direct agreement between the States concerned. By Article 93, Armenia undertook to protect the interests of inhabitants differing from the majority of the population in race, language and religion, and promised freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations

Concurrently with the signature of the Treaty of Sevres, the French, British and Italian Governments concluded between themselves a Tripartite Agreement whereby Asia Minor was carved up into French and Italian zones roughly corresponding with those outlined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916, and the St.-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement of April 17, 1917.

The other main provisions of the Treaty were:

Turkey renounced all claims to Egypt, Cyprus, Tripoli, the Hedjaz, Yemen, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Arabia. She ceded to Greece Eastern Thrace, and all the Aegean Islands. The city of Smyrna with its hinterland was to remain under Greek administration for five years pending a plebiscite. The Straits were to be demilitarized and placed under international control. Kurdistan was to obtain autonomy. The Turkish Army was to be reduced to 15,000. Turkey's finances were to be placed under Allied control. The

Capitulations were to be re-imposed, and a new system was to be introduced for the protection of the minorities.

President Wilson, on May 17, communicated to the Supreme Council his "willingness to undertake to act as arbitrator for the Armenian boundaries. . .gladly accepting this opportunity to contribute to the welfare of the Armenian people."

On November 22, the President "with eagerness to serve the Armenian people" and after "having examined the question in the light of the most trustworthy information available, and with a mind to the highest interests of justice," rendered his award assigning to the Independent Republic of Armenia some 40,000 sq. miles in the vilayets of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis.

CHAPTER XI

TEMPEST ON THE ANATOLIAN MOUNTAINS

"The mills of the gods grind slowly, but they grind exceedingly fine."

On November 10, 1914, Lloyd George had described the Turks "as a human cancer, a creeping agony in the flesh of the lands which they misgoverned," and had expressed his satisfaction that they were to be called "to a final account". (24)

On August 10, 1920, the dismayed Turkish Plenipotentiaries repaired to the Palais de Sevres to put their signatures to a peace treaty, the terms of which were the inexorable, but richly deserved, retribution to be visited on Ottoman tyranny.

Meanwhile, Armenia was formally erected into a free and independent State so that she might, in peace and security, develop her cultural and economic resources, and devote her energies to the service of civilization and the promotion of goodwill among nations.

Armenian gratification was short-lived, however. Clouds were gathering over Anatolia. The Treaty of Sevres was not destined to be carried out.

* * *

To negotiate a treaty is one thing, to have the will and the means to enforce its implementation, quite another.

While the peace treaty with Turkey was still in preparation, momentous events darkened the political horizon in Europe, greatly changing the aspect of the Near Eastern settlement.

The Armistice with Turkey signed on the island of Mudros on October 30, 1918, provided for the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; handing over unconditionally to the Allies all allied prisoners of war as well as Armenian interned persons; immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except for the troops needed to guard the frontiers; the surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters; the occupation by the Allies of all strategic points; the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish forces in northwestern Persia and the evacuation of the Caucasus; the surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia; the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia; the appointment of an Allied representative attached to the Turkish ministry of supplies, to safeguard Allied interests, and the right of the Allies to occupy any part of the six Armenian vilayets in case of disorders.

Notwithstanding these precise stipulations a deplorable lack of vigilance on the part of the Allies robbed them of the results of their crushing defeat of the Turks.

* * *

The Advent of Kemal

During the opening months of 1919, Turkish officers in Anatolia refused to disarm their units. General Kiazim Karabekir, in particular, ignored the orders of the Constantinople Government to disband

his divisions on the Caucasian-Armenian-front. No flight of imagination was needed to see that "something sinister was brewing on the barren expanses of Anatolia.

The Allied Governments, through their High Commissioners in the Turkish capital, made urgent and repeated representations to the Ottoman Government "to bring the army leaders to their senses," urging drastic measures to enforce compliance with the terms of the Armistice.

The Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, suggested that a high senior officer be sent to Anatolia, and warmly recommended Mustapha Kemal as the most suitable man for the task. He had distinguished himself as a good fighter, and had constantly been at loggerheads with the Germans and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Without a second thought, the Allied High Commissioners signified their approval of the Grand Vizier's choice, and authorized Kemal's journey to Asia Minor as Inspector-General of the Northern Area and Governor-General of the Eastern provinces. In other words, the Allies with their own hands set the stage for a conspiracy which their military might would prove helpless to put down.

Kemal saw his opportunity. He embarked, with unusual haste, on May 15, on a Turkish steamer, and arrived at the Black Sea port of Samson on the 19th, that is, four days after the Greek landing at Smyrna. Scarcely had the steamer cast anchor than the Allied authorities at Constantinople "became suspicious of his intentions and issued orders for the ship to be intercepted." They had "missed the bus."

Immediately upon arriving in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal gathered around him the disgruntled elements of his people, and with the active help of such men as Ismet Pasha (now Ismet Inonu), Fevzi Pasha (the late Fevzi Cakmak and the late Kiazim Karabekir, announced a crusade of national resistance, playing on the hatred of the Turkish peasantry towards the "Infidels of Europe under whose guns the Caliph was a prisoner." He made extensive tours throughout the country, set up action committees in every town and village, aroused the spirit of resistance, and instilled a new hope into the hearts of the Turkish people. "Yet even the energy and personality of Kemal would not have been so effective had not news arrived that the Greeks were advancing, that the Allies were planning to constitute a second Greek colony round Samson on the Black Sea coast and planning to add the eastern portion of Anatolia to an Armenian Republic which had already been created out of Imperial Russian territory. Everywhere the local Turks vowed that death was preferable to rule by Greeks and Armenians. Moreover, the Allies who had made these plans were far away, while near at hand was an undisbanded Turkish army corps at Diyarbekir. Men came crowding back to the ranks with guns and ammunition raided from the Allied arms dumps." (25)

The Allies were dumbfounded. They made further appeals to the Grand Vizier asking him to recall Mustafa Kemal who was not exactly the type of "senior officer" they needed at that crucial moment.

The Government ordered him to return to Constantinople, but Kemal was too busily engaged with his conspiracy to pay heed to the "puppet" Government's orders. He meant to stay in Anatolia "until

the nation has won its independence." The Sultan might join him there, and lead his people if he wanted to save his throne.

The Allies were confronted with a perilous situation. All they could do, however, was to threaten reprisals against the Sultan's Government whose agent had outwitted them. Again it was too late. The Turkish Revolution was afoot, and the "rebel" now enjoyed unopposed leadership.

* * *

At the first Nationalist Congress at Erzeroum, on July 23, 1919, it was resolved "to organize resistance to the occupation and the interference of the foreigner, and to form a provisional Government to carry on the affairs of State if the Central Government be unable or unwilling." On September 4, the Kemalists summoned a much larger Congress at Sivas to draw up their political and territorial claims.

On January 28, 1920 the Nationalist Deputies of the newly elected Ottoman Parliament succeeded in forcing the passage of the National Pact, a document of six articles based on the main provisions embodied in the Declaration of the Sivas Congress. It provided for the right of self-determination for the Arab provinces, and for the districts of Kars, Batoum, Ardahan and Western Thrace; the security of the city of Constantinople, the capital of the Empire and the seat of the Caliphate, which "must be beyond the reach of any infringement;" the rights of minorities on condition that Moslem minorities in neighboring countries were granted the same rights, and finally, the abolition of the Capitulations.

The Allies retaliated by closing the Chamber of Deputies, and placing under a kind of arrest some prominent Nationalist sympathizers.

By this time, Mustafa Kemal was consolidating his position. He moved, with his retinue, to Ankara where on April, 23, 1920, he inaugurated the "Turkish Grand National Assembly," and set up a Provisional Government to "preside over the destiny of Turkey as long as the Capital is in the hands of the foreigner." He set himself the task of liberating his Fatherland, and to reach this goal he defied not only the Greeks now firmly established on the threshold of Asia Minor, but also the Western Powers.

During the spring of 1920, the Allies under Nationalist pressure, already began to withdraw from Anatolia, their badly scattered troops. On May 11 they published their peace terms which, incidentally, had been disclosed to the Turks by the agents of a foreign Power.

By a series of successful campaigns during the summer months of 1920, the Kemalists cleared Eastern Asia Minor of all foreign troops, inflicting heavy losses on the French and Armenian detachments in Cilicia (in Marash they massacred some 20,000 Armenian civilians) and colliding with the British outposts as near Constantinople as Izmid. The British were still in the capital "to ensure the freedom of the Straits and to protect the Armenians" according to the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on February 26. Lloyd George had stated that were he an Armenian he "would rather know that the men who are responsible were within reach of Allied forces, and that I had the protection of the British fleet; and that if they ordered massacres and murders and outrages Constantinople could be laid in ashes." (26)

In September, the Nationalists along with the Soviets attacked Armenia. The Turkish attack hastened

the Sovietization of the Republic as will be shown in our next chapter.

* * *

It was in those fateful days that Venizelos offered to quell the Kemalist rising before it was too late. The war-weary British gave the plan their blessing; they could not take part in the battle, but they would furnish the material. Greece was expected to "clear the Dardanelles inside fifteen days, with 90,000 men."

Notwithstanding French and Italian opposition at the Hythe and Boulogne Conferences, the Hellenic armies, on June 22, 1920, moved forward with the loyal backing of the British Government.

The Nationalists were routed in a matter of weeks. One Greek division captured Adrianople in Eastern Thrace; another occupied Broussa and joined forces with the British. The Allied position in Asiatic and European Turkey was now as safe as could be expected. The main Hellenic army pushed its way straight inland as far as Eskishehir and dug itself in on a line about 140 miles south-west of Ankara, the "capital" of Turkey. France and Italy were particularly anxious to restrain Greek ambitions in Anatolia, and the liberation of the Straits zone having been accomplished, the Greeks were ordered by the Allies to advance no farther.

Kemal, ignominiously beaten, retired to the mountain fastnesses to lick his wounds. He was not however despondent. He had carefully studied the Treaty of Sevres, and was aware of its implications. He was, moreover, conscious of the lack of unity then existing among the Western Allies over the German Reparations question and the Levant. He decided to use Anglo-French disagreements to his own advantage, and avenge himself at the opportune moment. He

could wait and talk things over with "comrade" Lenin.

By the closing months of 1920, the Allies were still celebrating the signature of the Treaty of Peace and the brilliant victory of the Hellenic armies in Anatolia, but the political situation as a whole was far from reassuring.

France was pursuing a cautious policy in regard to Turkey, and secretly negotiating with Mustafa Kemal, leaving no doubt as to her intentions of concluding a separate peace with him behind the backs of the British. General Gouraud had already gone to Syria with authority to make concessions to the Turks regarding the Syrian mandate and Cilicia. Her support of Turkey might induce the British to fall in with the French plan of German Reparations.

Great Britain was confronted with serious economic and industrial problems at home, and there was trouble in Ireland, India, and Mesopotamia. Her differences with France on the German settlement were not of minor importance. Moreover, Lloyd George's anti-Turk policy had caused searching criticisms among the Conservatives.

The Bolsheviks, triumphant in their civil war, had considerably increased their power inside Russia and were actively supporting the Turks against the Allies.

Italy, greatly impoverished by the war, was in the throes of a Communist agitation, while the United States, after rejecting the mandates for Armenia and the Straits, was observing strict neutrality in the Turkish settlement.

In Greece, Venizelos was heavily defeated in the elections of November 14, and the anti-Entente King Constantine had ascended the throne with the immedi-

ate result that Great Britain and France withdrew from Greece their moral and material support.

Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal reorganized his forces with the financial and military help of the French, Italian, and Soviet Governments, and was obviously in good form to attack the Greek positions around Eski-Shehir.

In the ensuing battle in January 1921, Constantine's armies suffered a serious setback, but the Kemalists were not strong enough to break the enemy front.

In the hastily summoned London Conference, on February 21, 1921, the Greek Government rejected the Allied proposal for revision of the Treaty of Sevres. The Turks were unyielding regarding the Allied offer for the appointment of a Christian Governor for Smyrna.

The vigorous Greek offensive on the Kemalists in the summer of 1921 achieved very little, but the King's armies succeeded in maintaining the front covering Eski-Shehir.

* * *

France and Italy Woo Kemal

At the London Conference (February 21 — March 14, 1921) the Allies offered to revise the Treaty of Sevres, and to make the following changes:— The Allies would be prepared to facilitate Turkey's entry into the League of Nations if proof were forthcoming of Turkey's readiness to execute the Treaty as now modified; they would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty the threat at present held over Turkey that she might in certain eventualities be expelled from Constantinople; they would be prepared to concede to the Porte the Chairmanship of the Straits Commission wherein Turkey, moreover, would have two votes in-

stead of one as hitherto proposed; they would consent to the rapid evacuation of Constantinople, and to limiting the Allied occupation to Gallipoli and Chanak; in regard to Kurdistan, the Allies would be prepared to consider modifying the Treaty so as to conform more neatly with the present facts of the situation, but on condition that facilities be granted for local home-rule and adequate protection of Kurdish and Assyro-Chaldean interests; while the vilayet of Smyrna would remain under Turkish sovereignty.

In regard to Armenia, the present stipulations might be acceptable on condition that Turkey recognize the right of Turkish Armenians to a National Home on the eastern frontiers of Turkey-in-Asia, and agree to accept the decision of a commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to study on the spot the amount of territory that should equitably be transferred to Armenia.

These proposals were rejected by the two belligerents almost in toto. While they were being drawn up on British initiative and submitted to Greece and Turkey on behalf of the Allies, the French and the Italians, who were noticeably disturbed by the Greek military successes in Anatolia and by Lloyd George's unfriendly attitude towards the Turks, held secret negotiations with the Kemalist delegates and sought to lay the ground for an understanding with Mustafa Kemal. These independent actions on the part of the two Allies were directly in the face of the terms of the London Declaration of September 5, 1914, whereby Britain, France and Russia had undertaken to conclude no separate peace with the enemy. Italy was made a party to this agreement in 1915.

The Italian pact was signed in London March 12, 1921, between Count Sforza and Bekir Samy Bey, and

formally presented to the Italian Chamber of Deputies on April 7. Under the terms thereof, Turkey agreed to grant Italy economic concessions in Adalia, Moughla, Bourdour, Sparta, Afion Karahissar, Keutahia and Heraclea, while Italy pledged herself "to give effective support, in her relations with her Allies, to all demands of the Turkish Delegation regarding the Peace Treaty, and especially to the restoration of Smyrna and Thrace to Turkey."

The draft agreement entered into by France and Turkey was signed, on March 12, by the French Premier Briand, and by Bekir Samy acting in the name of the Turkish National Government. It provided for the evacuation of Cilicia, the fixing of boundaries between Turkey and Syria, and the transfer by Turkey of important railway concessions to French interests. The Pact underwent some minor changes during subsequent negotiations, and was formally signed at Ankara on October 20, 1921, by Yussuf Kemal Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister and by Henri Franklin-Bouillon, the Plenipotentiary of France.

The British Government took vigorous exception to the French action which was tantamount to the conclusion of a separate peace with Turkey. The Franco-Turkish Pact not only violated the Treaty of Sevres, but it also endangered British oil interests on former Turkish territory, interests established by the San Remo Agreement signed between Great Britain and France on April 24, 1920.

Briand's assurances, that the Pact implied no more than "a local arrangement" (*une tractation locale*), that Franklin-Bouillon's trips were "entirely of a private nature," and that the French Government never intended to conclude a separate peace with

Kemal without first consulting the British Government, did not quiet Lord Curzon's fears. The French stubbornly maintained that the Pact was "concluded with a Power which is neither recognized *de jure* nor *de facto*, but which has manifested a degree of authority, patriotism and loyalty, sufficient to warrant the opinion that it is capable of keeping and executing the obligations which it has assumed" (27). It was also pointed out that the Treaty of Sevres was not an operative Treaty as it had not yet been ratified by the Allies.

After months of bitter controversy, Anglo-French solidarity on the Turkish question was restored, at least outwardly, through French reassurances "that the Ankara Agreement would be adjusted to fit the final general settlement" (28).

Notwithstanding this pledge, France continued throughout 1921 to make a strong bid for economic and political ascendancy in Turkey, and supplied Mustafa Kemal with appreciable quantities of war material which were to enable him, during the following summer, to expel the Greek armies from the Anatolian mainland.

* * *

Our somewhat lengthy survey of Turkish affairs is warranted by the fact that the Kemalist rising and the diplomatic dog-fight between the Allies had a vital effect not only on the Turkish settlement and the destiny of the Treaty of Sevres, but also on the Armenian problem as a whole. The double-dealing of the French and Italian Governments on the one hand, and the vacillating policy of the British Government, on the other, simply paved the way for the Allies' ignominious capitulation at Lausanne in 1923.

Had Allied harmony been preserved between 1918-

1922 and the Turkish problem handled with the necessary vigor, the Nationalist movement would have been nipped in the bud, the Soviets would have been prevented from joining up with the Turks, and the Armenian question would have found a just and equitable solution.

In 1921 and — as will be shown — in 1923, economic interests were rated above moral and humanitarian considerations.

CHAPTER XII.

SOVIETIZATION OF ARMENIA

Mustafa Kemal, in 1920, redoubled his efforts to reorganize his widely scattered and ill-equipped forces and build up a modern army for the purpose of expelling the "Infidels" from Anatolia and Constantinople, and gaining full control of his country. To succeed in this ambitious aim, however, it was imperative that he secure the friendship of his immediate neighbor. As early as 1919, he was awake to the unbounded opportunities that Soviet Russia offered in this respect. He felt somehow confident that Lenin would not reject the idea of close co-operation between their two countries. Were not Russia and Turkey fighting a common enemy — the British? Was not Great Britain playing a leading role in the counter-revolution by sending large supplies of munitions to the White-Russian Generals?

Nor was Kemal too optimistic in his calculations. Lenin was indeed eager to co-operate with the Kemalists and take part in their struggle of liberation from "British Imperialism." Turkey was a Mohammedan country. By bolstering her up he might win over to his cause the entire Islamic world, and administer a

shattering blow to the integrity of the British Empire. It was a gamble, but one certainly worth trying.

* * *

Soon after the armistice of 1918, Moscow had become the center of feverish anti-British activity. Some prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress had gone to Baku where they were engaged in subversive propaganda work among the Mohammedans, keeping in line at the same time with the preachings and sinister methods of the Bolsheviks. Tentative negotiations had already begun in Moscow, and the stage set for an understanding which during the ensuing months grew into a cordial alliance between Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey. Lenin had promised Kemal moral and material assistance, and complete harmony existed between the two leaders as to their mutual line of policy.

“The delay on the part of the victorious Allies to impose on Turkey, after the armistice of Mudros, that peace, severe but just, which Turkey expected and then was ready to accept, the proposal to deprive the Turks not only of Constantinople but of Smyrna and its hinterland, the Greek adventure in Asia Minor, the disunion among the Allies, all these factors contributed to create at the end of the War a feeling of Islamic sympathy with Turkey more genuine and considerably more intense than the call to the *jihad* had been able to do at its outset. And this feeling was powerfully fostered by a new element which first appeared on the scene at the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks. While civil war was still raging in Russia and the Allied Powers were supporting the ‘White’ Russians in their struggle with the ‘Reds’, the Bolsheviks worked tirelessly and skillfully to keep the feeling alive and to direct it into anti-Entente channels.” (29)

So it came about that Lenin, in September 1920, summoned an Oriental Congress, at Baku, which was attended by the delegates of all Islamic countries, including Kemalist Turkey. The Congress was to pave the way for "community of action between Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey." The Islamic world was to fight against British imperialism, under the red banner of the Bolsheviks — "the defenders of the Mohammedan Faith."

The first step to be taken in this direction, according to Zinoviev, the Red President of the Congress, was to repudiate the Treaty of Sevres which Turkey had been forced to sign with the Allies a month earlier. To gratify this ambition, the Congress found it of the utmost importance to get the Armenian Republic — "that British outpost in the Caucasus" — out of the way and go to Kemal's rescue.

It must be pointed out that simultaneously with the outbreak in Anatolia of the Kemalist rising, Lenin's cohorts were engineering disturbances in Armenia. A handful of Armenian Communists from their headquarters at Baku were plotting against their own Government at a time when the reconstruction of the Republic was slowly getting into its stride. Lies, slander, malicious propaganda and conspiracy were the chosen weapons these opportunists used to undermine the National (Dashnak) Government of Erivan. In May 1920, serious disturbances instigated by Moscow had occurred in various parts of Armenia, but the Government had succeeded in suppressing the movement before it grew into a widespread revolution against the Democratic regime of the Dashnaks.

On the 20th of the same month, an Armenian delegation headed by the great scholar, Leon Chanth, had gone to Moscow to bring about an understanding

with the Soviet Government. An agreement had already been drafted — the Soviet Government was to recognize the independence of Armenia and to accept the principle of Armenian annexation of the provinces to Turkish Armenia; it was not to interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic.

The treaty was, however, never signed, the Armenian Bolsheviks — among them Anastas Mikoyan, a present member of the Politbureau — having successfully persuaded the Foreign Commissar, Chicherin, to prolong the negotiations in Erivan, through a reliable representative in the Armenian capital.

At this juncture, it is important to emphasize the historical fact that Lenin, the “liberator” of Russia’s workers and peasants, was double-crossing the Armenians. On the one hand, he was negotiating with an Armenian delegation, on the other, he was hobnobbing with the emissaries of Mustafa Kemal. This perfidious strategy found repetition nineteen years later in August 1939, when Stalin, behind the walls of the Kremlin, was “talking things over” simultaneously with Mr. (now Sir) William Strang, of the British Foreign Office, and with Ribbentrop, Hitler’s Foreign Secretary.

In the late summer 1920, events came to a head. By a secret agreement concluded in August between Turkey and Russia, the latter ‘ceded’ to Mustafa Kemal the Armenian districts of Kars and Ardahan. Meanwhile, Bolshevik formations were converging on Armenia from the north and the south. During the first encounters the Armenians achieved a notable success at Zangezour, but subsequently, under heavy pressure, they were forced to abandon the districts, enabling the Bolsheviks to join the Turks at Nachichevan.

On September 23, a Turkish army under the command of Kiazim Kara Bekir unleashed a treacherous onslaught against Armenia. The Armenian Bolsheviks received the "good tidings" gleefully. "Our Turkish brothers are coming to liberate the fatherland from the Dashnaks" they proclaimed to the workers and peasants of Armenia.

Three weeks later, Moscow presented an ultimatum to the Armenian Government at Erivan. Armenia was to renounce the Treaty of Sevres; she was to give the Red Army free passage into Turkey, and to accept the Soviet Government as arbitrator in the territorial dispute between Turkey and herself.

The National Government of Armenia peremptorily rejected these demands and mobilized its armed forces. The very existence of the people was at stake; the Turco-Bolshevik alliance threatened their country and its freedom, which must be defended at all costs.

At this grimmest hour of the Republic's history, the Armenians dauntlessly went forth into battle. They braced every nerve to drive the enemy out, in the east and in the west. Their magnificent resistance was however, robbed of final victory. The combined military might of two perfidious adversaries overwhelmed them. On October 30, the Turks captured the fortress of Kars. During November, they harassed the Armenian columns, and by the end of the month, were threatening the capital of the Republic. The Bolshevik detachments were closing in from the north and southeast.

Pressed to the limit of endurance, and hopelessly cut off from any effective assistance on the part of the Western Allies, the Armenians fell before Soviet and Turkish treachery.

Upon the Armenian defeat, the Bolsheviks welcomed the opportunity afforded them to proceed with the speedy Sovietization of Armenia. Legran, the Russian representative, had arrived in Erivan with his retinue of Armenian and Azerbaijanian Communists, ostensibly to continue the May negotiations on the basis of Armenian independence, but his real mission, was to overthrow, with the help of Armenian renegades, the democracy of the young Republic and force its Government to allow the Soviet order into Armenia.

The vital question before the National Government in this dark hour was the kind of "peace" Turkey might offer Armenia. Would Moscow be prepared to mediate between Turkey and Armenia? Would Lenin appeal to Mustafa Kemal for moderation? Would the Soviet Government defend Armenia's independence?

Any faint hope the Armenian Government may have entertained along these lines vanished on November 29, when the Bolshevik emissary at Erivan gave notice, in the form of an ultimatum, that an Armenian Revolutionary Committee had already set foot on Armenian soil, and that the Government of the Dashnaks would be well-advised to accept without further delay, the establishment of the Soviet regime in Armenia. Simultaneously, the Turks likewise presented an ultimatum, laying down very harsh terms and threatening to "march in" if the latter were not accepted within twenty-four hours.

Events reached a climax on December 2, when at Alexandropol (now Leninakan) the Armenians at the point of Kemal's guns — and yataghans — were forced to sign a peace treaty with him, "renouncing" the

Treaty of Sevres, and ceding to Turkey large tracts of Armenian territory.

The very same day, another agreement was signed at Erivan between the Soviet representative and the Armenian Government by the terms of which Armenia was absorbed within the Soviet Union, the latter solemnly pledging itself to respect the independence of Armenia and ensure her boundaries. The new Government, it was promised, would exonerate from all responsibility the leading members and the officials of the outgoing administration.

The Dashnak Government, relying upon these solemn assurances, withdrew in favor of a junta appointed by Moscow.

* * *

What Soviet perfidy brought in its wake is described by no less an authority than Ambassador James W. Gerard, a faithful friend of the Armenian people.

“Russia failed to fulfill her promise, which was apparently designed to oust the legitimate Government. Thereupon, the agents of Bolshevik Russia set up a reign of terror. They murdered, in the most brutal fashion, a score of Armenian leaders, and interned 2300 others. They invited, ostensibly for a conference, the 1600 officers of the Armenian Army to the Parliament Building, and exiled them, by forced marches, to the four corners of Russia — many falling by the wayside. They confiscated the already meager supply of food, and sent it to Russia, leaving the Armenians to starve. At the same time, her co-conspirators, the Turks, slaughtered (according to a subsequent report by a competent Commission) 30,000 men, women, and children in the districts of Kars and Alex-

andropol, laid waste 140 towns and hamlets, and committed the usual Turkish atrocities of nameless nature

“...On February 18, 1921, two months after the Bolshevik invasion of Armenia, the people goaded to despair, rebelled and drove the Bolsheviks out, and rescued 3000 Armenian leaders, whose execution was set for the following day. But a month later, a Bolshevik Army, after hard fighting, reconquered the capital, and four months thereafter, completed the subjugation of the entire country.

“Then, on March 16, 1921, the Bolsheviks entered into a Treaty with Kemal, whereby they ceded to Turkey a part of the Armenian Republic; two other parts to Azerbaijan, and the remainder, labelled ‘Soviet Armenia’, they annexed to Russia. They also repudiated the Wilson award to Armenia, and proclaimed that Armenia had no case against Turkey.” (30)

* * *

On December 31, 1917, Lenin and Trotsky presented to the National Constituent Assembly a document termed a “Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Peoples.” Section 2 of Clause 3 of this high-sounding Bolshevik rescript, reads:

“For this purpose (free self-determination of nations, J. M.) the Constituent Assembly declares its complete separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which furthers the well-being of the exploiters in a few selected nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling peoples of the colonies and the small nations generally. The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of People’s Commissioners in giving complete independence to Finland, in beginning the withdrawal

of troops from Persia, and in declaring for Armenia the right of self-determination."

Just what this hypocritical plea for self-determination really meant in the Bolshevik vocabulary is revealed to the thoughtful reader in the foregoing pages.

That the Soviets, in 1920, were just as brutal in their policy, violent in their methods, and cynical in their pronouncements as they are today, can hardly be refuted.

Lenin saw nothing dishonorable or inhuman in his fraternizing with Mustafa Kemal and in his treacherous onslaught against the "Toiling people" of Armenia. Stalin kept up the tradition when, in August 1939, he struck a pact with the Madman of Berchtesgaden, and stabbed Poland in the back.

For thirty long years Armenia has never been given a fair chance to choose her own government and her own way of life, for the obvious reason that Communist ideology is irreconcilably opposed to the freedom of small peoples. This, in contrast with the pledge embodied in Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution (1936) to the effect that to each Republic is reserved the right to secede from the Soviet Union.

Stalin's Armenian apologists (fortunately few in number and with little influence) who extol the Soviet system and its accompanying evils, would do well not to overlook these basic facts.

* * *

The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, to which reference has been made, provided for a Russian pledge "to take all steps necessary to secure the recognition by the Transcaucasian Republics. . . of such stipulations of the present treaty as relate directly to them." (article 15).

Consequently, on October 13, 1921, a complementary treaty identical in its essentials with the earlier document, was signed at Kars between the Kemalist Government and the Governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. By this instrument, the three Republics agreed:— not to “recognize any international act concerning Turkey which is not recognized by the National Government of Turkey”; nor “any international act concerning Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which is not recognized by the Governments of these respective countries.” They also agreed that Nakhichevan constituted an “autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan.”

These two treaties reduced Armenia’s territories from 29,000 to 11,580 squares miles. The Armenian problem had, through Comrade Lenin’s “magnanimity,” found its “just and equitable solution” as far as Turkey, the Soviet Government, and the latter’s Armenian apologists were concerned.

But not so for the Armenian people at large, nor for the Armenian Revolutionary Federation whose leading members had, by the end of 1921, found refuge in free and friendly lands to continue the nation’s struggle of emancipation from the Communist scourge.

CHAPTER XIII.

CAPITULATION AT LAUSANNE

The liquidation, by the sword, of the "British outpost in the Caucasus" having been achieved on the slopes of Ararat, the Turco-Bolshevik coalition had now to "shatter" British Imperialism on the Western shores of Anatolia.

By the spring of 1921, uninterrupted land communications were established between Soviet Russia and Turkey. Kemal could now rely upon a constant supply of war materials across the Russian border. Nor was the Soviet Government slow in showing itself ready to strengthen Kemal's armed forces and to replenish with gold his depleted treasury. Kemal had gained absolute control in Anatolia, and Turkey's destiny, for all practical purposes was in the hands of the Grand National Assembly of Ankara. Kemal's leadership and authority were unchallenged. His adherents were increasing daily, and men of influence were constantly rallying to his cause. On the Bosphorus, the Sultan's Government presented a melancholy picture. France and Italy were effectively supporting the Nationalists; Armenia was broken "beyond

repair"; Venizelos had gone into retirement; the Greek armies were almost encircled in Western Anatolia unable to make a move eastwards, and the Franco-British dog-fight over Turkey and the Near East was raging unabated.

This was more than Mustafa Kemal could have wished for.

On August 10, 1921, the Supreme Council announced its "strict neutrality" in the Greco-Turkish struggle. Five months later, in January 1922, at the Cannes Conference, Lloyd George warned the Greeks that "British feeling for Greece, while fundamentally unchanged, had lost something of its fervor as a result of the return to power of King Constantine. In these circumstances they could expect no active assistance from Great Britain if they decided to renew the war against Turkey". (31)

On March 7, Lord Reading, the Viceroy of India, "perturbed by the threat of renewed Moslem unrest" urged the Allies to evacuate Constantinople, accept Turkish suzerainty in the Holy Places, and restore to Turkey Smyrna and Thrace.

This was a serious warning to be reckoned with, and indicated the urgent necessity for the Allies of ending the campaign in Anatolia by compromise. They were confronted with other troublesome issues in Europe, and could not spare any further time or effort.

On March 27, Lord Curzon, Poincare, and Schanzer met at Paris and drafted a new set of peace terms. The Turks were to be re-established "in the areas which may fairly be regarded as their own, with the historic and renowned capital of Constantinople as the center, and with such powers as may enable them to renew a vigorous and independent national existence"

(32). In other words, Turkey would be allowed to retain the whole of Anatolia stretching from the borders of Transcaucasia, Persia, and Mesopotamia to the shores of the Aegean. **The four provinces assigned by President Wilson to Armenia in 1920 were to be incorporated within the Turkish dominions.**

These terms were formally presented to the belligerents. The Turks, on April 5, insisted on guarantees against a renewal of the Greek offensive, while the Greeks "informed the Powers that occupation of Constantinople by Greek troops was the only means of imposing peace on Turkey". (33)

Obviously no decision would be reached without the use of force.

On August 26, 1922, Mustafa Kemal unleashed his armies against the Greeks along the entire front on the Sakaria River, routed King Constantine's columns in utter defeat, and on September 9, triumphantly entered Smyrna. The city was set on fire by the Turkish mob and soldiery, and thousands of Greeks and Armenians were massacred. The Allies stood by complacently, while Lenin was jubilant behind his sinister Kremlin walls.

"In the glare of the fire," writes Harold C. Armstrong, the author of *Grey Wolf*, "the harbor showed full of corpses bobbing in the waves, and beyond that, red also in the glare, lay the battleships of Europe. 'It is a sign,' said Kemal — pointing to the fire — 'a sign that Turkey is purged of the traitors. . .and that Turkey is for the Turks'". (34)

* * *

The sweeping victory of the Kemalists had exposed the zone of the Dardanelles and the city of Constantinople to imminent danger. The military situa-

tion of the Allied forces was untenable; would the Allies agree on a common plan of action to repulse the Turks? France and Italy were loath to embark on such a perilous adventure. Great Britain, war-weary, was not in a position to stem the Turkish advance single-handed.

Consequently, on September 23, 1922, an urgent appeal was made to Mustafa Kemal to send his representatives to a Conference where a Peace Treaty would be negotiated on the following basis: Eastern Thrace to be restored to Turkey; the Allies to withdraw their troops from Constantinople; freedom of the Straits to be assured; religious and racial minorities to be protected; Turkey to be admitted to the League of Nations; neutral zones to be established during the peace negotiations, and Turkey to send no troops into Thrace until after the complete withdrawal of the Greeks.

An Armistice was signed at Mudania on October 11, 1922, along the lines proposed by the Great Powers, and hostilities between Turkey and Greece ceased on that day.

Then followed the Peace Conference at Lausanne, in two stages: the first, from November 20, 1922 to February 4, 1923; the second, from April 23, 1923 to July 24, 1923.

On the protracted and laborious proceedings of these dual Conferences we will not dwell long. It need only be recalled that the Turks sauntered into the Conference Hall in a mood of confident defiance. They were in a strong strategic position and had gained considerable political prestige, and on this vantage ground they found themselves for the first time in two hundred years in the lofty position of defying the Powers and dictating to them their own terms.

This they did to their great satisfaction. The Allies, utterly incapable of solidarity and determination in dealing with Turkey, shamefully surrendered to her on almost every essential point, and on July 24, 1923, affixed their signatures to the Treaty of Lausanne. They had blundered egregiously. Through lack of vision, they had forfeited not only rights, but also honor. They had fulfilled none of their pledges. At the eleventh hour, they deserted the Armenian people on whom both in peace-time and war-time they had showered such glittering promises, and let the Turks come out of the struggle with astounding impunity. To the Great Powers the welfare of a small yet gallant people was obviously of lesser import than the economic gains they might secure from a regenerated Turkey. This is a melancholy but inescapable reflection.

At Lausanne, the Powers signed not a treaty, but a humiliating capitulation, and by their folly reduced the Treaty of Sevres to a "scrap of paper." The Armenians were left completely in the lurch with nothing whatever to rely on, to protect their trampled rights, but the "deep concern" and touching "sympathy" of their friends throughout the world — just as was the case during the period of the massacres. The Lausanne Treaty contained not a single line concerning the Armenians, and, needless to recall, no reference at all was made therein with regard to the creation of a National Home — a plan suggested by Great Britain during the London Conference of March 1921, and adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the League of Nations on September 22, 1921.

In 1914, when Turkey took the hazardous step of throwing in her lot with the Central Powers, she

unwittingly offered the Allies their much sought-for opportunity to solve the Turkish problem effectively and permanently. In 1918, she was so completely defeated and prostrate that any kind of treaty might have been imposed on her. When Great Britain, the principal actor in the Turkish drama, awoke to realize this fact in 1919, it was too late — Mustafa Kemal had gone to Eastern Anatolia, and cowardice had already begun to play havoc with the unity of the Allies.

“In January 1919 the solution of the Turkish problem in relation to France and England was regarded by the statesmen of both countries as a matter of minor importance. Two years later a tornado which swallowed Asia Minor in fire and slaughter (and) destroyed the coalition of the Entente. . . . There is no question that the Allied statesmen failed to attribute at the beginning of 1919 the importance to the Turkish question that it later acquired. There were busy with their European peace terms, their Wilsonian dreams, and their imperialistic ambitions. Turkey had never been looked on as capable of resistance to Western demands, and her importance to the Allies during the War had been her relationship to the menace of Russia through the Straits, on the one hand, and the alarming expansion of Germany, as symbolized by the Berlin-Baghdad railway, on the other hand. Both these factors of disturbance had disappeared in 1919. Russia was completely absorbed in her own troubles and both Germany and Austria were incapable of further Near Eastern adventures. . . . In 1919, it was not believed. . . that Russia would be in any immediate position to exert any influence upon the Turkish settlement. Then, too, Woodrow Wilson’s assurances that he would, by the idealistic force of his nature, persuade

the United States to assume tremendous responsibilities somewhere in the Near East, served to lull the Allies into a sense of false security." (35)

The net result of the Lausanne tragedy was not the shattering of the British Empire the Soviets had boastfully proclaimed in early twenties, but the sordid betrayal of the Armenian people through the complacency of the British, the defection of France and Italy, and the cowardice of the Bolsheviks.

Another result was the later union in unholy wedlock of the Soviets and the Turks.

We are told that Mr. Lloyd George in turning over the pages of the shameful Treaty of Lausanne, muttered — "These Turks, these cut-throats and barbarians. . ."

It was his swan song.

POSTSCRIPT

Looking back over the period we have traversed, some outstanding phenomena strike the eye: first, the inconsistency of the Powers in their dealings with the Sultan and his successors; second, the virulent antagonism rife among them between 1878 and 1923, over the settlement of the Turkish and Armenian problems; third, their utter inability or reluctance to impose on Turkey, while there was time, plans for introducing reforms in Armenia, and finally, their wanton desertion of the Armenian people in 1923.

The initial cause of the tragedy of Armenia may indeed be ascribed to the disastrous alteration made in the Treaty of San Stefano. This original sin on the part of the Powers might, however, have been remedied in the course of the ensuing decades had not Great Britain and France, the chief actors in the Near Eastern drama, swerved from their determination to settle the Armenian question in a spirit of justice, and had not rivalry between them in the Levant intervened in the early twenties to warp their judgment.

The Armenian question would have been permanently solved by means of the Treaty of Sevres if the Powers, in 1920, had exerted their moral and material strength and shown any willingness to redeem their pledges — and their honor. The magnitude of their errors is commensurate only with the agony of the Armenian people.

Almost immediately after the triumphant exit of the Turks from the Lausanne Conference, the Armenian problem, which had entered the international domain by virtue of the Treaties of Berlin and Sevres, ceased so far as the Powers were concerned to be a far-reaching issue, and was reduced to the sombre insignificance of a "Refugee Problem" and as such relegated to the care of the Humanitarian and Social Organization of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, the Powers lost no time in seeking to fraternize with Turkey and to strengthen her political, economic, and military status through treaties and agreements. All that had been uttered for sixty years about the "unspeakable" Turk and his turpitude disappeared into thin air almost as fast as the solemn promises that had been given to the Armenians. In 1923 the Turk was proclaimed the "gentleman of the East," a gentleman however whose hands were drenched with the blood of Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Nestorians, Maronites, Serbs, Macedonians, Kurds, Arabs, and Albanians.

* * *

On December 17, 1925, the Soviet Union concluded with Turkey a Treaty of Friendship which provided for neutrality in case of aggression by a third party or parties against either signatory. It was renewed for five years in 1930, supplemented by a Protocol on October 30, 1931, prolonged again on November 7, 1935, for ten years, and was finally abrogated by the Soviet Government on March 19, 1945. The Turco-Soviet idyll lasted uninterruptedly for twenty years — from 1920 to 1940 — and did much to bolster up Turkey's position and prestige in the Near East.

The Treaty of Ankara signed on June 6, 1926, by

Great Britain and Turkey appreciably improved the strained relations between the two countries and paved the way for their remarkable cordiality in later years. There was a growing tendency in England during the thirties to lay stress on the community of interests existing between Great Britain and Turkey and on the "naturalness" of their friendship. One is tempted to deduce that British indignation over the Turkish atrocities was not so "natural."

In 1932, Great Britain warmly sponsored Turkey's admission to the League of Nations, evidently to forestall the danger of the Soviet Union directing the foreign policy of Turkey outside the pale of the League.

In 1936, Turkey scored another victory. On July 20, at Montreux, the Powers agreed to place in her hands the control of the Straits and authorized her to fortify and garrison them.

Anglo-Turkish friendship was further strengthened by the three Credits Agreements signed in London on May 27, 1938. Great Britain granted Turkey a credit of 16 millions sterling, while Turkey agreed to "buy British."

On May 12, 1939, five weeks after the Italian invasion of Albania (April 7), Mr. Chamberlain made the following statement in the House of Commons: "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government have entered into close consultations, and the discussions which have taken place between them, and which are still continuing, have revealed their customary identity of view. . . . Pending the completion of the definitive agreement His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government declare that in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area they would

be prepared to co-operate effectively and to lend each other all the aid and assistance in their power."

The Prime Minister's statement was followed on June 23 by a similar declaration by the French Government who ceded to Turkey the Sanjak of Alexandretta in the north-west of Syria, despite the wishes of the non-Muslim minorities of the district — including Armenians.

These declarations paved the way for the formal Treaty of Alliance signed on October 19, 1939 at Ankara between the British and French Governments on the one hand and the Turkish Government on the other. The Protocol of the Treaty provided for a Franco-British loan to Turkey of 25,000,000 sterling.

During the war a considerable quantity of war materials was supplied to Turkey by Great Britain as a precautionary measure against a German attack on Turkey.

Throughout the conflict, Turkey adroitly took refuge behind a policy of non-belligerency and maintained friendly intercourse with the Allies and with Germany. When on February 23, 1945, that is, after the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, she declared war on Germany, Hitler's crushing defeat was almost an accomplished fact.

To-day, Turco-Soviet relations are strained; their bond of friendship is broken, and the Soviet Government is insisting on the revision of the Montreux Convention relative to the Straits.

Turkey, however, is none the worse for this. The loss of moral and material support from the Russians is offset by the generous grants she now receives from the United States under the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947. She is on surer ground and stronger than ever before.

So by the tragic irony of fate "the sick man of Europe" was gradually raised to the exalted position of the protege of the Powers, completely absolved from her countless sins. On the other hand, the cause of the Armenian people has sunk into oblivion, Armenia's erstwhile friends having made no attempt whatever to tender to her a helping hand.

* * *

As we indite these lines, Armenia is still one of the component parts of the Union of Socalist Soviet Republics, her territory confined to an area of some 11,000 square miles for a population of 1,500,000. Of her historic lands, an area of 40,000 square miles has been seized by Turkey, while another 10,000 square miles are assigned to Soviet Georgia and Soviet Azerbaijan.

It must be readily admitted that Soviet Armenia during the last three decades has made remarkable cultural and industrial progress, and is to-day one of the flourishing regions of the Union. This however is chiefly due, not to the Communist order as is naively claimed by the apologists of Moscow, but to the industry and constructive genius of the Armenian people who would have achieved no less under a democratic system.

Soviet Armenia is not the answer to the aspirations of the Armenian people. Armenia did not shed her blood in order to throw off the Turkish yoke and fall under the grinding terror and tyranny of the Soviet regime.

The Armenians take a genuine pride in the antiquity of their race. They have waged with exemplary courage and fortitude a gigantic struggle against the evil forces of tyrants ,upheld by an unswerving deter-

mination to assert their national and spiritual identity and preserve their heritage. Their survival through fire and sword would have been impossible had they not throughout the centuries displayed the tenacity of purpose inherent in their national character. If their struggle for freedom is not yet crowned with success, the responsibility lies entirely on the shoulders of those who had not the moral stamina to recompense their unflinching loyalty to the ideals of freedom and justice.

The people of Armenia have as much right to sovereign independence as other nations of like stature. They have won this right by their culture and civilization, by their own blood, and by their unparalleled sufferings.

The restoration alone to the Armenians of their historic lands as defined by President Wilson offers no final solution to the Armenian question. It is important to bear in mind that the latter is not merely a territorial issue; it is a question involving the inalienable right to self-determination of a small and ancient people. Territorial aggrandisement is not an end in itself but a means whereby one third of the nation at present scattered to the four winds may return to their homes.

Armenia must be free and independent, free to choose her own government and her own way of life. Communism is not her way of life.

Undaunted by the wickedness of her foes, past and present, and undismayed by the desertion of her friends, Armenia will, under the leadership of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, carry on the struggle for liberation until such time as the glorious sun of freedom will again shine in the skies of the land of Ararat.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker a distinguished Englishman and a member of the British Cabinet, made this retort to the present author in 1939; "Soviet Armenia is yours, what more do you want?"

The answer is: Freedom, independence and our homeland!

THE END

ANNEXE

Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878)

“As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.”

* * *

Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878)

“The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.”

* * *

**The Cyprus Convention signed between Great Britain
and Turkey — (4 June 1878)**

Article One — If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

In return His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later by the two Powers, into the government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories; and in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.

Article Two — The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

In Witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople, the fourth day of June, in the year One thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.

(L.S.) A. H. Layard

(L.S.) Safvet

* * *

The American Democratic and Republican Parties and Armenia

The Democratic National Convention at San Francisco passed, on June 28, 1920, the following resolution regarding Armenia:

“We express our deep and earnest sympathy for the unfortunate people of Armenia, and we believe that our Government, consistent with the Constitution and principles, should render every possible and proper aid to them in their efforts to establish and maintain a Government of their own.”

* * *

The Republican National Convention at Chicago passed, on June 10, 1920, the following resolution regarding the American mandate for Armenia:

“We condemn President Wilson for asking Congress to empower him to accept a mandate for Armenia. The acceptance of such a mandate would throw the United States into the very maelstrom of European quarrels. According to the estimate of Harbord Commission, organized by authority of President Wilson, we should be called upon to send 50,000 Ameri-

can boys to police Armenia, and to expend \$276,000,000 in the first year, and \$756,000,000 in five years. This estimate is made upon the basis that we would have only roving bands to fight, but in case of serious trouble with the Turks or with Russia, a force exceeding 200,000 would be necessary. No more striking illustration can be found of President Wilson's disregard of the lives of American boys or American interests.

* * *

"We deeply sympathize with the people of Armenia and stand ready to help them in all proper ways, but the Republican Party will oppose now and hereafter the acceptance of a mandate for any country in Europe or Asia."

* * *

The Democratic Party and the Treaty of Lausanne

The Democratic National Convention at New York on June 24, 1924, condemned the Treaty of Lausanne in the following resolution:

"We condemn the Lausanne Treaty. It bar-
ters legitimate American rights and betrays
Armenia for the Chester Oil Concessions. We
favor the protection of American rights in
Turkey, and the fulfillment of President Wil-
son's arbitral award respecting Armenia."

* * *

The "National Home" and the League of Nations

The proposal for the creation of a National Home for the Armenians came before the Second Assembly of the League of Nations which adopted, on September 21, 1921, the following resolution:

"Seeing that. . .the Supreme Council, in the revision of the Treaty of Sevres, proposed to make provision for a National Home for the Armenians.

"Seeing further, the probable imminence of a Peace Treaty between Turkey and the Allied Powers at no distant date.

"The Assembly urges the Council to press upon the Supreme Council of the Allies the necessity of making provisions in this Treaty for safeguarding the future of Armenia, and in particular of providing the Armenians with a National Home entirely independent of Turkish rule."

* * *

Treaty of Sevres articles relative to Armenia on pages 90-91.

* * *

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL, REPRESENTING HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

AUGUST 14, 1941

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

FIRST, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

SECOND, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

THIRD, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

FOURTH, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoy-

ment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

FIFTH, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.

SIXTH, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

SEVENTH, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

EIGHTH, they believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practical measures which will lighten for peace-loving nations the crushing burden of armaments.

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


DOCUMENTS

Hatti Sherif of Gulhane (Tranzimat)

	November 3, 1839
Imperial Firman	November 15, 1847
Hatti Humayoun	February 18, 1856
Treaty of Paris	March 30, 1856
Treaty of San Stefano	March 3, 1878
Cyprus Convention	June 4, 1878
Treaty of Berlin	July 13, 1878
First Note on Reforms	June 11, 1879
Second Note on Reforms	September 7, 1880
Sultan's reply	October 3, 1880
British Circular on Reforms	January 12, 1881
Scheme of Reforms	May 11, 1895
Russian Note on Reforms	June 8, 1913
Treaty of Bucharest	August 10, 1913
Scheme of Reforms	February 8, 1914
Turco-German Treaty of Alliance	August 2, 1914
Constantinople Agreement	March 12, 1915
Treaty of London	April 26, 1915
Sykes-Picot Agreement	March 16, 1916
St. Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement	April 17, 1917
Fourteen Points of President Wilson	
	January 8, 1918
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk	March 3, 1918
Text of Mudros Armistice	October 30, 1918
Declaration of Congress of Sivas	September 9, 1919
Turkish National Pact	January 28, 1920
Treaty of Sevres	August 10, 1920

Turco-Italian Pact	March	12, 1921
Treaty of Moscow	March	16, 1921
Treaty of Kars	October	13, 1921
Franco-Turkish Pact	October	20, 1921
Text of Mudania Armistice	October	11, 1922
Treaty of Lausanne	July	24, 1923
Russo-Turkish Agreement	December	17, 1925
Montreux Convention	July	20, 1936
Anglo-Turkish Joint Declaration	May	12, 1939
Franco-Turkish Joint Declaration	June	23, 1939
Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance	October	19, 1939



CHRONOLOGY

1829

September 14 — Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey signed at Adrianople.

1839

November 3 — Hatti Sherif of Gulhaneh (Tanzimat) signed by Sultan Abdul Mejid.

1847

November 15 — A Decree by Sultan Abdul Mejid conferring special rights on the Protestants.

1854

January 17 — The Western Powers declare war on Russia.

1856

February 18 — Hatti Humayoun signed by Sultan Abdul Mejid.

March 30 — Treaty of Peace between Russia, Turkey and the Powers signed in Paris

1876

April 24 — Russia declares war on Turkey.

1878

March 3 — Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey signed at San Stefano.

June 4 — The Cyprus Convention between Great Britain and Turkey signed at Constantinople.

June 13 — Opening of the Peace Conference in Berlin.

July 13 — Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey signed in Berlin.

1879

June 11 — The Great Powers present a Note to the Sultan demanding reforms in Armenia.

October 7 — Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Austria.

1880

September 11 — Second Note on Reforms.

October 3 — Turkish reply on the question of Reforms.

1881

January 12 — A British Circular sent to the Powers on the situation in Armenia.

1894

January 4 — Dual Alliance between France and Russia.

1895

May 11 — A new plan of reforms presented by the Powers to the Sultan.

1896

August 26 — Attack by Armenian Revolutionists on the Ottoman Bank at Constantinople.

1904

April 8 — Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and France signed in Paris.

1905

August 3 — Attempt on the life of Sultan Abdul Hamid.

1907

August 31 — Agreement between Great Britain and Russia signed at St. Petersburg.

1908

- July 23 — Constitution proclaimed in Turkey
 October 5 — Bulgaria declares independence.
 October 6 — Austro-Hungary occupies Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1909

- April 14 — First Armenian massacres in Adana.
 April 19 — Turkey recognizes Bulgarian independence.
 April 27 — Second Armenian massacres in Adana.
 April 27 — Sultan Abdul Hamid deposed.

1911

- September 27 — Italy declares war on Turkey.

1912

- March 13 — Treaty of Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia.
 May 29 — Treaty of Alliance between Bulgaria and Greece.
 October 8 — Montenegro declares war on Turkey.
 October 13 — Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece declare war on Turkey.
 October 18 — Treaty of Peace between Italy and Turkey signed at Ouchy (Switzerland).
 December 3 — Armistice in the First Balkan War.

1913

- February 3 — Resumption of hostilities in the Balkans.
 May 30 — Armistice in the Balkans.
 June 8 — Russia submits scheme of reforms in Armenia.
 July 30 — Balkan Peace Conference opens in Bucharest.

August 10 — Treaty of Peace between Turkey and the Balkan countries signed at Bucharest.

1914

- February 8 — Scheme of reforms in Armenia signed at Constantinople.
- June 28 — Archduke Francis Ferdinand assassinated at Serajevo.
- August 1 — Germany declares war on Russia.
- August 2 — Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Turkey signed in Constantinople.
- August 3 — Germany declares war on France.
- August 4 — Great Britain declares war on Germany.
- August 6 — Austria declares war on Russia.
- August 11 — France declares war on Austria.
- August 12 — Great Britain declares war on Austria.
- August 23 — Japan declares war on Germany.
- October 30 — Turkey at war with Russia.
- November 6 — Great Britain and France declare war on Turkey.
- November 11 — Russia declares war on Turkey .

1915

- March 12 — Constantinople Agreement between Great Britain, France and Russia signed in London.
- April 24 — Turkish police arrests Armenian intellectuals in Constantinople.
- April 25 — Allies land at Gallipoli.
- April 26 — The Treaty of London between Great Britain, France and Russia signed in London.

- April 29 — Turkish atrocities in Van. (Armenia).
- May 23 — Italy declares war on Austria.
- August 21 — Italy declares war on Turkey .
- 1916**
- May 16 — The Sykes-Picot Agreement signed.
- 1917**
- March 15 — The Czar of Russia abdicates.
- April 6 — United States at war with Germany.
- April 17 — The St. Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement signed.
- November 7 — The Bolsheviks seize power in Russia.
- December 15 — Armistice between Germany and Russia.
- December 22 — Opening of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. (The Central Powers and Russia)
- 1918**
- March 1 — Opening of the Peace Conference at Trebizond. (Turkey and Transcaucasia)
- March 3 — Peace Treaty between Germany and Russia signed at Brest-Litovsk.
- May 11 — Opening of Peace Conference at Batoum (Turkey and Transcaucasia)
- May 23-28 — Battles of Sardarabat, Bash Aparan and Kara-Kilisse.
- May 26 — Georgia declares independence.
- May 27 — Azerbaijan declares independence.
- May 28 — Armenia declares independence.
- September 15 — The Turks occupy Baku.
- September 30 — Bulgaria surrenders.
- October 29 — Austro-Hungary surrenders.
- October 30 — Turkey surrenders.

November 11 — Germany surrenders; Armistice; the end of the First World War.

1919

January 18 — Opening of the Peace Conference at Versailles.

February 12 — Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha jointly present Armenia's case to the Supreme Council of the Allies.

February 26 — Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha received in audience by the Council of Ten.

May 15 — Greeks land in Smyrna.

May 19 — Mustafa Kemal arrives at Samson.

1920

January 19 — The Allies grant *de facto* recognition to the Armenian Government.

March 16 — Allies occupy Constantinople.

April 19-26 — Allied Conference at San Remo.

April 23 — The United States recognizes the Armenian Government.

April 26 — The Supreme Council requests President Wilson to define Armenia's boundaries.

April 28 — Sovietization of Azerbaijan.

May 11 — The Allies present to Turkey their peace terms.

May 24 — President Wilson requests the Senate to accept a mandate over Armenia.

June 1 — The U. S. Congress rejects President Wilson's proposal for an American mandate over Armenia.

- June 22 — Greek offensive against the Kemalists.
- August 10 — Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey signed at Sevres.
- September 23 — Turkey attacks Armenia.
- October 30 — The Turks occupy the fortress of Kars.

December 2 — Sovietization of Armenia.

- December 2 — Peace Treaty between Armenia and Turkey signed at Alexandropol.

1921

- February 18 — Revolt in Armenia against the Soviet regime.
- February 21 — Allied Conference in London to revise the Treaty of Sevres.
- February 25 — Sovietization of Georgia.
- March 12 — Secret Agreement between Italy and the Kemalists signed in London.
- March 16 — Secret draft Agreement between France and the Kemalists signed in London.
- March 16 — Treaty of Friendship between Soviet Russia and the Kemalists signed in Moscow.
- July 30 — The Ankara National Assembly ratifies the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921.
- August 10 — The Supreme Council announces its neutrality in the Greco-Turkish war.
- October 13 — Treaty of Friendship between Kemalist Turkey and the Transcaucasian Republics signed at Kars .
- October 20 — Treaty between France and the Kemalists signed at Ankara.

1922

- January 12 — Allied Conference at Cannes.
- March 22 — Allied Foreign Ministers meet in Paris to discuss Greco-Turkish war.
- March 27 — The Allies agree on terms for revision of the Treaty of Sevres.
- August 26 — Kemalist offensive launched.
- September 9 — Kemalists occupy Smyrna.
- October 11 — Armistice signed at Mudania.
- November 20 — First Lausanne Conference opens.

1923

- February 4 — First Lausanne Conference ends.
- April 23 — Second Lausanne Conference opens.
- July 24 — The Peace Treaty between the Allies and Turkey signed at Lausanne.
- August 6 — Treaty of Amity and Commerce between United States and Turkey.
- August 23 — The Turkish National Assembly ratifies the Treaty of Lausanne.

1925

- December 17 — Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union signed in Paris. Renewed in 1930 for five years, in 1935 for ten years. Supplemented by the Protocol of October 30, 1931. Abolished on March 19, 1945.

1926

- June 6 — Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Turkey signed at Ankara.

1934

- February 9 — Pact of Athens signed by Turkey, Roumania, Greece and Yugoslavia.

- 1936**
 July 20 — Convention regarding the Straits signed at Montreux.
- 1937**
 July 8 — Pact between Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq signed at Saa'dabat.
- 1938**
 May 27 — Credits Agreements between Great Britain and Turkey signed in London.
- 1939**
 May 12 — Joint Anglo-Turkish Declaration signed in London.
 June 23 — Joint Franco-Turkish Declaration signed in Paris. The Sanjak of Alexandretta ceded to Turkey.
 August 23 — Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow.
 October 19 — Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, signed at Ankara.
- 1941**
 June 12 — Declaration in London of solidarity of the United Nations.
 August 14 — A Joint declaration signed by President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, known as the Atlantic Charter.
 September 24 — Inter-Allied declaration of adherence to the Atlantic Charter.
- 1942**
 January 1 — United Nations Declaration.
- 1943**
 May 21 — Stalin announces end of the Comintern.
 December 4 — Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin meet at Teheran.

1945

- February 7 — Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin meet at Yalta.
- February 23 — Turkey declares war on Germany and Japan.
- May 7 — Armenian National Committee presents to the San Francisco Conference a memorandum on the Armenian Question.
- May 8 — End of Second World War (V. E. Day).
- May 21 — Memorandum on the Armenian Question presented to the Foreign Ministers of the Allies by the Central Committee of the Armenia Refugees Organization (Paris).
- June 22 — George VI. elected Catholicos of the Armenians.
- July 17 — Truman, Stalin and Churchill (later Attlee) meet at Potsdam.
- September 17 — M. J. Missakian, the London representative of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation presents to the Foreign Ministers' Conference a memorandum on the Armenian Question.
- November 27 — The Supreme Head of the Church of Armenia presents a memorandum to the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow.

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- January 21 — M. J. Missakian, acting on behalf of the Armenian Revolutionary Fed-

- eration presents to the First Assembly of the U.N. a memorandum on the Armenian Question.
- August 10 — U.S.S.R. sends a note to Turkey demanding the revision of the Montreux Convention.

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- March 10 — Memorandum on the Armenian Question presented by the Armenian National Committee to the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow.
- March 12 — President Truman asks Congress for credits for Greece and Turkey. His address is known as the Truman Doctrine.
- Sept. 21-28 — Secret meeting at Warsaw of Communist Parties of nine European countries.
- October 5 — The formation of the Cominform announced.
- October 24 — Vishinsky at United Nations Assembly declares that Kars and Ardahan are Georgian districts.



NOTES

- 1 — *The Making of Modern Turkey*, By Sir Harry Luke, 1936, p. 91.
- 2 — *Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities*, By Rev. Edwin M. Bliss, 1896, p. 243.
- 3 — *Briton and Turk*, By Philip P. Graves, London, 1941, p. 27.
- 4 — *Our Responsibilities For Turkey*, By The Duke of Argyll, London, 1896, pp. 74. 81.
- 5 — *Turkey — Decadence and Rebirth*, By Philip Paneth, London 1943, p. 45.
- 6 — *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, British Blue Book, 1916, p. 624.
- 7 — *Ibid* — p. 624.
- 8 — *Briton and Turk* — By Philip P. Graves, London, 1941, p. 32.
- 9 — *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 626.
- 10 — *These Eventful Years* — London, 1924, J. L. Garvin (and others) Vol. I. p. 39.
- 11 — *Ibid* — p. 40.
- 12 — *Briton and Turk* — By Philip P. Graves, London, 1941, p. 41.
- 13 — *Great Movements in European History* — By Moyses-Bartlett, London, 1940, p. 379.
- 14 — *These Eventful Years* — London, 1924, J. L. Garvin (and others) Vol. I. p. 3.
- 15 — *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 80, 81.
- 16 — *Ibid*, pp. 627-633.
- 17 — *The Memoirs of Naim Bey*, London, 1920, pp. 76-77.
- 18 — *Two War Years in Constantinople*, by Dr. Harry Stuermer, New York, 1917, p. 64.
- 19 — *A Brief History of the Great War* — By Carlton J. H. Hayes, New York, 1921, p. 140.
- 20 — *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* — 1919, Vol. IX pp. 899. 901-2.
- 21 — *Ibid*, — 1920, Vol. III., p. 778.
- 22 — *Ibid*, — 1919, Vol. IV., p. 509.
- 23 — *Ibid*, — 1919, Vol. III., p. 780-1.
- 24 — *Briton and Turk*, — By Philip P. Graves, London, 1941, p. 195.
- 25 — *Grand Turk*, By Wilfred T. F. Castle, London, 1942, p. 109.

- 26 — *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East*, by Henry
- 27 — *Ibid*, p. 147.
- 28 — *Ibid*, p. 161.
- 29 — *The Making of Modern Turkey*, By Sir Harry Luke, London, 1936, p. 160.
- 30 — *The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia*, by the American Committee opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, 1926 pp. 159-160.
- 31 — *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East*, by Henry H. Cumming, London, 1938, p. 164.
- 32 — *Ibid*, p. 168.
- 33 — *Ibid*, p. 169.
- 34 — *Grey Wolf*, By Harold C. Armstrong, London, 1932, p. 203.
- 35 — *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East*, by Henry H. Cumming, London, 1938, pp. 76-77.

